W. R. JONES.
No. 30

Emmanuel Library
Emmanuel School of Religion
Route 6
Johnson City, Tennessee 37601

THE REDEMPTION OF MAN.

FROM THE LIBRARY
OF THE
Rev. T. J. Wheldon, B.A.
PRESENTED BY
Miss & Mr. Glynne Wheldon
NOVEMBER, 1918.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

In crown 8vo, price 4s. 6d.,

THE BIBLE

AN OUTGROWTH OF THEOCRATIC LIFE.

'Will well repay perusal. It contains a great deal of learning as well as ingenuity, and the style is clear.'—*Guardian.*

'A more valuable and suggestive book has not recently come into our hands.'—*British Quarterly Review.*

'The position developed by the author is substantially that the Scriptures are not to be viewed from the standpoint of traditional dogma, but from the historical point of view, as the product of a divinely directed development of Jewish history which had for its end the achievement of a divine revelation, and the building up among men of a divine and spiritual kingdom.'—*New York Independent.*

E. J. Jones

THE REDEMPTION OF MAN.

DISCUSSIONS

BEARING ON

THE ATONEMENT

BY

D. W. SIMON, PH.D. (TÜB.),

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE CONGREGATIONAL THEOLOGICAL HALL, EDINBURGH;

AUTHOR OF "THE BIBLE, AN OUTGROWTH OF THEOCRATIC LIFE;"

CO-TRANSLATOR OF DORNER'S "HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST," ETC. ETC. ETC.

FROM THE LIBRARY
OF THE
Rev. T. J. Wheldon, B.A.
PRESENTED BY
Miss & Mr. Glynne Wheldon.
NOVEMBER, 1918.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.

1889.

LIBRARY
EMMANUEL SCHOOL OF RELIGION
ONE WALKER DRIVE
JOHNSON CITY, TN 37601

Emmanuel Library
Emmanuel School of Religion
Route 6
Johnson City, Tennessee 37601

PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, ... HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.
DUBLIN, ... GEORGE HERBERT.
NEW YORK, ... SCRIBNER AND WELFORD.

IN MEMORY

OF

F. A. G. THOLUCK, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE;

L. SCHÖBERLEIN, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN;

I. A. DORNER, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN:

TO WHOSE

TEACHINGS, EXAMPLE, AND FRIENDSHIP

I OWE A GREATER DEBT

THAN I AM MYSELF ABLE TO ESTIMATE.

25009

Be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh vou a reason of the hope that is in you.—1 PET. iii. 15.

In der christlichen Religion hat Gott sich geoffenbaret, das heisst, er hat dem Menschen zu erkennen gegeben, was er ist, so dass er nicht mehr ein Verschlossenes Geheimes ist ; es ist uns mit dieser Möglichkeit, Gott zu erkennen, die Pflicht dazu auferlegt, und die Entwickelung des denkenden Geistes, welche aus dieser Grundlage der Offenbarung des göttlichen Wesens ausgegangen ist, muss dazu endlich gedeihen, das was dem fühlenden und vorstellenden Geiste zunächst vorgelegt worden, auch mit dem Gedanken zu erfassen.

HEGEL, *Philosophie der Geschichte.*

The truth in God's breast
Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed :
Though He is so bright, and we so dim,
We are made in His image to witness Him.

R. BROWNING, *Christmas Eve.*

I say that man was made to grow, not stop :
That help, he needed once, and needs no more,
Having grown but an inch by, is withdrawn :
For he hath new needs, and new helps to these.
This imports solely, man should mount on each
New height in view : the help whereby he mounts,
The ladder-rung his foot has left, may fall,
Since all things suffer change, save God the Truth.
Man apprehends Him newly at each stage.
Whereat earth's ladder drops, its service done.
. . . . . .
I say the acknowledgment of God in Christ,
Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
All questions in the earth and out of it.
. . . . . .
God's gift was that man should conceive of truth,
And yearn to gain it, catching at mistake
As midway help, till he reach *fact indeed.*

R. BROWNING, *A Death in the Desert.*

PREFACE.

THIS book does not pretend to be a complete treatise on the doctrine of the Atonement. It is simply, as the title-page has it, "Discussions bearing on the Atonement." The subject is rather approached from various points of view, than rigidly and systematically expounded. The Introduction is mainly a series of critical notes, intended partly to explain, somewhat to justify, a classification and description of theories that deviate at points considerably from the one usually adopted. Various matters which ought to be included in a systematic treatment of the subject are left quite untouched. Amongst them, as will perhaps be noticed, is one of the three great problems suggested by Christ's obedience unto death, to which reference is made in the Introduction,—the problem, namely, as to the *modus operandi* of the death of Christ, or how it brought about the forgiveness of sin. With regard to the *fact*, I rejoice to know myself, both on experimental, Biblical, and rational grounds, in agreement with the "Catholic" Church of all times. But faithfulness to the teachings alike of experience, of the Scriptures, and of reason, compels me to differ from many "orthopistic" writers—first, on the *nature* of forgiveness; and secondly, on the *mode* in which forgiveness was brought about.

As I have to some extent criticized the views of others on these two points, it will naturally be thought that I ought to have discussed the latter as well as

the former. If enough interest should be awakened by this volume to make it worth while, it is my intention to do so.

It may perhaps be permitted me to add here a few words on two points which have been alluded to elsewhere, namely, the meaning of "fact" as distinguished from "theory," in connection with the atonement; and the use of the term "orthodox."

It has become in recent years very common, in particular for preachers, to say, "We accept the atonement as a *fact*, though we cannot accept any explanation or *theory* hitherto given of it." Looked at by itself, this is a perfectly legitimate and healthy position. As Dr. Dale has put it in frequently quoted words, "It is not the theory of the death of Christ which constitutes the ground on which sins are forgiven, but the *death itself*." The primary business of the Christian preacher unquestionably is, to "preach Christ, even the crucified One;" that is the kernel of the good news of which he professes to be the witness and messenger; practically considered, the fact *is* the good news. When the good news has done its work, explanation or theorizing on it may, *should* begin; not till then. So far, all is plain sailing; as to this, there is no real disagreement between the narrowly and the broadly dogmatic: apparent disagreements are due to misunderstanding of terms, which, as frequently as not, is as complete on the "broad" side as on the "narrow."

But a difficulty lies in the word "fact:" it is an ambiguous word, or may be used ambiguously,—it may have a broader or narrower, a more or less complete, denotation. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ask for a definition of the fact; to have its marks properly presented. Let me refer to one or two of the many modes of describing it.

What, then, is the fact with which we are concerned? The bare fact, accessible to ordinary people living at Jerusalem, was *the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth*:—is that all? Certainly not. What, then,

if we say, *Jesus, the perfect man, the wisest teacher, the clearest revelation of God, died a witness to truth and goodness?* True, as far as it goes; but inadequate. Is it not, then, stated completely when we add to the last description, *The incarnate Logos, the Son of God, died to commend His own love and the love of God, besides thus exhibiting the evil of sin?* Not yet the whole fact. Suppose we go a step farther, and add: *for the sins of the world*, shall we not have given an adequate description of the fact? Possibly, —possibly not. Even such a definition, full as it is, omits a feature or mark on which He seems to have put special emphasis, *who of all others might be supposed to know whereof He spake.* On one of the most solemn occasions of His earthly life Christ said: *This is my blood, which is shed for the remission of sins.* Judging by the later utterances—varied and emphatic—of the men whom He Himself had trained, and who heard this very expression, what He meant was, that the supreme end of His death was to secure for men the forgiveness of sin. Have we a right to ignore, to leave unmentioned the mark—*for the forgiveness of sins?* Unless, indeed, we resort to the desperate expedient of questioning the accuracy of this part of the report of the Last Supper.

The fact, then, according to Christ and His apostles, is only properly stated if, whilst not omitting the various features successively mentioned above—possibly also others—due emphasis is laid on this—that *Christ shed His blood to the end that sin might be forgiven.* As forgiveness is the foundation of a right relation to God, and through that of new life and blessedness, any Christian Church that does not jealously watch over this part of its faith is either wofully ignorant of its duty, or else unfaithful.

In the statement of the fact just given there is no trace of theory proper. It is true, indeed, that a divine act, *the forgiveness of sin*, is represented as brought about by the *death of Christ;* and that in so far we have gone beyond the mere fact of the

death. *But so do those who find in it a proof of divine love.* What we have to face is the question—Is it a fact that Christ shed His blood or died in order that God might forgive sins? Theory begins when we ask, *How* this took place? *Why* the death of Christ was a necessary condition of divine forgiveness?

The *second* matter to which I wish to refer is the use very frequently made of the term "orthodox." Alike by those who regard themselves as forming the "broad," or "liberal," or "advanced" school of Christian thought, and by those who claim to "stand in the old path," its employment is marked by great looseness. Between the two opposed parties there is, in fact, not a pin to choose as to this particular point.

If "orthodox" be applied to the *faith once delivered to the saints*, to the *credenda*, — in this case to the *credendum* that Christ shed His blood for the remission of sins,—there is such a thing as orthodoxy and a standard of orthodoxy; or rather, as I have elsewhere termed it, *orthopisty*. This is what Paul referred to when he used the words, *Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be* ACCURSED. There is such a thing as a right faith, that is, using faith in its objective sense; there is such a thing as the objects of faith held and presented in their genuine, undiluted, untwisted form. Those who change, diminish, mutilate, misrepresent them, Paul anathematizes.

But if by "orthodoxy" be understood, as is only too frequently the case, a certain right, recognised, "doctrine," systematic formulation or statement, explanation or theory of this *credendum*, there is not now, and there never was any such thing, at all events in Protestantism. There may have been, or even be now, a show of such a thing in the Romish Church. But even if men do no more than go direct to Scripture to learn its teachings—and Scripture alone gives us definite information

on this *credendum*, so that if it is untrustworthy we have no definite knowledge at all about it — the results of their inquiry in the shape of a classification, or formulation, or correlation of the material with which it supplies them will vary: much more will the men differ from each other when they try to think out or explain Scripture teachings. No Protestant theologian has yet existed who was willing just to repeat what his teacher taught him. The Rabbi who boasted that his mind retained and retailed the teachings of his teacher like a cistern absolutely without leak, has had no Protestant imitators. Even a slight reorganization, or rearrangement of the subject-matter, involves changes which render the idea of a fixed standard in this sense absurd.

I have been anxious to acknowledge my indebtedness to all and sundry to whom I am indebted; but it is only too likely that I have sometimes failed. To the following books, which I was early led to study, I owe far more than I am able to acknowledge:—Müller's *Christliche Lehre von der Sünde;* Bähr's *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus;* Dorner's *Geschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi;* Schöberlein's *Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe;* M'Leod Campbell's *Doctrine of the Atonement*, and one or two of F. D. Maurice's works, particularly *The Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament.*

For the index I am indebted and very grateful to my friend and former student, the Rev. J. H. Best, B.Sc., of Hopton, Mirfield. If I mistake not, it will be found to be marked by the accuracy which is sure to characterize any work he undertakes.

Congregational Theological Hall,
George Square, Edinburgh.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

—o—

INTRODUCTION.

If Christ was the Son of God, three special problems suggested by His death, 1 ; not if a mere man. Ambiguity of the terms "Son of God," "Divinity," "Incarnation," 1, 2. The reason : Change of presupposition. Earlier idea (Symbol of Chalcedon), that deity and humanity are disparate ;—modern idea : God and man essentially akin, 3. Inference : man as to his idea being essentially divine ; he who realizes the idea, though only a man, is an incarnation of God : new form of humanitarianism, 4, 5. The three problems involved are—(1.) The *nature* of the passion ; (2.) Its end ; (3.) The *modus operandi*, 6. Wherein all theories agree : where differences arise. Objective-subjective, and subjective or "moral theories," 7–9. I. Objective theories : (I.) Crypto-dualistic, which represent Christ's work as related to a power outside God. 1. Ransom to the devil ; 2. An eternal law. (1.) Dr. R. W. Dale's earlier view, 9–16. (2.) The so-called churchly, orthodox view. Crawford—The Hodges, 16–20. Defence of criticism. Laws and God. Distinction between God as God and God as Ruler. Crawford's concession — Turrettine. Crawford's approach to *acceptilation* theory, 20–23. Orthodox view of *justice* :—Crawford—*Suum cuique*—Justice done to sinners—Does God get His due? *Every lost sinner an eternal loss to God. Jus talionis*—debt—vindication of honour, 23–27. (II.) Personal (objective) or Godward theories. View of personal : Crawford — Burge — Dr. Dale, 27, 28. Mutually complementary. Fear of Anthropopathism—"Claims of justice," 28–30. 1. So much suffering for so much sin — a possible view. 2. Christ a propitiation of divine anger. Significance evacuated. Canon Westcott's view of ἱλασμός, 30–33. Anger real, but ethical : therefore to be ethically propitiated. 3. F. D. Maurice, 33–36. 4. Gess—Dorner. 5. M'Leod Campbell—Newman Smyth, 36–40. 6. Edward White — open to three interpretations, 40–43. II. So-called "moral" theories. (I.) Moral theories in the stricter sense. 1. Dr. John Young, 43–45. 2. The Governmental Theory : (1.) Professor Wace, revealing the real nature of sin, etc., 44–49. (2.) Albert Barnes — New School Presbyterianism, American Congregationalism. (3.) Josiah Gilbert—relates to God solely as Moral Governor. Identical with "moral" view, notwithstanding phrases like "enable God." Use of "law," etc. : tendency to crypto-dualism, 49–54. (II.) Organic or dynamic view. 1. Anselm—not satisfaction of honour (Dorner) ; looks to the cosmos as a whole, 55–58. 2. Bishop Magee—unique, miraculous, supernatural fact. 3. F. W. Robertson—Sin a "world-spirit" on which Christ inflicted a deadly blow. 4. Schleiermacher — men taken up into Christ's life and relation to God through the Church, 58–62. A third great class possible—philosophical : a process ; first, in God Himself (Böhme) ; secondly, in God and the cosmos, including man (Hegel) ; thirdly, in the human mind (Kant). Hegelianization of Christianity—either expressing faith in terms of Hegel, or expressing Hegelian ideas in terms of Christianity. The latter fatal to life, 62–65. The fact of Christ's death for the remission of sins known from New Testament—Lord's Supper. The *rationale* sought by theology. Scientific procedure—if there is a moral order of which God is the supreme factor, 65–68.

CHAPTER I.—THE ATONEMENT AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

I. Christ's earthly mission an episode in the history of the kingdom of God, 69, 70. II. An episode in His relation to the kingdom. III. Intelligible only in the light of the kingdom. IV. In the history of the kingdom there is nothing really exceptional—not even miracles—looked at in the light of the whole plan. V. Christ's language justifies this point of view, 71–75. VI. The kingdom of God—view of it assumed in this work: 1. The universe is the kingdom, 76. 2. The territory its physical part—visible, invisible. 3. The subjects are intelligences,—visible, invisible—the constitution, laws, 76–84. 4. Distinction of *de jure* and *de facto*—true both of visible and invisible world; men *are*, yet must *become*, subjects; this helps to correlate the various allusions in the Old and New Testaments, 84–88. 5. Kingdom of heaven — *de jure* and *de facto* identical. VII. The immediate aim of Christ—salvation; Christ's method new—dawned on highest reformers—reconciliation to God, though not indifferent to men's sufferings, 90–92. VIII. Establishment of normal *relations* Christ's end. Analogy from biology and medicine. Not to make holy, happy, healthy, save as *result*. Justification by faith, 92–96. IX. The kingdom of God never actually existed. The *de facto* never coincided with the *de jure* state save for a brief period. This explains God's treatment, 96, 97.

CHAPTER II.—THE CONSTITUTION OF HUMANITY.

I. Man is an individual — something *sui generis*. Law of differentiation — Dorner's view. Recognised in Scripture. Individuality of man's relation to God and of God's relation to man. Old idea of the relation of individual to nation or society. Still held, 97–101. II. Man an organic whole—macrocosm. 1. Biblical recognition of the fact. Paul and Israel — believers. Underlies the Biblical system, 101–103. 2. General recognition. Mankind unconsciously swayed by it. Yet limited to kindred—stranger a *hostis*. Internationalism. Not yet a complete whole. Dorner's idea of a fixed number of individuals, each of which is necessary. Christ's parable of the vine opposed thereto. Humanity not an agglomeration of atoms, 103–107. 3. Inferences. God and humanity will hold organic or corporate relations. Solidarity not necessary to the multiplication of men. Individuality without organic unity, 107, 108. 4. Influence on doctrine of Christ's work. Hitherto dominated by corporate aspect. Change through the moral view. Now Christ is too exclusively the Saviour of individuals. Both must be combined, 108–110.

CHAPTER III.—RELATIONS OF MAN TO GOD.

I. General considerations as to relations—determined by the nature of the beings related. Abnormal relations. (I.) Uncontrollable and controllable relations. Law used in five senses. Uncontrollable relations involved in the solidarity of the universe. Some beings able to control them, 111–114. (II.) God and man hold to each other both kinds of relations. 1. The uncontrollable relations defined — (1.) Determination, dependence; (2.) Thought of man, sense of God. Indifference impossible, 114–116. 2. The controllable relations. Their law, "God to man as man to God." Christ's injunction to love our enemies. Limits, 116–118. II. Normal or *de jure* individual relations—fixed though violable. Modes of relation—corporeal; intellectual — three functions of which one only is morally pleasing to God; affectional—heart or religious relation, 118–123. Chief stages of normal affectional relation: perfect at each stage, though ever growing. Reverence or fear, trust, love. Natural for man to render these. Right relations begin with respect: On its basis alone trust. Trust in God rooted in creaturehood, 123–127. Love—the ripe blossom—presupposes reverence and trust. Love is confession of need and assertion

that we can give. Man's natural belonging to God not enough, 127–130. III. Normal corporate relations to God. As corporate no self-consciousness. Yet dim feeling after something like corporate consciousness. Experiences in proof—religious, social, national. A περιχώρησις possible, 130–134. (I.) Action through representatives. The principle recognised. How statesmen feel. National life impersonated in them. Scapegoats. Spirit of an age expressed—Dante, Shakespeare, Milton. No *race* representative yet, 134–138. (II.) Nature of the relations. Representatives focus life. Ideal of completeness. True representative realizes it—reverence, etc. Expressed in worship. Israel typical—Moses—David—the law that every Israelite should appear thrice a year—High Priest—his sacrifice. Worship on national occasions—David—Solomon, 138–146.

CHAPTER IV.—HEBREW SIN-OFFERINGS, WITH ETHNIC PARALLELS.

Purpose of the Hebrew organization as a whole. Not an ideal constitution. The Divine Educator no doctrinaire, 147–148. I. The institutions, etc., had three objects. II. No distinction between secular and religious; though all acts not equal. Stress on personal offences. Personal relations fundamental, 148–150. III. Provision for impressing this by sacrifice. Regulated, not originated—Not *de novo* legislation. IV. Dim idea of the same thing in heathenism. Disorder in religion the root of all disorder, 150–153. V. Sacrifices in general. Corbanim — feudal offerings — altar sacrifices proper. Classification fourfold. Two great classes—one to express normal, the other to rectify abnormal, relations. Individual and corporate sacrifices, 153–158. VI. Sin-offerings. (I.) Material. The characteristic marks are—1. Offerer's own property—in a special sense. Ethnic recognition of the principle. Chinese—Hindoos—Greek deities. Sacrificial animals, κατ' ἐξοχήν, among Hindoos. Human victims and solidarity. Apparent exceptions. Various reasons for the Hebrew practice, 158–163. *First*, most natural; *secondly*, within easy reach; *thirdly*, embodied most of offerer's life; *fourthly*, truest sacrifice; *fifthly*, service by common things, 163–166. 2. Approved or prescribed by Jehovah, and rites also. Ethnic recognition of the principle — Delphi — Romans — Twelve Tables — particularity of rules, 166–171. 3. Spotless. So ethnic religions — Egyptians and others. Phœnicians, their mystical sacrifice, 171–176. (II.) Rites observed—1. Hands laid on the head. Similarly elsewhere. Jewish views. Significance—(1.) Offerer's own property; (2.) Rapport; (3.) Consecration, 176–182. 2. Victim slain. Universal custom. Why slain? Various views. Juridical view false. Death the way to life, 183–190. 3. Blood-sprinkling. This rite observed elsewhere. Views taken of its significance. The key thereto, 190–199. 4. Burning of sacrifice. Customary in other religions. Different views of meaning. Its real significance, 199–208. (III.) Function of sin-offerings. Threefold—specially atoning function. 1. Rooted in consciousness of sin. High-handed sin. 2. Designed to atone. The term *Kippēr;* various views. Effect on God. Divine forgetting. Self-forgetting. How the difficulty disappears. The relations between God and man elementary. Conditions of atonement elementary, 208–216.

CHAPTER V.—THE ANGER OF GOD.

The treatment of the subject inconsistent. I. Scripture references: (I.) Old Testament; (II.) New Testament, 216–219. II. Historical notices. Three classes of views: (I.) Anger as a determination of the life of God. (II.) Anger a mere anthropopathism, 219–224. (III.) Anger a factor in God. Böhme, 224–236. III. Doctrinal exposition. The essential element of anger found in God. Four aspects of normal relation to sin distinguishable —each predicated in Scripture of God. 1. Anger as a human phenomenon genetically considered. The primary impulse of living beings. Results. Anger in animals. 2. In man: (1.) Differentiated; (2.) Altruistic resentments; (3.) Moral resentment; (4.) Preservation of integrity. 3. Exact

nature of anger described. Complicated by sin. 4. Anger in God. Its justification found in the integrity of the divine life. Holiness, 236–250. IV. Difficulties. 1. Scripture condemns anger, yet also approves. 2. Inconsistent with divine immutability. 3. With the divine absoluteness. 4. Implies surprise. 5. In man depends on circumstances. 6. God is love, and therefore cannot be angry. Anger not hostility, 250–262.

Chapter VI.—Forgiveness of Sin.

Forgiveness of sin not identical with forgiveness of penalty. Nowhere identified in Bible. I. References in the Old Testament. II. In the New Testament. III. Views taken by Christian writers. (I.) Pre-Reformation writers. (II.) Protestant Confessions, 262–274. (III.) Theologians, 274–285. IV. The Biblical meaning of forgiveness: (I.) Forgiveness and acceptance negative and positive aspects of one act or process. Change of relation—removal of evils follows. (II.) Rationale of the deviation from Bible. Significance of the fact that revivals lead to a re-emphasizing of the personal—anger as well as forgiveness. Externalization of relation of man to God. Remission of penalty more intelligible. Value of personal relations to God not appreciated, 285–291.

Chapter VII.—Passio Christi.

I. The original relation of Christ to humanity. (I.) Scripture hints. All things made by Him—the channel between God and man. (II.) God has ever sought to establish right relations between Himself and man—inward and outward action. Sacrifices. (III.) The Logos the abiding mediator. Light from Israel. His work apparently in vain, 292–300. II. The Logos takes flesh and thus becomes man. The inner needs expression—the acarnate must become incarnate. Inward action went on. Would the incarnation have taken place apart from sin? The Logos the eternally man-like in God—the archetype of man, 300–305. III. The sufferings of the Logos as incarnate: (I.) From limitations. (II.) From His fleshly organism. (III.) Positive bodily sufferings. (IV.) Sympathy with human suffering. (V.) The evil of sin brought home to Him. (VI.) Organic influences from the race. (VII.) Assaults of the powers of darkness. (VIII.) As the very root and life of humanity. (IX.) The contemporaneous divine condemnation, 305–325.

Chapter VIII.—The Passion of Christ the Passion of Man.

I. Links between Christ's work and man according to the New Testament. II. How the result is to be explained. III. The conscious relation of man to Christ explains it in part—what can be seen in Him. IV. The Logos thus living and suffering in the flesh was identical with the Logos within. V. His organic influence. VI. His work complete, yet still being completed—The representative of men—Men rooted in Him—What men thus are, they are to God. Men *are* branches, but can cut themselves off—*c'est le premier pas qui coute*—necessity of faith, 325–341.

Chapter IX.—The Atonement and Prayer: an "Argumentum ad Hominem."

Man dependent on his environment. Functions of environment. Our relations to environment determined by it. So as regards God, its great spiritual factor. Explicitly recognised in prayer. The principle underlying prayer and the atonement identical, 342–347. Prayer defined—two main views:—two aspects of the orthodox view. Atonement defined—two main views. The objective here in question. Prayer for spiritual blessings alone here in question. God helps to fulfil His own law—towards Himself, towards man,

347–352. We fall short of duty. What do? *Prayer for* divine help. God then obeys His own law in our stead, and that obedience becomes ours. A mystery. All help is in its measure such, 352–355. The *Atonement.* New Testament descriptions. Underlying principle is substitution—as in prayer. That it is suffering instead of action makes no difference. Vicarious endurance of penalty easier than vicarious obedience. Objections. Prayers for support in sorrow. No burden-bearing without sense of burden. So-called "moral" view open to same objections, 355–361.

CHAPTER X.—THE HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

A unique phenomenon. I. In what light regarded by contemporaries. (I.) Romans and Greeks. Pilate and his soldiers counted it insignificant: so the higher Roman authorities. Roman writers. Terms used about crucifying as a punishment, 362–368. (II.) Jews. Caiaphas—behaviour on Calvary. (III.) Christ's friends, 368–375. II. Its position in the spiritual history of humanity. (I.) View taken by disciples. Within three months glorying in what had seemed their ruin. (II.) Persuaded numbers of their countrymen. (III.) Paul. (IV.) During the next 250 years accepted by all sorts of men, despite all conceivable opposition, 375–384. (V.) Christianity becomes the religion of the Empire—the cross a part of its labarum. (VI.) Julian the Apostate. 1. No inconsiderable part of human investigation has been since devoted to the death of Christ; oft tabooed, the problem has forced itself ever afresh on attention. 2. Influence on affections, effects on life—missions—crusades—art—philanthropy—Reformation. These are the problems to be solved, 384–394. III. The reason for this influence. Various explanations. Baur's view. Human mind eccentric enough and subject to delusions; but none like this. Keim. One hypothesis alone sufficient—that man needed a propitiation: that Christ's death was the propitiation, 394–403.

NOTES.

		PAGE
I.	The idea of Christ's death as a ransom to the devil. Luther's language,	404–408
II.	Christ and the law according to Luther,	408, 409
III.	Drs. C. and A. A. Hodge's exposition of the theory of the Atonement criticized,	409–417
IV.	Dr. Shedd on Propitiation,	417–419
V.	Mr. Gladstone on the ancient hostility towards strangers,	419, 420
VI.	The personality of societies — Mr. Gladstone, E. Burke, Coleridge,	420–423
VII.	On the law: "I to thee as thou to me,"	423–427
VIII.	Bersier on the heroes of Biblical story,	427
IX.	Carlyle on the naturalness of symbolic representations and grand ceremonial. State Churches,	428, 429
X.	Mactation not originally a special function of the priesthood,	429, 430
XI.	Mozley on representative national sacrifices,	430, 431
XII.	The Talmud on the objective efficacy of sacrifices. Hindoo conception,	431, 432

INTRODUCTION.

IF Christ was the Son of God, His death, with the circumstances by which it was preceded, accompanied, and followed, suggests three special problems :—I say, *if He was the Son of God.* If He were merely a man, it suggests only the problems which are suggested by the death of other men eminent for goodness and insight. And when I use the phrase, "Son of God," I do so in the sense of assigning to Christ an absolutely unique relation to God,—a relation such as never did, and never can belong, save in a purely derivative way, to any mere man; which, in fact, so far as it ever belongs to men at all, belongs to them through Him. He is the eternal, essential Son of God.

I am the more anxious to lay emphasis on this presupposition for two reasons: *first*, because the implicit or explicit denial of Christ's specific divine dignity logically involves and necessarily leads to the denial of His atoning work; and *secondly*, because the words Son of God, Divinity, even Incarnation, are now being a good deal used by a certain School that arrogates to itself the title of "Broad," "Liberal," "Advanced," and so forth, either consciously or

unconsciously, in a very ambiguous way. A few words on the genesis of what is unquestionably a new form of Humanitarianism—Crypto-Humanitarianism one might style it—may perhaps be of service, especially as an appreciation of its genesis will to some extent explain why some whose spiritual instincts are stronger than their logic, naturally fall into it without suspecting the true nature of the step they have taken. These men do not quite know where they are. Those who do, can scarcely rebut the charge of being more or less insincere in their use of the traditional phraseology.

The ambiguities referred to, whether conscious or unconscious, are explainable, at all events in part, by the new presuppositions with which the problem of the person of Christ is at present approached. For centuries the thought of the Church anent the person of Christ has been dominated by the presupposition which determined the form of the Symbol of Chalcedon[1]—a symbol which still more completely expresses the faith of Christendom than any other. It ran—"We teach and confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in deity and the same perfect in humanity; of one substance with the Father according to His deity, and the same of one substance with us according to His humanity; in all things like to us, but without sin; of two natures unmixed, unchanged, unseparated, so that the distinction of the natures is not abolished by the union, the specific nature of each being rather preserved, and concurring into one person and one

[1] Held A.D. 451. See Dorner's *Christology*, vol. ii. 117 ff.

hypostasis; not one Son divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, who is God the Logos and the Lord Jesus Christ."[1]

The presupposition in question was that Deity and Humanity are related to each other disparately, as infinite and finite, unconditioned and conditioned, absolute and relative. This presupposition, as was observed, to a large extent still dominates Christian thought and Christian language, alike scientific and practical. Now, so long as inquiries into the person of Christ started from this presupposition, ambiguities were on the whole impossible. If Christ were not the union of deity and humanity,—though there are, of course, various ways of conceiving the union,—He must have been either deity alone or humanity alone; He could not therefore be spoken of without conscious insincerity as the "Son of God," in a sense which did not separate Him *toto cœlo* from man. Under present circumstances, however, this has become possible.

During the present century, greatly owing to the influence of German thinkers, the Church has come, or is coming, to see that deity and humanity, instead of being essentially disparate, are essentially akin. Attention has been called to that corner-stone of the edifice of Biblical truth, *God made man in His own likeness; in the image and likeness of God made He him.* But if deity and humanity are essentially akin, a new turn is at once given to the problem of the person of Christ. The situation becomes in some respects less difficult than it was, whilst the old point of view was maintained; but the faith is exposed also to new,

[1] Dorner, *l.c.* p. 139 f.

possibly more subtle dangers. In fact, where it was once a question of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, it may very easily and even unwittingly become one of *orthopisty* or *heteropisty*—which is a very different thing.

If deity and humanity are essentially akin, humanity, it would seem, must be essentially divine: humanity, that is, according to its true essential idea; humanity as it should be. Humanity as it now exists, empirical humanity, indeed, is far from being what it should be; there is a great gulf between its idea and the actuality. Rarely in body, still more rarely in intellect, most rarely of all in heart, is any individual man, the man he himself knows he should be, might be—certainly not humanity as a whole. But let man be brought up to the ideal, let him realize the idea of his being, and what should we have? surely an embodiment, nay, an incarnation of God:—the essentially *divine*, to wit, the *true* nature and idea of man would be realized—realized in human form, in a human intellect and heart, in a human life. Yet he who thus manifested and embodied, who thus *infleshed* or incarnated, the essential idea of humanity, would be nothing but a man; he would, in fact, be the true, the real man: in a sense, the only man. Just as one might say of a perfect oak tree or a perfect rose bush, that is the true, and therefore in a sense the only oak tree in this forest; the true, and therefore in a sense the only rose bush in this garden; so would it be permissible to say of Christ, He is the true man, and therefore in a sense the only real man. Yet being such—yea, as such; because He is such—therefore is He the Son of God, divine—the incarnate

One. It is consequently quite possible now for one whose doctrine or view of the person of Christ is nothing but Humanitarian, commonly but inaccurately termed "Unitarian,"—Humanitarian, however, in the ideal rather than the empirical sense; to whom Christ is essentially nothing but what we all of us ought to be,—and what by coming under his influence we are destined to become; to avow his belief in the divinity of Christ, and in an Incarnation, without seeming to himself to be guilty of using ambiguous language. Yet the language assuredly is ambiguous. The questions which those who hold this position should face are: Is it involved in the affinity between deity and humanity that men can become as God? A human son, as we know, may attain to the rank and level of his human father because of the affinity between the two,—can that be applied to the relation we are now considering? Is there anything in Christ beyond the fact that He realizes the idea of His being —an idea as to essential features and allowing for individual differences, the same as the idea of any man's being—that does not or would not normally belong to every human being? Is there anything in Christ's relation to God that there cannot be in the relation of men to God; or is the only difference between His relation and ours, that His is what ours should be, whilst ours is not what it should be? If these last two and similar questions be answered in the negative, it is a case of Crypto-Humanitarianism, whatever may be its protests; nay more, it involves a heteropisty. So much by the way. A view of the person of Christ such as I have been noticing

logically involves an analogous estimate of His work on behalf of men. A mere man, even if he were a true man, could only have accomplished a human, even if it were an ideally human work—not a divine-human work; not such a work as the Scripture represents, and the Christian Church has believed Christ's work to be.

The three questions which face the theological inquirer into the atonement are: *First*, What was the exact nature of the passion of the Christ, of His *obedience unto death, even the death of the cross?* *Secondly*, What was the immediate end designed to be accomplished by Christ's obedience unto death? *Thirdly*, How was Christ's obedience unto death as *means*, related to the *end* to be accomplished—what was the *modus operandi?*

The answer to the second question so largely determines the answers required by the other two questions, that it has naturally been used as the chief principle of classification of theories of the atonement. If Christ's obedience unto death were designed to produce an objective as well as a subjective or "moral"[1] effect, clearly our view of the nature of His obedience, at all events of the suffering unto death which it involved, must needs be other than it would be, if it affected man alone. Still greater must be the difference in the respective *modi operandi*.

Each of the three problems would seem to furnish a principle of classification of theories of the atonement. This is, however, really the case only with

[1] The correlate to *objective* should be *subjective*, but it is scarcely suitable.

two—with one of the two partially, with only one fully, namely, with the problem as to the *immediate* end of the obedience of Christ unto death.

1. For first of all there is substantial agreement among all who have discussed the atonement, that Christ's intervention on our behalf effects reconciliation or salvation—whatever that may include ; as to which opinions differ. If this were remembered, disputes about the words representative, substitute, vicarious, mediator, might surely cease. He is our substitute, representative, mediator, whether we take an objective or a subjective ("moral") view of the end to be accomplished. The conceptions of what He did as our substitute—what He effected, and of the way in which it was effected—may vary—vary widely ; but in any case, it is allowed that He undertook for us ; that He taught us ; that He lived, suffered, died for us ; not less really by Young and Bushnell, and Robertson and Martineau, than by Calvin and Luther, Owen and Gerhard, Grotius and Turrettine, and others, their followers in our own day, whatever the differences between them in other respects.

Whether His sufferings were a mere accident, so to speak, of His real work, like the sufferings of martyrs ; or subordinate to His resurrection ; or necessary to the completeness of the example He left us ; or a part of the manifestation of the divine purity, truth, rectitude, holiness, love ; or appointed, either on grounds of fitness and congruity, or of legal or moral necessity,—all this does not materially concern us : did He actually speak, work, hunger, thirst ; was He buffeted, despised, humbled ; did He die *on our*

behalf? Then was He in a most true sense our representative, substitute, mediator, the more so, as by universal agreement He was and did what He was, and did of His own loving choice, and absolutely without ill-desert of His own.

2. Differences arise when we proceed to consider the *end* of Christ's work; though here, too, there is partial agreement. The so-called orthodox theories recognise a twofold end—objective and subjective ("moral"); whereas the so-called "moral" theories eliminate or deny the objective end, and recognise only the subjective or manward end.[1] All the theories treated by Dr. Crawford, for example, as "substitutes for the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement,"[2] or by Dr. C. Hodge as "antagonistic to the common Church doctrine, and purely philosophical,"[3] need not be treated as either "substitutes" or "antagonistic." Their advocates may ignorantly regard them as such; but the theologian who has learnt in the School of Paul should see and be eager to say to each of them, "Yes, you have laid hold of and are asserting a part of the truth; here is another part; let us try to

[1] It is unfortunate that so ambiguous a word as "moral"—ambiguous in this connection—should be still employed to designate the non-objective theories of the atonement. Not to mention its implication that the others are either immoral or non-moral, it is alike unfair and illogical to adopt as a principle of classification that which belongs to all the things to be classified. All theories are "moral" theories, though they may be also something more; that something more not excluding, but including, or certainly compatible with, the "moral" aspect. I shall generally use the term subjective as the antithesis to objective.

[2] Crawford's *The Atonement*, Table of Contents.

[3] Dr. C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. ii. p. 590. It is a pity that Dr. Hodge should have been guilty of what is both an injustice and an absurdity in applying the words "purely philosophical" to such theories as the governmental, mystical, moral.

confine them into one fair and harmonious whole." In endeavouring to classify theories, I shall therefore leave out of consideration this subjective, manward, world-ward ("moral") element of the objective theories. They do not all of them include all the aspects on which the several "moral" theories have laid stress; nor indeed has any single one of the non-objective theories ever embraced all these same aspects; but, as was indicated before, the latter are rather supplementary than exclusive of each other, and the same thing may be said of them relatively to objective theories.[1]

Considered in relation to the immediate end to be accomplished, theories of the passion of Christ fall into two great classes, namely, the objectivo-subjective and the subjective. As I shall have occasion to observe later on, a third great class may be formed of those which are purely philosophical.

I. *Objectivo-subjective*—or as I am leaving the subjective aspect out of consideration, *objective* theories. These may again be subdivided as follows :—

(I.) *Crypto-dualistic* theories, according to which the work of Christ bore a relation to some power or authority outside of God. This power or authority is not, of course, consciously conceived, still less actually represented, as dualistic; yet as it savours of independence of God, I think the theories which employ it deserve the description crypto-dualistic.

[1] I ought to say here that it is altogether beside my intention to notice every variety of theory that has been advanced. To do that would require a large volume, even if it were within my power. What follows claims to be nothing more than a rough, unfinished critical study—a sort of first sketch from nature.

1. The first of the class is that which represents Christ's death as having been in some sense or other required as a ransom by, or in order to do justice to, the devil, who had acquired a certain property in men, and a certain right to their services, in consequence of sin.

Irenæus[1] is credited with being the first to suggest this explanation of such terms as "ransom" and the like. There is not a little, too, in his references to the subject which seems to warrant the bestowal of this doubtful honour on him. He says, for example, "Nor did He truly redeem us by His own blood, if He did not really become man, restoring to His own handiwork what was said [of it] in the beginning, that man was made after the image and likeness of God; not snatching away by stratagem the property of another, but taking possession of His own in a righteous and gracious manner. As far as concerns the apostasy (devil) indeed, He redeems us righteously from it by His own blood; but as regards us who have been redeemed [He does this] graciously."[2] In the following passage some expressions look one way, others another: "The mighty Word, also very man, redeeming us by His own blood in a manner consonant to reason, gave Himself as a redemption for those who had been led into captivity. And since the apostasy (devil) tyrannized over us *unjustly*, and, though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples, the Word of God, powerful in all things and not defective with regard to His own justice, did

[1] A.D. 177–202. [2] Bk. v. ii. 1 (Clark's translation).

righteously turn against that apostasy and redeem from it His own property, not by violent means as the [apostasy] had obtained dominion over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not its own, but by means of *persuasion*, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain what He desires; so that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to destruction. . . . The Lord has thus redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh."[1] For my own part, however, I think with others,[2] that a careful study of the fifth book of Irenæus' work against heresies, and a connected view of his system of thought as a whole, will awaken very serious doubts regarding the correctness of the supposition; even if it do not fully convince of its groundlessness.[3]

Nor does it seem to me as certain, as is commonly assumed, that the successors of Irenæus are justly chargeable with soberly and seriously teaching the view in question. *Origen* is reckoned amongst those who worked it out most systematically. Still later writers often outbid him in the employment of images and similes that seem to us as offensive in taste as they are awry in their morality. And yet if we approach them, after reading the vivid, concrete, drastic characterization of Christ's relation to the devil, given by Luther, who can scarcely be supposed

[1] Irenæus, *Against Heresies*, Bk. v. c. i. 1.

[2] For example, Duncker, *des heil. Irenæus Christologie*, etc., Göttingen 1843; and Shedd, *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. ii. p. 220 f.

[3] See Duncker's account of the Soteriology of Irenæus in the work cited above.

to have believed that God entered into legal transactions with him, we shall be inclined to suspect that even the Fathers of the first six centuries may rather have been giving the reins to fancy than intending to reason soberly, when they wrote the offensive passages in their works.[1]

If such a theory were really held, it would surely be justifiable to characterize it as crypto-dualistic; for a position of such independence relatively to God is therein implicitly assigned to the devil, that the logical issue could be nothing short of dualistic, so far, that is, as strict dualism has ever been clearly, deliberately, and fully held at all.

2. The second crypto-dualistic theory is that which conceives of Christ's obedience unto death as rendered in conformity with the demands of an *eternal law*, having an objective existence independent both of God and the creature—a law to which God and the creature are alike subject; what is often called "the eternal law of righteousness."

(1.) The only writer who, to my knowledge, has explicitly expounded this theory is Dr. R. W. Dale.[2]

[1] See Note I., Appendix, for further details both as to the Fathers and Luther.

"Death" and "Hell" are sometimes spoken of as though they were objectively existing powers with which God entered into a sort of negotiation. But this has surely been mere personification. See, however, Baur, *Geschichte der Versöhnungslehre*, and Dorner's *Glaubenslehre*.

[2] In an article of the *British Quarterly Review* for 1867, p. 486 ff. It is only right to say, however, that in his Congl. Lecture on "The Doctrine of the Atonement," published 1875, he has completely modified the view in question—or tried to do so. He says there, "The law does *not* claim Him as the most illustrious of its subjects, it is supreme in His supremacy. His relation is not a relation of subjection, but of identity." I adduce the theory here, of course, as a matter of history, with no intention either in Dr. Dale's case, or indeed in the case of any one else whose views I

Because of its uniqueness it is worth stating at some length. Footing on principles of which Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clarke are the best known English expounders and defenders, the writer just mentioned has maintained, or *seemed* to maintain,[1] that Christ died in obedience to a law to which God and the intelligent creation were alike subject — the eternal law of righteousness. In answer to the questions, Why am I bound to obey God? Is it because, as a creature, I am naturally subject to God? he replies, "That involves the concession of an eternal obligation resting on the creature to obey the Creator. So far from the commands of God originating moral obligation, 'duty' is inconceivable if moral obligation does not exist antecedently to the divine commands. Deny the *independence* and eternity of moral obligation, and Duty vanishes from the universe." He quotes with approval from J. S. Mill[2] the words: "The only view of the connection between religion and morality which does not annihilate the very idea of the latter, is that which considers the Deity as not making, but *recognising* and sanctioning, moral obligation."[3] Nor may we say with "many theologians," that "the origin of moral distinctions is to be found in the Nature of

may criticize, of saddling them with what I consider the *logical* consequences of their principles.

Luther's personifications of law are very vivid; but they are mere personifications. No man ever felt more keenly than he that it was with God personally we have to do—not with anything outside God. See Note II., Appendix.

[1] Dr. Dale was commonly held to take the view I find expressed by his words.

[2] *Dissertations*, vol. i. p. 125.

[3] Compare the Stoical idea of universal order and Zeus as administrator, Bain's *Handbook of Mental and Moral Science*, p. 515.

God." "The idea of God involves," indeed, "the affirmation that in Him the Ideal Law of the Conscience assumes objective Reality." But the hypothesis that moral distinctions are derived from the divine nature is as untenable as the hypothesis which traces them to the divine will. "If the Moral Law be good and right simply because it is the expression of the attributes of an omnipotent and omniscient Being, on what ground are the attributes themselves to be called good and right? . . . If the attributes of God are the ultimate and ideal standard of moral perfections, what meaning can there be in saying that these attributes are themselves perfect? Goodness must be in *itself* deserving of honour, or we cannot be required to honour any being because he is good." "It is God's glory, not that His will originated the Moral Law, but that His will has uniformly *honoured and asserted its authority*."

"Implicated in the acknowledgment of the eternal authority of the law of righteousness is the acknowledgment that the violation of that law is justly followed by suffering. . . . If the divine penalty which follows sin has no other end to answer than the good of the universe, if it is not a recognition, on the part of God, of the essential evil of sin, and an act of *divine homage to the eternal law* that the wrong-doer deserves to suffer, our scheme of the Divine Government will rest on no solid foundation, and will have no place for an expiatory sacrifice."

"Great confusion has arisen from confounding two very different propositions. Our moral nature is

resolute in affirming that it is an absolute and eternal law that the sinner deserves to suffer. But our moral nature does not affirm that the Moral Governor is obliged to inflict all the suffering the sinner deserves."

The fact of the atonement has been revealed as the objective reason for the remission of sin: what is its *rationale?* If a solution of the problem be possible, it must be sought in the moral reasons on which penalties rest. If what has been advanced is true, the penal legislation of God is the divine recognition of the law that the sinner deserves to suffer; it is a proof that He cannot look on with passive indifference while men violate the eternal law of righteousness. The moral value of the infliction of penalties lies here, that although God has an infinite love for His creatures, He voluntarily punishes them rather than permit the eternal law that the sinner deserves to suffer to be unrecognised and unhonoured. But as a recognition of the ill-desert of sin, and as an honour to the eternal law of righteousness, the moral value of God's act in atoning for sin, He being the moral Ruler of mankind, to whom it appertained to assert the law, far transcends the moral value of His act in punishing it. Still more, the love of the Eternal Father for the Son whom He surrendered to humiliation and death, that the ill-desert of sin might be recognised before it was pardoned, invests the divine procedure with infinite sublimity, and makes the grandest moment in the moral history of God.

This view of the atonement is summed up by its author in the following propositions :—

"(1.) It is an eternal and absolute law that sin deserves punishment.

"(2.) It is the function of God as the Creator and moral Ruler of the universe to recognise this law.

"(3.) The moral significance of punishment inflicted on the sinful lies in its being the voluntary recognition by God Himself of the ill-desert of sin.

"(4.) The surrender by the Eternal Father of the only-begotten Son to penal suffering, that is specially, to death, and the Son's voluntary endurance of that suffering, constitute a divine recognition of the ill-desert of sin far transcending in moral sublimity the infliction of punishment on the guilty." [1]

Though the exposition just adduced contains, as I believe, the only explicit avowal of the theory under consideration, the work of Christ has frequently been reasoned about on principles which logically involve the same legal crypto-dualism. Dr. Dale has been consistent where other writers were inconsistent.

(2.) The theories which claim to be *par excellence* "Churchly," "Catholic," "orthodox," seem to me to oscillate between three points of view; two of which, with modifications, would supplement each other, though regarded as antagonistic; the third is incompatible with the rest. These three points of view are the crypto-dualistic, the "personal," and the so-called "governmental." The attitude they take up, however, towards what is termed the "personal," and which I shall further describe under the next head, is

[1] There is a curious affinity between the position which "the law" gradually assumed in Protestant theology and what is said about the *Thora* in the Talmud. See the very interesting details about the latter given in Weber's *System der Altsynagogalen Theologie*, especially pp. 14–20.

such that I am compelled to put them either in the class now under examination, or in that which their advocates constantly denounce, namely, the "governmental," which, as I shall show, is only another word for subjective, non-objective, "moral."

In order to substantiate this criticism, I must recall the chief features of the so-called "catholic" theory as set forth by two prominent theologians.[1]

And, first, I may adduce *Turrettine*, who, though belonging to the close of the seventeenth century, has done more to colour and determine the systematic theology of the Reformed Churches, especially in Britain, than almost any other writer. He puts the case in a nutshell as follows: "Agreeably to the triple nature (σχέσις) of sin (as payment of a debt, placation of anger and expiation of guilt), and to the σχέσις of God Himself, to whom satisfaction is due, He may be regarded either as a creditor, or as a party offended, or as a judge and ruler. The first two aspects have their own place and justification; but here we have specially to do with the third. God is not only a creditor who has a right to remit at pleasure; not only an offended party, who may do *as He will* in case of offence: but He is the Judge and Ruler of the Universe, to whom alone belongs the infliction of punishment or dispensation therefrom. A creditor has the right to claim his debt, and an offended party restitution and compensation for loss; but a judge alone, as the constituted authority, has the power to compel or enact punishment. . . . The

[1] For the views of two other representative divines, the Hodges, see Note III., Appendix.

πρῶτον ψεῦδος of our adversaries is the notion that sin is to be regarded here as a simple debt, and God as a mere creditor, who can at His pleasure either exact or remit penalty without satisfaction. Whereas it is certain that God here assumes the σχέσις of the Judge and Ruler of the world, who sustains the rights of majesty, and professes Himself the keeper and vindicator of its laws."[1] Elsewhere also he claims it also as "the unvarying opinion of the orthodox, that Christ truly and perfectly satisfied divine justice for all our sins; that this satisfaction was offered, not merely of congruity, but of necessity; that justice absolutely required it: and that in no other way was forgiveness possible." He adds, too, that "hatred and anger are attributed to God anthropopathically (ἀνθρωποπαθῶς), and signify solely supreme displeasure and detestation at sin, conjoined with a fixed and constant will to punish it."[2]

I will now quote from another theologian, whose work on the atonement is probably as representative of the general British consensus as any I could select —that of the late *Professor Crawford.* Replying to the objection, that if we can forgive an injury without demanding full reparation, why should not God do the same? he says, its "plausibility arises from an oversight of the very broad distinction between *personal resentment* and *judicial condemnation.* Men may pass over injuries and indignities the effects of which are limited to themselves; but we cannot thence infer that

[1] *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, Genevæ 1682, Loc. xiv. Quæstio x. ix. (vol. ii. 456). Cf. treatise, *De Satisfactionis Christi necessitate*, Pars I. xxv.

[2] See Dissertation, *De Satisfactione*, etc., Pars I. xvi.–xx.

'the Judge of all the earth' must in like manner pass over transgressions which are committed against those laws of His universal kingdom which involve the welfare of the whole intelligent creation. The satisfaction which He requires is not personal; for He solemnly declares that He has no pleasure in the death of the sinner. It is a *judicial* satisfaction which He is concerned to exact, not for the gratification of any wrathful or vindictive feelings; but for the vindication of His justice in the forgiveness of sins, and with the view of maintaining, inviolate and free from every charge of imperfection or mutability, the rectitude of His government and the authority of His statutes."[1] Elsewhere he tells us that "the attribute of justice is from its very nature a *judicial* or *magisterial* attribute:"[2] and that "the phrase satisfaction to divine justice indicates, not that any feelings of resentment or vindictiveness on the part of God were gratified by our Lord's sufferings, but simply that these sufferings were accepted by the supreme Lawgiver and righteous moral Governor of the universe as a ground on which He might show mercy to His sinful creatures, consistently with the rectitude of His character and the authority of those laws which as a just God He is concerned to uphold."[3] In other words, the satisfaction is offered to God in His "judicial or magisterial capacity," and that alone. "Christ's sufferings were

[1] The *Atonement*, p. 407 f. When Dr. Crawford says man may do this and that; and proceeds "but, etc.," we should expect a reference to what God can or cannot do relatively to "injuries and indignities;" instead of this he passes over—doubtless quite unwittingly—to the Judge of all the earth, to God in what he would call "another capacity."

[2] *Atonement*, pp. 372, 403.

[3] *L.c.* p. 176, cf. 178, 179.

penal in the sense of being *judicially* inflicted."[1] "If by an obstacle on the part of God to the forgiveness of sinners, there be understood anything in the shape of *personal resentment*, or *implacable vindictiveness*, or *unwillingness to show mercy*, it is perfectly true that there is no such obstacle. . . . The obstacles are His aversion to sin, His just condemnation of it, and His declared purpose *as the supreme Lawgiver* and *righteous Judge* to punish it."[2] "The sufferings of Christ, although they were not the very penalty which God was entitled to demand from the transgressors of His law, have yet been *appointed* and *accepted* by Him in place of it."[3]

How far now is the criticism previously advanced justified?

1. It is clear that we are concerned in the atonement or the obedience of Christ unto death with a transaction affecting God as the Judge and Ruler of the world, and the righteous administrator of its laws: it is not God in His personal capacity we have to do with—so we are assured. But here is the dilemma before which we are placed. The laws which God has to uphold are *either* laws independent of Him—laws which He no less than His subjects are bound to obey; *or*, they are simply the modes of His own being, life, and activity,—self-prescribed indeed, but still a part of Himself; as truly a part of Himself as His honour, or His faithfulness, or His love, or His feelings. If the latter view be taken of them, it seems

[1] *L.c.* p. 183 f. [2] *L.c.* p. 405 f.

[3] *L.c.* p. 179; cf. quotation from Principal Hill's *Theology* to the same effect, which is indorsed. That Drs. C. and A. A. Hodge agree with Turrettine and Crawford in substance, will appear from the account given in Note III., Appendix.

to me that to speak of God's laws demanding to be upheld, requiring penalty, compensation, honour, and so forth, is only a roundabout way of saying that God Himself requires all this. God *quâ* Ruler or Judge is still God and God alone. We cannot separate the one from the other, save on the supposition first laid down. We *can* separate between a man, and the same man *quâ* king, a man and the same man *quâ* judge, for various reasons, but specially because, firstly, he may though a man at any time cease to occupy the post of judge or ruler; and secondly, because the laws he administers were not enacted by him, nor the kingdom over which he rules established by him. But as this separation is impossible in the case of God,—Dr. Crawford implicitly confesses this when he tells us that "to satisfy the *justice of God* [which is essentially a judicial or administrative attribute] is to satisfy a *just God*, or to satisfy *God in respect of His justice*,"[1]—then to this extent his treatment of the atonement falls into what I shall designate the personal or properly Godward class. But as he repudiates the idea of a personal satisfaction, insists on Christ's satisfaction being exclusively judicial, and strenuously repudiates every form of subjective theory, the only course left open is to place his theory in what I have called the crypto-dualistic class. He, of course, had no intention of countenancing dualism in any form whatever; he takes the precaution, too, of using expressions which, whilst *distinguishing* the law or constitution of the world from God, do not separate the two: but I am concerned here with logic, not with personal intentions;

[1] *Atonement*, p. 179.

and I maintain that the theory expounded by Dr. Crawford, consistently carried out, involves the existence of a system of law dualistically independent of God, to which He as well as His creatures are bound to conform: and to which He, being perfectly righteous, as the supreme Judge does actually seek to conform His administration.

This criticism applies equally to *Turrettine*, as indeed to all who accept what is called the "sententia orthodoxorum" or the Catholic doctrine.

Some parts of Dr. Crawford's exposition are, I think, open to the further criticism, that it approaches dangerously near, if not to the governmental theory, yet to that most objectionable of all theories, the *acceptilatio* theory; otherwise what is the meaning of such words as, "The sufferings of Christ, although they were not the very penalty which God was entitled to demand from the transgressors of His law, have yet been *appointed* and *accepted* by Him in place of it;"[1] especially if he seriously approve, as he seems to do, of Dr. C. Hodge's statement, "It would be no exhibition of justice if it were not an exercise of justice; it would not teach that the penalty of the law must be inflicted, unless it implied that the penalty of the law *was* inflicted"?[2] If justice requires "the penalty," *i.e.* surely the very penalty; and if another than the very penalty is *appointed* and accepted in its place, have we not a case of an artificial, unreal value being put upon and character

[1] *L.c.* p. 179.

[2] Quoted *l.c.* p. 379. As I have hinted in the criticism of the method of the two Hodges in Note III., they too approach sufficiently near to the *acceptilatio* view.

assigned to something at the good pleasure of Him to whom it is offered? And what is this but *acceptilatio?* If Christ's sufferings were the very penalty, there could be no question of their being "appointed and accepted" by God "in place of" the very penalty.

For what is this theory which goes by the name of the *acceptilation* theory?[1] It signifies that God accepts the satisfaction of Christ, not because a strictly infinite value belongs to the sufferings of the God-man; but because in His infinite benevolence He is willing to content Himself with a satisfaction that is not strictly infinite. Hence the atonement of Christ is sufficient to satisfy the claims of law, because God is *willing to regard it as such*, although in strict fact it is insufficient. This is justified upon the principle that any oblation is worth whatever the Deity is willing to rate it at. Its value is not intrinsic and real, but acquired and nominal.[2]

2. But there is another point at which all these "Catholic" theories are open to objection, — it is their treatment of the word *justice*. Crawford assures us that "the distinction that has been attempted to be drawn," namely, by advocates of the governmental theory whom he is confuting, "between God's 'rectoral justice' and His 'absolute justice,' is inadmissible."[3]

[1] The *acceptilatio* theory may be regarded as one of the objective theories. In the expositions of some of its advocates, expressions enough occur which savour of crypto-dualism, whatever may have been the intentions of the writers.

[2] See Shedd's *History of Christian Doctrine*, ii. 348. This is his account of it as laid down by its originator, Duns Scotus. In the *Institutes* of Justinian, "acceptilatio" is defined as "solutio imaginaria." This theory was subsequently revived by Arminian theologians like Episcopius, Limborch, and Curcellæus.

[3] *L.c.* p. 373.

"Distributive justice," which consists in rendering unto all their dues, is displayed in the administration of His government. "In the case of human governments, which are fallible and defective, 'rectoral justice' may not always be administered according to the strict principles of real or absolute justice; but not so in the case of the perfect and unerring government of God."[1] In a word, as all these writers would agree, justice is to give *suum cuique*: God is absolutely just in all His relations; therefore He will give absolutely *suum cuique*.

God is absolutely just, and gives every one his due. To whom is justice shown or done, when Christ undergoes His sufferings? For whose sake is the passion? We should perhaps receive for answer, "The law," the law demands justice. But what is the law? Is it a law independent of God? If so, we fall into the dualism to which I previously referred. No; by the law is really understood God Himself, who is its source, who enacts it, who prescribes it; of whose life and action it is a mode. In that case it is God Himself, and no abstraction substituted for Him, who demands justice for Himself, who seeks to do justice to Himself through Christ. In short, the end of Christ's work was to do justice to God, to meet God's claims, God's requirements. It is useless here to say, God's claims and requirements *as Judge or Ruler;* for that, as I showed already, does not affect the point. It is God, God Himself, who puts in a claim for Himself. And what is that but the "personal" view which was so decidedly repudiated?

[1] *L.c.* p. 372.

Let us further consider in a word or two what is said to be done in the name of justice; what is offered to God as His just due; what God secures for Himself as His due. That Christ came in order to do justice to God, I hold to be certain; this was one great end He had in view: through Him, in other words, God sought to do justice to Himself. But how? So far as men were sinful, *they received their due* when the sufferings arising out of, and necessarily connected with sin came, and were brought, upon them; bodily sufferings for the violation of bodily laws; intellectual sufferings for the violation of intellectual laws; and so on, for every aspect of man's complex nature and its corresponding complex environment. If men's sin deserved eternal punishment, then they would get *their* due by being consigned to the place where *the worm dieth not* and *the fire is never quenched.* So far God would be just, according to the definition of justice agreed on,—*just*, namely, *to sinful men.* But does God thus get *His* due? The language used, especially by the forensic theologians, implies that justice would be done to God also when men were condemned. God Himself, in other words,—unless a dualistic position be assigned to the law, — demands for Himself so much punishment for so much sin, — infinite or eternal punishment for sin which, being committed against Him, the Infinite and Eternal One, is itself infinite; and this punishment is represented as His due—His righteous due; provided the suffering is endured, whether by those who deserve it, and whose *real due*, be it remembered, it is assumed to be, or by a substitute, is of no real consequence;

hence its transference to one who, in virtue of His divine nature, was able to endure infinite suffering,—not *extensivè* indeed, yet *intensivè*, not in duration but in intensity.[1] But this seems to me, again, the despised "personal" view of the end of Christ's passion, in a most awful and revolting form. Theologians have concealed from themselves, unintentionally, the true nature of the position they were taking up, by substituting abstractions like "divine justice," "the law," and so forth, for God, whenever they got directly face to face with it; and, unwittingly, they often lapsed either into dualism or into subjectivism. Not only so, they have themselves always repudiated, in the strongest terms, the idea that God demanded suffering, as such, for Himself; that it was infinite suffering He needed for a satisfaction.

But then the question returns, What about God's own due? Giving up the futile or fatal distinction between Himself and the law, what is His due? *Every sinner condemned to eternal death is an eternal*

[1] So Quenstedt, Gerhard, and others. The sufferings of Christ are regarded from three points of view—that of the *jus talionis*, that is, the "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" principle; that of a *debt;* and that of *vindication of honour* from insult. The second point of view still colours the language used by the less educated preachers and evangelists, and by the people at large; and there is not a little in the expositions of the so-called governmental theory to remind us of the third. As to the amount of suffering endured by Christ, there is a marked difference between recent divines and those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The former hold that Christ's sufferings were an "equivalent;" the latter, more or less distinctly, that they were *intensivè* if not *extensivè*, the exact penalty (as is noted above). Even Turrettine uses the language: "Quæ passioni temporali pondus addit *infinitum*," Loc. xiv. qu. xi. 28; see Note III., Appendix. Principal Cunningham speaks, too, of "the value and efficacy of what Christ did and suffered as *truly infinite*" (*Histor. Theol.* ii. 264); but he does not keep consistently to the idea.

loss to God: the loss of a child created in His image, from whom He expected loving reverence, worship, service; with whom He purposed to hold eternal and ever-growing fellowship. Can that be doing justice to God? In point of fact, justice would not be done to God, full compensation would not be made to Him, unless every sinful soul were brought back to Him in penitence and profounder reverence and love. The truth, therefore, is that justice can be done to God only by the redemption of man; and this is perhaps the true meaning of the expression, that in Christ mercy and truth kiss each other, righteousness and grace are one.

(II.) The second class of objective theories might be termed "personal"—I prefer designating them *Godward.* It may be well to avoid the use of the former term, because rather of what it connotes than of what it denotes. The ideas which have found expression in, or have coloured phrases like, "it is a personal question," "personal considerations," and the like, show what I mean.

I have quoted above the language of Dr. Crawford on the subject, with whom others of the same school agree. Here is what an eminent representative of the New England "Governmental" School says: "If sin be injurious to God in a private personal capacity only,[1] and He be not an inexorable but a compassionate Being, He might certainly pardon at least as many sinners as repent, without any atonement what-

[1] A strange notion of God surely, that could allow of His even being spoken of as standing in a "private personal" relationship,—unmistakeably dualistic.

ever. But sin should not be considered in this light. It is an offence against God in a public capacity, as the supreme Governor of the universe."[1]

Dr. Dale, too, says: "Personal claims, if they are exclusively personal, may be waived. If this theory of sin and its punishment were complete (*i.e.* the theory that 'sin is of the nature of a personal offence against the majesty of God, and that punishment is the expression of God's just resentment'), God would be free to inflict or remit punishment at His own good pleasure."[2] In another place, however, he remarks: "If the punishment of sin is to be defined as a vindication and assertion of the personal rights and claims of God against those who have sinned, it must be remembered that the Divine claims which sin resists, and the Divine rights which sin refuses to acknowledge, are essentially different from the claims and rights which are in such sense personal, that they can be remitted at pleasure. They are claims and rights which it is morally necessary that God should maintain."[3] Exactly so. But surely God can never advance claims and rights which it is *not* morally necessary for Him to maintain. And is it not unusually gross anthropomorphism to apply to any *divine* claims such words as "*exclusively personal*"?[4]

[1] Caleb Burge, "Scripture Doctrine of Atonement" in *The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises*, etc. With Introductory Essay by Edwards A. Park, Boston 1860.

[2] R. W. Dale, *Atonement*, p. 380. [3] *Ibid.* p. 382.

[4] This idea of "personal," as of something having lower value and validity than the legal, is explicable, of course, by the fact that men are selfish, warped, blinded, and so forth. But considered in themselves, personal relationships are surely the most important, the highest, the most sacred that can be sustained; and the duties, claims, rights, they

The views taken of the personal or Godward end of Christ's passion can scarcely be characterized as so many different theories—they are rather mutually complementary aspects of one theory, *i.e.* properly considered. Indeed, one can scarcely say that the subject has been looked at enough from this point of view to allow of the genesis of the variety which elsewhere prevails. Strangely enough, theologians, as a rule, have been deterred by the fear of anthropopathisms or anthropomorphisms from duly facing and entering into the many passages of the New Testament, not to mention the Old, where the idea of a personal change in God, or a personal action on God, is more or less distinctly suggested. Preachers, indeed, have clung to the anthropomorphic; the people, too, have never translated the personal language of Scripture into the forensic terms employed by theologians; but these latter, with rare exceptions, have fought shy of what the common mind and heart alone appreciated. The theological custom of speaking of the *justice* of God having its claims might suggest the idea that this was one of the ends of Christ's work which a Godward theory might have to consider. But the justice of God is merely an abstract way of speaking of God as just, of the just God. God is just; therefore He gives to every one his due: God is holy; therefore He seeks to preserve and secure what is due to Himself. In

involve are no less inviolable, nay, more inviolable, than any others. Specially true is this of God.

Canon Westcott's discussion of the terms ἱλασμός, ἱλάσκεσθαι, in his *Commentary on St. John's Epistles*, is warped by this mistake. Indeed, it has done untold mischief in connection with this whole subject.

speaking of rendering justice to God, we use words of wide scope. What is due to God? Not, as I have already remarked, the punishment of sinners: that is the due of sinners, which God, through the cosmic order, which is the expression of His mind and will, renders to them; but the *sinners themselves are His due*, with all their powers of body and mind. His due is, to be loved with all the heart and mind, and soul and strength, and to be served through service rendered to our fellow-creatures, human and non-human. The limitation of the scope of justice to penalty and the like has been a mistake fraught in the history of the Christian Church down to the present moment, with the saddest consequences alike to theology and practice, to intellect and heart.

Every possible legitimate aspect of the Godward end to be served by Christ's passion may be embraced under the head of giving God His due, meeting the claims of justice, and so forth.

1. One form, logically considered, of this personal theory I have already referred to in the course of my criticism of the juridical theory,—I refer to the notion—possible though scarcely actual—that God claimed so much suffering, no matter by whom borne, for so much sin—claimed it personally; claimed as His due, as His compensation or satisfaction. As this view of the matter is compatible neither with a true conception of justice, nor with Scripture, nor with human feeling, I need not further dwell on it: indeed I refer to it merely because a good deal of language employed in the discussion of this subject has unintentionally given rise to the charge that

theologians have actually held it. In what sense this had any foundation I have shown before.

2. The form that first deserves actual consideration is that which represents Christ as having come to be or make a *propitiation* (ἱλασμός) for the sins of the world—that is, to propitiate (ἱλάσκεσθαι) the displeasure, anger, indignation of God; or rather, God as displeased, angry, indignant at sin. Luther, Calvin, and the "Confessions" give great prominence to this aspect of the matter; and most of the earlier Protestant divines refer more or less distinctly to it. Says Luther: "It was the anger of God itself that Christ bore—the eternal anger which our sins had deserved. . . . Sin and the anger of God—these were the cause of His death. . . . The inner sufferings of Jesus, His anguish—an anguish in comparison with which all human anguish and fear are but a slight matter—was the feeling of the divine anger."[1] Calvin also: "Man was estranged from God by sin, an heir of wrath. . . . Christ with His own blood expiated the sins which rendered Him hateful to God; by this expiation satisfied and duly propitiated God the Father; by this intercession appeased His anger; on this basis founded peace between God and man."[2] In the *Apologia Confessionis Augustanæ* we read: "The anger of God cannot be stilled by our works; Christ alone is mediator and propitiator; and for His sake alone does the Father become gracious to us."[3] The *Confessio Wurtembergica* says, too: "The Son of God

[1] Köstlin, *Theologie Luthers*, vol. ii. 411.
[2] *Institutes*, Bk. ii. ch. xvi, 2.
[3] Art. iv. (ii.) 80.

alone is the placator of the anger of God."[1] The *Confessio Saxonica:* "Such is the greatness of the anger of God, that the Eternal Father cannot be placated, save by the beseechings and death of His Son."[2]

By degrees, however, the anger of God ceased to be mentioned, save as a kind of synonym of God's fixed purpose to punish sin; or of the threatenings of the law; or of the necessity that sin be punished, and so forth; and this has continued to be the custom down to the present day.[3] The "propitiatory" aspect of Christ's work has accordingly been either neglected or evacuated of its significance. The modern attitude[4] towards it is probably expressed by Canon Westcott when he writes:[5] "The Scriptural conception of ἱλάσκεσθαι is not that of appeasing one who is angry, with a personal (!) feeling against the offender; but of altering the character of that which from without occasions a necessary alienation and interposes an inevitable obstacle to fellowship. Such phrases as 'propitiating God,' and God 'being reconciled,' are foreign to the language of the New Testament. Man is reconciled (2 Cor. v. 18 ff.; Rom. v. 10 f.). There is a 'propitiation' in the matter of the sin or of the sinner. The love of God is the same throughout; but He cannot in virtue of His very nature welcome the impenitent and sinful;

[1] See Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus*, ii. 182.

[2] Heppe, *l.c.* p. 183.

[3] Dr. Dale is one of the few exceptions. He lays just stress on the reality of even divine anger. See his *Atonement*. But he has scarcely entered into the true meaning of ἱλασμός, notwithstanding.

[4] So far as our *dilettanti* take the trouble to grapple with the subject.

[5] *Commentary on the Epistles of St. John.*

and more than this, He cannot treat sin as if it were not sin. This being so, the ἱλασμός, when it is applied to the sinner, so to speak, neutralizes the sin. In this respect the idea of the efficacy of Christ's propitiation corresponds with one aspect of the Pauline phrase 'in Christ.' The believer, being united with Christ, enjoys the quickening, purifying action of Christ's 'Blood,' of the virtue of His life and death, of His life made available for men through death." I should be inclined to exclaim with regard to this exposition—

Veritatem expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

Canon Westcott is too strongly in the grip of the Christian faith to be able to be logical in his treatment of the question he handles; such, at all events, is my impression. Were this the place, I should have something more to say in support of the remark.

While I thoroughly hold by the reality of the anger of God and of the relation of Christ's work thereto,[1] I certainly do not accept the traditional exposition of either as adequately Biblical. Formally justifiable, its content has been wrong. The divine anger is ethical in quality, is of the nature of that of which even men have some experience, namely, moral indignation—burning moral indignation. As such it seems to me an essential potentiality of the ethical, yea, of the true, holy, loving God. But mere suffering, that is, penalty, can never propitiate or remove divine anger. Divine anger is one of the producing causes of the punishment of sin; as long as sin continues, it goes on

[1] See a later chapter on the Anger of God. See also Note IV. in Appx.

25009

producing punishment : how then can it be propitiated by that which it itself, under given conditions, necessarily produces ? Were it a sort of personal vindictiveness or blind rage, it might exhaust itself, as human passions tend to do, by its own activity ; but it is *toto cœlo* removed therefrom. *As being essentially ethical, it can only be acted upon by that which is essentially ethical.* This is in harmony with a great cosmic law. It is the oversight of this that has given rise to the confusion that has prevailed. God is angry, but His anger is moral ; God can be propitiated, but the propitiation must be moral. The anger is objective, though—perhaps *because*—moral ; the propitiation is real and objective, though—perhaps *because*—moral. Here is one of the keys to the entire problem ; and the direction in which the solution is to be sought is nowhere more clearly indicated than in the passage which Canon Westcott has so strangely tried to empty of its meaning : "*Herein is love : not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins.*"

3. In the view of Christ's obedience unto death, expounded by the late *F. D. Maurice*, there is, as it seems to me, a Godward element, which has been overlooked by its numerous critics and denunciators, and for the sake of which it deserves classing as objective. Starting with the conception of the oneness of Christ with every man, and of the constitution of mankind in Christ, from which naturally follows that what He does on their behalf is their act because it is His, he says : " The Father's will is a will to all good. The Son obeys, and fulfils in our flesh that

will by entering into the lowest condition into which men had fallen through their sin. For this reason He is an object of continual complacency to His Father, and that complacency is fully drawn out by the death of the cross. His death is a sacrifice—the only complete sacrifice ever offered. The cross is thus the meeting-point between man and man, between man and God. In it all the wisdom and truth and glory of God were manifested to the creature, and in it man *is presented* as a holy and acceptable sacrifice to God." As if further to emphasize the objectivity of the transaction, he says in another place: "Human beings are redeemed, not in consequence of any act they have done, or of any faith they have exercised. Their faith is to be founded on a foregone conclusion. . . . It is lawful to tell men that they are justified before God and are the sons of God in the only-begotten Son." [1] What is this but another mode of conceiving and expressing what lies behind that veritable *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiæ*, the doctrine of justification by faith, of the remission of sin through His death, of our acceptance in and through Him? I am far from thinking, for my own part, that Maurice's view is adequate. In the work of Christ there are elements which he does not explicitly take into consideration; but those others, and the one he presses, are mutually supplementary, not mutually exclusive. In its measure, however, there is an objective element, in the idea that God was well pleased with the sacrifice offered

[1] Passages quoted by Dr. Crawford for the purpose of establishing the charges against Mr. Maurice of deviating from Scripture and Church doctrine on the subject of the atonement.

by Christ,—the sacrifice being conceived as offered by the head and representative of humanity, and as carrying humanity's own self-sacrifice with it, not in the way of example only, though, as is required by the constitution of man, in that way also, but chiefly in the way of *empowerment;* and that because He was well pleased, the disapproval or anger which disturbed the fellowship between Him and sinners is set aside or counteracted; in a word, the sacrifice of Christ is conceived as the means of establishing right relations between God and man, looked at from both sides. "*Christ loved us and gave Himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice* TO GOD (εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας)."[1] "*We are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus once for all.*"[2] "*I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.*"[3]

4. Akin to Maurice's position, though more adequate to the subject, is the view advanced by *Gess:* "The Scriptural idea of the *modus* of the expiation is this—(1) Not the mere fact of the surrender of the holy life of Jesus to death in and by itself; nor indeed at all of His obedience in and by itself was it that expiated our sins; but the same self-surrender to death as the curse due to sin. (2) Not the mere fact that He bore and sunk under the curse of sin, considered in and by itself, but the fact that He, who was thus innocently burdened, consecrated the life that sank under this burden to the Father, was it that caused the Father to be gracious towards us. Christ glorified God in the suffering of death, because, whilst laden with the curse of the law which God had linked to sin, He surrendered Himself

[1] Eph. v. 2. [2] Heb. x. 10. [3] Gal. ii. 20.

to God as a spotless, holy sacrifice: this glorification God accepts as an acceptable ransom, on the ground of which men are freed from judgment." [1]

Still more adequate expression is given to the same ideas by *Dorner*. "Of what nature," he asks, "must the satisfaction or expiation be which shall effect reconciliation to the very innermost core of conscience, and establish unhindered vital fellowship between the Father and men? [It must be by a mediator,] and the mediator will need not only to recognise with incomparable truthfulness that the sin of the world is to be reprobated and is dishonouring to God, but must also, in the power of vicarious love, feel with intensest pain the guilt of the world as something which concerned him. In loving sympathy, he must feel and bear the ill-desert of sin, that is, the curse which it brings on us; yea, the justice of the divine disfavour and condemnation: still more, he must render to the divine righteousness in all that it does and may do, the honour which is its due, so that by his action and passion alike he may exhibit and confirm its eternal truth and sacred majesty.

"Wherever the divine disfavour is not only recognised, but its gravity and justice sincerely confessed, with an accompanying sense of unblessedness; where it is seen that this disfavour is the just source of all other possible evils; and where, finally, there is complete and willing surrender to the divine judgment —*there* the righteous displeasure of God is atoned or expiated, *there* it has been made possible for God to forgive and to restore His favour to man; for *then* the

[1] W. F. Gess, "Zur Lehre v. der Versöhnung," published in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vol. ii. iii. See vol. iii. p. 722 f.

sanctity of the divine righteousness is shown to be inviolable, and its just claims are asserted among men. Such an utter subjection of thought, feeling, and volition to its sentence would be expiatory or atoning satisfaction.

"Humanity alone could not accomplish this: none but Christ, who was at once Son of God and Son of man, the eternal Head of humanity, preordained to appear in the flesh, in order that He might bring humanity into the relation to God—whether after or apart from sin—which was necessary to the realization of the divine idea as well of man as of the world to which man belongs." [1]

Taken in conjunction with assumptions elsewhere advanced, there is not a little in Dorner's exposition to suggest classing his theory with the Governmental view. But I have given him the benefit of the doubt.

5. A further phase of the Godward, personal—objectivo-realistic-ethical—work of Christ is brought out in the view set forth by *M'Leod Campbell*, and more recently, and though informally yet a little more fully, expounded by *Dr. Newman Smyth*. The words of the former are so well known that I will only quote from the latter writer. In the sermon

[1] Dorner's *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. 640. Compare the works of Thomasius, Sartorius, especially Schöberlein's *Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe*, article "Versöhnung" in Herzog's *Real-Encyclop.* 1st ed., and *Princip und System der Dogmatik*. Few men have gained truer insight into the nature and conditions of personality and personal relationships. The study of Schöberlein's *Grundlehren* constituted an epoch in my intellectual and spiritual development; and I am myself altogether unable to estimate the full extent of my indebtedness to him. A soul he was, such as the world seldom numbers among its sojourners;—a dialectician of love after the mind of John. Dr. Dale may be also classed here.

on "God's Forgetfulness of Sin," he says: "God puts His own knowledge of our sin far from Him as Christ comes nigh and ascends the throne of His majesty, in His perfect confession of the sinfulness of our sin, in His perfect obedience in our nature to God's holy will, and in His perfect oneness with us in our humiliation before God. God in Christ can forgive and forget sin without denying Himself. Our sin, which God always would forgive, can be sin forgiven and forgotten, because it has been at last perfectly confessed before God, and God's necessary pain over it has been realized and revealed in the sufferings in it, and for it, of the Son of His love; and its condemnation, once for all, has been visited upon it in the death of Him who prays in God's pure will that His enemies may be forgiven. In view of Christ and His cross there remains no *moral need* that God should remember our sin a second time against us, and He will remember it no more against us for ever. The eternal presence of Christ in our nature and for us before the Father is the sufficient reason for His eternal forgetfulness of our sin which He would forgive. God sees us in Christ. God thinks of us always in Christ. There is henceforth no moral reason why He should think of us otherwise than in Christ. He has no divine need to remember us otherwise than in Christ's oneness with us and our union with Christ."[1]

If there is no objectivity apart from legal, forensic,

[1] *The Reality of Faith.* By Newman Smyth. In some respects Bushnell deserves a place here; see his *Vicarious Sacrifice*, in which he modifies the views expounded in his *Life and Light of Men.*

judicial processes, this view, of course, is not objective; but if there is such a thing as ethical objectivity, —if ethical relations are changed or established by the fulfilment of real ethical conditions,—then objectivity of the truest kind cannot be denied either to this position or to that of M'Leod Campbell.

6. One or two peculiar features characteristic of the mode of presentation, if not of the substance of the *Rev. Edward White's* view, render it worthy of special notice.[1] "So long as any explanation of the atonement is sought for *outside the Godhead*, it will be sought in vain. . . . The doctrine of the Apostles is, that the Divine Nature is revealed as bi-polar or of double aspect. They teach that there is in that Eternal Nature a love of righteousness and righteous law, necessary and ever-during; leading to an eternal resolve to uphold with the Infinite Might the authority of Right as right, and of God as God, both in His own mind and in His outward government. They teach that there is also in God, through the riches of a gracious Nature, an overflowing love and compassion,—*not for all sinners of all worlds and of all ranks*, but for creatures whose sinfulness is the result of an original malign interference, which has prompted the desire to 'save' man, although a law-breaker. Hence a moral schism in the Divine Nature." The sinner has thus set in eternal opposition to each other the righteousness which prompts to swift judgment, and the grace which remembers mercy.

"Can God forgive sin without some outward demonstration of a nature to show that forgiveness of

[1] See his *Life in Christ*, 3rd ed. pp. 253–255.

law-breaking is not a 'law' of the Divine Government, or an ordinary act of the Divine Government? . . . Can God extend His mercy without any manifestation of His righteousness? . . . There is but one way in which sinners may obtain life eternal. No innocent creature must suffer, however willing. *God Himself must suffer*, in one exceptional sacrifice, if sinners are to be saved; and the stability of the Divine government *within itself* and over other minds is to be preserved."

"Here alone we find the revealed reason of the atonement by the death of Christ considered as an expiation or ground for pardoning sinners. It is not a blow falling on an innocent creature *outside the Godhead*. It is a blow falling from the sinful creature *on the Godhead itself*." "The whole Godhead, which is righteousness and love, *sacrifices itself* in the agonies of a human death, that man, though a sinner, may live for ever."[1] "The death of Christ, thus regarded, is the visible reconciliation of the sinful *world to God*, because it is the visible reconciliation of the interior Divine Attributes in the abnormal act of saving sinners." "The reason is found in the heights and depths of the Godhead alone—in the holiness which abhors evil; in the rectitude which intensely loves the law; in the wisdom which must demonstrate that the salvation of sinners is no easy process; and in the boundless grace which resolves to endure all that sin and sinners can inflict, as a demonstration of the impossibility there is, even for Omnipotence, to save, by an arbitrary act, without a ransom and a sacrifice."[2]

[1] *Life in Christ*, p. 259. [2] *L.c.* p. 260.

Mr. White's exposition seems to me to be open to three interpretations: first, that the moral schism in God caused by human sin was veritably healed by a divine self-sacrifice *eternally*, and that the historical sufferings and death of Christ were but the visible manifestation thereof in time; secondly, that the historical sufferings and death of Christ were the fulfilment of a divine purpose of self-sacrifice, and, having both an inward and outward aspect, were the actual means of healing the schism; thirdly, that the "schism," being solely a question of how to offer forgiveness without encouraging law-breaking, the immediate end of the sufferings and death of Christ was solely to demonstrate at once the mercy and righteousness of God.

If the *second* be the correct interpretation, Mr. White's view of the work of Christ should be placed in the objective class.

If the *third* be the correct interpretation, his view is nothing but a rearrangement of the so-called Governmental theory which I have felt compelled to characterize as essentially subjective.

If the *first* interpretation be correct, I should have to raise a very serious objection to it,—the objection, namely, that the historical is reduced to a mere exhibition of what had already eternal reality. In making this criticism, I should add that I neither object to the idea of a "moral schism," which in one form or another must be recognised by all who believe in the "forgiveness of *sins*," nor, in speaking of the *historical*, do I mean exclusively the carnally visible. But it seems to me that there is considerable danger

in any form or degree of the resolution of what has been believed to be a divine transaction—with, of course, an inner and outer, an invisible and a visible side—in time and space, into an eternal, intra-divine transaction, whether of purpose or actuality, which preceded, and was merely displayed to view in the outward incarnation and death of Christ.

On the whole, however, notwithstanding the ambiguities which mark his presentation of the subject, he deserves to have the benefit of the doubt. I have accordingly classed him amongst those who hold to an *objective* effect of the passion of Christ, that is, an effect on God Himself,—the effect being in this case the reconciliation of conflicting attributes, the healing of a "moral schism."

II. We now come to the *second great class* of theories — those, namely, which deny the objective, especially the Godward, aspect of the passion of Christ; and hold that it was designed solely to produce an effect on man, that is, a moral effect, hence the designation "moral" theories. These again may be subdivided as follows :—

(I.) Attention is first claimed by the views which are in the more strict and proper sense describable as "moral"—those, namely, which represent the design of Christ, especially in His sufferings and death, to have been to bring considerations and influences to bear on men's minds, fitted to prepare and induce them to return to God. "God was in Christ *reconciling the world* to Himself"—*not being reconciled* to the world.

1. The most popular phase of the "moral" view of the atonement, or at all events the one best known as such, is that which represents Christ's obedience unto death as a manifestation of divine *self-sacrificing love*. Though this view has had, and still has, many advocates, no writer has given it more striking expression than Dr. John Young: "The divinest work of God on this earth is the destroying of evil. By the one true sacrifice of Christ—an act of divine self-sacrifice — He aims a blow at the root of evil within man's heart. The subsequent process is endlessly diverse and is tedious and slow, but the issue is certain—the death of sin. God touches the deadly disease at its foul source, and heals it. He breaks the hard heart by the overwhelming pressure of pure and almighty mercy in our Lord Jesus Christ. He kindles a new divine life, which is holiness,— the resolute free, glad choice of truth and good." [1] "From the beginning and through many agencies and influences mercy has wondrously interposed, not to defraud justice, but to destroy sin, which is death, and to create holiness, which is life. At last by one amazing intervention God's uttermost was put forth to secure the double effect by love, whose breadth, and length, and depth, and height no mind can compass." "The sacrifice of Christ was not required to appease God's anger or to satisfy His justice. . . . It was wholly and solely made by God for men and for sin, in order that sin might be for ever put down and rooted out of human nature. This stupendous

[1] *Life and Light of Men*, pp. 74, 101, quoted in Crawford, p. 353. Abelard was the first to take up this position.

act of divine sacrifice was God's instrument of reconciliation and redemption,—God's method of conquering the human heart and of subduing a revolted world and attaching it to His throne,—pure love, self-sacrificing love, crucified, dying love."[1]

Various reasons are given by those who take this view why Christ should have suffered and died in revealing God's love. Young says: "He fell a sacrifice to jealousy and rage; and without question, the offerers of the *sacrifice—the only offerers*—were the Jews."[2] Suppose the Jews had left Christ alone —what then?

2. In the second class of so-called "moral" views I must range the various forms of what is commonly designated the "*Governmental Theory.*" As the numerous expounders and advocates of this theory have been accustomed to regard it as one of the objective class — as one that retained the essential features of the "Catholic" doctrine without its harshness, and combined the advantages of the "objective" and "subjective" theories; and as they have pretty generally been taken at their own estimate, at all events as far as *objectivity* is concerned, it will be necessary for me to go into some defence of this deviation from the ordinary course.

First, however, let me lay before my readers material for the formation and substantiation of a judgment, in the shape of brief summaries of statements of some prominent representatives.

(1.) I will begin with one whose exposition is in

[1] *Life and Light of Men*, pp. 74, 101, quoted by Crawford, p. 353 f.
[2] *L.c.* pp. 286, 291. Crawford, p. 344.

some respects inchoate—at all events not systematic in the sense in which all theological writers outside the Episcopal Church understand that word, though probably very representative of the thinking of Episcopalians—namely, *Professor Wace.*

After referring to the disorder introduced by sin and the antagonism between sin and God's righteousness, he says :—

"Unless all the principles of God's moral government were to be undermined, and the whole analogy of His dealings were to be falsified—if His moral laws were to possess any real and effectual sanction, some vindication they must have, one which should be at least as conspicuous as awful and prominent in the moral sphere, as is the constant vindication of His other laws in the physical and social universe.

"Now, the chief truth embodied in the doctrine of the atonement is that this vindication has been afforded by the passion and death of our Lord; and although, as has been already said, no theory on this subject has fathomed, or is likely to fathom, its deep mysteries, we can hardly be wrong in observing, as a matter of fact, one important respect in which that vindication was exhibited by the awful events we have been considering. We have seen that our Lord's death was the natural consequence, the inevitable working out of human evil when brought into contact with truth, righteousness, and purity. Had men been left to themselves, this is the result to which they would have come; they would have trampled out the truth and goodness which is the life of their souls, and

God must needs have abandoned them, in the necessary vindication of His laws, to all the misery which they inflicted on our Saviour. But in enduring that misery our Lord has exhibited once for all, to earth and heaven, to time and to eternity, what is the natural consequence of the violation of God's moral laws. By suffering the extremity of misery, in soul and body, on the tree, He has manifested to the world the consequences of human sin — the consequences which in God's justice it must produce, if left to itself—as fully, as terribly, as vividly, as if the human race as a whole had themselves suffered such extremities. Nothing could be more horrible, nothing could be a more fearful manifestation of the deadly evil of sin, than that the holy, and perfect, and gentle Lord Jesus, who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth, should be betrayed, and insulted, and tortured, and crucified, and cast out of the world as one of its malefactors. It is sin which on the cross is crucified and exposed to the scorn and hatred of men and angels. Nay, surely it is a more awful exhibition of the evil of sin, that it should bring this suffering upon one so holy and innocent, that it should simply have been left to work out the just judgment of those who were guilty. . . . God left men for a while to the consequences of their own evil acts, and permitted His Son to appear among them, and the moral laws He had established vindicated themselves by their violation, working itself out into this fearful crime and cruelty. . . . If we could suppose God interposing by some act of arbitrary power to create men afresh as it were, and to blot

out the consequences of their sin, it would have amounted to a practical declaration that the moral law could be readily dispensed with, and the eternal supremacy of righteousness would have been superseded. But, on the other hand, if that eternal law had been left to work itself out, we see by its operation in bringing about the death of Christ that it must have wrought out the death of all righteousness and peace among mankind. . . .

"The Son of God by taking human flesh allowed that inevitable consequence of the operation of the law of righteousness to be wrought on Himself. . . . He revealed to men in His sufferings what was the real nature of sin and its consequences; and then having thus satisfied the law of God by allowing it to work itself out to the full, He interceded with the Father for mercy towards us, and returned among us to save us, having obtained for us the remission of sins.

"But this having been done, and done once for all, that vindication stands for ever, and we can at least see that it goes far to answer the main purposes of the actual infliction of punishment on the sinner. God willed not the death of the sinner, but rather that he should return and repent. Provided His law is vindicated in such a way as to declare His righteousness, to make it manifest to the whole world that He cannot be reconciled to evil, and at the same time to arouse in men a due hatred of evil and love of righteousness, He has no pleasure, but the contrary, in exacting the ultimate penalty of sin from every one of His feeble creatures, and He offers them

forgiveness on condition that they submit themselves to His justice and mercy, by seeking that forgiveness solely on the ground of the satisfaction which has been offered by our Lord."[1]

(2.) The next to be considered is the view presented by the late *Albert Barnes*.[2]

The position which the Atonement is designed to meet is the following :—Man is and knows himself to be guilty of violating the law—a fact which cannot be unmade; he cannot repair the wrong done to himself, to society, to his Maker, to the law; nor can he remove the penalty or lay claim to pardon. What does the Atonement effect? *Consider, first, what it is not intended to do.* It is not intended to make God more benevolent or just than He was before, or to buy Him over to mercy; nor did Christ endure the strict and proper penalty of the law,—either remorse or eternal death,—for this can only be borne by the offender. *Consider, secondly, what it is intended to effect.* It is an expression of God's willingness to forgive—a willingness which, had He so chosen, might have been shown by a simple declaration. It is, *further*, a device or scheme on God's part for removing the obstacle, under a moral government, to the exercise of pardon, and for making the forgiveness of the sinner consistent with the maintenance of

[1] Wace, *The Gospel and its Witnesses*, 1883; lecture on "The Passion and Death of our Lord," p. 137 ff. A work some parts of which reminded me of Schöberlein.

[2] The well-known commentator. I have been given to understand by an eminent American theologian that Albert Barnes' view fairly represents the average New School Presbyterianism and Congregationalism of America. The following is an abstract of his two sermons (xvi. xvii.) on the "Atonement."

the honour of the law, and with justice and truth. With regard to the hindrances in question, He remarks, that in all governments there are such difficulties, especially the difficulty that pardon tends to lessen the moral power of law and to diminish respect for its sanctions. What is needed, therefore, if pardon is to be practicable and proper, is an arrangement to prevent the effect mentioned. The cases in which human governments pardon, namely, when the sentence of the law is too severe, or when the executive uses its liberty to pardon, do not apply here. The difficulty, however, would be met if the end contemplated in appointing penalty and inflicting punishment were met—which end was to express the view taken by the lawgiver of the sanctity and value of law, and of the evil and desert of sin; to supply a measure of its enormity, and to furnish a deterrent from its committal. As a matter of fact, the evil of sin is often seen most clearly in the sufferings of the innocent. Now, the sufferings of Christ, who voluntarily took our place, especially because of His exalted dignity as the Son of God, show forth all these things even more impressively than would the punishment of the guilty. In addition, He commends the infinite love of God by His death. Consequently, to forgive the sinner who believes in Christ is now perfectly compatible with the honour and majesty of the divine law, with the safety of the divine government, and with the dignity and consistency of God the great moral Governor.

Such is, in substance, the Governmental view expounded by Albert Barnes.

(3.) *Josiah Gilbert* is another who deserves attention.[1] There is so much agreement between him and Albert Barnes that a detailed account of his view will not be necessary. He lays down even more explicitly and generally than Barnes, that God being unchangeable, the atonement could not be meant to affect His mind; least of all, to inspire Him with respect for His own law:[2] and says that "the aspect of the atonement is towards creatures, working effects on them, not on God:"[3] which of itself is almost sufficient to justify my classification as far as he is concerned. Men hold a twofold relation to God—individual and official; and God has corresponding claims on them. The former, however, He might forego if He chose; the latter He cannot forego; failures to meet individual claims might be foregone, not offences against official claims; for His duty as a moral Governor is to uphold the law and wellbeing of the world, whose stability is threatened by sin.[4] In fact, God shows His goodness by being ready to forego *personal* rights or claims; and illustrates His justice by so modifying His administration of mercy, at great cost to Himself, that the protective power of moral sanctions shall be invigorated.[5] The function intended to be discharged by penal sanctions, namely, that of "securing due respect for law and guarding against temptation," is now discharged by the atonement, which was a public declaration of the nature

[1] Author of *Congregational Lecture* on the Atonement, delivered in 1836. His work, too, is highly esteemed in America; and Dr. Dale remarks of it that it always seemed to him "singularly judicious and able."

[2] *L.c.* p. 223. [3] P. 230. [4] P. 240. [5] P. 229.

and righteousness of God, the moral Governor of the universe.[1] Such is its real end; such is its sole end. It has to do with God exclusively in His official character. Only as a moral Governor—controlling men by influencing knowledge, reasoning, free volition[2]—can He accept substituted suffering. It neither has nor can have a personal relation.[3] In short, penalties and atonement have one and the same design, namely, to exercise over men a moral sway, in the direction of conformity to the will and mind of God, and of obedience to the law and order of His universe.

I might quote to the same effect from the writings of Principal Hill, Drs. Pye Smith, George Payne, Ralph Wardlaw, W. L. Alexander,[4] and others. These writers differ from each other in minor details; but, so far as I am able to judge, their premises, methods of reasoning, and conclusions are substantially the same. Stahl, Hofmann, and others in Germany may also be classed here.

So far as I can gather from the various expositions of this theory which I have examined, the *immediate* end[5] of the passion of Christ was to produce on men the impression which the sanctions of law were designed to produce, and when completely carried out, would have produced, whilst opening the way for a

[1] *L.c.* p. 242. [2] Pp. 19, 47. [3] P. 121.

[4] To these might be added the names of eminent American Divines, Dr. N. Taylor, formerly of Yale College; Dr. Edwards A. Park, of Andover, and others. See Dr. Alexander's *Biblical Theology*, pp. 166–186, admirably edited by the Rev. James Ross; published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark.

[5] As to the more remote ends of the passion of Christ, all are agreed, though the two are not always distinguished as they should be.

salvation which was otherwise *ipso facto* impossible. They were to be made to feel that though God was ready to forgive, He was as unchangeably holy, righteous, true as ever; that though penalties were remitted, the law had lost none of its sacredness, inviolability, justness; that sin, though its evil effects were checked, was no less sinful. But what is all this but "moral" influence? Whether considerations be brought to bear on men that are fitted to overcome their aversion or hostility to God, and by removing their suspicions and fears to make way for confidence and love, as in Dr. Young's view; or whether their consciences, their power of moral judgment, their fears and so forth, are influenced and worked upon—makes no real difference. Phrases, indeed, are often used, such as "to *enable* God;" but take them in their connection, and they will be found to refer solely to hindrances or difficulties that lie outside God. At the back of the reasonings on the subject there is always the assumption that in God Himself there is no obstacle; often, too, the notion that had He so chosen, He might have forgiven and redeemed without an atonement. God is "enabled" by the passion of Christ, in that by means of that passion He can govern as readily and wisely as He would govern by means of the infliction of deserved penalties. But the advocates of the pure self-sacrifice view would be able to say just the same: God can secure all the ends of moral government far more certainly by a supreme manifestation of His love in the surrender of His Son unto death, even the death of the cross, than by letting law have its course.

In one respect the "Governmental" agrees most thoroughly with the "Catholic" theories, namely, in its frequent reference to "the law;"[1] and the usage in this respect seems to me to be open to the objections which I mentioned in dealing with the latter. It is really crypto-dualism. But for the perpetual substitution of terms like "justice," "government," "administration," "law," and the like, where, unless a sort of dualism is conceded, God is really meant, I question whether they could have kept up the appearance of objectivity that has been preserved. It is time that theology, especially so far as the question of the relations of God and man are concerned, were cleared of a good deal of the roundabout abstract phraseology and terminology that at present, like a bristling fence, shuts up believers, and often excludes those who do not believe.

(II.) In a second subdivision of the exclusively manward-looking theories, I would place various modifications of what may be termed the *organic* or *dynamic* view, — the view that Christ, by His obedience unto death, not merely brought considerations or influences to bear on men's minds, *i.e.* through consciousness, but also produced a real effect on the life, on the vital energy, on the organic constitution of the race, or on the system to which man belongs. The difference between the two positions is this:—According to the properly moral view, man is first consciously appealed to, and then through his own action, or with his co-operation, a

[1] Professor Park goes even so far as to speak of being *reconciled to law*. See *Sermons*, p. 112.

change is effected; according to the organic view, the spiritual substance, or, at all events, the environment of humanity, is, so to speak, unconsciously affected, and out of that arises the transformation of the conscious life. The two views are rather mutually supplementary than mutually exclusive.

1. The theory of *Anselm*.

It is usual to regard *Anselm* as the first sower of the seed from which, in the course of ages, the entire crop of orthodox theories of the atonement has sprung—the theories, namely, which are based on the idea of justice, which are commonly designated juridical, and which vindicate for the work of Christ an objective as well as a subjective, a Godward as well as a manward purpose and influence. Anselm's exact position is, however, not very easy to determine; in the course of the dialogue with Boso, he throws out so many suggestions, each of which may seem to supply the key to his theory, that one cannot be surprised at the variety of views held regarding it.[1]

There is much to be said in favour of an idea thrown out many years ago by Baumgarten-Crusius, and recently revived by Dorner,[2] namely, that Anselm regarded sin and the work of Christ very much in the light in which a knight of the age at which he wrote regarded an insult and the reparation due by his insulter. Not to pay to God His *debitum* is to sin;[3] what we owe to God is *solus et totus*

[1] *Cur Deus Homo?*
[2] Dorner, *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii.
[3] *Cur Deus Homo?* cap. xi.

honor, which includes everything;[1] he who fails to render to God the honour which is His due, robs God of what belongs to Him and dishonours Him;[2] as long as this is not repaid the offender remains guilty;[3] nor is it sufficient to repay simply what was robbed—no, for the insult inflicted, there ought to be returned more than was taken way;[4] such payment is the *Satisfactio* which every sinner ought to offer to God:[5] as man was so made that he could enjoy blessedness provided he did not sin; if, on account of sin, he be deprived of blessedness and all good, he repays what he robbed, even though he do it unwillingly.[6] Such payment, however, denotes for man ruin; if he is to be saved, it must be by Christ or in some other way; but another mode than by Christ exists not.[7] The alternative, therefore, was *satisfaction* by Christ or *payment by punishment*. God could not be really deprived of His honour; for if it were not paid voluntarily by the sinner, it would be paid involuntarily.[8] As the latter mode of payment, however, meant both man's ruin and the frustration of God's plan for supplementing the gap made by the fall of the angels,[9] God, being in addition compassionate, resolved to secure satisfaction by the God-man.

The frequent use of such words as "decet," "convenit,"[10] "tolerat,"[11] and so forth, point in the direction thus indicated by Dorner; and were this view of the case correct, we should have had to class Anselm's

[1] *L.c.* cap. xi. [2] Cap. xi. [3] Cap. xi.
[4] Cap. xi. [5] Cap. xi. [6] Cap. xiv.
[7] Cap. xxv. [8] Cap. xiv. [9] Cap. xvi.
[10] Cap. xii. [11] Cap. xiii.

theory with those which regard the work of Christ as having a *personal Godward* end to serve.

But a serious difficulty is interposed by Anselm himself. He tells us elsewhere, that as far as God Himself is concerned, nothing can be either added or taken away from His honour; and that it is essentially incapable of being stained or changed.[1] When creatures, however, serve God, whether naturally or rationally, *they are said to obey and honour* Him.[2] Especially is this said of rational creatures, which honour God by willing to render unto Him what they owe to Him; not because they *confer anything on Him*, but because they voluntarily submit to the divine will, and subserve the order and beauty of His universe.[3] When, on the contrary, they refuse to will what they owe, and thus bring disorder and ugliness into the universe, they are said to dishonour God, though they cannot in any wise thereby either damage or soil the divine power or dignity.[4]

If we are to interpret Christ's work in the light of this fundamental assumption,—an assumption which is in strict harmony with the general thought of the Church regarding God and His immutability, His non-affectibility by man, or anything man can do, down to a very recent period, yea, to our own day;[5] further, of the notion that a gap made by the fall in the number of angels, as conceived and willed by God, was to be filled up by men;[6] and lastly, of a certain conception of the constitution of the

[1] Cap. xv. [2] Cap. xv. [3] Cap. xv. [4] Cap. xv.

[5] See Dorner on the Divine Immutability in his volume of Dissertations, and the corresponding section in the *Glaubenslehre*.

[6] Cap. xvi.

universe as a whole, at which he hints in various passages,[1]—it seems to me more correct to class Anselm with the divines whose conception of the influence or action of the work of Christ is not properly objective. To describe his theory as subjective in the exclusively *manward* sense would scarcely be accurate; but that it does not look *Godward* his own protests make quite clear: it really looks towards the *cosmos as a whole*, with special reference, of course, to man and angelic intelligences. It is possible, of course, to use the word objective[2] in such a sense as to embrace all that is not man, or the individual man; but that would be simply to confuse, and would necessitate the employment of some other less ambiguous term like *Godward*.[3]

2. The second form deserving of notice is one that has recently been freshly put by *Bishop Magee*: "Forgiveness is achieved by and in a supernatural dispensation, a system of things created by the marvellous power and love of God, in order that by it that remission of penalty might be obtained which in the natural order of things seems impossible. This state of things is described as a new state of being—a new life; so new, that those who enter it are said to have been born again."

[1] *E.g.* cap. xv.: "Rerum universitatis ordo." "Ejusdem Universitatis pulchritudo."

[2] This is done even by writers so eminent as Dorner; so also by Dr. Dale.

[3] The prevailing theory in the Romish Church is probably in essence this of Anselm, stripped, of course, of some of the subordinate elements of Anselm's theory. See, *e.g.*, Hettinger, *Apologie des Christenthums*, Abth. i. Bk. ii. Lecture 10, 3rd edition.

"This state we enter into by a spiritual act of faith, which unites us with a divine person, who is said to be one with us. . . . We are his body; he is our life. He is not an individual man, but humanity.[1] . . . A unique supernatural fact is effected in the spiritual world by the great *miracle* of the incarnation, which produced a profound change in the relations between God and humanity. . . . It frees us from law. . . . And this new existence, this new state and condition of being in which we are in some *mysterious* way delivered from the operation and rule of natural law and brought under other rules and laws which are supernatural, is obtained for us by one who died, rose, and ascended to heaven, that he might communicate to us from thence a life over which death had no power." "The essential idea of the sacrifice of Christ is an offering made not to appease the wrath of an angry God, but to effect the compassionate purpose of a loving God." "The sublime self-sacrifice of a voluntary victim offering himself freely, lovingly to save others from sins in which he has no share, and penalties which he has never incurred."[2]

3. As a third form may be adduced the representation given by F. W. Robertson. In order to appreciate his view it is necessary to bear in mind what he held regarding sin. "*Sin*," he says, "is a *great connected principle*, — a *single world-spirit*, — exactly as the electricity with which the universe is

[1] There is a curious echo here of the ideas expounded by Kant in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft*, and since taken up by A. Ritschl, of Göttingen.

[2] Bishop Magee, *Atonement*, p. 114 ff., p. 83 f. Cassell & Co., 1887. The late Thomas Binney held a similar view of the work of Christ.

charged is indivisible, so that you cannot separate it from the great ocean of fluid. The electric spark that slumbers in the dewdrop is part of the flood which struck the oak. Separate acts of sin are but manifestations of one great principle." "Let us possess ourselves of this view of sin, for it is in this way only that we shall be able, with any reality of feeling, to enter into the truth that our sins nailed the Saviour to the cross, or that the Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all." "It was Christ's foresight of all the *results* of His opposition to the world's sin, and His steady and uncompromising battle against it notwithstanding, in every one of its varied forms, knowing that He must be its victim at the last, which elevated His death to the dignity of a sacrifice. It was a true and proper sacrifice—a sacrifice for sin—for the *world's* sin." It is altogether wrong, however, to think of Him "as having endured a mysterious anguish, the consequence of divine wrath, the suffering of a heart laden with the world's transgressions." "Christ simply came into collision with the world's evil, and bore the penalty of that daring. . . . Such is the law which governs the conflict with evil. It can be crushed only by suffering from it. The Son of man, who puts His naked heel on the serpent's head, crushes it; but the fang goes into His heel." [1] The idea evidently hovered before Robertson of a great whole of sin or evil on which Christ inflicted a deadly blow; thus in principle delivering man, though ages might elapse before the final destruction and disappearance of the whole; though the co-operation of every individual

[1] *Sermons*, 1st series, pp. 58–164.

man would be needed; and though the undertaking necessarily involved the suffering and death to which so exclusive prominence has been given.

4. A fourth form of the organic theory of the Atonement is *Schleiermacher's*. According to Schleiermacher, Christ's *business* (Geschäft) consists in the assumption of believers into the fellowship of His life; that is, on the one hand, into "the vigour of His God-consciousness;" on the other, into the "enjoyment of His untroubled blessedness."[1] The former is His redeeming, the latter His atoning activity. The *former* denotes the religious and moral renewal of the Church by means of vital fellowship with its archetypally perfect head; the *latter*, the doing away with the power of evil and sin, to the extent that evils are no longer felt to be a divine punishment, and the man who bears them no longer regards himself as worthy of punishment. . . . The sufferings of Christ were purely sympathy with human guilt and ill-desert, and the innocent endurance of ills deserved by others; which sympathy, being the highest proof of self-denying love, has a redeeming effect on human souls, and thus also mediately takes away punishment; that is, the sense of ill-desert from the redeemed. . . . All this Christ works solely through the medium of the organization, that is, the Church, which He called into existence by the moral energy of His life. He does not act directly on individuals for their redemption. When men are received into this organization they come under the influence of the pure and blessed life

[1] With which one side of A. Ritschl's is akin. For the account given in the text I am partly indebted to Lipsius' *Dogmatik*, 1st ed. p. 534 f.

by which it is, as to principle, animated; and so far as that life issued from Christ at the first, so far are we said to be still indebted to and saved by Him. Any other influence exerted by Him is what Schleiermacher calls "empirical;" that is, the influence of His example and teaching.

To put the position into a few words :—Christ held an archetypal relation to God; through Him and His life God or He founded a Church which embodies the principle of His life; Christ bore sympathetically human sufferings and sin, and yet His relation to God was not disturbed by them; those who become members of His Church enter into His life, and therefore become in principle what He was, and are no longer separated from God by sin and suffering; they are thus redeemed, on the one hand, by His action through the living organization which He established, and which His life in all its aspects animates and inspires; on the other hand, by what they read of His example and teaching.[1]

Besides the two great classes of theories — objectivo-subjective and subjective—to which attention has been called, a *third* might be made of theories which have been worked out from an exclusively philosophical point of view, and as constituent parts of systems of philosophy. These again might be subdivided, according as they represent the atonement as a kind of process primarily in God Himself though reflected or reproduced in the creature; or as a sort of cosmic process—the cosmos and the process alike embracing God and man; or

[1] See Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. § 100–105, 5th ed.

as a purely subjective process of the human mind, whether intellectual or moral. In the first subdivision may be placed Jacob Böhme and the mystics and theosophists generally; in the second, Schelling, Hegel, Daub, and others; in the third, Kant, some of his followers, and others akin to him.

It would help at the present time to clear the air in some quarters if a thoroughly definite exposition were given of the nature, scope, and implications of theories of the second subdivision, especially of that of Hegel. For signs are not lacking that there is going on among us not a little Hegelianization of the Christian faith in general, and of the Christian atonement in particular. What I mean is that *ideas* of the Hegelian philosophy are being quietly substituted for the concrete actualities accepted by the Christian Church. This may be done by some in the good faith that the two are really identical, that they are only different modes of presenting, or different stages of apprehending or conceiving the same things. All depends then on the starting-point. If a man start with the concrete actualities, he may perhaps find intellectual satisfaction—theological, or scientific, or philosophical satisfaction—by expressing and correlating them in *terms of the Hegelian* dialectic. Against this no objection of *principle* can fairly be urged. One may judge the result inadequate; one may fear its logical consequences; but, as a *bona fide theological* effort to rationalize facts derived from revelation and experience, it is as legitimate in principle as the procedure of the most "orthodox" theologian.

But it is also possible for a man to *start*, not with the concrete actualities in question, but with his Hegelian system,[1] and to clothe those of its ideas which bear the process, or which there may be other reasons for thus clothing, in the language of the Christian faith, in such a manner as to produce the superficial impression of being what is called orthodox ; whilst the concrete actualities believed by the Church are never really touched or grasped. Hegelian ideas or *Begriffe* are the objective reality : religious facts are the figurative (*Vorstellungs-mässige*) representations thereof. Perhaps this, too, may be done in good faith,—the good faith of one who thinks himself to have attained to the true esoteric gnosis, but feels himself bound to speak to *them that are without in parables, that seeing they may see and not perceive*. It may also be believed that the true function of the Church and the Christian preacher can in this way be discharged. If it could be, well and good ; but it cannot be. The soul of man, that is, the *inward man*, can no more be fed by ideas than the outer man. It needs *spiritual actualities*, even as the body needs material actualities. Preaching of this order is in reality the presentation of ideas and nothing more. They may, of course, have a certain influence,—ideas have, even fancies,—but they cannot produce the effects which actualities produce. The best evidence of this is the history of the Church. The substitution to which I am referring has been tried on a large scale, especially in Germany.

[1] For a thoroughgoing example of the Hegelianization of the Christian faith, see Biedermann's *Dogmatik* ; also Lang's *Christliche Dogmatik*.

Wherever it has been tried, the results have been, in the long run, an enfeeblement of the inner man, a lowering of the tone, and a diminution of his spiritual life and activity, exactly analogous to the enfeeblement of the outer man, the lowering of the tone, and the diminution of the bodily life and activity which invariably follow the withholding of proper bodily nourishment.

The fact that the Son of God died for the remission of sins is known by us now solely from the New Testament. The early Christians outside Jerusalem learnt it from the apostles and their successors. It was committed to writings, which are the channel through which we became acquainted with it. Another source of information does not exist. It is embodied, indeed, in the Lord's Supper, which was celebrated from the very beginning. But apart from the writings of the New Testament, that ordinance would certainly soon have degenerated into a magical ceremony observed with superstitious awe; but not understood at all, or, as is even the case now in the Romish and Greek Churches, and Churches which imitate them, very partially understood. Tradition, too, would have been a very untrustworthy vehicle of knowledge, as, in fact, experience has abundantly shown.

Whilst we owe our acquaintance with this great fact to the New Testament, it must not be supposed that the authority of the New Testament is our only ground of confidence regarding it. On the contrary,

it has proved its own reality by the effects which it has produced in the life of humanity.

Now Christian theology, as I have already taken for granted, is concerned with the task of showing the how and why of the great work accomplished by Christ. It aims at exhibiting its *rationale*. Whether we accept the fact simply on the testimony of the New Testament, or on that testimony conjoined with the confirmation afforded by the experience of centuries, matters not:—theology asks, How did the earthly passion of Christ bring these effects about? What was its exact relation to the establishment of the divine kingdom which has actually been proceeding? Especially, what had His death to do with reconciling God and man? What was the *modus operandi?* What were the principles involved? In a word, Christian theology seeks a "doctrine," or "theory," or explanation of the atonement.

At this point our business begins to be scientific or philosophical. We take the fact for granted as given. It is not, of course, a fact of the natural world, like the appearance of a new comet or the polarity of electricity; but it may none the less be a fact. There is an order of things, with facts and laws of its own, different from that with which natural science has to do. That order we designate the moral cosmos; and to it this fact specially pertains. Not that it will not affect the physical order; but that, as I previously remarked, it belongs specifically to the religious, which is a branch of the moral sphere. Within the great system of forces and relations and laws which is designated the moral

cosmos, there are lesser systems such as the family, the tribe, the nation, which at their centre are essentially moral; and their facts are no less real than the facts of the great physical system with the minor systems of which it consists. Of the great moral system God is the centre, the relations to Him are supreme, and the laws controlling those relations are fundamental and all-comprehending.

If this system really exists, we may surely inquire how the rectification of its disordered relations and states was accomplished by the mission of the Son of God on earth; and this inquiry is scientific. If the non-existence of such an order were established, and the fact were accordingly found to be a delusion, it would then devolve on science to show how the delusion arose. Meanwhile, those of us who believe in God and the closeness and supreme importance of the relation between God and man, and who know that naturally the relations between man and God are abnormal, can scarcely have an excuse for the *a priori* denial of the fact that Christ came to rectify these relations; still less to refuse to interest themselves in attempts to discover the how and why of the Saviour's work.

But if such efforts are to claim scientific character, they must submit to scientific conditions. Not, indeed, to conditions drawn from the natural sphere, but to conditions appropriate to the moral sphere—to the sphere of which God is the supreme factor. Speaking generally, we shall have to show that it falls in with, is congruous to, certain principles and relations which, if a God such as the Biblical God

exists at all, must be allowed to have validity and existence. The theologian who deals with the atonement alone must take for granted the chief features of a system whose justification is the task of systematic theology in general. So that, strictly speaking, the atoning work of Christ, as I previously remarked, can only be fully and adequately justified as part of a system which embraces in its consideration the kingdom of God in its entirety, with God, creation, especially the world of intelligences, and sin.

CHAPTER I.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

I. The earthly mission of our Lord Jesus Christ, with its *obedience unto death, even the death of the cross*, was an episode in the history of the kingdom of God. It was a history within a history; an objective historical process within another vaster historical process; a transaction or series of transactions within and related to a grander transaction or series of transactions. It might be called an act or scene in the great drama of history.

In this respect it has, of course, many analogies in human history. The history of every nation includes episodes within itself. The revolution which issued in the Cromwellian Republic was an episode in the history of England. So, too, though in another way and on a minor scale, the passing of the first Reform Bill. The Thirty Years' War in Germany was such an episode on a larger scale, with more complex connections and weightier issues.

The history of humanity, notwithstanding the apparent isolation of many of its families and tribes and nations,—notwithstanding the jealousies, antagonisms, and divisions that have everywhere prevailed,—is one great history. It is the history of the develop-

ment, amidst all kinds of hindrances and despite all kinds of failures and neglects, of the divine idea of humanity. That history, too, has its great episodes.

But the history of the kingdom of God is, beyond all imagination, vaster than that of the history of humanity. It embraces the latter and far more. And of it the mission of Christ is an episode,—the most significant episode,—one, indeed, which was played out on earth and amongst men, but whose relations and issues concerned far more than the earth and humanity.

II. Nay more, that mission is an episode in the relation of our Lord Jesus Christ to the kingdom of God. His relation to that kingdom neither began nor shall end with this particular mission. He undertook His earthly work because of the position which He already held in the kingdom. It was fitting that He should come to redeem, because of the relation He already bore to the system which needed redemption. To regard Christ, or to speak of Him, as if He were merely the Redeemer, or to ignore the larger and prior relations, is to narrow His functions,—yea, it is to endanger the due appreciation of His redemptive work.

To this also general history supplies us with analogies. He who discharges larger functions in a kingdom is for that reason better fitted to undertake special missions. Efficiency in a narrower sphere prepares, indeed, for undertaking larger duties; at all events, ordinarily. But if any task of more than usual complexity and difficulty is to be accomplished, it is usual to entrust it to one whose previous position

points him out as the one on whom it naturally devolves.

Forgetfulness of this very obvious truth regarding Christ has been fruitful of practical mischief. Men have supposed that if they needed no redemption or cared not to be redeemed, therefore Christ had no claim on them, and they owed no special regard to Christ. It is not so; and that it is not so, I would express by saying that His earthly mission is an episode in His relation to the kingdom of God.

III. As such, the mission of Christ can only be understood when looked at in the light of the kingdom of God,—of its nature, constitution, laws, condition, and destiny. Both the events which constitute redemption and the person who undertook the work, find their explanation in the kingdom. Were the kingdom not what it is, the mission of Christ would not have been undertaken, and would not have taken the form it actually did. Given a system constituted as is the kingdom of God, and the occurrence of the changes known as sin and evil, then the mission of the Son of God was a moral necessity, as rational and natural, though in form supernatural and transcending human comprehension, as any transaction whatever in the moral cosmos. It would not be more natural and reasonable for the father of a human family to entrust his eldest son with a mission to recall the rest of his brothers and sisters to duty and happiness; or for a human monarch to commission his son and heir to undertake the restoration of a rebellious province of his dominions to loyalty and prosperity. We should acknowledge that the mission in each case

owed its intelligibility to, and was truly intelligible in, the light of the previous relations.

So is it with Christ and His mission. If we would duly appreciate it,—*i.e.* in an intellectual respect,—if we would apprehend its truth as truth,—we must first grasp the larger whole, and then assign to it the place it actually holds in the larger whole. Till then, it will continue to wear that look of exceptionality which, in the domain of the spiritual, is the sure forerunner of intellectual doubt and practical disregard.

IV. One may say, indeed, that in the history of the kingdom of God there is nothing really abrupt, really exceptional. It comprises no *deus ex machinâ* interferences. The Eternal Father, the co-equal Son, and the Holy Spirit, hold originally and naturally such a relation to the great system of things which constitutes the divine kingdom, that whatever they do is as natural and reasonable for them to do as anything that can be normally done by a human monarch within his dominions, or a human father within his family. Not even miracles bear this character. They find a place as naturally in a system constituted as is God's kingdom, under the circumstances induced by sin, as would any seemingly exceptional act of an earthly ruler or father. If we fail to assign them their place, —the place which would account for them,—it is either because we do not understand the constitution of God's kingdom, or are still ignorant of the larger process to which these transactions belong.

All this is emphatically true of the mission and work of Christ. It did not, indeed, form part of or enter into the original divine plan of the kingdom;

at all events, not in the form which it actually took; but, as I observed already, given the kingdom as actually constituted by God, given the original relation of Christ thereto, and given the fact of sin, we may say not only that Christ's mission was natural and reasonable, but that it would have been a violation of its order,—a miracle of disorder,—an irrationality,—if the Son of God had not come into the world as He did.

V. The justification of this description of Christ's mission as an episode in the history of the kingdom of God is supplied by Christ Himself. He surely, if any one, knew from what point of view it is most satisfactorily regarded, most clearly understood. He does not, indeed, refer to the subject for the purpose of explanation; He simply sets forth the object which He came to accomplish in the plainest and most intelligible terms for an immediate practical end; He tells us what He came to do. But this may be taken to render His language all the more significant, all the more worthy of attentive consideration.

He speaks of His mission, and of the work of His disciples; and the disciples speak of His mission, and of their own work as directed to the establishment of the kingdom of God.

Our Lord began His ministry by "preaching the gospel of God, and saying the time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand;"[1] "And Jesus went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the gospel of the kingdom."[2] To the multitudes who wished to detain Him, He said, "I

[1] Mark i. 14.

[2] Matt. iv. 23.

must preach the good tidings of the kingdom of God to the other cities also; for therefore was I sent."[1] "He went about through cities and villages preaching and bringing the good tidings of the kingdom of God."[2] He also foretold that this gospel of the kingdom should be preached in the whole world for a testimony unto all the nations;[3] and "when He showed Himself alive after His passion, and appeared unto the disciples during the space of forty days, He spake the things concerning the kingdom."[4] A great part of His teaching before the crucifixion turned on the kingdom of God. His parables especially were devoted to the elucidation of its principles, laws, aims, and so forth. He exhorts men to seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness;[5] promising to them, as to all who are loyal subjects, every blessing—outward and inward.

His commission to His disciples was "to preach the kingdom of God;"[6] and that the apostles understood that it was to be the burden of their testimony is clear, both from their conduct and their words. Philip was believed, preaching good tidings concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ.[7] Paul says to the Ephesian elders when on the point of parting from them, "Behold, I know that ye all among whom I went about preaching the kingdom shall see my face no more:"[8] and whilst abiding in Rome he "received all that went in unto him, preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching the things

[1] Luke iv. 43. [2] Luke viii. 1. [3] Matt. xxiv. 14.
[4] Acts i. 3. [5] Matt. vi. 33; Luke xii. 31.
[6] Luke ix. 2. [7] Acts viii. 12. [8] Acts xx. 25.

concerning the Lord Jesus Christ with all boldness;"[1] and he warned the Christians of Derbe, Lystra, Iconium, and Antioch, that through many tribulations they must enter into the kingdom of God.[2] His kingdom is one that cannot be moved;[3] it is not eating and drinking, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost;[4] it is not in word, but in power;[5] the unrighteous cannot inherit it;[6] God delivers us out of the power of darkness, and translates us into the kingdom of the Son of His love.[7] It is an eternal kingdom;[8] Christians are exhorted to have patience and faith in all their persecutions and afflictions, to the end that they may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God for which they suffer.[9] And the Book of Revelation is full of allusions to the conflicts and triumphs, the joys and glories, of the kingdom of God or the kingdom of heaven.

Few things are more striking than the contrast between the emphasis laid on the kingdom of God and the variety of the allusions to it in the Scripture, especially in the Gospels, and the rarity and vagueness of the references to it in ordinary Christian preaching and teaching. Instead of being the burden of the message of the modern representatives of Christ, it is treated as a sort of idea having solely a theoretical significance, and therefore not to be given any prominence. And where it is preached or discussed it is too often spiritualized away.

VI. *The Kingdom of God.* — In the absence of

[1] Acts xxviii. 31. [2] Acts xiv. 21 f. [3] Heb. xii. 28.
[4] Rom. iv. 17. [5] 1 Cor. iv. 20. [6] 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.
[7] Col. i. 14. [8] 2 Pet. i. 11. [9] 2 Thess. i. 5.

agreement among theologians as to the nature of the kingdom of God, it will be necessary for me briefly to expound my own view. The limits of this work will prevent me from discussing with any fulness the reasons for or the objections which might be urged against it. To do that I should require a volume instead of a chapter.[1] If I might use any one term to designate the view to be expounded, it would be the word *realistic*. I take the expressions of the Scriptures—Old Testament and New Testament—in their natural sense as denoting something real, actual; and by doing so, I think it possible to correlate views which seem mutually exclusive.

1. The universe in its totality, with its innumerable intelligences, constitutes the kingdom of God. As such it is directly or indirectly described with great frequency in the Old Testament; and the allusions in the New Testament, so far from being incompatible therewith, really presuppose and require the recognition of what is contained in the Old Testament. The latter supplies in the main the inward for the outward chiefly set forth in the former. "Thine, O Lord," said David, king of Israel, when he publicly consecrated the gifts of the nation to the erection of a temple to Jehovah, "is the greatness, and the power, and the glory, and the majesty: for all that is in the heaven and the earth is Thine; Thine is the kingdom,

[1] The best English work on the subject is Prof. Candlish's Cunningham Lectures on the "Kingdom of God." A good deal of the literature is mentioned by him. See A. Dorner's *Kirche u. Reich Gottes*. The only writer that I know of whose general point of view seems substantially to agree with my own is Kling, in his article "Reich Gottes," in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopædie*, vol. xii. 1st ed.

O Lord, and Thou art exalted as head above all. Both riches and honour come of Thee, and Thou rulest over all; and in Thine hand is power and might; and in Thine hand it is to make great, and to give strength unto all;"[1] and David surely knew what was meant by the words he so emphatically employed. "The Lord hath established His throne in the heavens, and His kingdom ruleth over all. Bless the Lord, ye angels of His; ye mighty in strength that fulfil His word; bless the Lord, all ye His hosts, ye ministers of His that do His pleasure. Bless the Lord, all ye His works, in all places of His dominion."[2] "The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool: what manner of house will ye build me? and what place shall be my rest? For all these things hath mine hand made, and so all these things came to be."[3] "His dominion is an everlasting dominion, and His kingdom from generation to generation; and all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing; and He doeth according to His will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth."[4] "He is the living God, and stedfast for ever, and His kingdom that which shall not be destroyed, and His dominion shall be even unto the end. He delivereth and rescueth, and He worketh signs and wonders in heaven and in earth."[5] This conception seems to me to be the tacit assumption at the back of a large proportion of the references to God in the Old Testament:

[1] 1 Chron. xxix. 11, 12.
[2] Ps. ciii. 19–22. Cf. Ps. xi. 4; Matt. v. 34; Ps. cxlv. 10–13.
[3] Isa. lxvi. 1. [4] Dan. iv. 34, 35.
[5] Dan. vi. 26. See also the numerous passages where God is termed King.

it is its ruling idea. It dominates the Jewish view of their history, constitution, mission, and destiny as a nation. Why it should be reduced to the position of a kind of *theologoumenon* or *philosophoumenon*, instead of being treated as the supreme fact of the universe, is more than I feel able to explain.

God, indeed, is the creator, the generator of His own kingdom. Unlike human monarchs, He finds nothing ready to His hand; He has to bring everything into existence, give everything its nature, impose on everything its laws; but, notwithstanding, He is and must be regarded as the King of the universe, and the universe as His kingdom; yea, in the most real sense in which the words can be employed. There is no doubt a profound mystery in the fact — the mystery of mysteries; but the fact may be a fact despite its being a mystery; and whether we can see it to be a fact or not, such is the mode of representation of our Book of Books.

2. The territory of the kingdom of God is the physical part of the universe. When we speak of a kingdom we naturally—why not necessarily?—ask—where? The kingdom, in the strictest sense, is perhaps constituted by the subjects, but the subjects must be somewhere—must live, and move, and act somewhere. What is the *where* of this kingdom? The so-called physical universe. This physical universe is again distinguishable into a visible and invisible part; that is, a part which is appreciable by and accessible to our bodily senses, either unaided or with such aids as we ourselves can now supply for ourselves, and a part which is at present inaccessible to

us, unless it be by capabilities of perception, by powers of sensitivity, which are ordinarily dormant or in abeyance.

Of the former, the earth is the part with which we are most specially concerned ; but it also includes what we commonly term the heavens as well as the earth. Sun, moon, planets, stars,—all the heavenly hosts in all their known and unknown varieties, — with the earth, constitute the visible territory of the empire of the King of kings. Our earth is but a very minute part of His dominion ; so minute, that to many it seems the height of absurdity that the supreme Monarch should condescend to take note of it, still more, to arrange for its being the scene of a transaction so amazing as that of the incarnation and sacrifice of His beloved Son. But how little do we yet know of the inter-relations of the physical cosmos! —far too little to warrant us in dogmatizing on merely quantitative grounds. Who can tell but that this earth is in some such sense the present centre of the physical cosmos, as a comparatively small city may be the capital and centre of a mighty empire ? Meanwhile those of us who have experience of Christ as the power of God unto salvation can well afford to wait till we shall "know even as also we are known."

The laws of this physical universe are the laws of God ; none the less His for being interwoven with its very essence and constitution,—none the less His because they are not prescribed and promulgated after the manner of the moral laws to which moral beings are subject. These laws are being investigated by the scientists of the world ; and though many of them

fail to see that they are as truly written in stone and other materials by the finger of God as were the laws of Sinai, every godly man should rejoice at the work they are doing, and say like our great Master, *they that are not against us are for us;* and like Paul, even if in another connection, *in every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is proclaimed; and herein I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.*[1]

Concerning the invisible territory of the great King nothing definite can be said, and little conjectured. For my own part, as I hold that created spirit cannot exist without its corporeal correlate or vehicle, whether of the kind with which we are now familiar or of that kind which the Apostle Paul had in view when he used the—as some count them—paradoxical or even self-contradictory words "spiritual body," so also do I hold that the intelligences clothed with a "spiritual body" will inhabit a material or corporeal world answering to their spiritual bodies,—a world which shall be to them a basis of existence, a means of expression, a sphere of action, a source of stimulus and of nutriment, in short, an environment analogous to that in the midst of which we now live. This world, too, will have its own laws — divine laws analogous to, though scarcely identical with, or a continuation, prolongation, but rather a transfiguration, sublimation of those which it is at present the business of natural science to investigate and expound.[2]

Scripture does not, as far as I am aware, explicitly

[1] Phil. i. 18.

[2] See Isaac Taylor's *Physical Theory of Future Life;* Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World;* Stewart and Tait, *The Unseen Universe.*

distinguish between the territory and its inhabitants; but the distinction lies at the back of the numerous allusions to the divine kingdom as embracing the heavens and the earth, and is necessary to their being duly appreciated. Nor does it expressly inform us with regard to the invisible part of the royal dominion; yet it is surely fair to suppose that the descriptions of the "new earth and new heaven," of the heavenly Jerusalem, the holy city which has the glory of God to lighten it, of the river of water of life, bright as crystal, which is in the midst thereof, and of the tree of life on both sides of the river bearing twelve manner of fruits, yielding its fruit every month,[1] not to mention what is implied in the words, "in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers,"[2] have a background of reality; that though the images used are material, such as we now know it, the things signified may be material of the spiritual kind corresponding to the spiritual body.

3. The subjects of God's kingdom are the free intelligences which inhabit it. These, too, are visible and invisible; *i.e.* perceptible by our bodily senses, and imperceptible by our bodily senses;—whether or no the latter are occasionally perceptible to specially constituted, specially sensitive individuals, such as were some of the old prophets and the Apostle Paul, I need not stay to inquire. For our purpose men are the only visible subjects of God, and indeed only

[1] Rev. xxi. 1 ff., xxii. 1 ff.
[2] Col. i. 16; cf. Rom. viii. 38; Eph. i. 21, iii. 10; Col. ii. 10.

those who still visibly inhabit the earth. But there are among the inhabitants of the invisible sphere myriads on myriads of men who have been unclothed of their visible organization. That all these are the subjects of God is implicitly taken for granted and explicitly affirmed so frequently in Scripture, that it seems almost a work of supererogation to adduce passages:—"All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord; and all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before Thee. For the kingdom is the Lord's; and He is the ruler over the nations."[1] "God is the King of all the earth. God reigneth over the nations: the princes of the people are gathered together, the people of the God of Abraham; for the shields of the earth belong unto God."[2] "The Lord is the living God, and an everlasting King: at His wrath the earth trembleth, and the nations are not able to abide His indignation."[3]

Not less are the inhabitants of the invisible world His subjects. Indeed, the very name by which one great section of them is called points to this relationship,—they are angels—messengers. As such they are sent forth to do the will of God especially among men. "Are they not all ministering spirits?"[4] They were employed in a great variety of services alike in Old and New Testament times; they characterize themselves as "fellow-servants with their brethren the prophets;"[5] and at the last they will be sent forth by the Son of man to gather out of His kingdom all things that cause stumbling, and them that do iniquity.[6]

[1] Ps. xxii. 27, 28. [2] Ps. xlvii. 7 ff. [3] Jer. x. 10.
[4] Heb. i. 14. [5] Rev. xxii. 9, cf. xix. 10. [6] Matt. xiii. 41, 42.

"Because His kingdom ruleth over all,"—therefore are the angels called upon to bless the Lord—they who, being mighty in strength, fulfil His word, hearkening unto His voice.[1]

The Monarch and the subjects of this great kingdom are bound together by a fixed constitution, and their mutual relations are determined by laws as unchangeable as those which regulate the heavens. God and man, man and man, are designed by the Creator and Ruler to hold certain relations to each other. The various ethnic religions, theoretically considered, embody the results of human efforts to discover the relations men should hold to God: Judaism and especially Christianity give us God's view of those relations. Human social constitutions and laws, on the other hand, are the results of men's inquiries into and experiments with regard to the relations which man was designed by God to hold to man. In the New Testament, again, the fundamental laws regulating those relations are set forth by teachers whose eyes God had opened to know His mind and will.

Doubtless all this holds equally true of the invisible world. Indeed, there are hints in the Scriptures that its inhabitants are divided into ranks and orders; for we read of angels and archangels, cherubim and seraphim, principalities and powers. What their relations to each other may be, cannot be told; though we may be sure that the fundamental moral laws that apply to men apply also to them. The same thing may be assumed to be true of their

[1] Ps. ciii. 19 ff.

relations to God. In a word, for invisibles and visibles, the supreme law of life is the one laid down by Christ—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and soul, and mind, and strength; and thy neighbour as thyself."

4. In speaking of God as the universal King, and of the visible and invisible worlds as His territory or dominion, and of their respective inhabitants, visible and invisible, as His subjects, we are compelled to make use of the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto*, of right and in fact. God is of right the universal King; as a matter of fact His territory is in disorder, and myriads of His subjects are in more or less complete rebellion—some, it is believed, in open and avowed rebellion. But as a human monarch may be *de jure* ruler of his kingdom, whilst in fact provinces thereof may be in rebellion, and as he and his faithful subjects would resent, and justly resent, his being spoken of in any other way than as the king; so in the case before us. The Scriptures do not make use of these two expressions with regard to God and the universe; but the things denoted by the expressions are everywhere recognised. Indeed, they supply the true key to the history of which the Scriptures are the record and product.

The fact that *men* are God's subjects though they disobey His will, is everywhere implicitly or explicitly confessed; and commendation and blessing are bestowed on such as are loyal and righteous. The judgments pronounced and executed upon them by God for their conduct towards Himself are

only intelligible and justifiable on the assumption that they *are* His subjects—His rightful subjects,—not that they have to *become* His subjects, belonging *de jure* either to themselves or some other ruler, though their conduct is out of harmony with their responsibilities.

Equally true is this of the invisible world. Some of its inhabitants are—some always have been—loyal, loving subjects. Over them, God is therefore in the fullest sense King. Others again are rebels, doubtless of different degrees, from him who, because of his slighter offences, is beaten with few stripes, to that Titanic spirit whom Milton represents as saying,—

> Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.

But even of him God is *de jure* King; and no purpose, no effort to establish a separate and hostile dominion can relieve him from his allegiance—to the end of the chapter he is but a subject in rebellion.

It may almost seem trifling to call attention to this simple distinction; and yet, simple as it is, it has been practically ignored in the thinking, writing, and speaking of thousands of Christian teachers, and that to the great detriment of Christianity. Says a recent writer:[1] "Satan is said to be the prince and god of this world. His kingdom is the *kingdom of darkness, in which all men since Adam are born, and in which they remain,* until translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. They are *his subjects,* taken captive by him at his will."[2]

[1] *Systematic Theology,* by C. Hodge, D.D., vol. ii. p. 518 f.
[2] 2 Tim. ii. 26.

And this is a specimen of a mode of representation which has either given rise to, or at all events fostered, the notion that somehow or other men are naturally outside God's kingdom, and do not become subject to its obligations, till they freely take them upon themselves, — a notion, I grant, very vague, very unclear, yet unquestionably existent. The expression "kingdom of darkness," in the quotation just given, is not scriptural: it certainly is not sanctioned by the passage, "Who hath delivered us from the *power of darkness*, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son."[1] I am far from suggesting that those to whom I refer really mean that men are outside God's dominion; yet many of their words suggest the idea, and of a certainty adequate practical use has not been made of the great and primal fact, that men are verily natives of a country whose monarch they ignore, owe a loyalty which they are constantly violating, and consequently stand before the alternative, either of submission or ruin.

There is, no doubt, a certain truth in the words I have criticized—a truth which is brought out to the full alike in the Old and New Testaments. Men are not *true* subjects of God, and as such have to be *made* His subjects. The tendency or aim of rebellion is in God's kingdom, as it is in human kingdoms, to consolidate itself into an antagonistic kingdom: such is the aim of him who is called the prince of this world—the prince of the power of the air. But it should never be overlooked in thought,

[1] Col. i. 13.

or forgotten in our words, that, despite all, there is but one King and one kingdom. "Why do the nations rage, and the peoples imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth (and the prince of the powers of the air) set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against His anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision."[1]

But men could not become God's subjects if they were not already His subjects: His kingdom could not be established among them had it not already an existence. The conduct of subjects towards a monarch and his laws does not alter the rights of the case. If this be so in the affairs of man, how much more so in the affairs of God! He remaineth King for ever, let His subjects rebel as they may. Nothing can overthrow this order; nothing can affect this relationship.

As for the subjects, so for the territory, we need to make use of the distinction in question. The earth, at all events, is not in the condition in which it should be; in which it would be if the Lord reigned in deed and truth. Then, assuredly, we should be able to say of it in its entirety, as we can now increasingly say of it in part, "The Lord reigneth: let the earth rejoice."[2] How far disorder prevails in the rest of the physical universe we cannot tell. Perhaps even there the results of spiritual rebellion are also felt.

[1] Ps. ii. 1–4.

[2] Ps. xcvii. 1.

But Scripture gives us every reason for believing that the invisible part of the divine kingdom is to some extent in disorder. Doubtless the region inhabited by God's loyal subjects is one of perfect peace, harmony, beauty, glory; there the environed and their environment are in absolute correspondence. But there is also a region of which the contrary holds good,—where environed and environment are in more or less complete antagonism—an antagonism which will grow with the growth of disloyalty and wickedness, till it shall issue in that uttermost of chaotic disorder and confusion which the Book of Revelation describes as "the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone," to dwell in which is "the second death."[1]

Bearing in mind this simple distinction between *de jure* and *de facto*, and remembering that whilst in the Old Testament chief stress is laid on the more outward features of the divine kingdom, whilst the new is more concerned with its inward features, little difficulty will be experienced in combining all the more important and significant allusions into one self-consistent and harmonious picture.

5. So far as the expression "kingdom of heaven" is not a mere synonym for the "kingdom of God," and has a distinctive meaning of its own,—which seems sometimes to be the case,—the relation between the two appears to me to be this. The kingdom of heaven is the identity of the *de jure* and *de facto* kingdom of God. There God and His subjects,

[1] Rev. xxi. 8; cf. xx. 10, 15.

and the subjects amongst themselves, are related to each other, as God in founding His kingdom meant them to be related. Their state, too, and that of the territory, is all that it was designed to be, — living, growing, developing in absolute normality,—a full and glorious realization of the divine idea.

The end of the mission of Christ was to establish the kingdom of God, not in the *de jure* sense, for in that sense it already existed, but in the *de facto* sense; in other words, to realize the kingdom of heaven. Not that the kingdom was a merely ideal kingdom even prior to His mission; not that it had no actual reality till then! On the contrary, wherever God was trusted and served, wherever His laws, even though not known to be His laws, were loyally recognised and obeyed, there His kingdom existed *de facto.* Nay more, the King was ever asserting His authority and showing His power in the punishments which followed disobedience to His laws. Neither individuals nor societies can permanently flourish which refuse to submit to the divine order. They fall into discord, and misfortunes befall them, which are as really signs that the writ of the great King runs in this world, as if He had sent visible messengers to foretell what would be the consequences of disobedience, and had commissioned legions of angels to execute His decrees.

But the God who is Father as well as King could not be content until His dominions were one boundless scene of harmony, beauty, and gladness, and His subjects were subjects not in word only or outward conduct,

but in heart, and soul, and mind—outward answering to, expressing, supplementing the inward, and each ministering to the other. Hence the mission, the incarnation, the life, the sufferings, the death, the resurrection, and the intercession of His only-begotten and well-beloved Son.

VII. *The immediate aim of Christ.*—The earthly mission of the Son of God, the eternal Word, was undertaken for the purpose of establishing the kingdom of God; not, as He is wrongly supposed to have taught, in order to set up a new kingdom, but to make that kingdom a full actuality which already existed of right and in part. He came to realize the plan, the idea which God had when He brought into existence the self-evolving (as some count it) physical universe and its self-propagating races of free intelligences.

The physical universe was in disorder; the inhabitants were alienated from God, at discord amongst themselves, out of harmony with their abode, and therefore subject to suffering alike in body and mind.

In the invisible part of the universe were intelligences that sought to set up an antagonistic system or kingdom.

The work of Christ is accordingly spoken of as a work of salvation—salvation in all its various aspects, intellectual, affectional, corporeal, moral, spiritual; and as a work of destruction, so far as the powers of evil and their productions and ends were concerned: sometimes one aspect is emphasized, sometimes another. At what point did Christ begin? The idea of inaugurating an era of order, peace, happiness was not new, though none besides Christ, either before or after

Him, ever grasped it in all its length, and breadth, and depth, and height. The method of Christ was new; and it was the newness of His method that required the newness of the means for carrying it out. All other reformers begin at some part of the periphery; He began at the centre. Human attempts at reform generally attack first the external surroundings, and it is only as experience teaches the futility of such a course that the eye is fixed on what is nearer to the centre. Give men regular employment, give men good houses, give them land, give them material help of various kinds, enact good laws, let the State encourage or prohibit this and the other,—none of these things need be useless; sometimes they do a certain amount of good. But it becomes more and more evident that if societies are to be reformed, the inner nature, the heart, conscience, will, intelligence of the individual men must be quickened and renovated. The evils under which the world groans have their secret root there.

But even thus the true centre has not been touched. Occasionally, indeed, it may have dawned on reformers of the deepest insight that the true root of human disorder and misery lay somehow or other in the relation of the race to God. Perhaps this was the secret alike of the earnestness and influence of religious reformers. But Christ alone, in all the ages, saw the point as clearly as if it had stood out singly and alone in the full blaze of the mid-day sun, and His life-work was concentrated on it as though it alone had a right to attention. He came to reconcile men to God, because the alienation of God and man was the source and

sustaining energy of all the other alienation, disorder, and misery that are to be found in the universe.

What I have said may seem to be contradicted by the fact that He went about doing good, healing the sick, raising the dead, and working all manner of wonderful works for the relief of human suffering, and that He was a great teacher, and Himself described it as His mission to bear witness to the truth; but all these things were means to the one great end. Their significance becomes clear as soon as we view them in the light referred to; apart therefrom how fragmentary, how casual, how lacking in system, in definiteness of aim, in plan, was His whole life and work!

Not that He was indifferent to the inequalities and disorders and miseries of men. Far from it. It was simply a question, how best to remedy them? And knowing that the only true remedy lay in the rectification of the relation of man to God, He made this His grand aim. The rest He knew would follow as a result—follow, too, all the more surely and with all the more safety, because man himself would be transformed from a cause of disorder into a co-worker with God for the regeneration of himself and the world.

VIII. *The establishment of normal relations the end of Christ's mission.*—It may be well to draw special attention to a point which I have already touched in passing, namely, that the primary end of the mission of the Son of God was to establish right or normal *relations*—not a normal *state*, save so far as to be normally related is to be in a right state; whether that state be a matter of character or feeling, of right-

eousness or happiness, of nature. As was already indicated, too, the relations to be set right were those between man and God.

What I mean will be perhaps best elucidated by an analogy. Biology tells us that the healthy growth and development of living beings depends primarily on their holding fitting relations to their environment. The environing forces cannot act on them in such a way as to promote healthy growth and development, unless the living beings enter into fitting relations thereto, open themselves to their influence, lay hold of and do their part in assimilating them; in other words, unless they eat and digest food, and discharge other functions normally. The normal relations are the condition of that action of environment which issues in normal being. My eating and preparedness to digest do not of themselves constitute me normal as regards being. What I am I must first become; and the interaction or inter-relations of myself and the surrounding forces cause me to be. Man can only *be* through himself and his environment; but the two must be related, or stand towards each other, thus and thus, and not otherwise, or he will never be what he should be. It is man's business to relate himself; this is his part; and if he once lose the power to relate himself, no forces from without can help him. But to relate himself without environment or its action would also leave him helpless. If I am ill, I must seek and take medicine; the search and the taking are my relation. The medicine might be there, yet not help me without a fitting relation; or I might search and be ready to take medicine, but if the medi-

cine was not there, my search and readiness would not effect my cure.

So in the sphere with which we are now concerned. What Christ came primarily to remedy was the relations; that is, to bring God and man so together, that God might be to man and do for man what was necessary, in order that man should realize the divine idea, alike for his nature, character, and state.

It is obvious, of course, that to be related, or relate himself at all, whether in the biological sphere to which I have just referred, or in the moral sphere now under consideration, he must *be something;* but what he then is may be said to be a sort of minimum of being—a mere germ-like being. This has to be presupposed. It is further clear that with every step of growth, that is, of attainment of being, his relatedness becomes more fitting to his environment, and his growth and development and state more full,—not necessarily more healthy, unless he started out with being unhealthy. But the same law prevails. He must enter into ever new relations of this and that kind and no other, or progress will be changed into retrogression, health into disease, and pleasure into pain.

In the bodily sphere, it is true, a time comes when self-relation to environment, however normal, ceases to issue in growth. The utmost it can do is to check decay, to maintain the *status quo.* And after man's term is run, he ceases to be able to relate himself, and then dissolution is at hand. In this moral sphere, on the contrary, the life may be eternal; for not only are the environing divine energies, from which our

soul is to draw its chief sustenance, inexhaustible in fulness and variety; but each new step in our upward growth qualifies us, if our self-relation is normal, for assimilating ever richer and fuller nourishment from the source; and thus we shall grow from more to more in largeness of nature, holiness and beauty of character, and richness of blessedness for ever and ever.

It seems to me of considerable importance to observe the distinction I have attempted to draw; and I venture to think that forgetfulness thereof has caused a good deal of confusion in the treatment of this central theme.

Not to make holy or to remove unholiness, save so far as holiness and unholiness are predicable of relations; not to make men happy, or to remove and avert unhappiness; not to make them healthy and strong, or to overcome disease and weakness,—was Christ's primary and immediate end; but to bring about relations that will render possible such communication and assimilation of divine energy as will make man strong, holy, blessed, and reduce his abode to harmony.

In popular speech it is justifiable enough, nay, perfectly correct, to include the results of relations as well as the relations themselves, when describing the end of our Lord's mission; for Christ did come to bring in peace, righteousness, and joy in the Holy Ghost; but if we are to see our way theologically, I am convinced we must give due effect to the distinction which I have been urging.

Rightly understood, too, this view of the work of

Christ underlies the doctrine of justification by faith. Faith on the side of man, forgiveness for Christ's sake on the part of God, are its constituent factors: and the former no less than the latter is best described as a relation. Each conditions the other, and both together are the condition of the righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost which are characteristic of the kingdom of heaven. If that doctrine be regarded as anything more in itself than a statement of a relation, or of relations, we must fall into the Romish and Pelagian errors, and sacrifice the precious birthright won for us by the incarnation, life, and death of the Son of man.

IX. *The kingdom of God never had actual existence.* — Another point of considerable importance which needs to be remembered, is that the kingdom of God never had a normal existence among men in this world, unless we count the time—whatever may have been its duration—between the creation and fall of the first man. Language is frequently employed which implies that somehow or other men were loyal subjects of their King, and afterwards fell into rebellion. Whereas, as a matter of fact, disorder entered into the very foundation of the kingdom. No sooner was the first stone laid, than its position was altered for the worse. The self-propagating founder of the race fell; from the first, therefore, the kingdom has been rather an ideal to be aimed at than an ever expanding actuality. In consequence of the fall—such, at all events, is the teaching of Scripture—all men enter the world with an inborn bias towards a rebellious relationship more or less strong. None the less was God

their King *de jure;* though a condition of things had never existed when His *de jure* claims were *de facto* acknowledged.

This being the case, we can understand, on the one hand, how God should treat men with a forbearance, patience, and gentleness that would have been inexplicable had men been the conscious, deliberate, determined, and high-handed revolters of whom theologians have often spoken; and, on the other hand, the relation into which God at once entered to humanity, chastising, punishing, exterminating, educating, redeeming.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONSTITUTION OF HUMANITY.

I. *Man is an individual:*[1]—Each member of the human race is an individual — within limits, an independent whole—a distinct organism—a something *sui generis.* In the words of Dorner, "Every man is a peculiar combination of the forces or powers of the genus alike in a physical and psychical respect; and the totality of humanity is individuated in each man in a special manner. In the divine idea, humanity exists no otherwise than as a multiplicity of persons, each more or less different from every other."[2] This something *sui generis* consists rather in a peculiar proportion of the elements common to all men, than in the possession of absolutely different elements. How individuality arises need not here be investigated:—it is certainly not due alone to external influences. All we can say is, perhaps, that it is one result of the action of the great principle or law of differentiation which is everywhere at work in the domain of life.

[1] On the subject of the organic unity of humanity and its history as such, see works like Principal Caird's most interesting *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, especially the chapter on the "Speculative Idea of Religion;" Mehring's *Geschichts-Philosophie*, with his *Religionsphilosophie*, works rich in suggestions; Professor Flint's *History of the Philosophy of History;* and, of course, Schelling and Hegel.

[2] Dorner's *Christl. Sittenlehre*, p. 136.

Individuality is recognised distinctly enough in Scripture, and that not merely in the indirect form of appeals implying personal responsibility, but also otherwise. Implicitly it appears even in connections where stress is laid on its antithesis or correlate, the organic relation. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit. To one is given through the spirit the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge; to another faith; to another gifts of healings; to another workings of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discernings of spirits; to another divers kind of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues: but all these worketh one and the same spirit, dividing to each one severally, even as he will."[1]

As an individual, each man is bound and privileged to enter into an individual relation to God—a relation in its measure as *sui generis* as his constitution: even as in a large family each child holds its own specific relation to the parents,—a relation which no other can assume,—so is it with the human race and God. No one of the millions of millions of men that have come into existence could be or act towards God exactly as any other could be or act. To the extent of the individual difference is the extent of his relational difference.

God also is different to each individual. Nor is this difference merely a subjective difference—a mere result of our way of looking at Him. No, He shows Himself, manifests Himself, gives Himself to each peculiarly. For God is, so to speak, myriad-sided.

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 4–11; cf. Eph. iv. 11; Rom. xii. 4 ff. See Dorner, *Sittenlehre*, p. 129.

Emmanuel Library
Emmanuel School of Religion
LIBRARY
EMMANUEL SCHOOL OF RELIGION
ONE WALKER DRIVE
JOHNSON CITY, TN 37601
Johnson City, Tennessee 37601

His infinite unity is constituted by boundless diversities; and each of those who seek Him finds something in God that meets his specific needs.

For my present purpose, however, I need not dwell longer on this point. The actuality of the individual relations to God is now generally recognised, at all events among Protestants. Indeed, the tendency is to treat them as alone real or important. The days are passing when men's relation to God was implicitly, if not explicitly, regarded as determined by that of the nation, or society, or Church to which they belonged.

The Israelites cannot be said to have been emancipated from it. Individualism was recognised, indeed, implicitly when individuals were destroyed from amidst their nation for their sins; but these were cases of high-handed sin, and therefore exceptional. The average Israelite assuredly regarded his relation to God as determined, guaranteed by, involved in the relation of the people of which he was a member. The whole was chosen, therefore he; the whole was regarded with favour, therefore he; the whole was atoned for, therefore he. This is a consideration which needs to be kept in view when we deal with the Old Testament; for it has an important bearing on the interpretation and application of many things found there.

Nor is Christendom yet by any means quite freed from the notion,—if, indeed, one might not rather say, the greater part of Christendom is still more or less under its dominion. Of most Roman Catholics it is still probably true that the supposed relation of their Church to God as the holy Catholic Church involves or carries with it their individual relation; not, of course, apart

from their individual consent; but yet to a degree which a thorough Protestant can scarcely understand. To some extent this is also true of the Protestant Episcopal Churches, and especially of those sections thereof which are retrogressing to the beggarly elements of Rome. Where Lutheranism has a real hold on the people, we discover the same phenomenon; the Church in its totality somehow stands for the individual, and fills up that which in him is behind.[1]

II. *Man as an organic whole.*—But the constitution of man is not adequately described when we merely speak of him as an individual. The individual is a member of a race. Humanity is an organic whole, constituted by organic wholes, a macrocosm constituted by microcosms. Its life and activity revolve like an ellipse round two foci,—one the individual, the other the organic; and neither can be ignored without detriment to the other.

1. *Biblical recognition of the fact.*—As has already been hinted, the organic found full recognition under the old dispensation. Paul summed up the dominating conception of his nation when he wrote: "If the first-fruit is holy, so is the lump; and if the root is holy, so are the branches. And if some of the branches were broken off, and thou, being a wild olive, wast grafted in among them, and didst become partaker with them of the root of the fatness of the olive tree.

[1] "Among the Romans, religion was an integral part of the political constitution, a matter far more of national, or tribal, or family feeling than of personal."—Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, 10. In the Roman jurisprudence *jus sacrum* is a branch of *jus publicum*, *loc. cit.* 10. This fact throws light on the characteristic of the Romish Church to which reference has just been made.

. . . Thou wast grafted contrary to nature into a good olive tree."[1] In his view, the nation constituted an organic whole very much after the analogy of a tree.

The comparison which Paul institutes between the human body and Christ and His believers might also be very well transferred to the human race: "As the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body."[2]

The conception of the organic unity, or solidarity of the whole of humanity, is not indeed very distinctly expressed in the Scriptures; but it certainly lies at the back of and conditions their teachings, especially regarding redemption. The nearest approach to a distinct recognition thereof is to be found, perhaps, in the words of our Lord Himself: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit, He taketh away; and every branch that beareth fruit, He purgeth, that it may bear more fruit. . . . If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered; and they gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."[3] Paul might be supposed to hint at a vaster solidarity than even that of humanity, when he speaks of the whole creation groaning and travailing in pain together until now.[4] It is generally supposed to be involved, at all events, in the argument of the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, especially in such words as—"As through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through

[1] Rom. xi. 16 ff.

[2] 1 Cor. xii. 12. See Strachey, *Jewish History*, etc., and references, p. 205.

[3] John xv. 1, 2, 6.

[4] Rom. viii. 22.

the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous." "In Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible; whether thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, all things have been created through Him and unto Him; and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist"[1]:—these words, too, point still further in the direction of the passage previously quoted. If the whole is rooted in Christ, it may be truly said of humanity the part, and that part must consequently constitute, in some sense, an organic whole.

2. *General recognition of the fact.* — In all ages mankind has lived its life under the unconscious influence of this its constitution; and the idea, though never grasped with approximate clearness and fulness till the present day, has, so to speak, sought and found embodiments, and has dawned ever and anon on the higher thinkers and more energetic leaders of the race. Every society has been in its measure a witness to this unity; and the visions of a world empire which have fascinated the greater statesmen and rulers —were they not also due to its secret inspiration? Still the perception of the fact that *all* men constitute one body; and that, therefore, if one member suffer all suffer, if one rejoice all rejoice,—is the result of the advent of Him who came to be the propitiation, not for the sins of Jews only, but for those of the whole world. The societies which grew out of and embodied the indwelling idea, regarded each other for the most part with suspicion, and treated each other with hostility. To be a stranger was, *ipso facto*, to be

[1] Col. i. 16–18.

a foe. Christ brought in the idea that to be a stranger was to have a claim to sympathy and help—"I was a stranger, and ye took me in,"—"I was a stranger, and ye took me not in."[1]

Christ's Church, too, has more or less embodied the idea; for it has overleaped the barriers of clime and country, of colour, of race, of nationality, of station by which men are generally separated from each other, and accustomed them to regard themselves first as one in Christ, and then as one by nature. Now-a-days it is becoming more and more a power. Internationalism, with all its errors and defects, is its product and witness. And Tennyson lends voice to what is an ever-widening and strengthening aspiration when he says:

> For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,
> Saw the vision of the world and all the wonder that would be;
> Far along the world-wide whisper of the South wind rushing warm,
> With the standards of the people plunging through the thunderstorm:
> Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle flags were furl'd
> In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.[2]

But profounder expression is given to the thought by Browning,—

> When I say "you," 'tis the common soul,
> The collective, I mean; the race of man
> That receives life in parts to live in a whole,
> And grow here according to God's clear plan.[3]

Humanity is not yet, indeed, a complete whole. It is rather a self-developing organism analogous to the other organisms which constitute the world of life. And the idea of a cosmos, of a world, yea, even of a kingdom, may possibly warrant some such view as that which is advocated by Dorner—

[1] Matt. xxv. 35, 38. See Note V., Appendix.
[2] *Locksley Hall.*
[3] Browning, *Dramatic Lyrics*, p. 134.

"Reason demands a unity of the many; and the perfection of the world requires that its various members should further and supplement each other, constituting a perfect organism. The supposition is, therefore, inadmissible that the world consists of totalities having nothing whatever to do with each other. . . . An absolutely unlimited number of personalities with the destiny to live the true life of spirit is unthinkable. In that case it must be possible, in order that the number be infinite, for the same to reappear. That, however, would be no enrichment of the infinite life of love. We must, therefore, assume that the number is not absolutely unlimited; that, on the contrary, it is limited by its purpose. Such spiritual individualities are alone created as will be able in giving and receiving to promote the life of love, each of them having some specific characteristic of its own. The creative love and wisdom of God, therefore, did not design to bring into existence an infinite number of individualities, but only the *full* number of possible individualities, embodying all possible specific excellences. For a determinate end demands a determinate number; a perfect organism may neither be burdened by a too much nor weakened by a too little. It is rather a gapless though growing circle, in which everything has a place, and where each is for all."[1] What will be the final compass of this great organism which is now day by day adding to its members, the future alone can teach. Meanwhile, however, we must hold fast to this—that in its idea humanity is an organism;

[1] Dorner's *Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. 464 f.; cf. ii. 245, and elsewhere.

that this idea is only realizable through individuals who are themselves relative organisms; and that one day it will stand complete. Whether to that completeness each and every individual human being that has ever existed will be a necessity, is another question. Dorner's view would seem to look in that direction. The teachings of Christ, however, do not warrant the notion; at all events, if the words reported by the Evangelist John may be brought into connection with this subject, "I am the vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in me and I in him, the same beareth much fruit: for apart from me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered; and they gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned."[1] Applying these words to humanity and its relation to its head, it may be likened to a tree, which constitutes an ever-growing organic whole,—ever-growing, that is, till it has reached its appointed limit,—and which may be constantly dropping or be deprived of branches without essentially affecting its organic wholeness; though, of course, it need not be supposed to be destined to grow *in infinitum*, and until it has attained full growth is not the whole prefigured in its indwelling idea.[2]

[1] John xv. 5–7.

[2] Various interesting questions here suggest themselves, of which this is not the place to attempt an answer. Some will object to the application of Christ's words to humanity as a whole, and maintain that He refers merely to His Church, to believers. The matter cannot be settled by a simple appeal to this fifteenth chapter, but involves a wider survey of New Testament thought. Those, however, who chiefly urge the narrower view of the words seem to overlook the for them perilous inferences they then warrant.

"Humanity is then not an agglomeration of individual atoms, each possessing an independent life; it is not a mosaic which can be taken to pieces at will; it is not an aggregation of individuals, each of whom may, if he please, isolate himself from the rest and say, 'I stand for myself alone.' It is a huge tree, and we all are the branches, along which flows the common sap; it is a living body, of which we are truly the members. In my individual life I feel the life of humanity; in my blood the life-stream of the race." [1]

3. *Inferences that may be drawn.*—Such being the constitution of man, is it not natural and reasonable to suppose that God will hold to humanity, and humanity to God, relations of a specifically organic or corporate kind; that God in His dealings with man, and normally man in his behaviour towards God, will recognise this twofold characteristic of his being? Whilst not ignoring, on the contrary, giving full weight to the individual, we must be careful not to underestimate, much less to ignore or set aside, the organic or corporate aspect of the relations between God and man. If the organic have not a value of its own, a significance of its own for God, why should we have been thus constituted? Solidarity was not necessary as a means to the end of bringing into existence a certain number of mere individuals. We can conceive of the principle of individuality predominating in our case as in that of

[1] Bersier, *The Oneness of the Race in its Fall and in its Future* (London 1871), p. 48; cf. p. 62. For other quotations to the same effect see Note VI., Appendix.

the animals. Though, as even Aristotle said, man is essentially a ζῶον πολιτικόν, and it is quite true that *Unus homo nullus homo*, if we take *homo* to mean what it actually does mean. What man would probably have been had the principle of individuality excluded that of organic unity, we may guess from the state of the savages. This principle of individuality we find prevailing in the animal world, where each is little more than a repetition of its predecessors, all beginning and ending at much the same point. It is the organic unity of the human race that renders it possible for individual men to give and receive, to inherit and transmit, and thus to enrich and expand the life of the whole as well as that of each individual: in a word, to be a man.

We may therefore judge that the purpose of God required the organic as well as the individual; and that accordingly no account of the relations between God and man will be complete which leaves out of view the organic relations, or of the divine dealings with humanity which fails to recognise their organic aspect.

4. *Influence of the respective aspects on the doctrine of Christ's work.* — Until a comparatively recent period, the treatment of the doctrine of the atonement was dominated by the organic or corporate principle. Not that it was consciously or of purpose taken as the starting-point, or accepted as regulative, but unconsciously. The relative positions held generally by the two principles in the life of men was reflected in this particular domain. The State, the corporate life, was all-dominant. The individual

was lost, or nearly so, in the organic. At the Reformation the seeds were sown of the modern tendency to exalt the individual. They did not, indeed, at once bear fruit. On the contrary, the old view still controlled systematic thought regarding the relations of God and man; and that control has continued till a very recent period. The way was prepared for a breach in the traditional treatment by the so-called moral view of the atonement, first formulated by Abelard; and in recent years the sense of individual relation to God has been so intensified, that even where positive objections to the corporate treatment of Christ's work are neither felt nor expressed, it is being quietly superseded. Speaking generally, one may now say that Christ is looked upon solely in His relation to individuals. He may be regarded as the Saviour of all; but it is of all individuals. His relation to the race as something specific has ceased to be considered.

This seems to me, so far as it goes, an unquestioned gain. There was an element of unreality in the old view of the subject, which, though not felt as such in former days, nor even yet, apparently, in some quarters, needed setting aside; and the only way to do that was to secure the full recognition of the individual alongside of the organic. For it is to the individual that the organic owes its content. Neither, however, is healthy or true without the other. The truth is to be found in the combination of the two: in the treatment of the atoning work of Christ as related at once to the organic and the individual aspects of humanity.

But there is considerable danger of the organic now being overlooked. It is a somewhat remarkable fact, that whilst in other domains alike of thought and practice, there is a decided rebound from the individualism that prevailed down to a recent period, at all events in Britain, the individualistic tendency in religious matters, especially in the treatment of this doctrine, seems to be gathering strength. The solidarity of mankind is becoming one of the ruling ideas of the age in politics, in social questions, in natural science, and especially in philosophy;[1] yet, in theology, individualism seems day by day to be acquiring more and more complete sway.

The problem of the passion of Christ needs, however, to be approached from both sides—from the individual and from the organic or corporate—if it is to be adequately appreciated.

[1] See Herbert Spencer's *Sociology*. Compare Seth and Haldane's *Essays on Philosophical Criticism*, especially the essay on "The Social Organism."

CHAPTER III.

RELATIONS OF MAN TO GOD.

I. *General considerations as to Relations.* — Relations, that is, modes of behaviour of beings towards, of action upon, or connection with each other, are grounded in, determined by, the nature of the beings related, and cannot be capriciously imposed or held. In other words, no being can hold a relation to another for which it is not by natural constitution fitted. A piece of unorganized matter cannot hold the relations of a plant or animal. There are, indeed, relations which they hold in common; for example, that designated gravitation; but organized matter holds in addition relations of its own. A stone sunk in the ground acts mechanically, and may also act chemically, but that is all; whereas, a seed sunk in the ground acts mechanically, chemically, and as we say, vitally.[1] An animal, again, enters into other relations than the plant; man, than the animal; invisible intelligences, than men; and, perhaps, there may be analogous differences throughout the invisible sphere.

[1] Compare Rev. W. Arthur's interesting book, *Physical and Moral Law.* See Lotze, quoted by Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. 603; Köstlin in *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie*, 1864.

Relations may be abnormal, and yet grounded in the nature of the beings holding them. For example, if a stone fall on a plant and crush it, that is abnormal; but the relation is grounded in their respective natures. Were it to fall on another stone, or were a leaf to alight on the plant, the relation would not be in the same sense or degree abnormal, though not more truly natural. So a man may become a slave, because it is grounded in his nature, though such a relation is abnormal; a plant cannot under any circumstances become a slave — the relation denoted by that term is impossible to it.

(I.) Relations may be classed as uncontrollable and controllable. Other terms used to denote the same distinction are natural and moral, necessary and free. *Uncontrollable* relations are modes of behaviour or connection which must be observed or held as long as the beings exist, and are what they are. *Controllable* relations, on the other hand, are modes of behaviour or connection which may be modified or changed, either by the beings themselves or by other beings, though never to the extent of contrariety to or transcendence of the natural capabilities of the beings related.

By some writers the uncontrollable or necessary relations are termed *par excellence* laws; as, for example, by Montesquieu, who defines the latter as *rapports nécessaires qui derivent de la nature des choses;* and a recent English writer says they are "a statement of constant relations posited by the

nature of things."[1] The word law is used in a variety of senses, however; such as—(1) Prescribed mode of behaviour; this is the moral or legal sense; (2) Constant mode of occurrence of two or more phenomena; in this sense it is used in mathematics, and sometimes in natural science;[2] (3) Necessary mode of relation; *i.e.* mode of relation conceived as necessary, for example, gravitation; (4) That which necessitates modes of relation; (5) Active cause or force in nature. There is evidently a great difference between the first use—which I hold to be the generative principle of all the rest—and the following senses—the difference between consciously self-controlled or self-regulated behaviour, and behaviour that is not self-regulated or self-controlled, yea, even force compelling behaviour. In the first sense, law is necessarily presented to thought, to consciousness, before it passes into actuality; in the latter senses it is not.

It is involved in the unity and solidarity of the universe that there should be relations which are absolutely uncontrollable, which beings must under all circumstances hold towards each other. It is equally involved in the fact that the universe has been and is being continuously evolved, that there should be relations which are variously modifiable; in other words, that the behaviour or connection of the constituent factors may within certain limits

[1] See Edith Simcox, *Natural Law*, p. 6, to whom I owe the quotation from Montesquieu. Compare also what Pye Smith says on the Moral Law, *Discourses*, p. 162; and Dr. Dale's striking though partial discussion of the subject of law in his work on the *Atonement*.

[2] See Jevons' *Principles of Science*.

be changed. Among the stable relations, the most remarkable at present known is gravitation; the other physical relations are modifiable.

Whilst some of the relations of all beings are controllable, that is, capable of modification, all beings are not capable of exercising that control. So far as control of their relations is possible, the control is exercised not by themselves but by others; some again have the power both of controlling others and of self-control; indeed, the two are correlates, for no being really controls another unless it has control of itself. Otherwise, its apparent control is simply transmission of control originating elsewhere.

Within limits that are not easy to define, man has the control of himself,—in some cases direct, in others indirect,—and therefore, also, control over other beings. God alone was originally the absolutely self-controlled, for He created the beings between which and Himself relations exist.

(II.) God and man alike hold both controllable and uncontrollable relations to each other.

1. The uncontrollable relations may be reduced to the following:—

(1.) God not only brought man into existence,—whether by a separate creative act or as a part of the process which He initiated and regulates, matters not for my present purpose,—but also sustains him, and therefore conditions him.

Man, on the other hand, lives, and moves, and has his being in God — depends on God — cannot escape from God if he would. He cannot become independent if he would.

So that neither God can separate Himself from man, as long as man exists, nor man from God. If God were to withdraw Himself absolutely from man, man would cease to exist. Man may wish to cease even to exist, but he cannot, save by the will of God. He may change his relation to the visible part of the universe to which he now belongs at his pleasure, *i.e.* by committing suicide; but he cannot therefore cease to exist.

Any appearance of interfering with the divine absoluteness presented by this statement will vanish when it is remembered that the relation in question originated with God Himself; and any other view of the matter would involve laying against God a charge of self-contradiction.

(2.) God cannot but think of and feel with regard to man. God cannot forget man, cannot ignore him, cannot treat him as non-existent. Nor can the divine heart be unaffected towards man; it must feel for and towards him, as we say, either in one way or another. In other words, man can never become an object of indifference to God.

Man, on the other hand, can never escape from some sort of *consciousness* or *sense* of his relation to God. The fact that his being, his life, his movements are rooted and grounded in God, will in some form or degree colour or condition his thought when he reflects on himself. And the more he enters into himself, the more distinctly will the world outside speak to him of the being who is the common source and abiding ground of both. At the same time, the more man becomes absorbed in

the world outside him, the less sensitive will he become to the voice of God within.

Nor can man ever become really *indifferent* to God, or his state be unaffected by his relation to God. In the words of Christ, "he that is not with Him is against Him;" and as he is with or against, so will be the effect on His state, and therefore on His feeling. Here there is no escape. The relation of the heart and the condition of feeling will, of course, be affected by the general state of the man; if he is generally low, undeveloped, insensitive, unreflective, his affections and feelings in this direction will be proportionately indeterminate and vague. But the relation in itself cannot be changed by anything he can do. No creature can constitute a cosmos of its own within which it shall be independent of God.[1]

2. The controllable relations between God and man. Theologians and preachers sometimes use language which implies that, however greatly man may change towards God, God can never change towards man; and that whatever semblance of change there may be in God, is in reality a change in man's view of God. As the sun never ceases to shine, though men may intercept its rays, and thus be in darkness more or less deep, so God never ceases to be what He always was, though men alter their relation *to* Him, and may regard that as an alteration *in* Him. This notion is not Biblical; the unchangeableness of God is not only compatible with,

[1] On Freedom, see Kreibig, *Die Versöhnungslehre*, 1878, p. 48.

but even expresses itself in the greatest possible changeableness.[1]

God's thought of man is determined by what man is; it may therefore vary. The divine affection towards man varies. The divine feelings, too, are coloured by men's changes. And God's actions relatively to men are not always the same.

It scarcely needs adding that men, too, change their relations to God. They cannot get away from certain relations; but the *character* thereof may vary. Their thinking, their affections, their conduct, their feelings —all are and have been subject to alternation.

It is of importance distinctly to recognise the fact to which I have now called attention, in both its aspects. Not to do so is to reduce God and man alike to the rank of the inorganic substances, and to treat their relations as purely mechanical.

The law or principle of these controllable relations is—"God to man as man to God." This law is repeatedly and expressly alluded to in the Scriptures; as for example—"With the merciful Thou wilt show Thyself merciful; with the perfect man Thou wilt show Thyself perfect; with the pure Thou wilt show Thyself pure; and with the perverse Thou wilt show Thyself froward."[2] "The Lord is with you while ye be with Him; and if ye seek Him, He will be found of you: but if ye forsake Him, He will forsake you."[3] "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if ye

[1] See a profound and learned discussion of the *Unchangeableness of God*, by Dr. J. A. Dorner, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, vols. i. ii. iii.

[2] Ps. xviii. 25, 26.

[3] 2 Chron. xv. 2.

forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses."[1] Compare, "Inasmuch as ye did it to one of these my brethren, ye did it unto me."[2]

It is not, "Man to God as God to man," for God never changes so as to involve or call forth a change in man, but "God to man as man to God." God changes in accordance with human changes.

This may seem inconsistent with the words, "Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven: for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust;"[3] but there is no real discrepancy between the teachings.

So far as a man is holy, as God is holy, so far may He also recognise as the law of His relations to men, "I to thee as thou to me." As long, however, as men are imperfect in knowledge, temper, expression, so long will it behove them to be exceedingly chary of letting the principle just stated influence their conduct, and even under the greatest provocations will do well to remember the divine example adduced by Christ.[4]

> God's all man's nought:
> But also, God, whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away
> As it were a handbreadth off, to give
> Room for the newly-made to live,
> And look at him from a place apart,
> And use his gifts of brain and heart,

[1] Matt. xvi. 14, 15. [2] Matt. xxv. 40. [3] Matt. v. 45.

[4] A full discussion of this subject lies beyond the scope of the present work. Ethical problems are here involved to which very little attention has been given. See Note VII. in Appendix.

Given, indeed, but to keep for ever.
Who speaks of man, then, must not sever
Man's very elements from man,
Saying, "But all is God's"—whose plan
Was to create man and then leave him
Able, His own word saith, to grieve Him,
But able to glorify Him too
As a mere machine could never do.

R. BROWNING, *Christmas Eve.*

II. *Normal or* de jure *relations of man as an individual to God.*—The relations here to be considered are, of course, those which are controllable, those which have to be voluntarily entered into, and which may therefore be voluntarily avoided,—modes of free activity or behaviour. The relations looked at as *laws* are fixed; that is, such and such relations ought to be entered into; if they are not entered into, disorder and suffering ensue. Personal relations in this sense are as fixed and determinate as the relations between the stars; the difference between them is, that whilst the latter cannot but be observed, the observance of the former is a matter of choice on the part of the beings who are to be related.

The individual man is capable of entering into three modes of relation, answering to the three aspects of his nature—the corporeal, the intellectual, the affectional. We have here to do exclusively with the third mode of relation—the affectional. The first or *corporeal* relation, though of independent, intrinsic importance as regards the mundane system, is of significance as far as God is concerned solely as the vehicle or mode of expression of the affections. This aspect of the matter is brought out with great clearness in connection with sacrifices by the writer of the

51st Psalm when he says, on the one hand, "Thou delightest not in sacrifice, else would I give it; Thou hast no pleasure in burnt-offering: the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise;" and, on the other hand, "Then shalt Thou delight in the sacrifices of righteousness, in burnt-offering and whole burnt-offering; then shall they offer bullocks upon Thine altar."[1] When sacrifices embodied or were made the vehicle of one kind of spirit or affection, God would have none of them; when they embodied another and opposite spirit or affection, they were a delight to Him.

Our corporeal relation to our fellow-men, however, as we well know, may in and of itself condition the welfare both of the corresponding aspect of their nature, and also of their spiritual nature so far as it depends on the body; besides serving the purpose to which reference has been made above.

The divine estimate of the *intellectual* relation of man equally depends on the purpose it serves. Three functions are assigned to intellect, to the intelligence of man, including therein the senses at the one end, and speculative reasoning and constructive or creative imagination at the other. The *first* is to guide him to the objects to which he should be related, and to the relations which he should hold to them. This concerns the body as truly as the heart, the outer man as truly as the inner man. The *second* function is to minister to its own needs. The intellect has its needs as truly as the

[1] Ps. li. 16, 17, 19.

body and the heart; these needs may to a certain extent be met by the discharge of the function just mentioned, and of that to which I shall next refer; but it has needs which are only met by those higher, and deeper, and broader exercises which issue in literature, art, science, and philosophy. The *third* function is to minister to others, by aiding them in the discovery of the objects and the determination of the relations which are necessary to the healthy development of either body, intellect, or heart. As far as the first two functions are concerned, it will be obvious that intellectual activity is self-centred—meaning by self not merely the intellect, but the whole man. Its significance therefore, alike for God or man, depends on which of the functions it discharges, whether the first two or the last. As far as the first two are concerned, it is very possible for them to be so discharged that God and man alike must despise and reject them; as to the third function—both God and man take pleasure therein. No healthy-minded man cares to be made an object of observation, thought, and imagination merely with a view to meeting intellectual or other wants of a fellow-man; but he values it highly when another places his intellect at his service; and the higher the intellect, the higher the estimate. Equally true is this of God. Hence the highest philosophy may be as offensive to Him as the vulgarest curiosity; His estimate of it, in other words, its religious value, depends on the degree in which it is designed to minister to the purposes of His kingdom.

The third relation, which I have termed the affectional—emotional—or heart relation, is the one with which we have here exclusively to do, because it is by the affections, through the heart, that persons are centrally united with or separated from each other. Out of the heart are the issues of social life. A man's physical relation to his fellow-man is of comparatively subordinate importance as long as he "feels" as he should towards him. The intellectual relation exercises a more directly determining influence on, and is too fully inspired by, the state of the heart, to allow of our saying in the vast majority of cases, I do not care how he conceives me, so long as he feels rightly towards me. So far, however, as the two can be dissociated, the former would unhesitatingly be subordinated to the latter and treated as of small importance in comparison with it. The strongest possible confirmation of this position, as far as the body and God are concerned, is given in the saying, "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him."[1] And the notion of the essential subordination of the merely intellectual to the moral or spiritual, by which men generally mean the heart relation, underlies a good deal of the modern protest against dogma and theology. It is, of course, or ought to be, obvious enough, that the relation of the affections to God, in other words, the relation of man to God, and to that extent the reciprocal relation of God to man, must largely determine, as well as be determined by, the relation of his intellect, that is, by the view he entertains of God and of the divine mind and will.

[1] Job xiii. 15.

In point of fact, as it seems to me, *religion*—and we have here really to do with religion, though I have thus far avoided, yea, purposely avoided, using that vague term—has its seat in the heart. It is a matter of the affections—the affections as directed towards God. The religious man is the man whose *heart is right with God;* the non-religious man, if such a man there be, is the man whose heart is negatively related to God—a state which is scarcely conceivable when God has once arisen above the mental horizon; the irreligious man is the man whose heart is, if I may use the apparently self-contradictory expression, positivo-negatively, antagonistically related to God. For the heart, as every one knows, may take up a positively wrong attitude as well as a positively right: the attitude being as positive and active in the one case as the other. Herein it differs from the intellect, which is only capable of either action or inaction, not of negative action.

What then are the normal relations between God and man with which we have here to do? What, in other words, are the truly religious relations of man to God, and the corresponding relations of God to man?

The chief constitutive features, or as they might be designated, the principal stages of a right affectional relation as between man and men, are respect or reverence, trust or confidence, and regard or love; equally so, therefore, as between man and God. These more than any other, even if not exclusively, are *personal* relations — relations characteristic of personal beings.

Normally, men would have cherished and, of course, displayed towards God the fullest *reverence*, *trust*, *love*, of which their nature was at each successive stage capable, — at each stage perfect; yet, ever more perfect. For perfection is not merely a matter of degree, but also of kind. If the affections cherished by the child are all that it can cherish, they are for the child perfect; but the affections of the youth and man must be broader, stronger, deeper, fuller, or else they will be imperfect, that is, abnormal. As our nature grows, so must our affections grow; and as they can never transcend, so should they never fall behind the capability of the stage we may have reached.

These forms or aspects of our relation to God are sufficiently emphasized in Scripture. So, for example, *reverence*, or, as it is often termed, *fear*. "Let all the earth fear the Lord: let all the inhabitants of the world stand in awe of Him."[1] "Be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long."[2] "The Lord of hosts, Him shall ye sanctify; and let Him be your fear, and let Him be your dread."[3] "Who shall not fear Thee and glorify Thy name? for Thou only art holy."[4] "I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever, for the good of them, and of their children after them: and I will make an everlasting covenant with them: and I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me."[5]

Not less stress is laid in various ways on *trust* or *confidence* as due to God from man. "Trust in God

[1] Ps. xxxiii. 8. [2] Prov. xxiii. 17. [3] Isa. viii. 13.
[4] Rev. xv. 4. [5] Jer. xxxii. 39 ff.

at all times."[1] "Trust in the Lord with all thine heart."[2] "Trust ye in the Lord for ever."[3] "Who is among you that feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the voice of His servant, he that walketh in darkness and hath no light? let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God."[4] "Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is."[5] "We both labour and suffer reproach because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe."[6] "Hezekiah trusted in the Lord, the God of Israel; so that after him was none like him among all the kings of Judah."[7]

And as to regard or inclination for God, rising to *love*—that, we know, is set forth as the great duty required of man. "Take diligent heed to do the commandment, and the law, which Moses, the servant of the Lord, commanded you, to love the Lord, and to walk in all His ways, and to cleave unto Him, and to serve Him with all your heart, and with all your soul."[8] "O love the Lord, all ye His saints!"[9] "Keep yourselves in the love of God."[10] "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind, and with all thy strength."[11] "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart?"[12]

It is natural for man, that is, it is in accordance with

[1] Ps. lxii. 8. [2] Prov. iii. 5. [3] Isa. xxvi. 4. [4] Isa. l. 10.
[5] Jer. xvii. 7. [6] 1 Tim. iv. 10. [7] 2 Kings xviii. 5.
[8] Josh. xxii. 5. [9] Ps. xxxi. 23. [10] Jude 21. [11] Matt. xxii. 37.
[12] Deut. x. 12; comp. 2 Kings xxiii. 25.

his true and uncorrupted nature, to render *respect*, *reverence*, *homage* in the presence of personal greatness, wisdom, truth, sanctity. Nay more, it is a need, one of the deepest needs of his inmost nature, to give such reverence, to give it without stint, to give it in the fullest measure of which he is capable. It is normal, therefore, for man absolutely to revere the holy and exalted name of God. Corrupt and degraded as humanity now is, there are few men in whom signs of this original need and impulse of their nature are not discoverable.

Now all right personal relationship begins at this point. This is its abiding root or foundation. It may be taken up into the higher stages, but it must be also preserved in them; for it is in a sense their immanent law. Like the foundations of a temple, it may be out of sight; but it none the less sustains the whole edifice, which without it must speedily fall to pieces.

Were man's nature true, it would go out in reverence as surely as the magnetic needle turns to the north. For what more does this say than that when he recognises the greatness, and glory, and majesty, and holiness of God, his heart will at once respond, "Worthy art Thou, our Lord and our God, to receive the glory, and the honour, and the power"?[1]

Equally is it a need and an impulse of man to *trust* —to trust implicitly—to trust utterly. There must be some form or degree of respect where we are to repose trust; and we can scarcely help trusting where we see reason for respect. Trust, I mean, of its kind, answering to respect of its kind. If there is physical

[1] Rev. iv. 11.

power that commands respect, I may trust for that, though other grounds for respect may be absent; and therefore it may be impossible to trust in other directions. Or I may respect a man's knowledge, and therefore trust it, without being able to respect or trust his strength or artistic skill. At the same time, one ground of respect needs, as a rule, to be present if we are to repose confidence even for other qualities, and that is moral integrity. A man may have the strength of a giant, the skill of a Bezaleel, the knowledge of a century; but if his moral integrity is doubtful, it may interpose an impassable gulf between the respect these qualities necessarily awaken and the trust by which that respect ought to be immediately followed, or which, rather, it should contemporaneously evoke. In proportion as absolute reverence is seen to be deserved,—reverence without a break,—in that proportion can we absolutely trust; nay, as in the case of reverence, we need to do so, we are sensible of the impulse to do so. Trustfulness—implicit, unquestioning trustfulness—is according to man's true idea. Trust is the recognition of our dependence, whilst it is also in one and the same act the assertion and renunciation of independence. The former, in so far as it is a free act; the latter, in so far as dependence is the antithesis to independence.

Trust towards God is rooted in our creaturehood; trust towards man and other creatures, in the fact that each of us is the complement of the other, and only partially realizes the full idea of creation. Dependence on God is a necessity of our nature, which we share with all other creatures of every kind and grade;

trust is a matter of free control, at all events, within certain limits as to degree and direction, which, in the present state of man, are not easy to determine. Absolute trustlessness is impossible to dependent beings. A man utterly trustless would be a monster, and must perish. But we may refuse trust to this and the other being: we can refuse it even to Him who concentrates in Himself all the attributes which commend themselves to us as worthy of trust. Yet, without question, our normal relation to Him is one of trust, of confidence that knows no shadow of doubt, that has never encountered, never dreamed of a limit.[1]

Love, however, is the crown or ripe blossom of personal relations, and when perfect, presupposes perfect reverence, perfect trust. In loving, we give ourselves; but how could we give ourselves to one whom we do not respect, do not trust; still less absolutely give ourselves unless we absolutely reverence, absolutely trust? There may be, there is, a sort of natural affection, even where there is little respect, and less trust; but natural affection is not the same thing as love. It may be transfigured into love; and where love is, as it were, grafted on to such natural affection, or has it for one of its roots, there it has the greatest intensity and depth. But true love cannot live in the absence of respect or reverence and trust.

[1] Schleiermacher would have been nearer the truth had he said that religion is *rooted* in absolute dependence, instead of defining it as the sense of absolute dependence. If we are absolutely dependent, then when man comes to himself he will have the sense or feeling of it; but that he cannot help. Whereas religion surely as a thing for which we are responsible—for whose lack we are blamed—must be under our free control.

Who would willingly commit anything of value to one who lacked these qualities? How, then, can it be possible to give ourselves? Such giving would issue in that death of the self from which there is no resurrection: it would be a giving which would put an end to the possibility of giving, and therefore be the very depth of immorality. But, indeed, such giving, though it may seem to be and wear the name of self-giving, has in it a hidden worm of selfishness, either negative or positive, in the form either of reluctance to encounter inconvenience, or of some desire of advantage. It is not genuine love; for genuine love is full of that divine wisdom which is inherent in simplicity of purpose; and aiming, as it does, solely and purely at the highest good of him to whom it gives itself, it cannot consent either to bear or do anything that would be mischievous. Whether, therefore, it withhold or bestow, its own nature is enriched.

It is not, indeed, a more real, but still a profounder necessity of man's nature to love than it is to render reverence and to exercise trust. Love is at once a confession of need and an assertion that we have something to give; and so the practical solution of one of the greatest paradoxes. Man needs, moreover, to love utterly—to love without any reserve. Nay, indeed, wherever love exists truly, this is its demand. A love that could consciously impose a limit on itself would by the very act destroy itself. But such absolute love can only be centred on one who is absolutely worthy of it—on God. So that love—complete, perfect love to God—is in the fullest sense

normal to man. It is for this relation, indeed, God created him. God yearned, so to speak, for the love of those who were not Himself; and so He brought beings into existence who should be in a sense independent of Him, and yet as to every fibre of their nature, every aspect of their constitution, need Him and His love, and be able to give Him their love, that is, themselves.

Man belongs, of course, to God by his very nature; he is literally nothing without God; yet God's purpose did not end with this natural belonging. Not for that alone did He create him. Indeed, constituted as man is with the power to control himself and his relations, he cannot be said to belong really to God till he has made the natural relation a matter of free conscious ratification, until he has made the natural belonging a freely chosen belonging. And this is what God looks for; this constitutes the fully normal relation. In a sense, God is not satisfied till man has enriched Him by self-bestowal, and thus transformed God from a mere bestower into a receiver, from a mere creditor into a debtor. So wonderful is the significance of the capacity to love.

Neither God nor man can be satisfied till reverence and trust are taken up and transformed into love. Reverence that does not issue in love becomes unreal; trust alone does scant justice to man's highest capability and dignity; whereas love raises both reverence and trust to their highest potence.

III. *Normal or* de jure *corporate relations of man to God.*—Humanity in its corporate or organic capacity or aspect has not a specific consciousness, still less

self-consciousness.[1] Herein it differs from the organisms by which it is constituted. An individual man is conscious as a whole ; the elements, whether organic or inorganic, by which he is constituted are unconscious. It would seem, therefore, as though corporate humanity must be incapable of any relations approaching to those of a personal kind,—relations for which it can be held responsible, which are under its own control, and which may be designated normal or abnormal ; that any relations it holds must be natural, inevitable. Were this the case, it would be as needless, or indeed absurd, to institute the present inquiry, as to inquire into the relations which might be held by the constituent factors of the self-controlled individual, which, as was stated, are impersonal. Are not the only relations into which humanity can enter those of the individuals who constitute it? What we term the corporate relations, are they anything more than the sum-total of the individual relations? All the individuals of a race might be related, each in its own way, each in the best possible way ; and yet there might be no properly corporate or organic relation,—no relation, that is, rooted in, determined by, and expressive of the organic unity,—of the fact that humanity is a great organism constituted by organisms. Nay more, they might perform conjointly the acts in which they severally express their relation to God, and yet there might be no corporate act expressive of a corporate relation.

Yet men have always had a dim feeling that their conjoint manifestation of what stirred them as indi-

[1] See Note VI. in Appendix.

viduals was, or might and should be, something more than appeared on the surface; they have reached out towards something grander—something which, as it seems to me, may be best described as a corporate relation or activity. Especially has this been the case in connection with worship. Nowhere have they been content, save when overmastered by an unhealthy individualism, or possibly at the lowest stage of degradation, with lonely adoration and prayer; on the contrary, they have felt that their individual worship needed for its correlate a corporate worship—neither supplanting the other, rather each complementing the other. They have not, it is true, said this to themselves; but men often do without previous reflection, and as it were instinctively, things which reveal to themselves aspects of their nature and constitution that otherwise would altogether have escaped their notice. By unconscious action we awaken conscious attention to ourselves. The Israelites, however, did say to each other in sacred song what all feel should be said by every man to his fellow-man, "O come, let us sing unto the Lord; let us make a joyful noise unto the Rock of our salvation. O come let us worship, and bow down; for He is our God; and we are the people of His pasture, and the sheep of His hand."[1] "I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the Lord."[2] All this may, indeed, have been very imperfect, even at its best: that is true; yet glimpses were and are thus sometimes got of a community of sentiment, spirit, life, action, which seems to hover on the very verge of specific

[1] Ps. xcv. [2] Ps. cxxii.

consciousness. Men experience conjointly what has an analogy to one's feeling when one waits for a word to embody some thought or emotion which is stirring below consciousness.

The experiences here referred to are not confined to religious occasions. At other times, under other circumstances, as, for example, in great crises of a nation's life, men are impelled by a common impulse, stirred by a common sentiment, swayed by a common purpose, which carries them out beyond themselves. Each individual, whilst apparently contributing only his individual share to the joint movement, finds that he is something more and other than his individual self. He says afterwards of himself, "I was completely carried away; I did not know myself; I was another being; and now I am my former self." Each is lifted up and swept onwards by a power not himself, yet most fully akin to himself. For the moment his little individuality is as it were blended with, though not swallowed up or extinguished, nay, rather elevated, expanded, quickened by, the whole body to which he belongs. Just as there is always more belonging to the individual than he himself is fully aware of, and this more may flash up sometimes to his surprise, or cause him to do or say what he never dreamt of doing or saying; so is there a depth below that depth—the depth where the currents of the lives of the individuals who constitute the race cross and blend; and at special times, out of this deeper depth—it is not the deepest of all—arise the phenomena to which I am now alluding.

Perhaps at some future period, when sin has ceased

to wield its darkening and dividing influence over men, there may be realized a περιχώρησις, a *circumincessio*, an in-each-otherness of individual and individual, such as shall express itself, not only in feeling,—each feeling what all feel,—but even in some sort of awareness of the oneness which will coexist or alternate with the properly individual consciousness. The mutual exclusiveness which is now a characteristic of individuality is not after all so essential thereto as many imagine :—it is rather a defect of our present condition.

So far, however, as we can at present see, corporate relations can only be upheld through a *representative* or representatives, whose *action* the body of individuals represented *consciously* and *freely makes or adopts* as its *own*. The principle has found recognition among men in the most varied forms and circumstances. The two elements have gone together —representative action ; free ratification of the action of the representative by those represented. The modes of effecting the ratification have varied ; the *thing* has been abiding.

(I.) *Action through representatives.* In all ages and under the greatest variety of circumstances men have acted through representatives ; been regarded as responsible for what their representatives said and did, promised or refused ; nay more, those who were represented have been conceived and treated as the body of which the representatives were the veritable head and organ. Even as in the individual the body executes what the head plans, prospers or suffers by what it does, and is bound by that to which the head binds it ; so is it in societies and nations.

Alike in a formal and informal way has this principle found recognition. What monarchs and great leaders say or do commits the peoples at whose head they stand. What again are ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and the like, but representatives through whom bodies of men hold corporate relations with each other, by whose words and acts, yea, even by whose feelings and dispositions, they judge each other? Often, indeed, —perhaps as often as not,—the representatives may misrepresent; they cannot so rise above their own individual notions and prejudices as to let the great mass for which they stand speak through them as their organ. Yet there is great truth also in what is remarked by one who more than most men deserves to be heard on this subject:[1]—

"The statesman must resolve to lay aside in his public function a part of his individuality, and very commonly, in all matters that are not of conscience, must act more as impelled than as impelling, more upon the convictions of others than his own. Still, the acts so done are acts which may be fraught with most serious, even with highly moral results. At least they are acts which ought to be, like all others, commended to God. Yet these are acts done, so to speak, without an agent, unless the nation, the moral person of the State, be that agent. They are not the acts of the statesman in any sense, except that he is their instrument. . . . He will shift the responsibility for them from himself in proportion as they are less the genuine offspring of his individual judgment; he will feel, and with a degree of justice, that morally,

[1] W. E. Gladstone, *Church and State*, i. p. 92.

though not constitutionally, it rather lies elsewhere. But what is its true and proper seat? The persons whose will he is anticipating are busy each with his farm and his merchandise, with personal interests or duties. This responsibility, however, which has an aspect so indefinite, while we look only at individual men, has, in fact, a legitimate subject, which can consistently and adequately refer all these acts to the Almighty Ruler. There are qualities as a combination which arise out of the union of its parts, and are not to be found in those parts when they have been separately and singly examined. In the government and laws of a country, we find not a mere aggregation of individual acts, but a composite agency, the general result yielded by a multitude of efforts, each of which in part modifies, in part is abolished amid the rest. This composite agency represents the personality of the nation; and, as a great distinct moral reality, demands a worship of its own, namely, the worship of the State represented in its living and governing members, and therefore a public and joint worship." [1]

"A man will feel that when he becomes a member of the governing body, a portion of the national energies are impersonated in him, and take effect in his decisions. . . . Acts are public, and they should be sanctified not only by the private personal prayers and piety of the men filling public situations, but also by their public observances as composing a public body, and actuating and impelling the sovereign power. In the collective character, in which they constitute

[1] *L.c.* p. 128. Compare also Burke's *Thoughts on the French Revolution*, p. 185.

the organ of the nation and wield its force, they are bound to offer collective prayer and praise." It has been well said also that "George III. and Lord North have been made scapegoats for sins which were not exclusively their own. They were only the organs and representatives of all the lurking ignorance and arbitrary passions of the community." [1]

It has been often remarked, too, that in certain eminent men the whole spirit of an age is embodied and finds expression. Dante, for example, focussed the mind of his nation; Shakespeare, the spirit of the Elizabethan era in England; Milton, the Puritan mind, with its strengths and weaknesses, with its theology and religion! But they could not be said to have had a kind of double consciousness. The generic which lived and stirred in them was, strictly speaking, subconscious. Yet, at the same time, their more or less conscious ambition was to feel and think, not merely individual, but collective thoughts and feelings. In so far they bore unconscious testimony to the truth I am urging. Indeed, the same may be said in its measure of every writer, or speaker, or artist. The secret desire of his heart is to be at once individual and generic, both in one; his deepest, though it may well be an unconscious ambition, is to gather up in himself and be the mouthpiece of the thinking and feeling of, at any rate, his circle; and the wider the circle, the greater satisfaction does he experience.

Hitherto, indeed, representatives have acted solely

[1] John Morley's *Life of Burke*, p. 72. A remark applicable to the present time. Cf. T. Carlyle on Dante, Shakespeare in *Heroes*, etc.

on behalf of communities within nations, or on behalf of tribes and nations: mankind, as a whole, has never, at all events since it attained vaster dimensions, acted in any respect in its corporate capacity. No man has yet arisen who can be said to have become the voice even of a single aspect of its corporate life. But more and more outreachings after something of the kind are manifesting themselves. Alexander the Great in his day; some of the emperors of Rome; other great conquerors; Napoleon,—all were possibly more or less stirred by the idea. Corporate action on the part of the great body the "Leviathan" will not in the fullest sense be possible till it is full grown; but even during its development such action towards God is necessary—necessary, because without it the healthy development of humanity is not possible.

To this end, however, an adequate representative would be needed, one in whom, as it were, all the separate lines of human thought, purpose, affection, action should converge; who knew and could express for every man not only what he himself could express, but also that in him which he could himself not express; could set forth what was generic and what was individual in every man; who should be in contact with every man; who should be every man's real self yet more; whose action on behalf of men could be known by them; whose relation they could make their own.

(II.) What is the *nature of the relations* that would normally have existed between God and corporate humanity? and that would have been mediated or

upheld by means of a representative; and been ratified by those who were represented.

The function of the representative would have been, as has been said, to combine, as in a focus, what is otherwise broken up and scattered; to provide it fit and adequate expression; to make known also to the individual members the life of the whole; and thus to render it possible for them at once to ratify and share it.

Every individual man in a normal state would cherish in his own way and degree the affections and prosecute the activities in relation to God which are the divine due—each, however, only in his own way and degree; and each in a different way and degree from every other. The reverence, trust, love of one man towards God is never identical either in quality or quantity with that of another man. Yet an ideal of completeness hovers before all higher minds, *i.e.* an ideal of perfect worship and service. But such a perfect, all-sided relation must be impossible to an individual member of a great organization merely as an individual. Each may be true and perfect so far as he goes, even as an eye may be perfect, yet not be able to supply the place of the ear; yet the whole may not be set forth by what he says and does. Implicitly the aim of all true representation is to focus every variety of need, thought, wish, purpose, and so forth. Hence the custom of deputing several men to represent larger bodies and interests.

Such an organ and representative as was described will realize the idea of the organism to which he

belongs, the idea of its life—the idea which dwells in, controls, and is its goal; the idea of which each sees an angle, and of which each is more or less realizing a part. He thus helps each to understand and duly appreciate the double fact, that on the one hand he really holds a necessary place in the whole; whilst, on the other hand, his place is but one among a myriad places, each of which also has its holder. This not only heightens the individual's activity, but links it consciously on to that of the rest of the members, and renders possible a veritable organic corporate relation.

Whatever individuals do in relation to God, the whole body thus does, of course through its organs: be the form what it may in which the individual life finds expression. All the reverence, trust, and love which filled and swayed the individual members would concentrate itself in and flow through the representative. In him the ideal devotion of the race would find embodiment. As each member contemplated him, he would discover not only that the deepest and truest in himself was there to be found in all purity and fulness, but that it had a full-orbed glory and perfectness due to the fact that in it met and blended all that was deepest and truest in each and all.

The feelings described would have found glad and glorious expression in public worship. Perhaps each nation would then have had its central national temple; and if so, the race might also have had its great human temple, where worship of the grandest and most impressive kind would have

been constantly celebrated. All the inward love of the race would there have poured itself forth in sacred song, set to sublimest music, and manifested itself in picture, procession, and every other sensuous embodiment of the spiritual life, alike beautiful and august. One may well say, "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man," the vastness, magnificence, and beauty of the edifice wherein the human race would have met by its representatives; and the equal impressiveness and significance of the worship which would there have been paid to the King of kings and Lord of lords.

As regards the point under consideration, Israel and its history are typical. This, indeed, might be expected, if, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the Jewish nation was meant to be the beginning of the true kingdom of God; for the child is father of the man. Not merely individual Jews held relations to God, but the nation as a whole; and the nation as a whole was related through men who acted as its organs and representatives, and for whose acts on its behalf it made itself responsible.

Repeatedly did men arise in its midst who seem to have been possessed with the feeling, even if it did not distinctly formulate itself to them, that they were called to act for the nation in relation to God; that they stood, as it were, between it and God.

Such was Moses. How emphatically is this brought out when the Israelites say to him at Sinai, "Now, therefore, why should we die? For this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die. Go

thou near and hear all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and will do it."[1] Samuel, again, took up this position when he said, "Gather all Israel to Mizpeh, and I will pray for you unto the Lord;"[2] and when the children of Israel said unto him, "Cease not to cry unto the Lord our God for us."

But in no one did the most characteristic elements of the Jewish nation find such full expression as in David, their beloved hero; he, too, was more completely the organ and medium of the nation's relation to God than any other man. Alike in obedience and disobedience, in wisdom and folly, in the passionateness of his sin and in the truth and intensity of his religious affections, he was the true representative of his people, voicing forth what was deepest and best in them. His exhortations and aspirations set forth in typical form and degree what individuals and communities alike ought to feel towards God. "Stand in awe of Him, all ye seed of Israel."[3] "O fear the Lord, ye His saints."[4] "Blessed are they that put their trust in Him."[5] "The Lord is my strength and my shield; my heart hath trusted in Him, and I am helped."[6] "O love the Lord, all ye His saints."[7] "I love Thee, O Lord my strength."[8]

The idea of a corporate relationship between Israel and Jehovah their King was further distinctly embodied in the law that "three times a year all

[1] Deut. v. 26 ff. [2] 1 Sam. vii. 5, 8. [3] Ps. xxii. 23.
[4] Ps. xxxiv. 9. [5] Ps. ii. 12. [6] Ps. xxviii. 7.
[7] Ps. xxxi. 23. [8] Ps. xviii. 1. See also Note VIII. in Appendix.

the males should appear before the Lord God, the God of Israel,"[1] for common worship; a law which, when the people grew in numbers, was fulfilled by means of representatives. On other special occasions too, indeed, whenever the nation as a nation was deeply stirred, and its mind and will had to be expressed in gratitude or penitence, in adoration or humiliation, the people met in great assemblies, constituted, doubtless, by deputed members. One of the purposes of the law referred to unquestionably was to promote the unification of the tribes, whose centrifugal tendencies exposed the nation to the constant danger of disintegration; but it was also designed to express the fact that even as a nation they owed allegiance and reverence to their great King.

Special provision was made, too, for preserving the continuity of the relation of the Israelites to God in their national corporate capacity by the institution of the office of high priest with its distinctive functions. He was termed "the priest who is higher than his brethren, upon whose head the anointing oil was poured."[2] He concentrated in his person the duties connected with mediatorship, which were distributed among the other priests and Levites. Special rites were observed at his consecration; garments of special glory, beauty, and sanctity were made for him;[3] he was to wear a breastplate of judgment, the work of cunning workmen,[4] upon his heart; there were to be engraved thereon the names of the children of Israel;[5] and he was to "bear

[1] Ex. xxxiv. 23; Deut. xvi. 16; Luke ii. 41.
[2] Lev. xxi. 10.
[3] Ex. xxviii. 2, 3 ff.
[4] Ex. xxviii. 15.
[5] Ex. xxviii. 29 ff.

the judgment of the children of Israel upon his heart before the Lord continually."[1] Nay more, he was to wear a mitre on whose forefront was a plate of pure gold, with the words engraved thereon, *Holy to the Lord*, in sign of his bearing the iniquity of the holy things which the children of Israel shall hallow in all their holy gifts; and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted of the Lord.[2] In sign of his being, as it were, equal to the entire people,[3] it was ordained that if the anointed priest should sin so as to bring guilt on the people, he was to offer for his sin the *same sacrifice as was offered for the whole congregation* when it had sinned, namely, a young bullock.[4] When he sinned, the whole people sinned; when he was well-pleasing to Jehovah, the whole people was well-pleasing.[5] The representative character of the high priest was brought out with special clearness on the great day of atonement, when he had to lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel and all their transgressions, even all their sins.[6]

The Israelites rendered corporate worship to Jehovah through their representatives, especially on great national occasions. How truly did David carry out this idea, alike in his own action and in calling on the people for co-operation, when he determined on fetching in the ark of God! "David said unto all the assembly of Israel, If it seem good unto

[1] Ex. xxviii. 30. [2] Ex. xxviii. 36 ff.

[3] Æquiparatur universo Israëli, says Aben Ezra on this passage. See Oehler in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* vol. vi. 199.

[4] Lev. iv. 3, 13 ff. [5] See Lev. iv. 3; Zech. iii. [6] Lev. xvi. 21.

you, and if it be of the Lord our God, let us send abroad everywhere unto our brethren, that are left in all the land of Israel: and let us bring again the ark of God to us."[1] "And David assembled all Israel at Jerusalem to bring up the ark of God unto its place which he had prepared for it;" and the priests were called upon "to sanctify themselves for the purpose. And David clothed himself, and all the Levites that bare the ark, and the singers, with robes of fine linen. And all Israel brought up the ark of the covenant of the Lord with shouting, and with sound of the cornet, and with trumpets, and with cymbals, sounding aloud with psalteries and harps."[2]

So, too, when Solomon consecrated the temple he had built, everything was done to embody the idea that the worship was the worship of the whole nation. "He held the feast," we read, "seven days, and all Israel with him, a very great congregation."[3] Sacrifices, music, processions, robes—all that could be done to heighten the splendour of the ceremonial was done; and "the people went away unto their tents, joyful and glad at heart for the goodness that the Lord had shown unto David, and to Solomon, and to Israel His people."[4]

When David made preparations for a "house that was to be builded to the Lord exceeding magnificent of fame and of glory throughout all countries;"[5] and when Solomon set about building a house which

[1] 1 Chron. xiii. 2, 3.
[2] 1 Chron. xv.; comp. 1 Chron. xxix. 20 ff.; 2 Chron. v.; Josh. xxiv. 24; Deut. v. 22–33.
[3] 2 Chron. vii. 8.
[4] 2 Chron. vii. 10; cf. also 2 Chron. xxxiv.
[5] 1 Chron. xxii. 5.

should be great, because of the supreme greatness of the God to whom it was to be dedicated, which should in some measure reflect the glory of Him whom the heaven and the heaven of heavens could not contain,[1] they were the organs in part of the national mind and will, but certainly of the national idea. Occasionally, too, the thought of a still vaster temple, of still vaster significance and representative of a still vaster unity, rose on the horizon of the higher prophetic minds. Indeed, Solomon seems to become for a moment the representative of humanity, whilst he is actually only dedicating the national temple; for in the act of praying for his own people and their needs, his thoughts suddenly take a wider range as he exclaims, "that all the peoples of the earth may know that the Lord, He is God: there is none else."[2] In Isaiah we read, "As the new heavens and the new earth which I will make shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord."[3] "The desirable things of all nations shall come, and I will fill this house with glory, saith the Lord of hosts. The latter glory of this house shall be greater than the former;"[4] as indeed it must needs be if it were to be "the house of prayer for all nations."[5]

[1] 2 Chron. ii. 5 ff. [2] 1 Kings viii. 60.
[3] Isa. lxvi. 22. [4] Hagg. ii. 7–9.
[5] Isa. lvi. 7; cf. Zech. vi. 12, viii. 22; Ezek. xxxvii. 26 ff. See Note IX. in Appendix.

CHAPTER IV.

HEBREW SIN-OFFERINGS WITH ETHNIC PARALLELS.

The social and political organization whose life during its beginnings, its culmination, its disintegration, and its final destruction is reflected, or embodied, or recorded in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, was called into existence, protected, and sustained by God for the purpose of making His kingdom *de facto* what it was *de jure*. Institutions and laws were given to the Jews, and God entered into special personal relations to them, in order that, on the one hand, they might themselves be His loyal subjects, and, on the other hand, that they might be His representatives, agents, missionaries to the rest of the world. Their institutions and laws, indeed their constitution as a whole, whilst ordered to meet their own needs, and undergoing constant changes according to the exigencies of their individual, social, and national life, were intended to undergo, as the ages ran on, a process of evolution fitting them to become the chief and determining feature of the framework of the life of all the peoples of the earth.[1]

It must not, of course, be forgotten that nothing in the constitution referred to was settled on purely ideal

[1] Isa. ii.

principles. From the beginning to the end it was essentially an adaptation of the ideal to those who were actually imperfect and sinful. Men, Israelites, were taken as they were; and institutions and laws were given best fitted to train them into true loyalty to their invisible King. Things were accordingly permitted and prescribed at one stage of their development which at another might be left in abeyance or even prohibited. The divine educator, lawgiver, Saviour, was no doctrinaire, no theorizer, no adherent of finalities.

It is from this point of view that we must try to ascertain what may be learnt from the Old Testament touching the divine method of establishing the kingdom of God.

I. The institutions and laws and personal interventions referred to had three great objects in view, — these three objects, however, being but the constitutive factors of the one great object, the establishment of the kingdom. They are, first, the establishment and maintenance of right relations between the invisible King and His subjects; secondly, the establishment and maintenance of right relations between the subjects, according to the several positions and functions assigned to them in the organization by its divine Head; and thirdly, the establishment and maintenance of normal relations between the subjects and their dwelling-place — the territory which they held in fief from their great Lord. These are at all events the all-dominating ends which God had in view.

II. Owing to the fact that God had constituted or rather revealed and proved Himself to be the real active ruler of the nation, the distinction now so

frequently drawn between the religious and secular had no existence for the Jews:—it could have none. Inasmuch as all their laws and institutions — their entire constitution—were mediately or immediately, directly or indirectly of God's appointment or sanction, and were recognised as such, disobedience to any law, violation of any obligation, was sin against Jehovah; fulfilment thereof was obedience: everything, therefore, was either religious or irreligious. For the Jew, therefore, there were no distinctions of kind between sins. Indeed, there has never been an error so fruitful of mischief, an error so clearly traceable to the Spirit of all untruth, as the notion embodied in the distinction frequently drawn between secular and religious. In God's world everything is related to God, or should be; it is therefore, or should be, religious: if it is not so, the world is not a part of God's kingdom. "Whatsoever ye do, whether ye *eat* or *drink*, do *all* to the glory of God." Whatsoever then is not thus done is a sin.

This did not mean, however, that all acts were of equal value—all equally good and right, if good and right; or equally sinful, if sinful. There were differences of degree, especially between sins, according to the persons offending, according to the circumstances of the offence, and according to the persons offended.

Peculiar stress was laid on the relation of sins to God: particularly on certain sins above others—those naturally which had a more direct bearing on Him, either as involving a violation of His royal rights or as being the transgression of special commands.

This was grounded, too, in the supreme importance

attached to the personal relations between God and His subjects. These relations were consistently thus treated because of their fundamental character. According to the very constitution of the world, a constitution which God Himself could not change without first changing the world, all other relations are necessarily conditioned by the relation between the ruler and the ruled. This need not be the case in earthly kingdoms. Whether subjects stand in this or the other personal relation to the monarch, may have very little to do with their relations to each other or with their relations to their environment: but it is not so in God's kingdom; it is not so even in a human family. His subjects can hold truly harmonious relations to each other and to their environment on one condition alone—that they are inwardly and outwardly loyal to Him, that their relation to Him is normal. On this condition alone can they enjoy, not only spiritual, but even material prosperity.

III. Provision was accordingly made for impressing this great principle on the minds of the Israelites by the institution of sacrifices—or rather by their specific regulation. Like all other branches of the human family, they were familiar with the practice of sacrificing. It existed, doubtless, in Ur of the Chaldees, whence Abraham was called to go forth with his family; it existed among the tribes of Canaan, in whose midst he and his family took up their abode; it existed in Egypt, whither the tribe he had founded went to live. So that, apart altogether from any real or supposed divine command, we may be pretty sure that they would have formed no exception to the

universal custom. We are justified, too, in assuming that this was the case by the words which Moses and Aaron spake to Pharaoh: "Thus saith Jehovah, the God of Israel, Let my people go that they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness. . . . The God of the Hebrews hath met with us; let us go, we pray thee, three days' journey into the wilderness and sacrifice unto the Lord our God; lest He fall upon us with pestilence or with the sword."[1] From another passage, however,—"And Pharaoh called for Moses and for Aaron, and said, Go ye, sacrifice to your God in the land. And Moses said, It is not meet so to do; for we shall sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians to the Lord our God: lo, shall we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and will they not stone us? We will go three days' journey into the wilderness and sacrifice to the Lord our God as He shall command us,"[2]—some writers have drawn the conclusion that the Israelites offered no sacrifices. But so sweeping an inference is unwarranted; for, first, the reference may be, not to bloody sacrifices in general, but merely to one species, *e.g.* the bullock, one of the gods of the Egyptians; secondly, even if bloody sacrifices were meant, other offerings may have been presented; and thirdly, danger may have been apprehended, not because of the bare fact of sacrifice, but because of its public, special corporate character.

We altogether lack, however, detailed information either as to the nature of the offerings presented or the ritual observed.

[1] Ex. v. 1, 3.

[2] Ex. viii. 23–28.

Neither the matter nor the manner of the sacrificial legislation compels us to assume that Moses, under the guidance of Jehovah, began *de novo*. It is sheer misunderstanding of God's method, and false supernaturalism, to shrink from conceding that laws, customs, ceremonies, sacrifices, rites, and so forth, with which the Israelites were more or less familiar through their intercourse with other nations and tribes, and which were adapted to their circumstances, or which they could readily understand and assimilate, might have been incorporated with the code drawn up by Moses and others. As long as there was nothing in any of these things which absolutely prevented its becoming the vehicle of a divine idea and a true life, it was acceptable. The only questions to be asked were—Would it prove a temptation, or a snare, or hindrance, though essentially harmless? Or was it essentially and exclusively adapted to a heathen system?

IV. In fact, a dim and vague apprehension of the truth which was vividly and forcibly impressed on the Israelitish mind, lay at the back of the entire sacrificial system of the heathen world. Men have felt that somehow or other their supreme concern was to stand well with God. They were far enough, indeed, from discerning the full significance of the fact thus recognised. Very few dreamed of the close relation that existed between their religion and the rest of their life; between rectifying the relation to God and rectifying all other relations: still less did they seek to bridge over the apparent distance between the two. Even down to our own time,

even at the present moment, a right relation to God is not regarded as the essential condition of the rightness of other relations. The former may be held to be of supreme importance; but it is rather because of the determining influence it is believed to have on the never-ending existence awaiting men beyond death, than because of the close, vital, organic connection between it and every other domain of life. The distinction between the religious and the so-called secular—if distinction there be—lies here, that the character of the religious life determines that of the secular life. They are related at the deepest as cause and effect. Disorder in religion is the root of disorder elsewhere; to establish order elsewhere is hopeless till order is established in religion—and that because God cannot be to us and to our created environment what it is necessary He should be if we and that environment are to be in a normal state, and normally related, so long as we, who have self-control, are wrongly related to Him. It is not merely the influence exercised by our own wrong state on our environment; no, it is that our wrong relation to God checks or stops the influx of those energies and influences from Him on which depend the well-being of the cosmos. A hint of this is given us in the New Testament, when it is said of Christ, "He could do no mighty works there because of their unbelief."

V. A few words on sacrifices in general.[1] The

[1] The following is a list of some of the principal works which have been consulted :—Oehler's *Theology of the Old Testament*, and the same writer's articles in Herzog's *Realencyclopædie*, 1st ed.; Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship of the Old Testament;* Alfred Cave, *Sacrifice;* Bähr, *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*, 2 vols.; Smith's *Dictionaries;* Briggs' *Messianic*

most general term for offering would seem to be *corban* = presentation oblation, for which other words are also used, as, for example, Matnoth and Kadesh.[1] Of the *Corbanim*, there were three great classes: *first*, those offered to God for the erection, furnishing, and maintenance of His sanctuary, such as, for example, those mentioned in Numbers: "It came to pass on the day that Moses had made an end of setting up the tabernacle, and had anointed and sanctified it, and all the furniture thereof, and the altar and all the vessels thereof, and had anointed them and sanctified them, that the princes of Israel brought their oblations (*corbanim*) before the Lord, six covered waggons and twelve oxen, a waggon for every two of the princes, and for each one an ox; and they presented them before the tabernacle."[2] "And we have brought the Lord's oblation (*corban*), what every man hath gotten (*i.e.* his share of the prey taken from the Midianites), of jewels of gold, ankle chains and bracelets, signet-rings, ear-rings, and armlets, to make atonement (*Kapper*) for our souls before the Lord."[3]

Prophecy; Keil's *Archæology of the Old Testament;* Outram, *De Sacrificiis*, one of the best works on the subject yet; Orelli, *Messianic Prophecy;* see also Dr. Alexander's judicious discussion in his *Biblical Theology*, so admirably edited by the Rev. James Ross.

[1] See Ex. xxviii. 38; cf. Mark vii. 11. With this agrees the view taken by Abarbanel (*Exor. Comm. in Lev.* c. i.): "Omne Zebach est Corban; quoad adolebatur in ara. Verum est Corban quoad non est Zebach, e.g. oblatio volucris, quoniam in ea non est jugulatio: et Mincha etiam vocatur corban." Quoted in *Essay on the Nature, Design, and Origin of Sacrifices* (1748), p. 18.

[2] Num. vii. 1–3, and whole chapter.

[3] Num. xxxi. 50. "In Ex. xxx. 12–15, the expression, Money of atonements, is used. It was to be employed for the service of the tabernacle of the congregation, and was for a memorial to the Lord to make an

In this class may also be included things which became Corban in consequence of vows.[1] In a word, they were dedication gifts. Modern equivalents might be church buildings, pulpits, windows, communion utensils, Bibles, altar cloths, or any other part of the furniture of the sanctuary; or the money necessary for their purchase.

Secondly, offerings for the maintenance of the priests and Levites, as being the immediate servants or, so to speak, officials of Jehovah, and consisting of first-fruits, tithes, and the male first-born of man and beast. These offerings, as well as those mentioned under the preceding head, were a sort of tribute or tax paid to God as the King of the Israelites and the Lord of the land—the Feudal Superior.[2]

Lastly, there were the corbanim for Jehovah Himself, or the altar sacrifices proper, which were generally consumed upon the altar. It is with these last we have now specially to do.[3]

atonement for their souls. This offering is called by the LXX. εἰσφορά, a tribute to the Lord; and it is said, ἐξιλάσασθαι περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν, as if it had been an expiatory sacrifice, or there had been an effusion of blood. The meaning of the law is, that when this tribute was paid the law was observed, and the dominion of their God and King was recognised; whilst He on His part engaged that there *should be no plague among them* (Ex. xxx. 12)." *Essay*, etc., p. 5 ff.

[1] Mark vii. 11.

[2] See Num. xviii. 8–20. "The first ripe fruits of all that is in their land shall be Thine. Everything that openeth the womb, both of man and beast, shall be Thine—the first-born of man shalt Thou redeem." (See note under the preceding head.) The firstling of an ox, sheep, goat, however, were not to be redeemed, but dealt with like the third class of corbanim. See next head.

[3] The Romans also recognised three classes of offerings:—1. Those which were of a permanent character, *donaria;* among the Greeks, ἀναθήματα. These were gifts presented to the gods, and deposited in their shrines by individuals or whole nations, and consisted in statues, pictures, tapestry, plate, etc. 2. Those which passed away at the

Various kinds of sacrifices are mentioned in the Pentateuch, and considerable diversity of opinion prevails as to the best mode of classifying them, as to their relation to each other, and as to the precise significance of some of them. They are perhaps best reduced to four classes, namely, *burnt*-offerings, which are the most ancient; *peace*-offerings, again subdivided into *thank*-offerings, offerings in pursuance of *vows*, and *free-will*, spontaneous offerings; *trespass*-offerings; and *sin*-offerings.[1] A fifth class might, however, be made of *meat*- and *drink*-offerings, on the ground that though generally presented along with burnt-offerings and thank-offerings, they sometimes formed a sacrifice by themselves. We read, for example, "The man shall bring her (his wife's) oblation for her, the tenth part of an ephah of barley meal; he shall pour no oil upon it, nor put frankincense thereon; for it is a meal-offering of jealousy, a meal-offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance."[2] Elsewhere, however, it is associated with other sacrifices: "When ye be come into the land of your habitation, which I give unto you, and

moment when they were offered, viz. *sacrificia*. These were divided into two classes, bloodless and bloody—the latter generally designated *victimæ* or *hostiæ*. 3. *Epulum—Epulæ*,—feasts. During the Roman games and at other times, a feast termed *Epulum Jovis*, the feast of Jove, was spread in the Capitol. Many temples contained couches, and occasionally the Senate in times of great depression or exultation caused the statues of the deities to be laid on the couches in pairs, and banquets to be served up to them. With this *lectisternium*, as it was termed, was often combined a *supplicatio*. Public feasts given to the people were sometimes regarded as offerings to the gods by the hosts. 4. The public games were regarded as religious rites in the earlier ages, and are therefore also adduced under this general head. See Ramsay, *Roman Antiquities*.

[1] So Outram, *De Sacrificiis Judæorum*, p. 98. [2] Num. v. 15, 25 f.

will make an offering by fire unto the Lord, a burnt-offering, or a sacrifice, to accomplish a vow, or as a freewill-offering, or in your set feasts, to make a sweet savour unto the Lord, of the herd, or of the flock; then shall he that offereth his oblation offer unto the Lord a meal-offering, and wine for a drink-offering."[1] The quantities to be offered are then prescribed, and differ in proportion to the importance of the animal sacrificed.

Approached from the point of view of this discussion, they might be distributed into two classes,—those which were the outcome, expression, ratification, of normal relations; and those which were designed to rectify wrong and establish right relations between the subjects and their King.[2]

The several species of sacrifices, especially those of propitiation, may be further divided into two

[1] Num. xv. 1–16.

The meal-offering mentioned in Lev. v. 11 is merely a substitute for the two turtle doves, or two young pigeons, that ought properly to have been sacrificed. Again, in Lev. vi. 14 the meal-offering is presented independently in connection with the consecration of the priests. As Oehler says ("Opfer," in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* x. 621), the first sheaf brought on the first day of Passover, and the Pentecostal and Shew-bread, may also be regarded as species of mincha or meat-offerings. See Keil, *Bibl. Archæology* (Eng. tr.), i. 256.

[2] So Oehler, *l.c.* p. 634. Compare also the *Apol. Con. Aug.*: "Sunt autem sacrificii species proximæ duæ, nec sunt plures. Quoddam est sacrificium propitiatorium, i.e. opus satisfactorium pro culpa et pœna, h.e. reconcilians Deum seu placans iram Dei seu quod meretur aliis remissionem peccatorum. Altera species est sacrificium εὐχαριστικόν, quod non meretur remissionem aut reconciliationem, sed fit a reconciliatis ut pro accepta remissione peccatorum et pro aliis beneficiis acceptis gratias agimus vel gratiam referamus." Quoted by Schneider, "die lutherische Lehre vom Opfertode Christi," *Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1860, p. 659 f.

Maimondes gives as a reason for incense, "that because they killed a great number of beasts and cut them in pieces, and washed and burned the inwards, the stink would have been just like that of a

classes, viz. those which are offered by and on behalf of individuals, and those which are offered by and on behalf of the community; in other words, particular and general, individual and corporate.

VI. *Sin-Offerings.*

We are concerned solely with the second of the two great classes of offerings just mentioned, and more especially with sin-offerings. It should not be overlooked, however, that the sense of sin can scarcely be said to have been completely absent from sacrifices of even the first class. If not in the offerings themselves, yet in the rites with which they were presented, there was always something to remind men that the offerers were not what they should be. In general, *that which* was presented was not what a pure and holy being would have offered; nor, apart from special rites, was the mode of presentation such as a pure and holy being would have chosen. With this class of sacrifices it was as with our warmest thanksgivings—we dare not forget that though we are in a position to thank for grace, we deserve rather to be deprecating wrath; and, accordingly, confession of sin, when not expressly interwoven with thanksgiving, is really presupposed or implied in it.

Three points have to be examined, viz., first, the nature of the objects presented; secondly, the rites

shambles; that therefore it was necessary that incense should be burned twice a day to make the smell of the place and of the clothes of those that ministered in the temple not disagreeable" (*More Nev.* iii. 46). Frankincense is said also to have been of peculiar efficacy in driving away or destroying flies.

observed at presentation; and thirdly, the function subserved by the sacrifices. These points need, indeed, to be inquired into in connection with all sacrifices, specially, however, with those in which we are here interested, namely, offerings for sin.

(I.) The nature or material of the sin-offerings. All the animal or blood-offerings were to be taken from the herd, or the flock, or other domestic animals. If from the herd, a bullock or heifer;[1] if from the flock, a goat or a lamb, in both cases either a male or a female;[2] if of other domestic animals, a young pigeon or a turtle dove.[3] In cases of poverty, it was permitted to bring as an "oblation for that wherein he hath sinned, the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a sin-offering; he shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense thereon; for it is a sin-offering."[4]

The following are the characteristics by which sacrifices were to be marked:—

1. That which a man presented was not only to be *his own property*, but was to belong to him in a special sense. "When any man of you offereth an oblation to Jehovah, ye shall offer your oblation of the cattle, even of the herd and of the flock."[5] And in order that every one might fulfil this rule, the poor man was to offer two young pigeons or turtle doves—things which he most probably possessed; nay, he that was poorer still, was to give what the very poorest must have if he were able to live at all,

[1] Lev. iv. 3, 14; 1 Sam. xvi. 2. [2] Lev. iv. 24, 28, iv. 32, viii. 18.
[3] Lev. v. 11. [4] Lev. v. 11. [5] Lev. i. 2.

a small quantity of fine flour.[1] He must bring some part of his personal property.

But, further, it must be in a certain special sense his property. It was not enough for it to belong to him. A great many things are excluded from presentation, which in the usual sense might be considered as truly his as his bullock, or goat, or lamb, or turtle doves, or pigeons, or even flour. Neither the gazelle (roebuck) nor hart, though both of them were pure animals, might be offered;[2] indeed, all others were excluded, even if pure; still more if impure. Nor were any of the fruits of the earth to form an oblation, except corn, oil, and wine; by way of substitute for the simplest kind of sin-offering, as we saw, corn alone, or what was made from corn, was admissible.[3]

Much discussion has been devoted to determining the reason of this restriction.

With regard to the recognition of this principle in other religions, I cannot do better than quote the following words:[4] "An indispensable quality of oblations was, that they should be the property of those who presented them. In the course of time a limit ceased to be placed on the class of objects that might be offered; but this characteristic remained,—it was so even with the offerings of gold brought by the Hindoos, or of manufactures by the Chinese. And a decided preference continued long to be shown

[1] Lev. v. 11. [2] See Deut. xii. 15, 16, 22, xv. 22.

[3] The exceptions recorded in Ezra vii. 17, vi. 9 (cf. 1 Macc. x. 39; 2 Macc. iii. 3, ix. 16), really confirm the rule.

[4] See Plath, *Cultus der alten Chinesen*, pp. 31, 34, quoted by Kleinert in "Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Theorie des Opfers," in *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1874, p. 424.

for the simplest and most primitive forms of property, as, for example, fruits of the field or domestic animals. Amongst some peoples, indeed, this restriction to what might be considered property κατ' ἐξοχήν, was so far removed that game as well as domestic animals were received. But that the principle was not surrendered, is clear from the fact that the exceptions were limited to two cases: first, that of men whose calling required them to depend for a living on wild animals. The Chinese ritual, for example, allowed a huntsman in the mountains to present stags and boars; fishermen, fish and turtles.[1] Secondly, the case of deities, to whom special thanks were due for having first bestowed the property, part of which was sacrificed. Thus fish were offered to Poseidon,[2] and game to Artemis Laphria at Patræ, as is described in detail by Pausanias."[3]

Among the Hindoos, tame animals were the sacrificial ones κατ' ἐξοχήν, and, indeed, the following five species,—man, horse, ox or cow, sheep, goat. In some lists man is omitted and another inserted. A goat was the animal usually sacrificed, both alone and in connection with the Soma; and the mode of its presentation may be regarded as typical.

The he-goat had to be taken from the flock; be one of twins; its parents and brother be still alive; it was to have two teeth; must therefore be about two years old; and was required to be, if possible, faultless. Among other defects by which it was not to be marked are specified,—a broken or imperfectly grown

[1] Plath, *l.c.* Li-Ki, c. 9.
[2] Athenæus, vii. 50, 51, 56.
[3] vii. 18, ed. Kuhn, p. 570.

horn, too short ears, missing teeth, a hoof not cloven, mutilated tail, one eye short, blind, deaf, lame, or diseased with the scab. To Indra and Agni it was forbidden to offer a castrated goat. As to the colour, it might be red or of two colours, chiefly black and yellow. Special importance was attached to the fat, particularly that about the kidneys.[1]

The central feature of animal sacrifice was the presentation of the caul (*omentum*) and of the parts which could be medhya, of which eighteen are mentioned (*e.g.* heart, tongue, liver, kidneys, etc.; see p. 126 ff.). They are offered to the chief deities of animal sacrifice through the mediation of Agni, and were intended to be eaten by them. The primary occasion of animal sacrifices, and others rooted in them, was probably the desire to gratify the gods with the best that man himself enjoys. The pressing out of the Soma was regarded as a kind of slaughter.

Animals of the greatest variety were offered, wild and tame, male and female. Cows, indeed, were specially spared, though there is no express prohibition to sacrifice them. Wild animals were, however, not bound to the stakes like tame ones. From the lists of animals to be sacrificed in connection with the horse, it would seem that nearly all kinds were eligible. The lists, it is true, are of late origin, but they testify at any rate to the universality and the early date of animal sacrifices.

In the selection of a victim, the preference of the deity, or the agreement between certain marks on

[1] See Schwalb, *Das altindische Thieropfer*, 1886.

the victim and characteristics of the deity, was taken into consideration. To the gods of the early dawn, dark animals were presented; to Indra, as the representative of power, males and so forth.

Even when human beings were offered as propitiatory sacrifices, as when the inhabitants of Patros were counselled by the oracle of Delphi to sacrifice a youth and a maiden in order to avert the plague that had been brought on their land by the priestess Komætho and her lover Melanippos; or when Nero, alarmed by a comet, caused several of the chief Romans to be immolated on his behalf,[1]—the same idea underlay the action. The persons offered belonged to the State; there was a tie of solidarity between them and the offerer.[2] This seems to be contradicted by the custom that prevailed amongst many peoples of offering captives and prey in sacrifice. Whilst it is probably true that the boundary-line for consciousness between sin-offerings and thank-offerings—offerings intended to propitiate and atone, and offerings intended to express the gratitude, or reverence, or loyalty, or love of the offerer—was frequently very vague and indeterminate, there still seems reason for supposing that the offerings now referred to belonged as a rule to the latter class. When the Franks in making war entered the territory of the Goths, they cast the children taken captives into the river; but they are expressly designated by Procopius[3] *ἀκροθίνια τοῦ πολέμου*, first-fruits of the war. Of like nature were

[1] Kleinert, pp. 432, 433.
[2] Kleinert, p. 435.
[3] *De Bello Gothico*, in Kl. p. 434.

the offerings of captives and strangers among the Scythians;[1] of a captive warrior to the Mirrîch, *i.e.* Planet of War, Mars, amongst the Arabs;[2] so also when the Thracians sacrificed the fugitive Orobazos to their national deity Pleistoros;[3] and when the Messenian general Aristodemus offered three hundred Lacedæmonian prisoners, with their king Theopompos, to the Ithomian Zeus.[4] They were no doubt intended also to secure the further favour of the gods for the undertakings thus fortunately begun; and according to circumstances, the one idea may have passed into the other till the same sacrifice really embodied a variety of feelings and thoughts. In the main, however, the prevalence of the conception under notice can scarcely be questioned.

Various convergent, not conflicting, but mutually supplementary reasons may be assigned for the Israelitish practice, which, be it remarked, should rather be regarded as a revival or reinforcement of what had been felt to be the normal practice, than as a rule introduced *de novo*. All men, they themselves included, were departing more and more from the principle which had commended itself as the correct one; and now they were recalled to its observance. The first is, that in a primitive state of society the oblations enjoined were the most natural ones.[5] Men's earliest occupations were the keeping of flocks and herds, and agriculture. The only property they had was got by these means; sheep, cattle, corn,

[1] Herod. iv. 62, in Kleinert, p. 434.
[2] Gesenius on Isaiah, Kl. p. 435. [3] Herod. ix. 119, Kl. p. 435.
[4] Clem. Alex. *Coh.* iii. 36. 19, in Kl. p. 435.
[5] See Kleinert, p. 424.

wine, oil,—these were their only valuables. Indeed, what else could they offer?[1]

Secondly, oblations of this kind were within everybody's reach. The last thing a man lacks or is destitute of is food, or that which is to serve for food, as long as he has anything, that is, under ordinary circumstances. One may say, indeed, that such offerings were appointed, so far as they were or were supposed in any case to be of divine ordination, for the sake of making it easy for men to manifest their loyalty to God, or express their penitence for sin. Even at the present day men who are engaged in agricultural pursuits find it much easier as well as much more natural to contribute what they do contribute, as we say, in kind, for religious purposes. This is emphatically the case with converts to Christianity from heathenism.

A further reason was doubtless that into this form of oblation men put most of their own labour and thought, most of their life. These things were the product of their personal toil and care. Game, fish, fruits of trees, and the like, might be as truly their property, and they might have put forth great effort in securing possession of them; but they had not co-operated in bringing them into existence, or giving them form. Yet this latter has ever been felt to be a condition of the most acceptable offering, whether to

[1] Our word pecuniary is from *pecunia*, which is again derived from *pecus*, a herd; the word herd being applied not merely to cattle proper, but to sheep, horses, swine, and even fowls (*volatile pecus*). Pecunia sacrificium fieri dicebatur, cum frugum fructuumque causa mola pura offerebatur in sacrificio, quia omnis res familiaris, quam nunc pecuniam dicimus, ex his rebus constaret. Festus, quoted in Andrews' *Lat. Dict.*, *sub voce* "Pecunia."

man or God. What we make is better fitted to represent us than anything we find made; and all oblations, whether for sin or other reasons, owe their true value to their representing us: their value as oblations is not intrinsic.

It is so with what men now give to God. The more personal thought and work put into it, the more worthy of Him to whom it is offered. An altar cloth purchased—how poor a gift! How rich one with whose design and needlework the offerer has interwoven the best love and thought of her heart! Even when men are compelled to employ others to produce their offering, as in the case of a church, the more loving personal interest they take in it, the more carefully and tenderly they watch over the inception and execution of the plan, the more anxiously they seek to exclude everything that can mar its beauty, fitness, or value, the higher is men's estimate of it as a gift to God!

Here is the true secret of the divine ordinance. Men were to give the things into which, as a rule, they had actually poured most of their inner as well as outer, their spiritual as well as their bodily life.

As following from or involved in the last reason, we may also say that in the sacrifices thus prescribed there was most of the element of sacrifice. That which has demanded most of our personal energy is the hardest to surrender. This may seem to conflict with reasons previously assigned; but it does not really do so. The things which it ought to be most natural and easy for us to give, we most grudge to give, if the spirit of sacrifice is absent. Sacrifice ought

always to combine two apparently contradictory elements — it should cost us what is dear; and it should be given with ease and readiness.

Perhaps, finally, there may have been the intention to familiarize the minds of men with the fact that the most acceptable service they can render to God is that which is most closely associated with their common life. Not what is far-fetched, but what lies close to hand; not what is rare, but what is common, —*that* God is most delighted to receive as our sacrifice; that is the best and the most significant vehicle for the expression of our thoughts, affections, purposes.

This, as we all know, is even now one of the hardest lessons men can learn; even now no lesson needs more perpetually inculcating; and if the Christian Church were inventing symbols for the purpose of familiarizing their minds with the principle I am referring to, would it not require the presentation of our most ordinary possessions? Owing to the vastly greater variety and complexity of modern life, the gifts would need to be of a far more varied character. The agriculturist might still bring grain and the like; the gardener fruits and flowers; but the tradesman and manufacturer, the artist and poet, the publisher and publicist, would bring of the things in whose production or diffusion they are respectively interested.[1]

2. The second characteristic of sacrifices was that

[1] "Sacrifices were all of such things as were usually eaten by the Jews, and were in common practice for the purpose of making or restoring friendships; and therefore they were applied to keep up friendship between God and men." *Essay*, etc., p. 319.

both as to matter and rite they should be approved or prescribed by Jehovah. This is not, indeed, stated in so many words, but it is distinctly involved in or follows from the prohibitions and commands relating to the objects to be presented, and the rites to be observed. We read, for example, in Deuteronomy, "Then it shall come to pass that the place where the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell there: thither shall ye bring all that I command you; your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices."[1] "The Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Command the children of Israel, and say unto them, My oblation, my food for my offering, made by fire, of a sweet savour unto me, shall ye observe to offer unto me in their due season."[2] "I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls."[3] "Whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not offer; for it shall not be acceptable for you. And whosoever offereth a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the Lord . . . it shall be perfect to be accepted."[4] We know, too, that certain things were prescribed, others prohibited;—among the latter, no animal unclean for food: no animal that could not be included among domestic animals; no vegetables: no fruits on which human labour had not been directly spent in some form or other. On the other hand, it was expressly laid down when they should be of the male sex,[5] when female;[6] the former being prescribed for the more important occasions. They were to be neither too old nor too young—animals from the flocks

[1] Deut. xii. 11. [2] Num. xxviii. 2. [3] Lev. xvii. 11.
[4] Lev. xxii. 20 ff. [5] Lev. iv. 3, 14, 24, 15, xvi. 3, 7.
[6] Lev. iv. 32, 28.

were to be at least eight days old.[1] Sheep and goats were to be of the first year, as also calves;[2] bullocks and oxen might be of a greater age.[3]

The rites and ceremonies to be observed were also carefully prescribed; though the whole tone and manner of the prescriptions are as far removed as possible from the vexatious anxiety about trifling externalities that is so characteristic of heathen ceremonial.

The same principle is more or less distinctly recognised in heathenism. Both the things offered and the manner of offering were deemed to require divine approval, if not divine appointment. Oracles were frequently consulted on the subject, or at all events gave their commands. The inhabitants of Patros consulted the oracle of Delphi what sacrifice would effect the removal of a calamity which afflicted their country.[4] Among the Romans, no sacrifice was efficacious unless it conformed to the prescribed rites; and the sole concern of one who prayed was exactly to fulfil the religious law. He who had a favour to ask of heaven, needed first to ascertain which god he ought to address; further, also, to know his peculiar nature, functions, and name, lest he should make mistakes. It was accordingly the custom to resort to the pontifices, whose business it was to watch over

[1] Lev. xxii. 27; Ex. xxii. 30.

[2] Lev. xxii. 27; Ex. xxii. 30; Num. xxviii. 3, 9, 11; cf. Kurtz, *Mosaic Sacrifices*, p. 81.

[3] See Judg. vi. 25; Lev. xxii. 27.

[4] Pausanias, vii. 19, 21, iv. 9, quoted by Kleinert, "Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Theorie des Opfers," in *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1874. Compare Socrates' injunction to his friends to offer on his behalf a cock to Æsculapius.

and scrupulously to maintain all the details of worship. Sacrifices and ceremonies alike must be such as the gods approved of, and their mind was learnt from the public religious officials.[1]

According to the Code of the Twelve Tables, animals were to be offered in sacrifice which were known to be fitting and agreeable to the deity intended to be worshipped,—whether, as some think, because of some affinity between the two or for some other reason can scarcely be decided. To Jupiter Capitolinus, white heifers with gilt horns were offered, but no bullock nor ram; Apollo, Neptune, and Mars alone accepted bullocks; asses, cocks, and horses to Mars; a white cow, because of her moon-shaped horns, to *Juno Calendaris;* an untouched calf to the virgin Minerva; a pig with young to Ceres; pigeons, sparrows, and the loins of various other animals to Venus.[2]

"The number of the gods amongst the Romans being as great as the number of special occasions in life, and the neglect of a god or a wrong mode of showing reverence being sure to be at once avenged, the task of even correctly ascertaining their religious

[1] See Boissier, *La Religion Romaine*, vol. i. 14 ff.

[2] Döllinger, *Heidenthum u. Judenthum*, p. 530. Compare Bähr, ii. 248, 250, 251, 252, 267, 273.

As Bacchus was the God-protector of vines, and as goats by their bite did irretrievable mischief to the vine,—

Non aliam ob causam Baccho caper omnibus aris cæditur.

VIRG. *Georg.* ii. 380.

There were other reasons also why goats were never sacrificed to Minerva, besides the fact that their bite was as destructive to the olive tree as it was to the vine. It would have been an affront to that maiden deity to have offered her such a sacrifice. See *Essay*, etc., p. 268 f.

duties was encompassed with toil and danger; hence the influence secured by the priests who knew what ought to be done."[1] Accordingly "the Pontifex Max. in Rome had to teach all who came to consult him the order and manner of their sacrifices, to appoint the holidays, to determine all controversies, relating to sacred things between private persons or magistrates, or the ministers of the gods: they could make laws in relation to such points as were not wrote down, or by use were not received; judging and determining what appeared to them to be proper to be made into laws or received as customs; they had power of examining all those officers and priests to whom the right of sacrificing or the service of the gods was committed, their servants and officers that they used in their sacred rites, whether they observed or did not observe the sacred laws; they were to instruct private people who did not know the proper manner of worshipping the gods; and if they found any that did not obey their directions or commands, they had a power of mulcting them, whilst they themselves were not accountable, either to the Senate or the people."[2]

From this cause alone, if from no others, the heathen in all ages and lands have been all their lifetime subject to bondage, especially when their intelligence was awakened. They felt the need of the divine approval of their religious acts, and yet could never be certain of having that approval. This is one of the grounds of the superior confidence and peace of

[1] Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, i. 160; cf. 842.
[2] See Dionysius Halicarnassus, I. II., quoted *Essay*, etc., p. 221 ff.

the Jew: God Himself had prescribed what sacrifices he should offer and what rites he should observe; and fulfilling the revealed will of his King, he could feel satisfied.

3. The third characteristic of sacrifices was that they should be spotless, faultless, the most perfect, the best of their kind. The injunction that animals offered be without blemish is very frequently repeated; but in one passage special prominence is given to this characteristic: "Whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not offer;" that is, as a burnt-offering or sin-offering, though admissible as a "free-will offering;"[1] "for it shall not be acceptable for you . . . it shall be perfect to be accepted: there shall be no blemish therein."[2] The goat offered by a ruler was to be a male without blemish;[3] that offered by one of the common people a female without blemish;[4] even the flour brought for a sin-offering by the man who was too poor to afford two turtle doves or two young pigeons was to be "fine flour."[5] When the condition is not expressly mentioned, it is fair to suppose from the passages quoted above that it is implied. And the divine mind in relation to this characteristic, as also implicitly to the one mentioned under the last head, is sternly enough expressed in the words of Malachi:[6] "Ye have brought that which was taken by violence, and the lame, and the sick; thus ye bring the offering: should I accept this of your hand? saith Jehovah. But cursed be the deceiver,

[1] Lev. xxii. 23. [2] Lev. xxii. 20, 21. [3] Lev. iv. 24.
[4] Lev. iv. 28. [5] Lev. v. 11. [6] Mal. i. 13 ff.

which hath in his flock a male, and voweth, and sacrificeth unto the Lord a blemished thing: for I am a great King, saith the Lord of hosts."

The same condition is more or less clearly, and in various forms, recognised by the heathen religions.

Among the *Egyptians* the task of testing and selecting animals for sacrifice was a very difficult and delicate one. They were most carefully examined in a variety of ways. If, for example, a single black hair was found on an ox, it was counted unclean. The examination was conducted according to definite rules laid down in special writings.[1]

The *Greeks*, too, laid great stress on purity in connection with sacrifices. Those who took part in the ceremonial had to wash their hands, be sprinkled with water, and put on clean garments. It was deemed of great importance that the animal to be sacrificed should move willingly towards the altar. It must not be dragged violently; if it went readily, it was a specially favourable omen.[2]

Equally significant were the prescriptions of the *Roman* ceremonial in this respect. The animals selected for sacrifice had always to be perfect in form and free from blemish. The victims employed in the public solemnities in honour of Capitoline Jove were usually milk-white steers from Umbria. All who took part in the rites were required previously to purify themselves in a running stream, to appear in white garments, and to wash their hands. The victim was led gently to the altar; and any

[1] Döllinger, *Heidenthum*, etc., p. 442, quoted from Wilkinson.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 209.

reluctance displayed by it was regarded as an evil omen.[1]

It is said that the inhabitants of Telmessos, in Lycia, were enjoined to propitiate the deity who had sent the calamity from which their country was suffering, by offering every year their most beautiful virgins.[2] And in the case of such human sacrifices great stress was further laid on their being willing to die.[3]

According to Diodorus Siculus, the Carthaginians, when pressed sore by Agathocles, ascribed their sufferings to the anger of the gods, and accordingly sacrificed "at one fell swoop two hundred of the children of the first nobles;" and the parents were compelled to put on the appearance of sacrificing them cheerfully.[4]

Porphyry, too (*l.c.* l. 2), tells us that "in public calamities, whether of war, or drought, or pestilence, the Phœnicians used to devote one of their dearest and best beloved, chosen by lot, as a victim to Kronos"—*Φοίνικες δὲ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς ἢ πόλεμων, ἢ αὐχμῶν, ἢ λοιμῶν, ἐθύον τῶν φίλτατων τίνα ἐπιψηφίζοντες Κρόνῳ.* Sometimes their princes offered up the most beloved of their offspring as a ransom to the avenging deities *τὸ ἠγαπημένον τῶν τέκνων τοὺς κρατοῦντας, ἢ πόλεως, ἢ ἔθνους, εἰς σφαγὴν ἐπιδιδόναι λύτρον τοῖς τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι.* Sometimes even an only child—*τὰ ἀγαπητὰ καὶ μονογενῆ τῶν παίδων*,[5] was thus sacrificed for the public weal.

[1] Ramsay, *Roman Antiquities*, p. 166 f. ; compare Döllinger, p. 533.
[2] Kleinert, p. 432. [3] Kleinert, p. 433. [4] xx. 14, p. 415, in Bähr, 241.
[5] Philo, *de Phœnic.* ap. Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* l. 4, c. 16. 4, 7 ; cf. Bähr, ii. 241 ; Döllinger, *l.c.* 397.

The Phœnicians had a sacrifice, too, in which the victims were mactated mystically—*κατεσφάττοντο δὲ οἱ διδόμενοι μυστικῶς*, and it had the requisites that a *prince* should offer it, and *his only son* should be the victim.[1] The explanation given thereof by the Phœnicians themselves is this, that their supreme deity Il, whom they called *κύριος οὐρανοῦ*, *the Lord of heaven*, and said that he had the Elohim for his associates (*συμμαχοὶ Ἰλοῦ—Ἐλωεὶμ ἐπεκλήθησαν*), had *a son ἀγαπητόν, well-beloved, born of the fountain of light*, his only-begotten *μονογενῆ*, and therefore called *Ieoud;* that this son was *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, ἀντὶ τῆς παντῶν φθορᾶς*—to give his soul a ransom for many, to prevent the ruin of all; and what is most remarkable, make the sacrifice *βασιλικῷ σχήματι κεκοσμημένος*, robed in royal state.[2]

The Babylonians and Persians, too, had a solemn festival, which Berosus calls *Σακεα*, to which Dio Chrysostom alludes as follows :—"Have you never considered the festival of the Sakkoi which the Persians celebrate? They take a prisoner under condemnation of death and set him on the king's throne, and clothe him with the king's own robes, and feed him daintily, and no one hinders him doing whatsoever he will. But afterwards they strip him of the royal garments, and, having scourged him, hang him up, yea, hang him on a stake." [3]

[1] Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* l. c. 16. 7, 8; 4. 16. 142; 1. 10. 30.

[2] Quoted from Philo Byblius, in Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangel.* iv. 16. 7, 8; see *Essay*, etc.

[3] *οὐκ ἐννενόηκας τὴν τῶν Σακκῶν ἑορτὴν, ἣν Πέρσαι ἄγουσι; λαβόντες τῶν δεσμώτων ἕνα τῶν ἐπὶ θάνατῳ, καθίζουσιν εἰς τὸν θρόνον τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα διδόασιν αὐτῷ τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τρυφᾶν—καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν κωλύει ποιεῖν ὧν βούλεται. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀποδυσάντες, καὶ μαστιγωσάντες, ἐκρέμεσαν· ἐκρέμεσαν ἐπὶ ξύλου.* See Athenæus, l. 14, c. 10—*patibulo suffigunt.*

Augustus Cæsar, on the surrender of Perusia, offered up three hundred chosen persons, both of the Senatorian and Equestrian order, at an altar dedicated to the manes of his uncle Julius: "Perusiâ captâ—scribunt quidam, trecentos ex dedititiis electos, utriusque ordinis ad aram Divo Julio extructam, idibus Martiis, bestiarum more mactatos."[1]

Porphyry, too, asks: ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν τίς ἀγνοεῖ κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τῇ τοῦ Λατιαρίου Διὸς ἑορτῇ σφαζόμενον ἄνθρώπον[2]—"Who is not aware that even now a man is mactated in the great city at the festival of Jupiter Latiaris?" Tertullian testifies also to the same fact: "Latio in hodiernum Jovi mediâ in urbe humanus sanguis ingustatur."[3]

Among the Northern nations, as Cæsar, Lucan, Tacitus, Claudian, and others testify, human sacrifices were only two common under the superintendence of the Druids. The woods of our own island of Anglesea were specially devoted to these cruel rites; as Tacitus says: "Excisi luci, sævis superstitionibus sacri. Nam cruore captivo adolere aras et hominum fibris consulere Deos, fas habebant."[4] Even as late as the tenth century of our era, we are told that seventy carcases thus immolated were found in a wood of the Suevi.[5]

The altars of Thor and Woden used to be glutted with human blood by the Massagetæ, Getæ, Sarmatians, Scythians, particularly the Suevi and Scandinavians. The beautiful isle of Rügen was

[1] So Suetonius in *August.* c. 15.
[2] *De Abstin.* l. 2, p. 226.
[3] *Gnost.* c. 7.
[4] *Annal.* xiv. 29, 30.
[5] Adam Bremensis, *De situ Daniæ*, c. 234; see *Essay*, etc.

specially the scene of these atrocities. But the most famous altar of all was at Upsala in Sweden, where grand sacrifices were offered annually for nine days.[1] Bishop Dithmar mentions a place called Ledur in Zeeland, where ninety-nine persons were annually sacrificed to the god Swantowite. It is said, too, that the blood of the victims was struck upon the doorposts of the place where they were slain, and part of it handed round to the bystanders: pars sanguinis postibus illita; pars adstantibus propinata.[2]

The Suevi on one occasion, when afflicted with a grievous famine, even sacrificed their own king:—Cum pœnam delictorum divinam agnoscerent, primo anno boves, altero homines, tertio Regem ipsum velut iræ cœlestis piaculum, ut sibi persuasum habebant, Odino immolabant.[3]

But, indeed, kindred ideas constantly recur in nearly all, if not in all religions, sometimes in one form, sometimes in another; sometimes, too, so wrapped up and concealed as to be scarcely recognisable.

The voluntariness which Greeks and Romans regarded as of so much importance alike in animal and human victims, reminds us involuntarily of the words of Isaiah, "He was oppressed, yet He

[1] See Tacitus, *de Mor. Germ.* 40. 43. Compare Dithmar, *Episc. Mersburg*, i. p. 12; Schafferi, *Upsal.* c. 16.

[2] Olai Wormii *Mon. Danica*, i. c. 5, p. 28.

[3] Loccenii *Antiq. Suevo-Gothicæ*, l. i. p. 5. In the notes to Archbishop Thomson's Bampton Lecture on the Atonement will be found many interesting details with regard to human and other sacrifices, drawn from Ernst v. Lasaulx's *Die Sühnopfer der Griechen u. Römer*, and other sources.

humbled Himself, and opened not His mouth: as a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, yet He opened not His mouth."[1]

Surely a remarkable condition to insist on—that the objects presented as sacrifices for sin should be the best of their kind, without blemish! The representative of an offender as unlike to the offender as possible! The more imperfect and blemished the sacrificer, the more perfect and faultless the sacrifice! Should we not have expected just the opposite? Natural enough, as we all know, in the case of thank and similar offerings, but strange in the case of victims that seem to bear sin!

(II.) The rites and ceremonies observed in the presentation of sacrifices.

1. The offerer *laid his hands on the head* of the offering. When a sacrifice was presented on behalf of the congregation, "the elders of the congregation," we are told, "shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock before the Lord:"[2] so, too, the ruler had to "lay his hand upon the head of the goat" which he offered:[3] the member of the common people likewise had to "lay his hand upon the head of his sin-offering;"[4] on the great day of atonement Aaron laid "both his hands upon the head of the live goat

[1] Isa. liii. 7.

Nägelsbach is of opinion that amongst the Greeks the idea of substitution was originally associated exclusively with human sacrifices; and that such sacrifices were never offered save where a number of others were to be saved from ruin—not for individuals. When animals had a substitutionary character, it was as taking the place of men, never independently. See his *Nachhomerische Theologie*, p. 355 f.

[2] Lev. iv. 15. [3] Lev. iv. 24. [4] Lev. iv. 29.

which was to be sent away into the wilderness."[1] The only exceptions were such as did not admit of the act, as, for example, when a pigeon or fine meal was presented.[2]

Customs similar or analogous to this were observed in other religions. Among the Parsees the priests laid their hands on the animal, and kept them there till life was spent.[3] The Egyptians, again, according to Herodotus,[4] laid a curse on the head of animals that were sacrificed, and therefore refused to use them for food; the Greeks, however, would seem to have bought these very heads for the purpose of food, perhaps because they got them cheap. The hide of the goat offered by the Greeks in November to Zeus Maimaktes or the Stormy One, was regarded as specially efficacious for atonement, and it was customary accordingly that such as had been atoned for at other festivals should put their left foot on it.[5] Amongst the Albanians, too, the peculiar custom was observed, that when a human sacrifice had been offered, all the heads of families trod thereon with their feet, the idea seeming to be by this means to gain participation in the atonement effected by it.[6] The same aim dictated the Hindoo ceremony of Açmavedha. A cripple of the Brahman tribe Atri

[1] Lev. xvi. 21. [2] Lev. v. 7, 12.

[3] Döllinger, *Heidenthum u. Judenthum*, p. 370.

[4] See Bähr, *Mos. Cultus*, ii. 339; Kleinert, p. 447.

[5] They were wont also to desire that evils, instead of falling on themselves or their country, might fall on the head of the victims offered in sacrifice (Herod. ii. c. 39). Perhaps the very expression, visit or fall on men's *heads*, may have originated in this custom, or at all events have had a co-ordinate origin therewith.

[6] Döllinger, p. 208.

having been purchased from his relatives for a thousand cows, was led to the water, and after the blood of the sacred horse had been poured over his head, was drowned therein—after which sinners descended into the water, and being sanctified by his death, were thus made clean.[1]

According to the Hervarar Saga, King Heydreck was in the habit of offering a boar to the goddess Freya every February. It was first, however, brought into the courtyard of the royal residence, and all the chiefs and head-men were required to lay their hands on its back bristles and renew their oath of allegiance.[2] An interesting parallel, though opinions may differ as to its exact meaning.[3]

What now is the significance of this evidently symbolical act? The rite is not limited to sacrifices. It is observed in connection with the giving of blessings;[4] with the communication of the Holy Spirit;[5] with consecration to office alike under the Old and New Covenant;[6] with the miraculous cures of Christ;[7] and, finally, in the case of one accused of cursing, all who heard him were required to lay their hands on his head before he was stoned.[8]

Jewish views do not throw much light on the

[1] Kleinert, p. 431. [2] Bähr, ii. 261.

[3] Compare Virgil's words, "Unum pro multis dabitur Caput" (*Æn.* v. 815), quoted by Kleinert, p. 430 f. Among the Syrians, punishment by death is simply designated "laying on the head," Bähr, ii. 342. In manumitting serfs or slaves, the Romans laid hands on the head of the slave, thus signifying that he was handed over to himself, Bähr, ii. 343.

[4] Gen. xlviii. 13; Matt. xix. 13–15. [5] Acts viii. 17, xix. 6.

[6] Num. xxvii. 18; Deut. xxxiv. 9; Acts vi. 6; 1 Tim. v. 22.

[7] Matt. ix. 18; Mark vi. 5; Luke xiii. 13; cf. Acts xii. 17.

[8] Lev. xxiv. 14; cf. Susanna 34; Kurtz, *Sacrifices*, etc., p. 83.

matter, even apart from their lack of agreement with each other. We are told in the Mishna, when the high priest made or used the form of confession on the great day of atonement, he laid his hands on the scapegoat and said, "I beseech Thee, O Lord, Thy people the house of Israel hath sinned and done iniquity, hath transgressed before Thee. I beseech Thee, O Lord, כפר, cover (*remitte*) now the sins, and the iniquities, and the transgressions which Thy people, the house of Israel, hath sinned, done iniquity, and transgressed before Thee. As it is written in the law of Moses Thy servant, saying, On that day יכפר shall an atonement be made for you to cleanse you from all your sins."[1] Hands were imposed on the head of the sacrifice when sins were not confessed. Maimonides says that "sinners and trespassers when they bring their offerings for their sins and trespasses are not expiated by their sacrifices unless they first repent and repeat the form of confession."[2] The rite did not denote merely translation of guilt.

Philo says, "That hands were laid on the head of the animal was a manifest token of innocence, and of a life that could not have anything laid to its charge; that life had been spent agreeably to the laws of nature and the divine commandments."[3]

Abarbanel says, "The person that put his hand upon the head of the beast by this rite confessed the desert of his sins, and declared the blood of the animal to be shed in lieu of his own, and that it was just and

[1] Lev. xvi. 30; see Mishna, ii. 29, quoted in *Essay*, 154.
[2] *De Pœnit.* i.; see *Essay*, 26. [3] *De Victim.* 838 f.

right that the offender's life should be taken away, as was that of the beast brought to the altar."[1]

Without entering here on the various views which have been taken of this rite, I will briefly explain my own, which is an endeavour to combine some that have hitherto been separately advocated. It seems to me to lie in the very nature of a symbolical rite that it should both admit of and be meant to have various meanings—of which now the one and then the other may be more distinctly present to the mind of those who observe them. The act of laying the hands on the head of the sacrificial victim by the offerer[2] expressed (1) *first* of all, the fact that the animal was the man's own property which he had brought to the tabernacle of Jehovah for the purpose of presentation. This idea may not have been very distinctly present to consciousness; other ideas probably overshadowed it; yet it underlay the rest—it was their presupposition; without it, indeed, or at all events apart from the fact which it represented, no sacrifice could be valid. (2) The *next* thing denoted by the act was the rapport between the person sacrificing and the sacrifice itself. In other words, it symbolized the thought—"that am I," "this stands for me." The man thus identified himself with his offering; let it take his place, stand for him. In this way there was brought out and expressed the

[1] *Comment. in Lev.* p. 301, quoted in *Essay*, 28.

[2] The Rabbins call the act *Semichah*, from the Hebrew word סָמַךְ, and held that it was required to be performed with all the strength of the body, which is probably an exaggeration. It would seem, however, that a certain amount of pressure was implied. Cf. Oehler, *O. T. Theology*, ii. p. 409.

idea of substitution, which in some measure inheres in all offerings, especially in all propitiatory offerings,—an idea which is everywhere present in sacrificial ritual, whether formally indicated or not. Even a thank- or loyalty-offering, whether presented from man to man or from man to God, in proportion as it is genuine, stands, as it were, in the place of the man himself. Its real value lies, not in any intrinsic worth it may possess, but in its representing the giver. Under what aspect and with what design an offering stands for the giver, will have to be determined in other ways. (3) In the case of the offerings with which we are here concerned, the rite *further* denoted the consecration of the animal to Jehovah. We can scarcely go wrong if we here follow the guidance of the account given in Numbers of the consecration of the Levites, "Take the Levites from among the children of Israel. . . . And thou shalt present the Levites before the tent of meeting; and thou shalt assemble the whole congregation of the children of Israel. And thou shalt present the Levites before the Lord; and the children of Israel shall lay their hands upon the Levites: and Aaron shall offer the Levites before the Lord for a wave-offering on the behalf of the children of Israel, that they may be to do the service of the Lord. . . . Thus shalt thou separate the Levites from among the children of Israel; and the Levites shall be mine."[1] At the same time we are told that, "The Levites shall take two young bullocks, and shall lay their hands upon the heads of the bullocks; and offer them, the one

[1] Num. viii. 5–14.

for a sin-offering and the other for a burnt-offering, unto the Lord, to make atonement for the Levites."[1]

If in the one case the laying on of hands denoted consecration, devotion to Jehovah, it is scarcely likely that the same rite performed at the same time, though in another connection, should have a different meaning. We may therefore accept as the chief point in the significance of the laying on of hands—the devotion or consecration of the animal to Jehovah. Consecration implying ownership—without which the offerer would have no right to consecrate; and, further, involving the notion that in some sense or other the victim offered stood for the offerer; that, in other words, the two were *en rapport.*

2. The offering in the case of an *animal* had to be *slain*, and that generally by the offerer himself. When the elders of the congregation brought their bullock, we read, "the bullock shall be killed before the Lord,"[2] probably by one of their number, and hence the indefiniteness of the expression. The ruler was himself to kill his offering in the place where they kill the burnt-offering before the Lord.[3] The common man, too, was to "kill the sin-offering in the place of the burnt-offering."[4] That the priest had to perform the task in the case of pigeons was ordained probably to the end that he might at once be able to press out the blood on the altar; the quantity being too small to allow of its being put first into a vessel.[5] On the great day of atonement there were two remarkable

[1] Num. viii. 8, 12.
[2] Lev. iv. 15.
[3] Lev. iv. 24.
[4] Lev. iv. 29.
[5] See Oehler on "Opfer," in Herzog's *Real-Encyl.* p. 628; Bähr, *Mos. Cultus*, ii. p. 343.

deviations from the usual custom: first, that Aaron, probably as the representative of the whole people, was to kill the one goat; and, secondly, that the other goat was sent away alive,—an addition to the symbolism of sacrifice, which, perhaps more than anything else, points forward beyond itself.[1]

The custom of offering bloody sacrifices, *i.e.* animals which had to be slaughtered at the altar and in the presence of deity, has been well-nigh universal; and it seems probable that where the custom does not prevail, it has been dropped, either because of poverty or other circumstances, or in consequence of a lowering of the religious life.[2] In India, notwithstanding that the slaughtering of animals for food was forbidden, the chief sacrifice was the Açmavedha, or Horse Sacrifice. A horse having been selected, was let go free for a whole year, though constantly under the care of a guardian, and was then killed with great solemnity. By its means all sins were supposed to be expiated.[3] Animals were also sacrificed to Siwa.[4] No death is more welcome to a Hindoo than one which involved the shedding of his blood, the idea being that thus all his sins are cleansed.[5]

The Persians also, though their cultus was by no means so rich in sacrifices, or indeed generally, as that of the Hindoos, yet sacrificed horses and oxen; and held that it was the ψυχή which deity demanded.[6] In Egypt, again, bulls or cows or even swine were offered

[1] Note X. Appendix.
[2] Kleinert, p. 429.
[3] Bähr, ii. p. 218.
[4] Bähr, ii. p. 223.
[5] Bähr, ii. p. 223. Compare de Maistre in Bähr, ii. p. 270; and *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1874, p. 448.
[6] Bähr, ii. p. 225; cf. Kleinert, p. 422.

to Isis, or Osiris, and goats to Amun.[1] Even in China, animal offerings were presented, though by some their propitiatory character is called in question.[2] But that the idea of a substitutionary sacrifice was not foreign to the Chinese mind, is evident from the fact that after a drought and famine of seven years during the reign of T'ang (B.C. 1766–1760), it was suggested by some one that a human victim should be offered in sacrifice to Heaven, and prayer made for rain. Whereupon T'ang said, "If a man must be the victim, I will be he. He fasted, cut off his hair and nails, and, in a plain carriage drawn by white horses, clad in rushes, in the guise of a sacrificial victim, he proceeded to a forest of mulberry trees and there prayed, asking to what error or crime of his life the calamity was owing."[3] So another fact, that when Wuwang, the founder of the third dynasty, fell dangerously ill, his pious brother Tcheu-Kung, in a solemn address to the ancestral deities, offered to die for him: whereupon he recovered.[4] Among the ancient Germans the sacrifice was designated *Blot* (blood); to offer sacrifice was *blotan* (to bleed); and the priest was designated by various names signifying literally *bloodman*.[5] The Lapps presented reindeer. Among the Swedes a great festival was held every nine years, when for nine days one human being and seven different animals were offered; and the Danes sacrificed in January every nine years, 99 human beings, 99 horses, 99 dogs, 99 cocks, and 99 hawks.[6]

[1] Bähr, ii. 228–232.
[2] Legge, *Religions of China*, p. 53; cf. Douglas, *Confucianism*, etc., p. 85.
[3] Legge, *l.c.* p. 54.
[4] Kleinert, p. 434, cf. 421.
[5] Bähr, ii. 258. See Kleinert, p. 422.
[6] Bähr, ii. 259–262.

In Athens an ox was offered to Zeus Polieus, the chief patron deity of the city, under very peculiar and solemn circumstances.[1] Greek and Roman writers make repeated allusions to the sacrifice of human beings for their fellow-beings.[2] When Nero was alarmed by the appearance of a comet, he caused, as was already mentioned, several of the principal Romans to be sacrificed on his behalf, doubtless with the intention of propitiating an offended deity.[3] Homer refers frequently to sacrifices, and in one place says,—

> The Gods themselves, in virtue, honour, strength
> Excelling thee may yet be mollified ;
> For they, when mortals have transgress'd or fail'd
> To do aright, by sacrifice and prayer,
> Libations and burnt-offering, may be sooth'd.[4]

Amongst the Romans it was the duty of one of the assistants of the Pontifex, a popa, at a signal from the priest, to strike down the victim with a mallet, and then to stab it with a knife.[5]

But now the question arises, What was the meaning of the act of slaughter? Had it a separate significance of its own? Or was it merely a means to an end—to the end of securing the blood? If it had a significance of its own, what was it? As is evident from the variety of views prevailing on the subject, the question is not without its difficulty. This, however, is chiefly due to the words—"for the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the

[1] Bähr, ii. 253.
[2] Kleinert, p. 431 ; cf. Note XI. Appendix.
[3] Kleinert, p. 433.
[4] *Iliad*, ix. 295, Earl of Derby's translation, i. 292, compare Bks. I. II.
[5] Ramsay, *Roman Antiquities*, p. 167.

life."[1] This point is one of such importance that I shall first refer to one or two of the views taken of it. One writer regards the passage as a proof that "in the Mosaic ritual the slaughtering of the offering had no independent significance, and only served as a means of obtaining the blood. It is at least not indicated in the law of offering, that what the offerer deserved as a sinner was inflicted on the animal when it was slaughtered; and that thus the death of the sacrifice satisfied the divine punitive justice."[2] According to another writer, on the contrary, "The slaughtering was the consummation of the complete surrender expressed in the laying on of hands. For it had to be performed by the offerer and not by the priest. Surrender reached its climax in mactation; and as it was a surrender to the Holy One of Israel, for the behoof of sanctification, the animal was first truly consecrated by death. Thus regarded, therefore, mactation and sanctification, dying and being holy, are in a certain sense synonymous terms."[3] The importance of the words quoted from Leviticus is confirmed, not only in general by the stress everywhere laid in heathenism on the blood, but also in particular by the fact that to offer the blood and offer the life or soul and slaughter a sacrifice are almost synonymous expressions.[4] Another view is, that "as the *imposition of hands* denoted the consecration of the animal

[1] Lev. xvii. 11.

[2] Oehler, *O. T. Theology*, i. 411; cf. Herzog, "Opfer," p. 631; and Kurtz, p. 123.

[3] Bähr, ii. 343.

[4] Bähr, ii. 225, 247. "*Animam* litare and *sanguinem litare* are synonymous expressions. Even the word *sancire* is derived by Servius from *sanguis*."

to be the medium of atonement for the sins of the offerer, by means of a substitutionary transference (according to the analogy of Num. viii. 10) of the obligation to do or suffer in his stead that which his God demanded from him on account of his sin; so the *slaughtering* expressed the completion of the act or the endurance of the punishment in order that the animal, or rather its blood, in which was its soul, might thereby become fitted to be a medium of expiation."[1] A further view is that of Delitzsch, who says: "The Schechitah merely answered the double purpose of providing, first, the blood, which was the life of the animal, for the expiation of the soul of the sacrificer; and secondly, the flesh as the fire-food of Jehovah;"[2] and appeals in support, not only to the passage above referred to, but also to such words as "sweet savour unto the Lord;"[3] "it is the food of the offering made by fire unto the Lord;" "it is the food of the offering made by fire for a sweet savour; all the fat is the Lord's."[4] Others again say that it was "an acknowledgment on the part of the person presenting the offering that he gave the animal entirely up, renouncing for ever both it and its life."[5]

There is a certain truth in each of these positions; but how are they to be combined? The following questions have to be faced. Why the animal that had been solemnly consecrated to Jehovah should be slain at all? It might have been preserved alive,

[1] See Kurtz, *Sacrifices*, p. 102; cf. 119 ff., 149.
[2] See Kurtz, pp. 108, 147.
[3] Lev. iv. 9, 12, 17, ii. 9.
[4] Lev. ii. 11, 16.
[5] See in Kurtz; Hofmann, p. 141; Keil, p. 144; Neumann, "d. Opfer des A.B.," *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, 1853, p. 343.

fostered, and honoured, as, amongst the Greeks, the peacocks offered to Here and the swans offered to Helios, or amongst the Persians and Germans, the horses consecrated to the sun?[1] Further, why should the offerer himself slaughter the victim? Is it not strange that he who gives the life should at once take it away or render it useless? Then, again, if it were his own life, the offering of which was symbolized by the death of the victim, why should he stop at a symbol and not go on to sacrifice himself? This has been done in some cases, and would seem to be the most natural course if God really demanded the giving up of the life. Still further, if what was needed was a symbol of the offerer's life on the altar, would that purpose not have been best served by shedding a portion, either of his own or of his victim's blood, without absolutely taking away the life?[2] And, lastly, if the essential matter was the death as a *pœna vicaria*, what meaning can be attached to the words, "It is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life"? To put the case into a nutshell—why should it be necessary for a life given to be slaughtered? Why should death be the way to bestow life? If the life is what God valued, why should the giver thereof first take it away? The fact as it stands may be stated thus: a spotless victim forfeits its life in order that the offerer may be reconciled to or accepted by God. I venture to think that the difficulty of combining the two points of view is due, on the one hand, to

[1] Schneider, "Die luther. Lehre u. Opfertode Christi," in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 695.

[2] As would seem to have been the case on certain occasions among the Mexicans. See Wuttke, *Geschichte d. Heidenthums*, i. 270.

the false juridical idea that God's claims on men, the neglect or violation of which is recognised by means of sacrifice, can be met by the punishment, that is, death, of either the offender or a substitute; and, on the other, to a superficial, a defective, not to say wrong estimate of the moral conditions on which offenders can find peace with God. For sinners the way to life is through a process whose culmination can alone be expressed by death. But if death in this sense is to be the way to life, it must be first undergone by one who himself has no need to undergo it. Thus viewed, it is the life in very deed that atones, but a life which goes through death; *i.e.* which bears for the offender the brunt of that anger of God against sin whose supreme sign and expression is death; and of which, therefore, the death of an innocent victim is the supremely fitting symbol.[1]

3. The next step was the *sprinkling of the blood.* The modes of sprinkling varied according to the importance of the sacrifices. In the case of burnt-offerings, guilt-offerings, and peace-offerings, the blood was to be sprinkled upon the altar round about;[2] in that of a sin-offering for a ruler or a man of the common people, the priest was to take of the blood with his finger, and put it upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering, and the blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt-offering;[3] in that of an anointed priest and of the congregation, the blood of the bullock was to be brought to the tent of meeting,

[1] In order to make clear this somewhat enigmatical statement, I should have to expound a view of the atonement which is at present not clear enough to myself to fit me for presenting it to others.

[2] Lev. i. 5, vii. 2, iii. 12.

[3] Lev. iv. 25, 30, 34.

and the priest was to dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven times before the Lord, before the veil of the sanctuary. And the priest shall put of the blood upon the horns of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord which is in the tent of meeting: and all the blood of the bullock shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt-offering, which is at the door of the tent of meeting.[1] The ceremonial on the great day of atonement was unusually complicated. First, the blood of the bullock offered for Aaron the officiating representative priest was to be sprinkled with his finger upon the mercy-seat on the east, and seven times before the mercy-seat; then he was to do with the blood of the goat of the sin-offering that was for the people as with that of the bullock for himself, namely, bring it within the veil, and sprinkle it on and before the mercy-seat; and finally, we are told, "he shall go out, *i.e.* from the holy place, unto the altar that is before the Lord, and make atonement for it; and shall take of the blood of the bullock and of the blood of the goat, and put it upon the horns of the altar round about. And he shall sprinkle of the blood upon it with his finger seven times."[2]

The custom of sprinkling the blood of animal sacrifices seems to have been not infrequently, even if not generally, observed in other religions. The Chinese, averse as they ordinarily are to anything like mystic rites and ceremonies, observe a mysterious ceremony called Hin, which seems to be a relic of an earlier custom, and an evidence of the early

[1] Lev. iv. 6, 17. [2] Lev. xvi. 14, 15, 18, 19.

and wide prevalence of sprinkling with blood. The hall of ancestors, the drums and weapons, bells and musical instruments, articles for divination and the like, are smeared with blood.[1] When swine and fowls are offered in sacrifice their necks are cut, and the warm blood is either sprinkled on or allowed to run over the hands and feet of the image of the god. It is also usual to sprinkle with blood the things for whose sake a sacrifice is offered, as, for example, ships or boats, when a sacrifice is made to the river-god with a view to securing a fortunate voyage.[2] When a victim is presented in India to Siva, the blood that streams from it is solemnly carried into the presence of the image of the god, as though to be presented to it. Then the cry is raised, "Kali, drink the blood; be thou adored:" whereupon the worshippers, with a great shout, smear their faces with the blood and roll themselves in blood and dust on the ground.[3] Amongst the ancient Germans, too, the blood of sacrifices, being deemed specially sacred and holy, was sprinkled on lifeless things and on the wooden images of the gods with the idea of giving them life and sensation.[4] The Lapps, too, were in the habit of renewing the image of their god Tiermes every year, and then sprinkling it with the heart-blood of a sacrifice.[5] Amongst the Romans, the blood was poured upon the altar, together with wine, incense, and sacred cake.[6] The Greeks were in the habit of pouring

[1] Kleinert, p. 448. [2] Bähr, ii. 245.
[3] Bähr, ii. 223; cf. Kleinert, p. 431; see Bähr, ii. 220 f.
[4] Bähr, ii. 258. [5] Bähr, ii. 259.
[6] Ramsay, p. 167; cf. Döllinger, p. 534.

the blood of sacrifices into a hole near the altar, whilst the flesh was being eaten by the worshippers, or was laid aside as a *sacrosanctum;* perhaps it was given as food to the subterranean deities;[1] but whilst it may be doubtful whether this or other ceremonies had anything to do with the idea underlying the sprinkling of blood, there can be little, if any doubt, that the Greeks recognised the expiatory element in sacrifice. "The *taurobolion* was the offering of a bull (*kriobolion* of a ram) to Cybele the mother of the gods. A deep trench was dug, and planks pierced with holes were placed over it. Under these the person who was to undergo lustration placed himself, whilst the beast, with its horns gilded, was brought and slain upon the planks. The blood flowed down upon every part of the man below, who thus considered himself purified for twenty years to come, or even for ever."[2] In Mexico the blood of human sacrifices was sprinkled on the lintels of the door of the temple and on the image of the deity.[3]

Amongst the Nicaraguans the sun and other deities were worshipped, and priests prescribed

[1] Kleinert, p. 450; with references to Eurip. *Hec.* 536; and Pausan. x. 4. Compare Döllinger, p. 209.

[2] Thomson's *Atonement*, p. 266.

[3] Wuttke, *Geschichte des Heidenthums*, i. 274.

"When the Sabæans sacrificed an animal, they were wont to collect the blood in a hole in the ground, and sitting round it to eat the flesh, imagining that whilst they were eating the flesh, the dæmons did eat the blood, and thus they contracted friendship together as eating at the same table" (Maimonides, *More Nev.* 484).

Homer, too (*Od.* x. 25, 36, 42, 227, 231), in describing the sacrifice of Ulysses, tells us how the souls of the dead gathered about to drink the blood, and how by this means he consulted the dead. (*Essay*, etc., pp. 131, 132.)

festivals, solemnities, the modes of sacrifice, and forms of prayer, etc. In sacrificing, the priest turned thrice round the victim, who was always a prisoner of war, singing at the same time in a most lamentable tone. After this he ripped up his breast, smeared his face with the blood of it, took out the heart, and then cut the body to pieces. The heart was given by the sacrificer to the chief priest, the hands and feet to the king, and the rest to the people. The head was fixed on a stake which was called by the name of the province against which they were making war, and we may naturally suppose the victim to have been of that country. They often sacrificed children and even men of their own country on those stakes; but they were obliged to purchase them before they could offer them as victims; and a father was allowed to sell his child for that cruel purpose. All their religious ceremonies were intermixed with prayers, vows, promises to the gods of sincere repentance, and processions in their honour.[1] The chief priest walks at the head of the band carrying an image of the deity of the country fixed at the end of a lance. The priests sing till they reach the place where the idol is to halt, when they strew the place where it is set down with all kinds of flowers. Then they leave off singing, and the chief priest draws blood from some part or other of his body in honour of the god. The rest follow his example, some letting blood from the tongue, others from the ears, and others a great deal lower, as they think proper; but the blood, from whatever part it

[1] Picart, *Ceremonies and Religious Customs*, etc., iii. 168.

be drawn, is always used in smearing the idol's face.[1]

As to the general significance of this rite there can scarcely be a reasonable doubt, in face of the very distinct statements in connection with the great day of atonement: "He shall make atonement for, *i.e.* cleanse, the Holy Place, because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel;" and "he shall *cleanse* the altar, and hallow it from the uncleannesses of the children of Israel;"[2] and of the various allusions in the New Testament, especially the words, "the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin."[3] It seems to symbolize the cleansing, washing, doing away of the sin which rendered a sacrifice of propitiation or expiation necessary. Sin is conceived as a source of impurity; the pure and holy God cannot admit to His fellowship those who are impure; hence the need of cleansing. The question is, who or what is conceived to be cleansed? One would naturally in the light of the New Testament think of the sinner.[4] But in the way of this interpretation lies the fact that the altar, or its horns, or the veil, or the mercy-seat, is sprinkled, and not the offender. Let us see how

[1] I may refer here to what Nägelsbach says in his *Nachhomerische Theologie*, p. 359, about purification by human blood. Murderers sometimes tried to purify themselves after the committal of a murder by binding or laying pieces cut off from the hands and feet under their armpits. This was termed μασχαλίζειν, from μασχάλη, a word whose meaning is doubtful. It was also a custom to wipe the sword used on the head of a slain man, as though to transfer the stain or guilt to him. In some cases, too, his blood was licked and then spat out again. Water, however, was most commonly used for this purpose among the Greeks, both for individuals and for large numbers. See examples, *l.c.*

[2] Lev. xvi. 16, 19, 29–34; cf. viii. 15.

[3] John i.; cf. Heb. ix. 13; cf. Isa. lii. 15; Lev. xiv. 7; Num. xix. 19.

[4] Kurtz, quoted by Oehler in Herzog, *Real-Encycl.* p. 631.

the rite has been explained by others. Among the more striking explanations the following may be adduced: "Sprinkling denoted that the slaying of a living being which took place by way of atonement was appropriated to, as it were made the property of, the Holy Place through the blood which had been its life. The Holy Place was sprinkled, not the sacrificer, because it was the latter who made the payment, and God to whom it was made. The sin of the sacrificer made the Holy Place unclean, inasmuch as it was the place of his communion with God. Hence what had been done for the restoration of fellowship with God was attributed to it, and thus the uncleanness caused by sin was taken away." Or, "The essential purpose of the sprinkling was to bring to God what had been the life of the sacrificial animal as a payment rendered by its being shed, and by means of that payment to deliver the abode and vicinity of God from the defilement which sin had brought upon it."[1] Surely a strange symbol of the appropriation to God of the payment of life! Says another, "The sprinkling of the blood could have but one end, namely, to bring the *nephesh* or life to the place where Jehovah's holiness is revealed, in order that that holiness might act upon the *nephesh*, that is, sanctify it, in other words, destroy, cover its sin, atone it."[2] There is more in the following view: "Strictly speaking, the only thing that can cover or expiate the souls of the people is a soul. A man may express his thanks or petition in a gift or offering; but as coming from an impure, sinful

[1] Hofmann, quoted in Kurtz, p. 141 f. [2] Bähr, ii. 346.

person, it must itself be impure. For this reason God has provided something which shall take the place of this self-surrender: He substitutes the soul of the pure, innocent animal for the impure, sinful soul of the offerer. Presented in the blood, it comes between the offerer and the holy God; the latter beholds accordingly on His altar a pure life by which the impure life of the worshipper is covered. It serves in like manner to cover and do away with the impurities which cleave to His sanctuary."[1] Keil says, "The power of covering the sinner before God, or of making atonement for him, was due to the circumstance of that blood being brought before God as the element in which resided the soul of the animal put to death in sacrifice, and also to the fact that the soul of the man who had substituted the animal for himself was received by God into His favour."[2]

None of these explanations seem to me quite to hit the point; nay more, they partially ignore the references to cleansing both in the Old Testament and elsewhere. I venture also to think that the key to the riddle may be found if we take as our starting-point the words, "blood, it polluteth the land," *i.e.* the blood shed by a manslayer or murderer: "and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. And thou shalt not defile the land which ye inhabit, *in the midst of which I dwell: for I the Lord dwell in the midst of Israel.*"[3] When the land was

[1] Oehler in Herzog, p. 632; cf. *O. T. Theol.* i. 417.
[2] *Archæology*, i. 272. [3] Num. xxxv. 33 f.

defiled by the blood of a murdered man, it became to that extent impossible for God to dwell in it; such defilement drove Him away from it; there could be no fellowship between Him and it. If the right relation between God and the land were to be re-established, the land must be cleansed by the blood of the murderer. But by the land was meant not merely the territory, but also the people: both were included. The nation was defiled, and needed to be cleansed before God could again take up His abode in their midst; if it were not cleansed, He would cease to dwell in their midst. The same idea, modified according to the circumstances, is expressed in the rite now under consideration. Every individual by sinning defiled the temple or sanctuary of God; still more the ruler, the priest, the congregation, the nation as a whole. Fellowship with God was thus rendered impossible: God could not draw nigh to them as long as the place of meeting was uncleansed. But this cleansing really embraced the offender, whether common man, or ruler, or priest, or nation. This also seems to be exactly what the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews takes for granted when he writes, "For if the blood of goats and bulls, and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling them that have been defiled, sanctify unto the cleansing of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ cleanse your conscience from dead works;"[1] for surely the reference is not exclusively to the "sprinkling upon him that is to be cleansed from leprosy," mentioned in Lev. xiv. 7, although it too may be included. In a

[1] Heb. ix. 13; cf. ver. 21 ff.

word, the Holy Place with the furniture belonging to it represented the Israelites in their specifically religious aspect. It was as though God said, "Your temple and you with it, it as representing you, are defiled by your sins; the temple is where I dwell in your midst; as long as it is defiled, I am shut out from it, and you from me; it and you must be cleansed by the blood of the sacrifices which I appoint." This idea harmonizes with the stage at which the Israelites were; but it prepared the way for the higher idea set forth in the New Testament, according to which the man himself is the place of meeting between God and himself and the world; and he or his heart needs to be cleansed ere God can enter into fellowship with him and he with God.

4. The next step of import was the *burning of the sacrifice* either in whole or part on the altar and elsewhere. In the case of sin-offerings brought by one of the common people or a ruler, the fat, or one of the two pigeons, or a handful of the fine flour which was permitted as a surrogate, was to be consumed on the altar.[1] In the case of a priest, the fat, the two kidneys, and the caul upon the liver were burnt on the altar of burnt-offering; and the skin of the bullock and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its inwards, and its dung,—even the whole bullock was to be carried forth without the camp into a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and to be burned on wood with fire.[2] In the case of the sacrifice for the congregation both on ordinary occasions and on the great day of atone-

[1] Lev. iv. 13, 26, v. 10, 12. [2] Lev. iv. 8 ff.

ment, it was ordained that whilst the fat of the sin-offering should be burnt on the altar, the rest of the carcase should be carried forth and burned without the camp.[1]

In other religious systems also it was more or less customary to burn parts or the whole of animal sacrifices, not to mention incense. In India, Agni was conceived as the Fire-God, whose business it was to devour the offerings, and thus bring them for the satisfaction of the needs of the gods.[2] In the *Bhagavad-gita* we read, "Some devotees attend to the sacrifices of the deities only; others offer sacrifice by the action of worship only in the fire of the supreme Being. Some sacrifice the sense of hearing and the other senses in the fires of restraint; some offer objects of sense, such as sound, in the fires of the senses,"—an indication, as it would seem, of the existence of an authorized custom of burning victims.[3] The Chinese custom of burning paper is, perhaps, also a relic of an earlier and more serious rite. Perhaps, too, the letting off of fire-works on the eve of the New Year—which has also, undoubtedly, a religious significance.[4] The Peruvians sacrificed at the greatest of their festivals, that held in December, a great number of sheep and lambs, which they burnt with worked and odoriferous wood.[5] The Mexicans, too, when they offered human sacrifices, tore the still throbbing heart with a stone knife

[1] Lev. iv. 12, 20, xvi. 25, 27.

[2] Kleinert, p. 444; comp. *Bhagavad-gita*, p. 23.

[3] *Bhagavad-gita*, ch. iv. p. 33. Translation, by J. Cockburn Thompson (Hertford), 1855.

[4] Wuttke, ii. 66.

[5] Amberley, *Analysis of Religious Belief*, i. 53.

out of the body, held it up to the sun, then laid it at the idol's feet, or put it into its wide opened jaws, and afterwards burned it.[1] Homer alludes to the custom as though it were common among the Greeks :—

> Next, proclamation through the camp was made
> To purify the host ; and in the sea,
> Obedient to the word, they purified ;
> Then to Apollo solemn rites performed
> With faultless hecatombs of bulls and goats
> Upon the margin of the watery waste ;
> And, wreathed in smoke, the savour rose to heaven.[2]

Again, in another passage, the whole ceremonial is fully described : —

> The sacred hecatomb
> Around the well-built altar for the god
> In order due they placed ; their hands then wash'd
> And the saltcake prepar'd, before them all
> With hands uplifted Chryses pray'd aloud.
> The prayers concluded and the saltcake strew'd
> Upon the victims' heads, they drew them back
> And slew and flay'd ; then cutting from the thighs
> The choicest pieces, and in double layers
> O'erspreading them with fat, above them placed
> The due meat-offerings ; then the aged priest
> The cleftwood kindled and libations pour'd
> Of ruddy wine ; armed with the fivefork'd prongs
> The attendant ministers beside him stood.
> The thighs consumed with fire, the inward parts

---

[1] Wuttke, i. 273.

[2] *Il.* i. 301. Speaking of the Trojans offering a hecatomb to the Gods, Homer, as quoted by Plato in the *Alcibiades*, ii., says : "The sweet savour of it went up, but the blessed gods did not eat of it, nor would they : for Troy was hateful to them, and so was Priamus and the people of Priamus." The gods' eating of the sacrifice is therefore made the mark or sign of their being in friendship with those that offered : refusal, a sign of displeasure.

So Maximus Tyrius (*Ser.* 38) reports that the Persians, in sacrificing to the sun, used this form of words : "Bringing to him, as it were, the meat of fire, O Lord Fire, eat" (πῦρ δεσπότα, ἔσθει).

If the smoke ascended, the heathen believed the sacrifice accepted ; if it were beaten down, the reverse. (*Essay*, etc., p. 74.)

They tasted first ; the rest upon the spits
Roasted with care and from the fire withdrew.[1]

Amongst the Romans, too, it was customary to take the choicest entrails of victims slain in sacrifice, sprinkle with meal, wine, and incense, and throw the whole into the fire.[2]

Whatever is given or offered in a solemn manner immediately to God, so as that part of it or the whole is consumed, is what is meant by the word sacrifice. Whether on an altar or by fire, or whether a libation of wine or other liquid is poured on the earth or into the sea, or the entrails of an animal are cast into the sea, is indifferent. Such is Virgil's idea in *Æn.* v. 235 ff. :[3]—

Dii, quibus imperium est pelagi, quorum æquora curro
Vobis laetus ego hoc candentem in littore Taurum
Constituam ante aras, voti reus, Extaque Salsos
Porriciam in fluctus, et vina liquentia fundam.

The sea was the proper place for offering to the Sea-Gods, in which their part of the thing sacrificed was consumed. There was always to be such a consumption of the thing offered to God that the owner could never have or enjoy the whole again for his own use.[4]

The savages of North America "offer tobacco instead of incense, which they call smoking the *Sun*. The chiefs of the families assemble by daybreak at the house of one of their principal men. The latter lights the calumet, offers it thrice to the rising sun,

[1] *Iliad*, ii. 366. Earl of Derby's translation, 25 f. See also Bk. II. (Translation, p. 56). Bk. VIII. 549.
[2] Ramsay, *Antiquities*, p. 167.
[3] See *Essay on Nature, Design, etc., of Sacrifice* (1748), p. 18.
[4] *Essay*, etc., p. 5 ff.

and, waving it with both his hands according to its course, till he comes to the point from whence he first began, he addresses his prayers at the same time to the sun, implores his protection, beseeches him to direct him in his undertakings, and recommends all the families of the canton or province to his care. After which the chief smokes the calumet and presents it to the assembly, in order that every member of it may smoke the sun in his turn."[1] This ceremony is never performed but on important occasions. In their common worship they merely address their *Manitou*,[2] which is given them by their jugglers.

"Certain savages who live towards the North coasts believe that storms are raised by the spirit of the moon's lodging itself in the bottom of the sea. To pacify it, therefore, they sacrifice to it the most valuable things they have in their canoe, and throw everything into the sea, not excepting their tobacco. This sacrifice is heightened with singing and certain ceremonies, which they think efficacious in driving out this evil spirit."

"Whenever the *Virginians* go a journey, they burn tobacco in order to obtain the assistance of the sun. When they cross a lake or river, they throw tobacco into it, or the most valuable thing that they

[1] La Potterie, *History of North America*, quoted in Picart, *Ceremonies and Religious Customs*, vol. iii. pp. 80, 81.

[2] Manitou is the name given to a genius, which is held to reside not only in living, but inanimate beings. They worship it in everything that strikes their senses. A bird, an ox, a bear, an arrow, each has its manitou. Every savage has his particular manitou, which he looks upon as his tutelar deity. "They set it forth in their huts, and sacrifice dogs or other animals to it. The warriors (of Illinois) carry theirs in a mat, and perpetually smoke it to give them victory." Father Marest's *Letter to the Illinois*, quoted in Picart, iii. 80.

have, in order that the spirit who presides in those places may grant them a safe passage over. Whenever they return from hunting or any other considerable enterprise, they offer part of their spoils, of their best tobacco, of their furs, their colours with which they paint themselves, nay, even fat and the best of their game."[1]

"Every season of the year they offer to the wicked spirit the first of their fruits, of their birds, fish, cattle, plants, roots, etc., and repeat their offering every time they have any extraordinary success in war, hunting, or fishing."[2]

"The moment the sun begins to shine, the Iouanas[3] sing forth his praises by falling several times upon their knees; after which they throw perfumes into the sacred fire that is lighted before the gate of the temple or grotto. These two acts of worship are followed by a third no less essential. The priest pours honey into a stone made hollow for the purpose, and which stands before a stone table; and scatters about the stone a considerable quantity of maize half-bruised and cleared from its chaff. This is the food for certain birds who, the Floridans tell us, sing the praises of the sun. Whilst the priests are burning the perfumes and singing to the honour of that planet, the people prostrate themselves and pay their devotions. When the sun begins to gild the edges of the table with his rays, they throw all the perfume they have left into the fire. After the last oblation of perfumes six Iouanas,

[1] *History of Virginia*, quoted in Picart, iii. 114.
[2] *Ibid.* iii. 117.
[3] Iouanas—Floridan priests.

chosen by lot, stay by the table and set at liberty six birds of the sun, which they brought in cages, in order that they may act their part in the ceremony. Then follows a procession of devotees, who come down from the mountain of Olaimy with boughs in their hands and go to the entrance of the temple, into which they are introduced by the Iouanas. Lastly, the pilgrims wash their hands and faces with a sacred water." [1]

As to the significance of this rite, whether in Judaism or in the ethnic religions, very divergent opinions have been expressed. Whilst there may be ground for thinking that some of the heathen meant to supply their gods with actual nutriment and enjoyment, and regarded the burning as a means of enabling them to partake of what was offered, we may surely dismiss, as an exaggeration, the assertion of a celebrated philologian, "The gods are hungry and wish to eat; this is the root of all sacrifice." [2] The notion is at all events out of harmony both with the spirit and teachings of Judaism as represented in the Scripture. For only strong prepossession can find a warrant or support for it in the oft-repeated words, "The food of the offering made by fire for a sweet savour unto the Lord." [3]

By way of ascertaining the significance of the rite, let us consider again what went before. A subject of the great King has failed to render to Him the service which he owed. For this cause his Lord regards him with displeasure—there is aliena-

[1] Picart, iii. 126, from Rochefort, *Hist. of the Antilles*, referring especially to the Apalachites.

[2] F. A. Wolf, quoted by Kleinert, p. 453. [3] Lev. iii. 16, iv. 31.

tion between them. The offender comes to make atonement in the appointed way. He has brought a sacrifice; by imposition of hands he has signified that whilst it is his, and he identifies himself with it, he devotes it to the purpose of making atonement. Then he slew it in sign of the death which is the condition of life. Afterwards the blood was sprinkled to signify that the past is done away with, that he is cleansed, and that he starts as it were afresh. What, then, can be the further meaning of the burning? Surely it is impossible for it to symbolize the punishments of hell.[1] Nor am I satisfied with the view advanced by another writer: "Its primary intention was to consume or annihilate the gift so far as the offerer was concerned. This design was, however, merely subordinate and negative (for it might have been destroyed in some other way); its proper and positive end was that it should in the very act of being consumed rise to Him who dwells on high: the true goal of the sacrifice was thus indicated."[2] There is an element of truth therein, but it seems to me inadequate. Did it not rather symbolize that complete reconsecration to the service of Jehovah, the interruption of which had given cause for sacrifice? Nay more, a reconsecration in which the free devotion of the offerer and the accepting and enabling act of God met and united? The latter is symbolized by the fact that it was divine fire—fire from God—by which the flesh was con-

[1] Michaelis, *Typische Gottesgelahrtheit;* de Maistre, *Soirées*, etc., and others; see Bähr, ii. 349; Kurtz, p. 151.

[2] Bähr, ii. 347. Compare Kurtz, p. 153; also substantially Oehler in Herzog, *Real-Encycl.* p. 632 f.

sumed;[1] the former is symbolized by the act of placing the flesh in contact with the fire. In this way the establishment of normal relations is signified: and what is thus signified is the spiritual reality.

(III.) The *function discharged by the sacrificial system*, more particularly by the sin-offerings, whose nature and ceremonial have just been considered. This function was threefold — atoning, educative, and prophetic. We have to do here exclusively with the first-mentioned function.

Their atoning function was to re-establish normal relations between the ruler and the subjects of the kingdom.

1. They were rooted in the *consciousness of disordered relations* between either the individual Israelite or the congregation, *i.e.* the nation as a whole and the divine ruler. In Leviticus reference is made to this when it is said, "If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt on the people, then let him offer for his sin which he hath sinned;"[2] again, "If the whole congregation of Israel shall err, and the thing be hid from the eyes of the assembly, and they have done any of the things which the Lord hath commanded not to be done, and are guilty; when the sin, wherein they have sinned, is known, then the assembly shall offer a sin-offering;"[3] further, "When a ruler sinneth, and doeth unwittingly any one of all the things which the Lord his God hath commanded not to be done, and is guilty; if his sin,

[1] See Ex. ix. 24; cf. Judg. vi. 21; 1 Kings xviii. 38; 1 Chron. xxi. 26; 2 Chron. vii. 1; Lev. vi. 5, 6.

[2] Lev. iv. 3. [3] Lev. iv. 13 f.

wherein he hath sinned, be made known to him, he shall bring a sin-offering;"[1] finally, "If any one of the common people sin unwittingly, in doing any of the things which the Lord hath commanded not to be done, and be guilty, or if his sin, which he hath sinned, be made known to him; then he shall bring an oblation for his sin which he hath sinned."[2] Other references are contained in the same and following chapters, as well as in many other parts of the Old Testament.

We learn, however, from Numbers that for high-handed sin atonement was impossible: "But the soul that doeth aught with an high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, the same blasphemeth the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from among his people. Because he hath despised the word of the Lord, and hath broken His commandments, that soul shall utterly be cut off: his iniquity shall be upon him."[3] Wilful sin thus cost the offender his position as a member of the divine commonwealth. He was sentenced to expatriation, to outlawry from God and His kingdom.

2. The *design of the sacrifices was to atone.*

This is set forth with equal distinctness in the passages from which I have just quoted. "And the priest shall make atonement for them, and they shall be forgiven"[4]—so as regards the congregation; as regards a ruler we read, "And the priest shall make atonement for him as concerning his sin, and he shall be forgiven;"[5] and in the case of the common man

[1] Lev. iv. 22–24. [2] Lev. iv. 27 f.
[3] Num. xv. 30 f. See Weber, *Zorn Gottes*, p. 169.
[4] Lev. iv. 20. [5] Lev. iv. 26.

we are told, "The priest shall make atonement for him, and he shall be forgiven."[1] As to the word rendered "forgiven," little difficulty is felt. Whatever it denotes generally, it denotes here. The chief difficulty is with the word כִּפֶּר, "*Kippēr*," whose radical signification is generally allowed to be "to cover," "to cover up," the notion of which, however, in the Piel form used in the passages quoted, has passed from the literal to the figurative sense.[2] The question is, what is the force of this word or idea, "cover," "cover up," in connection with the offender, sin and sacrifice? Sacrifices "cover;" what do they cover? And what is "covering"? A pretty general opinion is that "the covering removed the sins from the sight of Jehovah; Jehovah saw them no more; they no longer provoked His anger and His punishment; and thus they might be regarded as no longer existing, as exterminated and altogether removed from the wrath of God."[3] One eminent writer makes it signify a payment, so that the means by which the sin is expiated assumes the appearance of a "compensation," without which the sinner could not be set free from the captivity of sin; in just the same sense in which payment is made as a redemption fee for deliverance from bodily captivity.[4] Kurtz understands the covering of sin by the sacrificial worship as "a covering by which the accusatory

[1] Lev. iv. 31; see also Lev. xvi. 6, 11, 17, 24, ix. 7; cf. Ezek. xlv. 17; 2 Chron. xxx. 18; Weber, *Zorn Gottes*, p. 162.

[2] Kurtz, p. 67; Weber, p. 161.

[3] Kurtz, p. 68, referring to Bähr, Ebrard, Kliefoth, and Oehler.

[4] Hofmann in Kurtz, p. 7; Weber, p. 162.

and damnatory power of sin — its power to excite the anger and wrath of God—is broken; by which, in fact, it is rendered both harmless and impotent,"[1] and agrees substantially with Kahnis, who says, "To cover up, *i.e.* to expiate, does not mean to cause a sin not to have been committed, for that is impossible; nor to represent it as having no existence, for that would be opposed to the earnestness of the law; nor to pay or compensate it by any performance: but to cover it before God, *i.e.* to deprive it of its power to come between us and God."[2]

That *Kippēr* refers to an effect on God Himself seems clear from such passages as, "Make atonement for them before the Lord;"[3] "For on this day shall atonement be made for you to cleanse you: from all your sins shall ye be clean before the Lord."[4] The original might be literally translated, "to cover them or upon them to the face of Jehovah." God hides away their sins even from His own face. Some light may be thrown on the point by the prayers, declarations, and threats relating to sin found in other parts of the Old Testament: "*Remember* not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions."[5] "I, even I, am He that *blotteth out* thy transgressions for mine own sake; and I will not *remember* thy sins."[6] "I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I *remember* no more."[7] "They consider not in their hearts that I *remember* all their wickedness; now have their

[1] Kurtz, p. 70. [2] Kurtz, p. 70.
[3] Lev. x. 17; cf. xiv. 18, 29, xv. 15. [4] Lev. xvi. 30. [5] Ps. xxv. 7.
[6] Isa. xliii. 25; cf. Jer. xviii. 23, "Blot out their sin from before Thy face."
[7] Jer. xxxi. 34; cf. Heb. viii. 12, x 17.

own doings beset them about; they are before my face."[1] "Cast their sins into the depths of the sea."[2]

It would seem, therefore, that one of the primary effects of the sin-offering duly offered was to hide the offence from God—to make Him forget it—to cause it to be as though it had never been committed, so far as His remembrance of the offence was concerned. Forgiveness included forgetting: forgive and forget—that is what God does. Men forgive without forgetting, or forget without forgiving; God does both. How both are possible is another question: but who shall undertake to determine what is possible or impossible to Him who has *life in Himself*, and who, therefore, has *absolute control over the depths of His own being?*

Perhaps, too, the correlate of the divine forgiving and forgetting was self-forgiving and self-forgetting. Or must the sins of the offender be "ever before Him,"[3] as David says his sin was. Hiding from God by God involves surely hiding from man by God.[4]

But in what sense did these sacrifices atone? If they produced any real effect at all, what was the nature thereof? In view of the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things, they can never with the same sacrifices year by year, which they offer continually, make perfect them that draw nigh. Else would they not have ceased to be offered? because the worshippers, having

[1] Hos. vii. 2; cf. viii. 13, ix. 9. [2] Micah vii. 19. [3] Ps. li. 3.

[4] See those most remarkable words of Job, "Oh that *Thou* wouldest *hide* me in Sheol, that *Thou* wouldest keep me *secret*, until *Thy wrath be past*."

been once cleansed, would have had no more conscience of sins. But in those sacrifices there is a remembrance made of sins year by year. For it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins,"[1] it has become customary to deny that the sacrifices had any real objective effect. "The whole of the sacrificial ceremony, up to the act of expiation itself," says Kurtz,[2] "moved upon the basis of symbolism; and the sacrificial blood, therefore, was capable of nothing more than a *symbolical atonement*. But Lev. xvii. 11 does not state that the atonement was merely symbolized by the sprinkling of the blood; on the contrary, it assigns to it a real atoning power Whence did the sacrificial blood acquire this; and by what means did its symbolical atoning power acquire the potency of a *real* atonement, and the empty powerless symbol a sacramental efficacy? . . . The genuine and essential atoning power with which God endowed the sacrificial blood that was brought to the altar, as the place of salvation and of grace, so as to change the empty *symbol* into a true sacramental *type*, was derived from Christ, whose self-sacrifice was to God an ever present event, and the fruits and merits thereof also objectively present before its actual occurrence in the fulness of the times."[3]

It seems to me impossible to read the passages relating to sacrifices for sin without feeling that they were prescribed for the purpose of effecting atonement, and were offered in the belief that they actually did effect atonement. The rites may have been sym-

[1] Heb. x. 1–4; cf. Ps. xl.
[2] *Sacrificial Worship*, etc., p. 119 f.
[3] So Keil, *Archæology*, i. p. 278.

bolical; the victim and its qualities typical; but the whole ceremonial—the sacrifice in its entirety—was believed to have a real present value, a real present efficacy: it secured forgiveness of sin, reconciliation with God.

The difficulty will disappear if we look at the subject from the point of view from which the atonement is being approached in these studies, and further remember that the Israelites were still at a very early stage of their moral and religious development.

Jehovah was literally their King; the country in which they lived, which they cultivated, whose fruits sustained them, was His property, and held by them in fief; all their institutions were of His appointment or sanction; their laws were the expression of His personal will; there was nothing abstract in their relation to Him. All violations of law were therefore offences against Him, more or less heinous; and, as I observed before, our modern distinction between ceremonial, political, moral, and religious offences had no existence for them. But their conception of God and of their relation to Him was a very elementary one—not indeed altogether external, but rather that of a child or of an uncultivated man, who is not yet alive to the distinction between external and internal.[1]

God's view of and relation to them answered in the main to theirs. The worship and service expected from them were not such as He expects from us. Nor did He regard their offences as He may justly regard ours. We may, nay, must apply to these relations the analogy of human relations. The same

[1] See Oehler in Herzog, p. 643.

conduct has a different value and significance, and is differently regarded and dealt with, according to the age, circumstances, and development of the persons. So is it in the history of the kingdom of God. That the same words are used at the earlier as at the later stages, need cause no difficulty. The meaning and force of words grow and expand with human development. Sin, ingratitude, rebellion against God on the part of an Israelite, were something widely different in intensity and significance from the same things in us.

If this is true, it may be also true that atonement could be accomplished in the case of Israelites by means which, when Christ came, had become utterly inadequate. When the Israelite came with his victim —a lamb, or a goat, or a bullock, or even a pigeon, or some fine flour—he made a real sacrifice. It was not only real to him, but if offered in penitence and loyal submission, accorded with the constitution of the kingdom of God as then recognised. It was fitting that a subject of the kingdom at that stage should be restored to peace with his ruler by the fulfilment of these God-appointed conditions. If we transfer our present idea of God and man, sin, repentance, submission, reconciliation to these early ages, the thing becomes, of course, absurd. But the Israelites were on a lower plane than we. It was impossible for them either to do right or commit sin, as we can do both.[1] Their righteousness and their sin were related to our righteousness and sin much as the conduct, whether good or bad, of a child is related to the

[1] See Mozley's sermon on this subject. Note XII. Appendix.

conduct of a mature human being. Answering thereto were the conditions of pardon and reconciliation. This consideration does not at all nullify the reality of their offences, or render unreal the transaction by which their reconciliation is effected; but it helps to explain behaviour, both on the human and on the divine side, which must seem very inconsistent when regarded from the point of view of Christianity.

CHAPTER V.

THE ANGER OF GOD.

The treatment of the subject of the anger of God by Christian thinkers has from the first been marked by a singular inconsistency. When dealing with it practically, they have unhesitatingly used the words of Scripture in all the vigour of their anthropopathism; when dealing with it theoretically or theologically, on the contrary, they have done their best to eliminate the anthropopathic element everywhere present in the words of Scripture. There have been exceptions to the rule — men who either accommodated their practice to their theory, or their theory to their practice; but the vast majority of theologians and preachers have been open to the charge which I have just mentioned. Were this the proper occasion, I could quote passages in evidence from every age and section of the Christian Church down to the present day. We have to do here with the subject in its theological aspect.

I. *Scripture references to the divine anger.*

(I.) *Old Testament.* A variety of terms is used to denote the divine anger, of which the principal are the following:—אַנַף with its derivative אַף occurs in— "Turn us, O God of our salvation, and cause Thine

indignation toward us to cease. Wilt Thou be angry with us for ever?"[1] "The Lord, the Lord, a God full of compassion and gracious, slow to anger:"[2]—אַף in "For a fire is kindled in mine anger:"—זָעַם in "God is a righteous God, yea, a God that hath indignation every day;"[3] "The hand of the Lord shall be known towards His servants, and He shall have indignation against His enemies:"[4]—זַעַף in "I will bear the indignation of the Lord, because I have sinned against Him, until He plead my cause and execute judgment for me:"[5]—חֵמָה in "As they gather silver, and brass, and iron, and lead into the midst of the furnace to blow the fire upon it to melt it; so will I gather you in mine anger (אף) and in my fury, and I will lay you there and melt you:"[6]—חָרָה in "Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless child. If Thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry, and my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword:"[7]—עֶבְרָה or עָבַר in "Thou hast cast off and rejected, Thou hast been wroth with Thine anointed:"[8]—קָצַף in "And it will be, seeing ye rebel to-day against the Lord, that to-morrow He will be wroth with the whole congregation of Israel."[9] "Because they went and served other gods and worshipped them, gods whom they knew not and whom He had not given them, therefore the anger of the Lord was kindled against this land to bring upon all the curse that is written in this book:"[10]—כָּעַס or

[1] Ps. lxxxv. 4, 5. [2] Ex. xxxiv. 6. [3] Ps. vii. 12. [4] Isa. lxvi. 14.
[5] Micah vii. 9. [6] Ez. xxii. 20. [7] Ex. xxiii. 24; also חֲרוֹן.
[8] Ps. lxxxix. 39; cf. lxxviii. 59. [9] Josh. xxii. 18.
[10] Deut. xxix. 26, 27.

(noun) בְּעַס in "Ye will do evil in the sight of the Lord to provoke Him to anger through the work of your hands."[1] "They have moved me to jealousy with that which is not God; they have provoked me to anger with their vanities."[2]

(II.) The allusions in the *New Testament* are not so numerous as in the Old; but they are no less significant and forcible. Two terms only are employed —*θυμός* and *ὀργή*. *Ὀργή* is used in the following passages:—"He that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."[3] "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness."[4] "Let no man deceive you with empty words; for because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the sons of disobedience."[5] "Hide us from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb: for the great day of His wrath is come, and who shall be able to stand?"[6] *Θυμός* is used as follows of God or Christ: "If any man worshippeth the beast and his image, he shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God;" "the winepress of the wrath of God."[7] "In these seven plagues is finished the wrath of God;"[8] "the fierceness of the wrath of God" (*θυμὸς τῆς ὀργῆς*).[9] If there is a difference between *θυμός* and *ὀργή*, it is that whilst the latter means simply anger, the former denotes fierce anger, hot indignation.[10]

II. *Historical notices.*—The views taken of the divine anger may be arranged in three classes:—in

[1] Deut. xxxi. 29. [2] Deut. xxxii. 21. [3] John iii. 36.
[4] Rom. i. 18. [5] Eph. v. 6. [6] Rev. vi. 16, 17.
[7] Rev. xiv. 10, 19. [8] Rev. xv. 1. [9] Rev. ix. 15.
[10] See Weber's *Theologie des Talmud* on "Anger of God," p. 301.

the first class may be placed those which maintain that anger in God is the archetype of anger in man, that the two are in essence one ; in the second, those which deny this, and resolve anger as ascribed to God into some other principle or relation ; in the third class, the view of anger as an original factor or constituent of the divine essence or nature.

(I.) Among the comparatively few who, either in ancient or modern days, have regarded anger as a determination of the life of God, or a divine state not only analogous to, but essentially the same as *possible* human anger, were Tertullian and Lactantius.

The former in his treatise *Against Marcion*—who, like some very modern thinkers, held anger to be incompatible with a truly Christian conception of God, and accordingly distinguished between the God of the Christians, who only loves and blesses, and the Demiurge or God of the Jews spoken of in the Old Testament, who is both angry and punishes—reasons as follows: "Marcion and his followers refuse to ascribe to their God such emotions of mind as they censure in the Demiurge. Now, if He is susceptible of no feeling of rivalry, or anger, or damage, or injury as one who refrains from exercising judicial power, I cannot tell how any system of discipline can be consistent in Him." "Most listless is He, since He takes no offence at the doing of what He dislikes to be done, although displeasure ought to be the companion of His violated will. If He is offended, He ought to be angry ; if angry, He ought to inflict punishment. For such infliction is the just fruit of anger, and anger is the debt of displeasure, and dis-

pleasure is the companion of a violated will."[1] "Even His severity is good, because just: when the judge is good, that is just. Other qualities likewise are good, by means of which the good work of a good severity runs out its course, whether anger, or jealousy, or sternness. For all these are indispensable to severity, as severity is to justice." "This is to be deemed the likeness of God in man, that the human soul have the same emotions and sensations as God, although they are not of the same kind; differing as they do, both in their conditions and their issues, according to their nature. Then again, with respect to the opposite sensations,—I mean meekness, patience, mercy, and the very parent of them all, goodness,—why do you form your opinion of the divine displays of these from the human qualities? For we, indeed, do not possess them in perfection, because it is God alone who is perfect. So also in regard to those others (the opposites), namely, anger and irritation: we are not affected by them in so happy a manner, because God alone is truly happy by reason of His property of incorruptibility. Angry He will probably be, but not irritated, nor dangerously tempted; He will be moved, but not subverted. All appliances He must needs use, because of all contingencies; as many sensations as there are causes: anger because of the wicked, and indignation because of the ungrateful, and jealousy because of the proud. So again, mercy on account of the erring, and patience on account of the impenitent. All these affections He is moved by in that peculiar manner of His own, in which it is profoundly

[1] Book I. c. xxvi.

fit that He should be affected; and it is owing to Him that man is also similarly affected in a way which is equally his own." [1]

Lactantius takes up substantially the same position. In his treatise, *On the Anger of God*, he remarks in substance, in opposition to the Stoics and Epicureans, "The common Father of all, you say very pleasingly, is not subject to such littleness of mind as to be angry; He is only mild, calm, propitious, beneficent. It belongs to Him to conciliate the race of man by divine and heavenly benefits. These things now are very specious, and allure many to believe them; but though they approach, they do not reach the truth. For if God is not angry with the impious and the unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and the righteous. Therefore it is more consistent to deny of Him both anger and kindness. For in opposite matters it is necessary to be moved to both sides or to neither. He who loves the good hates the wicked; he who does not hate the wicked does not love the good; because the loving of the good arises from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise from the love of the good. . . . They (the Epicureans), on the other hand, ought not to reason that because God is not liable to anger, therefore He is not moved to kindness; but rather, because God is moved by kindness, therefore He is also liable to anger. . . . . The truth is that God is angry because He is moved to kindness. This opinion is to be maintained by us; for it is the sum and

[1] Book II. c. xvi.; cf. xi., xiii.

turning-point on which the whole of religion depends." [1]

(II.) The second class embraces views which regard the words of Scripture as necessarily anthropopathic, and explain them to mean either a principle, or a mode, or an effect of the divine action. The immense majority of Christian writers have taken up this position.

The first, so far as known, theologically to formulate this opinion was Origen; and he as well as others who, like Irenæus and Clemens Alexandrinus, took up the same position, though in a less formal manner, most probably owed their impulse to the Neo-Platonic philosophy, with its conception of God as exalted above all human thought, yea, all that actually has existence. No true idea of God can be arrived at, so they held, unless all attempts to construe the divine after the analogy of the human be most rigidly abstained from. Consistently enough, therefore, Origen says: [2] "When thou hearest of anger in God, do not believe that there is such a divine passion. God is represented as angry for our benefit: in reality He is not angry. Thou wilt be enduring the divine anger when thou endurest the sufferings drawn on thee by thine own wickedness." Or again: "If on account of those expressions which occur in the Old Testament, as when God is said to be angry or to repent, or when any other human affection is described, our opponents think that they are furnished with grounds for refuting

[1] Lactantius, pp. 7–9, Clark's translation.
[2] Hom. viii. § 6 in Jerem. See Weber, p. 42.

us, who maintain that God is altogether impassible, and is to be regarded as wholly free from all affections of that kind, we have to show them that similar statements are found even in the parables of the Gospel. When we read either in the Old Testament or in the New of the anger of God, we do not take such expressions literally, but seek in them a spiritual meaning, that we may think of God as He deserves to be thought of."[1] Again, in his Refutation of Celsus, he says: "Celsus, not understanding that the language of Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthropopathic point of view, ridicules those passages which speak of words of anger addressed to the ungodly, and of threatenings directed against sinners. . . . We speak, indeed, of the 'wrath' of God. We do not, however, assert that it indicates any 'passion' on His part, but that it is something which is assumed in order to discipline by stern means those sinners who have committed many and grievous sins. For that which is called God's 'wrath' and 'anger' is a means of discipline. . . . The language regarding the wrath of God is to be understood figuratively. . . . Threatenings are intimations of the punishments which are to befall the wicked. . . . Wrath is no passion on the part of God, but each one brings it upon himself by his sins."[2]

No less decided in his theological opposition to anthropopathisms and assertion of the impassibility of God than any of his predecessors, was Augustine; partly, too, in consequence of the influence of Plotinus,

[1] *De Principiis*, Bk. II. c. iv. 4. [2] Book IV. cc. lxxi.–ii.

traces of the study of whose philosophy, and especially of whose views of God, are plentiful in his writings. His allusions to the subject are frequent, and as clear as they are frequent, and demanded by his general view of the divine nature. In the treatise on the *Manichæan* heresy he says: "God does not suffer perturbation when He visits men in anger; but either by an abuse of the word or by a peculiarity of idiom, anger is used in the sense of punishment."[1] "God is not enraged with a passion similar to human anger, but is angry, not in the sense of desiring vengeance, but in the peculiar sense of giving full effect to the sentence of a righteous retribution."[2] So in the *Enchiridion:* "When God is said to be angry, we do not attribute to Him such a disturbed feeling as exists in the mind of an angry man; but we call His just displeasure against sin by the name anger, a word transferred from the analogy of human emotions."[3] "The wrath of God, that is, their condemnation, — for it is this and not any disturbed feeling in the mind of God that is called His wrath, — abideth on those who are damned."[4] To precisely the same effect we read in the work on the *Trinity.* Treating of the words of Paul— "God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him"[5]—he adds, "Justified, he says, in His blood,—justified plainly in that we are freed from all sin; and freed from all

[1] Book XXII. c. xviii. [2] C. xxi. [3] C. xxxiii.
[4] C. cxii. [5] Rom. v. 8, 9.

sin, because the Son of God, who knew no sin, was slain for us. Therefore, 'we shall be saved from wrath through Him;' from the wrath certainly of God, which is nothing else but just retribution. For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a perturbation of the mind; but it is the wrath of Him to whom Holy Scripture says in another place, 'But Thou, O Lord, mastering Thy power, judgest with calmness' (Wisd. xii. 18). If, therefore, the just retribution of God has received such a name, what can be the right understanding also of the reconciliation of God, unless that then such wrath comes to an end? 'Neither were we enemies to God, except as sins are enemies to righteousness; which being forgiven, such enmities come to an end, and they, whom He Himself justifies, are reconciled to the Just One.'"[1] In the following passage from *The City of God*, he himself traces his view of anger to its roots in his conception of the divine immutability, which again depends on the divine simplicity. "The anger of God is not a disturbing emotion of His mind, but a judgment by which punishment is inflicted upon sin. His thought and reconsideration also are the unchangeable reason which changes things; for He does not, like man, repent of anything He has done; because in all matters His decision is as inflexible as His prescience is certain. But if Scripture were not to use such expressions, it would not familiarly insinuate itself into the minds of all classes of men whom it seeks access to for their good."[2]

[1] Book XIII. c. xvi. [2] Book XV. c. xxv.; cf. Bk. IX. cc. iii.–vii.

Beyond Augustine, little, if any, advance has hitherto been made by the great mass of Christian writers. Substantially they are where he and, indeed, Origen were; though, since the Reformation, greater care has been taken so to formulate the matter as to cover over the contradiction between theology and Scripture.

Gerhard, the greatest of the early *Lutheran* divines, says: "Scripture ascribes anger to God merely ἀνθρωποπαθῶς; for the effect of divine punishment is signified, not any turbulent emotion of God."[1] In answer to the question whether God is subject to emotions, he replies: "Scaliger distinguishes between passive and active emotion. The former is always conjoined with change, from which God ἀμεταβλήτος, is totally free. Anger in men is a certain perturbation of the mind, because it is a passive emotion; but the anger of God is not a perturbation, because it is an active emotion. For it is nothing but just aversion from sin, and the will to punish offenders."[2] Indeed, he and those who followed did not profess to go beyond Augustine and the scholastics as to this point. The same holds true also of the majority of the *Reformed* theologians, alike German, Swiss, French, and English. Turretine, for example, who did more than any other writer to mould the theology of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism for at least a century, expressly maintains that anger is attributed to God merely ἀνθρωποπαθῶς.[3]

[1] *Loci*, ii. 176; Weber, p. 46. [2] Weber, p. 46.
[3] *De Satisfactionis Christi necessitate*, Pt. I. xx.

An eminent English theologian of the last generation remarks to the same effect : " The terms anger, indignation, wrath, threatening, punishment, remission, reconciliation, propitiation, and similar expressions, are, under all the circumstances, most proper to be employed, and are the best calculated to produce a just sense of the evil of sin and many other salutary feelings ; yet we should be careful to understand them as expressing modes of the divine administration and effects of the divine counsels, but not affections operating upon the divine nature, nor changes in it. A creature who is under the guilt and dominion of sin stands in that position, with respect to the necessary and unchangeable attributes of God, which is fitly expressed by terms denoting the strongest displeasure and abhorrence." " We are not warranted to understand passages which describe God now in the language of love and approbation, and now in that of anger and condemnation, as indicating a real change in God." [1]

Professor Crawford refers to the subject in the following terms : " If by 'an obstacle on the part of God to the forgiveness of sinners,' there be understood anything in the shape of personal resentment or implacable vindictiveness, or unwillingness to show mercy, it is perfectly true that there is no such obstacle. But that there are what may be called 'obstacles' of another kind, arising from God's most holy aversion to sin, His just condemnation, and His declared purpose as the supreme Lawgiver and righteous Judge to punish it, can hardly be denied by any

[1] Pye Smith, *Discourses*, etc., pp. 131, 132.

careful reader of the Scriptures. How else are we to explain those frequent and express statements regarding the divine anger and so forth? We cannot literally ascribe to God those human passions and emotions which such language denotes. But they are not devoid of meaning. It is intended to make men feel that there is *somewhat on the part of God* opposing the reception of sinners into His favour, which may be fitly depicted by comparing it to those dispositions and feelings of the human heart under which in these figurative expressions it is represented."[1] It is not easy to say what Dr. Crawford's position exactly is; but he seems to me to go as near as may be to a denial that anger, as ascribed to God, denotes a disturbing determination of the divine life, essentially the same as that which men experience. I imagine, however, that he pretty fairly represents the current mode of treating the subject.

Dr. Wardlaw does not go deeply into the subject, but I am not sure whether he is on the whole less vague than his predecessors.[2] "Has the countenance of the Being with whom we have to do," he asks those who oppose the atonement, "never worn any other expression than that of kindness? Very far from it." Then, after quoting passages ascribing anger to God, he goes on to say: "We are reminded, it is true, that God is there spoken of after the manner of men. And if what is meant by this be that the infinite mind is free from all the agitation and turbulence which the passions produce in the minds

[1] *Doctrine of Atonement*, p. 406.
[2] Cf. Gilbert, *Atonement*, p. 114; Alexander, *Biblical Theology*.

of His creatures, we admit the truth. But the expressions must have some meaning. And is it not a more than suspicious circumstance that this qualifying consideration is applied all on one side? We hear little of it in regard to the exercise of the divine benevolence; although there is in the minds of men such a thing as the turbulence of ecstasy in the emotions of love and joy as well as in those of indignation and wrath. The truth is, that we know humblingly little of the operations of the divine mind. That there is the utter and eternal absence of all the variations of painful, or even of violent excitation and emotion, is clear; but that there is nothing that bears any analogy at all to what exists in the minds of His creatures, is what we dare not affirm. At all events, granting that wrath in God is not an agitating passion, it is incomparably more dreadful when regarded as standing figuratively, by anthropomorphism, for a principle or a settled and determinate purpose, that under His government sin shall not pass with impurity. And this it must mean, if it mean anything at all."[1]

Another view of the anger of God claiming the character of greater objectivity, but in reality reducing it as effectually to another divine principle or relation, has been taken of recent years by many theologians in all parts of Christendom. Their general position has been summed up as follows: "God is love, and what is not love is not in God. It is therefore not permissible to admit an antithetical quality into God's nature. Holiness and love are one in God. To

[1] Wardlaw's *Systematic Theology*, vol. ii. pp. 362, 363; cf. Park's *Atonement*, p. 525.

recognise in God an anger which has to be satisfied or appeased is heathenish, yea, devilish. The anger of God is in reality nothing but the displeasure at sin which God causes man to feel, in order that he may repent and reform; the end of punishment is improvement. Anger, therefore, is a form or mode of the manifestation of love."[1]

As typical examples of this mode of treating anger —which might perhaps be described as semi-objective, semi-anthropopathic—I may quote *Martensen*, the well-known Danish theologian; and *Schöberlein*, a less known but equally noteworthy German theologian.

Martensen says: "The fact that the relation of God to the world is unsatisfactory, is expressed in the notion of the divine anger. This notion is not merely anthropopathic, but expresses the divine πάθος which is necessarily involved in the conception of love, whose manifestation is restrained and unrighteously hindered. For anger is holy love itself when it feels itself stopped by the turning away of the being with which it was minded to enter into fellowship. What may thus in one aspect be designated anger, in another aspect may be described as a grieving of the Holy Spirit of love, and thus passes over into compassion. We can only speak of God's anger where we can speak of God's compassion." These remarks are made in elucidation of previous statements regarding the atonement, as to which he maintains that whilst it is true that not only man but God is reconciled, it is equally true that no alteration metaphysically considered was produced in God, the

[1] See Weber, p. 58.

eternal depth of whose love is without the shadow of change.[1]

Schöberlein treats the question of divine anger very beautifully, though he scarcely gets beyond the general point of view which I am illustrating: "At the first blush it might be thought that pure love would ignore or do away with sin. But this would be a very external view of the nature of sin and love. A personal being can only be freed from its own act by freely turning back into itself; and as it is absolutely dependent on God, it can only do this when God turns into it. Were God to ignore man's free act, He would be misregarding the native dignity of personality; were He to do man violence, He would be destroying the very basis of loving intercourse. No: whilst He never loses sight of love's goal, namely, the destruction of sin in man, which is the real hindrance of union, He does not go to work arbitrarily or with violence. One thing, however, Love does—she refuses to let man alone; she opens her heart to the reactive force of his sin, and follows him with all the energy of her devotion. In doing this, however, she cannot but feel the attempted apostasy as something hostile. Not only is her inner harmony disturbed, but her living impulse to secure man's true life by a complete bestowal of herself on him is also impeded. But divine Love cannot abide in this passive state of holy anguish: being love, and her nature being to communicate herself, unless she is to deny her own nature, she must set herself in hostile opposition to the spirit which sets itself in hostile opposition to her.

[1] Martensen's *Dogmatik*, p. 281, § 157.

This pain of love at sin thus assuming an active form, we designate anger. Anger is not hatred. There is no hatred properly so called in God, at all events not towards persons, but only towards sin, so far as it is distinguishable from the sinner to whom it cleaves. Anger, on the contrary, is the energy of love against the sinner, the expression of its pain that he should have become untrue to his better self; and he who cannot feel anger can have no hearty love for another's true self."[1]

A very fascinating view of the subject; one, too, that brings out an important side of the truth; but scarcely objective enough, as it seems to me, to do justice to the plain and strong words of Scripture.

(III.) A third view which may be briefly alluded to, less for its own intrinsic importance than for completeness' sake, is that which assigns to anger or its equivalent a constitutive place in the divine essence,—a place as real and essential as any other attribute, for example, love.

The chief representative of this view is Jacob Böhme;[2] though, indeed, it may be questioned whether he ought to be quoted in this connection at all, inasmuch as his treatment of anger is rather theosophic or philosophic than theological. The fundamental thought which he takes for his starting-point is that of a distinction, of a duality of principles

[1] Schöberlein, *Grundlehren des Heils*, pp. 49, 50.

[2] See *Kernhaffter Auszug aller Schriften, etc., Jacob Böhmens*, Amsterdam 1718. Jacob Böhme's *Leben und Lehre*, von W. L. Wullen, Stuttgart 1836, pp. 45–59. Compare Lange in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.*, "Zorn Gottes," p. 666; Baur's *Gnosis*, p. 558; Martensen's *Jacob Böhme*, translated by Rhys Evans.

in the nature of God Himself. It is the old dualism of the Gnostics and Manichæans, with the difference that what they conceived as a principle, outside and independent of and opposed to God, Böhme represents as inherent in God Himself. In the very divine essence, according to him, there is an antagonism of darkness and light, of grimness and gentleness,—a duality which is the source of all the antagonisms of nature and mind, yea, of good and evil themselves. The former, indeed, the dark, grim, bitter, stern principle, or however it may be designated, is not God in the highest sense; but yet it is also God, or belongs in such wise to His essence, that it is the presupposition or condition of God. "Seeing that man knoweth," says he, "that he is a twofold man, held fast in good and bad, it is highly necessary for him to learn to know himself, — how he is constituted? Whence cometh the good and evil impulse? What the good and evil in him really and truly is? Whence it springs? What is the proper origin of all the good and all the evil? From or through what is the evil in devil and man and in all creatures? For, notwithstanding that the devil was a holy angel, and man also was created good, yet such discontent is to be found in all creatures that every one bites, smites, kicks, crushes, and attacks the other; yea, hostility is in all creatures; nay more, everybody is at discord with itself, which may be seen to be the case, not merely with living creatures, but with stars, elements, earths, stones, metals, wood, foliage, and grass,—in all is poison and mischief; nay more, this must be so, for otherwise there were no life nor mobility, even as

there would be no colour, virtue, thick or thin, or any sort of sensation, but all would be a nothing. Entering upon these lofty contemplations, we find that all such things come from and out of God, and that they are of His own essence which He Himself is, and that He has thus created out of Himself, and that the evil belongs to form and movement, and the good to love, and the stern or contrarious to joy."[1] So again: "In God there is, one may say, no distinction; but when one inquires whence come good and evil, one must know what is the first and primal source of anger and then also of love, because they both have one origin, one mother; yea, are one thing. Accordingly one is compelled to speak after a creatural manner as though it had a beginning, in order that it may become matter of knowledge. For one cannot say that in God there is fire, the bitter or the harsh, much less air, water, or earth; yet one sees that it is derived from Him. Nor can one say that in God there is death, or hell-fire, or sadness; yet one sees that it is derived therefrom. One must therefore search out the source of causes, what is the *prima materia* for evil, and that alike in the depths of God and in creatures. For in the deepest depths all is one thing, all is from God, all is made from His essence, according to the trinity. —The harsh, the bitter, and fire are in the primal ground in the first *principium*, the water-fount takes its rise in them, and according to the first *principium*, God is designated, not God, but grimness, anger, from which arises evil, pain, trembling, burning."[2]

[1] Vorrede to the *Drei Principien*, quoted in Baur's *Gnosis*, p. 558.
[2] *Princ.* p. 4 f. See *Drei Princ.* c. iv. 45 f.

"In the primal depth one finds the most terrible, severest generation, everything that is harsh, and bitter, and fire. One cannot say, however, that it is God, and yet it is the inner primal point which is in God the Father, according to which He calls Himself an angry, zealous God; and the same point is the first *principium*, and is God the Father in His deepest ground, out of which this world originates.—In this *principium* there is nothing but the most fearful generation, the greatest dread, hostile joy, like a sulphurous spirit, and it is just the gate and abyss of hell in which Prince Lucifer has remained with extinction of his light."

Böhme is hard to understand in detail, chiefly because of his strange, uncouth terminology; but the general trend of his thought is pretty plain; and that is, that somehow or other there was an abysmal nature in God before He became consciously, that is truly, God; that this nature was constituted by antagonisms, which were necessary to each other; that one of these antagonistic principles was anger, or that which expresses itself in anger; that there was a scene of tumultuous struggling, travailing which he calls birth or begetting; that out of this birth-travail God issued forth; and that creation is a reflection of the constitution and struggles of the abysmal divine nature.

III. *Doctrinal exposition.* For my own part, I do not hesitate to accept in substance the view which I adduced first.[1] Not, indeed, that I should be ready to indorse all the expressions used to describe it by men

[1] Cf. Lange's article, "Zorn Gottes," in Herzog, p. 658.

of the fiery temper of Tertullian, writing against heresies which they abhorred; but that I believe that the essential element in anger, as a specific determination of the life, may be ascribed really and truly to God. Human anger, like everything human, is affected by human imperfection and sin; but in itself it is neither imperfect nor sinful. Stripped of its defects, exaggerations, and corruptions, it is an emotion which under certain circumstances is as normal to God as it is to man:—abnormal, indeed, *per se* to both; yet of such a nature that God would not be God, nor man truly man, if either were incapable of it.

The translation of anger as predicated of God into such terms as condemnation or judicial punishment and the like, is altogether opposed to the usage of Scripture. Four normal relations on the part of man to sin, or four aspects or stages of his normal relation thereto, may be distinguished:—The *recognition* of sin as sin, that is, its implicit or explicit condemnation; a sense of *aversion* rising to abhorrence with regard to sin, as also with regard to the sinner in the measure in which he identifies himself with sin; more or less intense *emotion*, that is, displeasure, resentment, anger, fierce indignation accompanying or following thereon; and finally, corresponding *action*, or manifestation of the inward relation in an outward relation, which will, of course, vary according to the position, circumstances, rights, duties, in short, general relations of the parties concerned.

Now these several aspects are distinguished in Scripture when the divine relation to sin is referred to; not, of course, in a formal way, not with the

precision and uniformity of usage that would mark a scientific treatise or a code of laws, but clearly enough.

The places are well-nigh innumerable in which God is represented implicitly if not explicitly as regarding, recognising, looking upon, judging, condemning sin as sin. But one need not for this purpose go beyond the catena supplied by Paul in the Epistle to the Romans.[1]

How frequently, too, is God represented as turning away from, not being able to look upon sin, as hating, loathing, abhorring, abominating sin—according to its intensity, its blackness.[2]

The resentment, anger, wrath of God are also mentioned.

And, finally, in passages far too numerous for quotation, even if it were necessary, outward expression is said to be given in various forms to the divine judgment, loathing, anger; as, for example, in entreaties, warnings, threats, reproaches, sacrifices; in chastisements, afflictions, punishments; in declarations of active hostility; in affirmations even of mockery; and in the destruction of the finally and wilfully impenitent.

Not unfrequently, too, do we find two or more of the phases in question conjoined whilst distinguished in the same passage, the one being treated as the cause or the natural precursor of the other.

All this has to be ignored, so far at all events as the one element of anger is concerned—the element of emotion—if a view be taken of it such as has been

[1] Chap. iii. 10–18.

[2] Compare Prov. vi. 16–19, xv. 9; Jer. xliv. 4, 11; Deut. xxv. 16.

customary among theologians. But with what right can we regard the divine judgment and condemnation, or aversion and abhorrence, or reproach and threat, or chastisement and punishment, literally, realistically, if we put a merely figurative unreal interpretation on other terms associated with, yet plainly not meant to be synonyms of or tautological repetitions of the rest? And all this because we cannot at once see our way into the consistency of the use of the one, imagining, meanwhile, that we can do so in the case of others.

Let us now then try to enter a little more fully into the nature and function of anger. The objections raised against its ascription to God, I propose to notice afterwards; though some of them, if indeed not all, owe a part of their force to lack of insight into the true nature and genesis of the emotion. I will deal first with the constructive part of my task.

1. What is anger as a phenomenon of human experience? Let us approach the subject genetically.

One of the primary and fundamental aims and impulses of a living being is the maintenance of its own integrity. As an organism, it is a whole; its wholeness constitutes its perfectness. If the integrity of its constitution, or functions, or activities be interfered with, it ceases to that extent to be itself. This cannot be said of non-living things, with the exception, perhaps, of crystals, which hold a kind of midway position between non-living and living things. All living things open to human observation illustrate what I have said. So far as is within their power, they ward off injury or repair injury: and injuries of a certain kind that cannot be repaired are in some

way or other compensated or covered over. This is the case both in the vegetable and in the lower regions of the animal world.

Animals of a higher type are made capable of pain more or less acute and varied, in order that they may by its means be warned of the presence and action of causes tending to the destruction of their integrity — integrity of constitution or of life. This is the true function of pain. In a system of things where interferences never took place, where relations were perfectly harmonious, there would be no need of pain—it would have no function to discharge. But in our present world it is an absolute necessity. It is a sort of self-acting signal to us, or even brake upon us, when we ourselves or others are endangering any side of our organism.

All animals probably, certainly a large majority of those open to observation, react in some way or other as soon as they are threatened with injury or are really injured. They do this frequently before they can have been warned by pain; possibly in some cases when they are incapable of pain. Notice the worm when pressed or trodden on, how it twists and turns about: or the earwig when touched or even approached—how it turns up its horned tail as if ready to repel an assailant. The stings of wasps and bees are inflicted in supposed self-defence. There is no deliberate purpose; there is no emotion; it is simply reaction against real or apprehended danger, the approach of which is generally, possibly always, indicated by some sort or degree of nervous or quasi-nervous excitement, not to say of pain.

Amongst animals capable of emotion, the phenomenon becomes more complex. A dog, an elephant, a horse, not only shrinks from, reacts against, threatened or actual injury, not only feels pain, but experiences a further something which resembles and anticipates what in ourselves we call resentment, anger. Dogs show this emotion by growling, snarling, barking. These things do not express pain:—If a dog is simply pained or hurt, it yelps or howls, or whines or groans: they are the physical equivalent or correlate to the nervous or muscular reaction of which I spoke above; whereas whining, yelping, howling, groaning, are the expression of pain, or fear, or some such thing. Sometimes, as we know, the very sight of a man or other being which has once before inflicted, or only threatened or seemed to threaten, injury to a dog, awakens violent anger, followed by corresponding threats or attempts to drive off or even injure the foe. Nay more, this anger occasionally becomes an abiding attitude of the dog, which we then call hatred,—"That dog hates me or him," we say. This attitude is not under the animal's control; sometimes, indeed, it may yield to proofs of friendliness, provided it has not become too fixed or decided; but the animal cannot help itself, nor can its attitude be influenced by considerations which we term rational. With some animals, injury threatened or inflicted on their young offspring, and in some rare cases on others mated or closely associated with them, excites what may be termed altruistic anger. They resent not only what prejudicially affects

themselves, but also what threatens to harm others.

2. In man we find naturally all this and more To some extent, especially in the earlier and in the less developed and cultured stages or states of his existence, his nervous and muscular system reacts automatically for the purpose of warding off or repelling injury. He also experiences pain of various kinds, which, as was already remarked, warns him of danger, or checks him in its midst. He further experiences resentment or anger; but, so far as we can judge, whilst there is a general resemblance, there are also remarkable differences between his anger and that which is observed in the lower animals. Let us look at it a little closer.

(1.) It is *differentiated* in accordance with the varied aspects or functions of man's nature.

We resent *corporeal* injury threatened or real:—we further resent *intellectual* injury, or what we deem such, though this is mostly very slight, if not in some non-existent:—we resent also slights and the like done to our *affections*, to our heart. All men are more or less on the *qui vive* for enemies to their *interests;* they guard their self-interest, as we term it—a general expression, which may embrace all the aspects or functions of our being, though ordinarily it relates to those which are lower or less important. And naturally enough, at any particular moment our anger may be really or apparently complicated, through being called forth by threatened injury to more than one side of our nature at one and the same time.

(2.) Our *altruistic* resentments are much more varied and intense than any to be found in the highest animals below us. Rightly constituted, men resent injuries inflicted on the lower animals; yea, even on nature generally. Still more do they resent their infliction on their fellow-men; but specially on their relatives and friends. They resent injuries, too, inflicted on their fellow-men in all the respects in which they resent their infliction on themselves; though not perhaps with the same intensity. Sometimes, too, though perhaps not as often as they should, they resent dishonour done to Him in whom they live, and move, and have their being.

(3.) The fact that our relations to other beings—natural, human, divine—are partly under our own control, and that just those relations are under control which are fitted to foster our and their well-being, gives rise to another form of resentment to which presumably lower creatures are perfect strangers—namely, *moral resentment*. Morality, as we term it, is a quality of those relations or of those of our activities which are under our own control. This moral quality excites emotion: if the relations or activities are right, we approve; if wrong, we disapprove; yea, our disapproval may rise to resentment or even to anger. This is a completely different form of resentment from that which we feel at injury, whether inflicted on ourselves or on others; though the two may be and often are conjoined and so blended that they can scarcely be discriminated. Nay more, we feel moral resentment not only at

wrong relations or activities, but also at the wrong habit or character which such wrongly controlled activities necessarily generate. And the stronger such a character, the greater normally is our resentment. At last we may come to feel what is called resentment against sin as a disturbance of the moral order of the world, against sin in the abstract, and against sin as contrariety to the will of God. This highest form of anger is not unknown; perhaps it was felt by David, and expressed in some of the Psalms known as imprecatory. At a lower level something akin thereto may be found in the indignation that fills the soul of a true patriot when he sees his country's laws scorned, its welfare spoiled, and its glory and honour trampled under foot by ignorant, self-seeking, and vain demagogues.

(4.) Now all these varied forms of resentment, and others not touched upon, relate to one and the same thing, namely, the preservation of integrity, both static and dynamic as it may be termed, or otherwise expressed, of being, function, activity. The differences between man and the lowest creature are rooted in the greater variety and complication of his functions and activities, and of their corresponding roots or bases. Corporeal integrity, intellectual integrity, integrity of the heart, moral integrity —each and all in its measure may become an occasion of resentment. And as injury done to the moral nature and activity is the most serious, we might surely expect that the fiercest resentment would normally be called forth against any one who should seem to be its antagonist; though, naturally

enough, the lower the *morale* of a man, the less keen will be his anger against those who seek his moral corruption. Indeed, the same holds true regarding the other sides of our nature—regarding the intellect, the affections, and even the body.

3. What, then, is the exact nature of anger? If we observe ourselves when angry, we shall find two elements commingled—a corporeal and a psychical; frequently, at all events, if not always. We are sensible of a quickening of the beating of the heart, of a rush of blood to the head, of a flush in the face, and of general bodily excitement, followed by action more or less unusual and violent, either objectless or with a definite object. These are the common and usually noted characteristics of anger. But it has in all cases its psychical side; by which I mean not the ideas or representations or fancies which give rise to it, but a properly psychical excitement, answering to the corporeal excitement; though undoubtedly the psychical is in very many, perhaps most cases, completely swallowed up in, overborne and obscured by, the nervous or corporeal. Yet the reverse is sometimes the case. The psychical may be supreme, and keep the corporeal under perfect control. There is none the less anger, but it need not manifest itself in ebullitions, or gestures, or strong language, or hasty movements, still less in violence against others; on principle, in the very interest of the integrity, the attack on which excites it, it may possibly remain perfectly calm. This, indeed, is the profoundest and intensest form of resentment. Sometimes the very absence of the usual signs of anger may lead to its

being confounded with what we describe as being swayed by principle, adherence to principle, and the like. The two things are very distinct from, though certainly not incompatible with, each other. The psychical in us is never absolutely alone; indeed, as long as we are in the body, psychical changes must always have corporeal correlates of some kind or degree. This follows from the relation between body and soul. But the higher the man, *i.e.* the more vigorous the psychical, the more the corporeal correlate is kept under control; the lower the man, the more the corporeal overshadows and sways the psychical. Descriptions of psychical experiences are useless, save to those who have had them; but I presume we all know something of the indignation, more or less intense, which arises when truth is being perverted; when men's intellects are obfuscated by superstition or bewildered by sophistry; when men's hearts are played with, or wounded, or corrupted; when morality is treated as an old wife's whim or fancy, or prudishness; when religion is scorned as mere weakness or superstition; when trust in Christ is represented as trust in a mere idea; when prayer is decried as an unmanly whine into vacuity, like the midnight howling of a dog, and so forth. Even if these things do not directly affect ourselves, we resent them; especially if we find seducers invading the sacredness of our own home, and our children, whom we have anxiously tried to train up in the fear of God and faith of Christ, led away—are we not angry? do we not burn with indignation? And can we be blamed? Does God blame us?

The subject of human anger is further complicated because of the hereditary imperfection and taint of human nature, its acquired evil bias, and its ignorance. If man were in a normal condition, his anger might be normal; that is, he might be perfectly justified in feeling resentment, or even wrath, against enemies who should seek to invade and violate the integrity of his being and life. But man is not in a normal condition; and, accordingly, when we undertake to form a moral estimate of his anger, we need to take into consideration his irritability, his overweening complacency, his selfishness, his suspiciousness, his fancies, his fears, his failings of temper, the injustice he may have unintentionally or intentionally previously committed, and a hundred other things which cause his resentments to be hasty, or exaggerated, or even undeserved; and on the ground of which, therefore, we condemn what we otherwise might excuse or even commend.

4. We are now prepared to consider more closely the question of anger in relation to God, wherein it consists, what calls it forth, what justifies it. The nearest approach to the divine anger is to be found in the psychical indignation to which I referred. In the sense in which we are corporeal, God is incorporeal; there can therefore in Him be no corporeal affections such as we experience. Perhaps we, too, shall not experience them, or they will take a higher, purer form when we are clothed upon with our house which is from heaven,—the glorified body fashioned after the likeness of Christ's own glorious body. But the spiritual indignation of God may be none the less real—so real

as to deserve being described as a consuming fire. We cannot, of course, describe it further: we can but try to abstract from anger in ourselves all that even we recognise as due to imperfection and sin, and transfer the remainder with all due humility and modesty to God. But if it seem to be not only right, but necessary in us; nay more, if we seem actually blamable when under circumstances such as I referred to we do not feel anger, surely it may be permitted us without inconsistency to ascribe it to God—to ascribe to Him not any mere general principle of justice, or resolution to resist sin, or judge-like condemnation of offenders; but a veritable, genuine emotion or uprising of resentment, or anger, or wrath, or fiery indignation, according to the heinousness of the offence committed, and the degree in which the sinner sins wilfully, boldly, consciously—with a high hand.

Analogously to the case of man, it is in the integrity of the divine nature and life, and, one may add, cosmos, that we must seek the justification of the divine anger; though we need to make modifications. The divine nature as such is clearly exalted above the possibility of injury; but the divine *life*—especially the affectional life of God, the heart of God, and the cosmos which has issued forth from His hand—may be prejudicially affected by man. Should not God resent the introduction and spread of disorder, of sin and evil, of wickedness and suffering, into this fair world, which He intended to be the manifestation of His eternal glory and beauty? Should He not resent the disappointment and sadness which the apostasy and sin cause him on whom He

purposed to bestow His love? Should He remain unmoved under the necessity laid on Him of inflicting pain where He designed only to give pleasure? Should He be undisturbed by the misrepresentation of Himself, the distortion of His character, the utter caricature of His image, and the total or partial ignorance of His mind and purposes which have resulted from sin? He resists all this—that surely is manifest; for is not the suffering of men the effect of the divine reaction against interferences with the integrity of His life and of His works? Does He take note of it all? does He resist it all? and between or accompanying the two is there no equivalent of that which in ourselves we designate resentment—no stirring, more or less profound, of the depths of divine feeling? We ascribe to Him a welcoming of sinners at their return; a welcoming of the love and worship of His saints: He notes all that, He responds to all that; but the welcome is something beyond. And as the one form of emotion is ascribed to Him, so also is the other.

Now, the integrity which we have found to be the inward reason of recoil, resistance, pain, resentment, all up through the hierarchy of the organic sphere, and which I have ascribed to God, is but another mode, as it seems to me, of describing divine holiness, to which so frequent allusion is made in the Scriptures. Not mere purity, or separateness, or exaltedness and the like,—all which are either negative or merely relative descriptions,—but static and dynamic integrity — wholeness — wholeness of being and life. The fundamental law of an organized being is the mainten-

ance of itself intact, in harmony with its indwelling idea. This, too, is the great law of the divine being and life. "Be ye holy, as I am holy." And when we remember that the integrity of the divine life means the integrity of the whole world, especially of humanity, which lives, and moves, and has its being in God, we shall see that the one great condition of the well-being and orderly development of creation is the preservation and assertion of the divine holiness. Accordingly, the resentment felt by God against those who sin, *i.e.* who violate the integrity of His life first, so far as it is in themselves, and then as it is in the system to which they belong, and who bring grief and dishonour on God Himself, is a resentment of an essentially altruistic character, as much more profound and more perfect than anything found among men, as the relation between God and His children is more radical and more vital than that which can subsist between any creatures, however closely related.

IV. We now come to the examination of the difficulties which have suggested themselves to various thinkers. The force of some of them has been already, in part at all events, weakened; but it may be well briefly to touch on them in order.

1. The first arises from the condemnation pronounced by Scripture on human anger. This condemnation is pronounced in various ways, indirect and direct. "Wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous; but who is able to stand before jealousy?"[1] "Be not hasty in thy spirit to be angry; for anger resteth in the bosom of fools."[2] "Make no friend-

[1] Prov. xxvii. 4.

[2] Eccles. vii. 9.

ship with a man that is given to anger, and with a wrathful man thou shalt not go."[1] "An angry man stirreth up strife, and a wrathful man aboundeth in transgression."[2] "Cease from anger and forsake wrath."[3] "The works of the flesh are jealousies, wraths."[4] "Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger."[5] "Put away all these; anger, wrath, malice, railing, shameful speaking."[6] "I desire that men pray in every place, lifting up holy hands, without wrath and disputing."[7] "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath; for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God."[8]

It must not be forgotten, however, that wrath is, of all the determinations of human life, of all the forms of human activity, the most liable to be perverted by the corruption which cleaves to our nature. The boundary line between necessary and right regard for the integrity of our nature in the best sense on the one hand, and selfish and corrupt regard for our supposed interest on the other, is one that is easily blurred, and which only he will mark who has in the truest sense a single eye. Accordingly, righteous resentment and indignation may only too easily be supplanted by that which is unrighteous and sinful. So subtle is the temptation to offend in these two ways, and so difficult is it to discern and keep the right path, that we do well to follow the counsel of Scripture, and shun anger as though it were sin, in the assurance that in the present condition of

[1] Prov. xxii. 4. [2] Prov. xxix. 22. [3] Ps. xxxvii. 8.
[4] Gal. v. 20. [5] Eph. iv. 31; 2 Cor. xii. 20.
[6] Col. iii. 8. [7] 1 Tim. ii. 8. [8] Jas. i. 19.

human nature it is far more frequently wrong than right.

But that there is such a thing as justifiable anger even in men, Scripture itself testifies. "Be ye angry and sin not,"[1] we are told; it must therefore be possible to be angry without sinning. Examples also of anger which incurred no reproof occur in Scripture; as, for example, that of Moses, of whom it is said that when on coming down from the mount he saw the calf which the Israelites were worshipping, his "anger waxed hot, and he cast the tables out of his hands, and brake them beneath the mount."[2] Would God have dealt with Moses as He afterwards did had his wrath been a sinful wrath?[3] The Lord Jesus Christ Himself is also said to have been "moved with indignation," for the words *ἐνεβριμήσατο πνεύματι καὶ ἐτάραξεν ἑαυτόν* seem to describe with almost literal exactness the state of emotion called anger; and *βρέμω* or *βρίμη*, the root of *ἐνεβριμήσατο*, denotes primarily anger, wrath, and is akin to the Latin *fremere*, *fremitus*, low, suppressed indignation, expressing itself in a sort of growl.[4] And surely in Him it must not be counted sin. It is true the Revised Version renders the passage "groaned in the spirit and was troubled," but that may be due to the mistaken view of anger which I am combating.

2. The next objection is drawn from the immutability of God, with which anger is held to be inconsistent.

[1] Eph. iv. 26; cf. Ps. iv. 5. [2] Ex. xxxii. 19.

[3] Weber, p. 23. God gave new tables. So also His wrath against Korah's company.

[4] John xi. 33. See Weber, p. 23, and Passow, *sub voce*. So Meyer and others.

As regards this point, I cannot do better than quote the following words: "The conception of the divine unchangeableness, traditional in Protestantism as inherited from the Romish Church, is essentially Epicurean or Deistic, though buttressed up by the false Neo-Platonic notion of deity as altogether unlike and out beyond the creature; for Scripture lends no sanction to a lifeless and motionless identity or self-sameness. All depends on our idea of change. In the sphere of the eternal, that is, of the ethical, change denotes change of principles. Vital movement ought not to be called change; for be it ever so manifold, it *may* have, nay, ought to have, for its correlate the utmost fixity of moral principle. It has therefore been justly remarked by Schenkel: 'We do not consider a man changeable because he acts variously, but only when he becomes unfaithful to his principles and to the character which those principles have formed; that is, when the essence, not the mere form of his actions, varies. The life of God must be pronounced unchangeable if it is always truly divine; that is, if it be a real manifestation of the essential nature of the absolute Spirit, if it reveal absolute love and goodness, if in all that God wills and works He will and work only redemption. Only then could He be said to be changeable if the end of His will and working became alternately the life of spirit and the transitory life of sense, love, and sinful hatred, the perfect good and moral evil.'"[1]

Scripture supplies concrete proofs enough that its

[1] *Dogmatik v. Standp. des Gewissens*, ii. 32. See Bartholomäi in *Jahrbücher*, etc., p. 263, vol. vi. 1861.

writers were not taught to think of the divine unchangeableness as excluding variety of action and manifestation. God is not only said to repent;[1] but repeatedly also He omits to do what He had threatened to do, and does what He had threatened not to do;[2] nay more, we are expressly told: "When I say to the righteous, he shall surely live; if he trust to his righteousness, and commit iniquity, therein shall he die. Again, when I say to the wicked, Thou shalt surely die; if he turn from his sin, and do that which is lawful and right; he shall surely live, he shall not die."[3]

3. A kindred objection to the last is, that to ascribe anger to God is to interfere with His absoluteness; on the one hand, because it involves His being subject to the influence of the creature; on the other, because an emotion like anger, if not, indeed, emotion as such, is impossible to the Absolute. How can the infinite be thus determined by the finite? How can the Absolute be perturbed? Is it not altogether unworthy of God? To the first part of this difficulty I would reply: If the beings who thus determine God are the work of God's own hands, and He knew when He created them what He was creating, then surely He must have willed that their free activity should have a determining influence on Him. If He did not will that, either He created not knowing what He created, or the

[1] 1 Sam. xv. 11, 35; cf. ver. 29; Mal. ii. 17–iii. 6.

[2] Jonah and Nineveh. See Bertheau, "Weissagung über Israels Reichsherrl.," in *Jahrbücher*, etc., vol. iv. See Bartholomäi, *ubi sup.* p. 264.

[3] Ezek. xxxiii. 13–15.

whole of creation has a mere show of reality. If men existed in absolute independence of God, *i.e.* were self-existent, or were the creatures of another God or Demiurge, then their determination of God would be a limitation of God, and unworthy of Him; but this cannot be if He is the one sole creator of heaven and earth. God is but conceding to His creatures the reality and exercise of the powers with which He Himself endowed them; in other words, He is but acting consistently with Himself when He lays His life open to be affected by the conduct of men, whether it be good or evil.[1]

As to the second part of the difficulty, namely, that emotion of any kind, being a sort of perturbation, much more, an emotion like anger, is incompatible with the absoluteness and self-sufficiency ascribed to God, it must suffice to make the following reply: If emotion in itself is unworthy of God, then the emotion of joyous glad approval with which He is supposed to welcome a returning prodigal, and to greet him who fights the good fight of faith, must be also an anthropopathism. If God must be essentially impassible, unless He is to cease being God, then all our talk of His Fatherly sympathy with us and joy at our faithfulness and the like has no real meaning.

But it may be thought that there is in the emotion of anger an element essentially differentiating it from the corresponding reverse emotion, however it may be named; and that on this ground it is incompatible with absoluteness, not simply as emotion or perturbation. This is doubtless the vague surmise, where it

[1] Cf. Weber, p. 49; Dorner on the Divine Immutability.

is not the distinct conviction, of such as raise the objection. What, now, is this something? Suppose anger to be, as I have maintained, the emotion which arises when the integrity of the being or life is threatened with injury,—in the case of God, the life alone, because His nature is not susceptible of injury. How can a feeble creature like man—nay, how can a creature at all, owing as it does its very being and power to God—interfere with God? How can God be the perennial sustainer and Lord of man, and yet be at the very same time, in a certain sense, in man's power? Men are angry, it is said, because they more or less distinctly fear loss or resent loss: what loss can God fear or resent? And if He is capable of loss, can He be absolute? This, however, brings us back to the point touched on in the last section. We are made by God Himself capable of interference with the divine life; nay more, that God should have made such creatures is the supreme proof of the absoluteness of His creative power; and He will show that He has life in Himself by finding in the unfathomed depths of that life the energy necessary for converting the loss inflicted by the creature into an eternal gain.

4. It has also been objected, in the fourth place, that in the case of men anger is frequently due to surprise; whereas God cannot be surprised. If men knew beforehand that a certain thing was going to happen, there would be no tendency to anger—no possibility of it; though we might take appropriate action relatively to the thing in question after it had happened, or even before. So with God. He may act

towards offenders as their offences warrant or require, either beforehand or afterwards; but as He never can be taken unawares, the offences cannot excite in Him anything that corresponds to anger in man.

This objection, however, seems to me to be untenable. For, in the *first* place, I am not at all prepared to concede that foreknowledge or certainty of the event would entirely prevent men feeling resentment, indignation, anger at wrong when it happened,—nay, even in anticipation of its happening. It may be urged, indeed, that in our case there is surprise at some point or other,—the intention or the inclination that is manifested in the conduct may be a surprise, even if the conduct itself be expected; and that it is this that explains our anger. Whereas, it will be added, God knows the end from the beginning: God searches hearts before those hearts exist to be searched; He, therefore, can never be surprised at anything, and therefore never angry. Yet is it not true that we feel anger at what our fellow-men *are*, as well as at what they purpose and do? Nay more, is it not at all events frequently rather they themselves than their conduct that excite our resentment? —on the supposition, of course, that they themselves are in some way or measure responsible for what they themselves are. Where this is not at all the case, we too feel no anger; or if for a moment such a feeling possess us, we reproach ourselves either for foolishness or for sin; then, too, we may possibly be angry at ourselves.

But, *secondly*, the objection carries us too far. If God foreknows everything, as the objector assumes,

and if foreknowledge of wrong-doing prevents resentment or anger being caused by it when it occurs, then for the very same reason we must deny to God any semblance of feeling with regard to human conduct. Does God rejoice when a poor tempted mortal struggles against sin, cries to Him trustfully for help, gains a hard victory, and then thankfully raises his Ebenezer? There is surely no Christian thinker who would not answer, "Yea, certainly!" But how can that be? God knew it all from eternity. We rejoice because we look on with trembling and uncertainty, it should be said; if we were certain of the result, why should we have any special feeling at all? In fact, the objection would reduce us to saying of God—not a little of the formal, official teaching of the Christian Church has tended thereto—as Xenophanes said: *οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει*; or, *σύμπαντά τ' εἶναι νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀΐδιον.*

5. A fifth objection is based on the fact that human anger depends largely on what may be described as the circumstances under which a wrong is committed. "If we see no possibility of mending matters, we may feel very angry; but if we see that the intended injury or ingratitude, or whatever else the wrong may be, has rather improved than worsened the position, rather tended to good than to evil, we do not, cannot feel angry. Such, now, is God's relation to sin. His will cannot be hindered by man. Nay more, man's sin is His opportunity—the opportunity especially for self-revelation."

Here, too, again I cannot but regard the objection as mistaken.

In the *first* place, a right-minded man should feel resentment, more or less intense, at conduct or acts because they were wrong, even though their results should be good. It is the evil intention, or the carelessness that implies indifference, that excites anger. Unintended evil and unintended good alike do leave, or, as all allow, should leave, men unmoved. Human anger may indeed be somewhat mitigated—nay, in many cases even counteracted—by the circumstance mentioned; but that is because of the imperfect or wrong element in our anger, not because the anger itself is absolutely out of place. So that the objection is not grounded even in human experience.

In the *second* place, is it true that God's will cannot in any respect, or in any degree, or for any length of time, be hindered by human perversity? Is the course of history and nature just what He meant it to be; just what was necessary for His self-revelation? If so, what becomes of evil or sin? The worst that can then be said regarding it is, that it is the shadow of the good, its foil, so to speak; the dark frame needed to throw it up to let its light and beauty be duly seen. But then it is not what the Bible, the Christian Church, and the ethnic conscience has believed and declared it to be. Or, if the objector should refuse to go so far, and say, "That is not my meaning; all I intended was that, in the long-run, God's will is sure to be done; that somehow good

> Will be the final goal of ill,
> To pangs of nature, sins of will,
> Defects of doubt, and taints of blood:

That nothing walks with aimless feet ;
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish in the void,
When God hath made the pile complete :

That not a worm is cloven in vain ;
That not a moth with vain desire
Is shrivel'd in a fruitless fire,
Or but subserves another's gain.

That good shall fall
At last—far off—at last to all,
And every winter change to spring ;"—

my reply would then be, Is God unmoved to complacency by the efforts of His creatures for each other's good, and to anger by their efforts to harm each other ? by their joys and sorrows, because the former naturally, and the latter compulsorily, fit into His plan, and promote His final designs ? What a God would He be ! But if He rejoices with men in their present joys, sorrows with them in their present sorrows, and is pleased with their present good conduct, must He not be displeased with their bad conduct—nay, even resent it and be angry with it—when it is marked by conscious and wilful purpose ?

6. A sixth objection is, that if God is angry, He cannot be love.

This difficulty, like a good many others, is partly rooted in the use of abstract terms. Love and anger *per se* are mutually exclusive. But the same being may easily love and be angry at one and the same time. He cannot, indeed, be angry with and be actually loving the same being at the same time ; for his anger arises from some cause which renders love inconsistent—which checks the flow of love. In proportion to the strength of the anger is the feebleness

of the love for the particular being who was loved, and who is now regarded with anger. But it is very possible that God should at one and the same time love one who loves Him and His holiness, and be angry with another who turns away from and despises Him and His holiness. A father here may become angry with one of his children, and to that extent cease loving him, without therefore ceasing to love the rest. At the moment of intensest indignation with the one, he may turn with deepest tenderness to the rest. Not otherwise with God. Nay more, as has often been pointed out, it is just the man who loves most intensely, who may also be most highly indignant. If his true and pure love encounters undeserved indifference, contempt, aversion, can he be otherwise than angry?—though he will also, even whilst angry, carefully search for means of vanquishing the indifference, and converting the contemptuous aversion into loving regard. This is what a *loving being*, a *loving God*, can do; but it is misleading to ascribe it to *love*.

Another mistake is the *identification of anger* with *hostility, active enmity*. No doubt anger at its intensest, and evoked by wilful, conscious, high-handed rebellion, will manifest itself in, or, at all events, lead to active hostility. At such a stage it is not true to say, with Baader, that "the negativity of God towards the negative is nothing but love; for He repels the evil in the creature solely because it stands in the way of the creature's union with Himself."[1] That

[1] See Clausen's *Baader's Leben und Ideen*, ii. 155; and Bartholomäi in Dorner's *Jahrbücher*, etc., p. 364.

may be true at the earlier stages of a sinner's relation to God; but when the sinner reaches the point of sinning with a high hand and an outstretched arm, sinning against light and knowledge, sinning from hatred of God, God's anger passes over into, or becomes the accompaniment of hatred; and divine hatred is a consuming fire. We are apt, however, to forget that God's dealings with His creatures are individual. The relationship between Him and us is personal, and therefore varies as we vary. There is a sense, no doubt, in which He is the same to all; there is a sense in which a true man should be the same to all; and God does not require men to love every man alike; nor does He love every man alike. He has doubtless cause to be angry with all men; but He is as far as possible from being equally angry with all; and, accordingly, whilst from some He does but for a moment hide His face, and others are chastened, others, again, have to feel the weight of His hand,—there may be those whom He is compelled by self-consistency and holiness to cast into the outer darkness.

CHAPTER VI.

FORGIVENESS OF SIN.

In the Old and New Testaments forgiveness is almost, if indeed not quite, without exception connected with sin; it is scarcely ever, if indeed ever at all, connected with punishment, penalty. Yet in the history of Christian thought there has been an ever strengthening tendency, not only to *associate* penalty with sin as the direct object of forgiveness, but even to treat forgiveness of penalty as *identical* with forgiveness of sin. There is no doubt such a thing as forgiveness of punishment — we hear and know of it in ordinary life; but it is a remarkable fact that, as far as God is concerned, the Bible never associates forgiveness and punishment.[1]

By way of substantiating the two statements made above, I will adduce, first, the chief references to forgiveness in the Old and New Testaments; and secondly, a few passages from the works of Christian writers down to our own day. After having done this, I will briefly inquire into the reason of the general deviation from Biblical usage, stating what seems to me the true Biblical conception of forgiveness.

I. References to forgiveness by God in the Old

[1] This does not pretend to be a full treatment of this important question.

Testament. Various terms are used in the original Hebrew, with their derivatives, to signify forgiveness. The chief of them, at all events, are כפר (*caphar*), סלח (*salach*), נשׂא (*nasa*). סלח and נשׂא seem to be the proper technical terms for forgiveness. Whether כפר also had that meaning is doubtful; in the majority of cases, at all events, it rather denotes the transaction which conditioned forgiveness, whether conceived as effected by God or by man. Some of the passages, however, as to which there may be doubt, will be adduced. The passages in which the references occur are quoted according to the Revised Version :—

סלח in Ex. xxxiv. 9. And pardon our iniquity and our sins, and take us for Thine inheritance.

Num. xiv. 20. And the Lord said, I have pardoned according to thy word.

1 Kings viii. 34. Then hear Thou in heaven, and forgive the sin of Thy people Israel, etc.

1 Kings viii. 50. And forgive Thy people which have sinned against Thee, etc.

Ps. xxv. 11. Pardon mine iniquity, for it is great.

Jer. xxxiii. 8. And I will pardon all their iniquities, whereby they have sinned against me, etc.

Jer. xxxvi. 3. That I may forgive their iniquity and sin.

Lam. iii. 42. We have transgressed, and have rebelled: Thou hast not pardoned.

Deut. xxix. 20. The Lord will not pardon him.

2 Kings xxix. 4. For he filled Jerusalem with innocent blood, and the Lord would not pardon.

Isa. lv. 7. Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts; and let him return unto the Lord, and He will have mercy upon him: and to our God, for He will abundantly pardon.

Num. xiv. 19. Pardon, I pray Thee, the iniquity of this people, according unto the greatness of Thy mercy, etc.

Amos vii. 2. O Lord God, forgive, I beseech Thee.

Num. xxx. 5. And the Lord shall forgive her, because her father disallowed her.

2 Kings v. 18. The Lord pardon Thy servant in this thing.

2 Chron. vii. 14. And will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.

Jer. v. 1. If there be any that doeth justly, that seeketh truth; and I will pardon her.

Jer. l. 20. For I will pardon them whom I leave as a remnant.

Ps. ciii. 3. Who forgiveth all thine iniquities.

Lev. iv. 20. And the priest shall make atonement for them, and they shall be forgiven.

Lev. xix. 22. And he shall be forgiven for his sin which he hath sinned.

Num. xv. 25. And the priest shall make atonement for all the congregation of the children of Israel, and they shall be forgiven.

נשׂא in Num. xiv. 19. And according as Thou hast forgiven this people from Egypt even until now.

Ps. xxxii. 5. And Thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin.

Ps. lxxxv. 2. Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people.

Ps. xxv. 18. And forgive all my sins.

Ex. xxiii. 21. For He will not pardon your transgression: for my name is in him.

Josh. xxiv. 19. He will not forgive your transgression nor your sins.

Job vii. 21. And why dost Thou not pardon my transgression, and take away mine iniquity?

Isa. ii. 9. And the mean man is bowed down, and the great man is brought low: therefore forgive them not.

Hos. i. 6. For I will no more have mercy upon the house of Israel, that I should in anywise pardon them.

Ex. xxxiv. 7. Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty. (See also Num. xiv. 18.)

Ps. xcix. 8. Thou wast a God that forgavest them.

Micah vii. 18. Who is a God like unto Thee, that pardoneth iniquity?

Ps. xxxii. 1. Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven.

Isa. xxxiii. 24. The people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity.

כפר in Ps. lxxix. 9. And purge away our sins, for Thy name's sake.

Ps. lxxviii. 38. But He, being full of compassion, forgave their iniquity, and destroyed them not.

2 Chron. xxx. 19. The good Lord pardon every one that setteth his heart to seek God, etc.

Ps. lxv. 3. As for our transgressions, Thou shalt purge them away.

Isa. vi. 7. And thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin purged.

Prov. xvi. 6. By mercy and truth iniquity is purged, etc.

Deut. xxi. 8. Forgive, O Lord, Thy people Israel, whom Thou hast redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood to remain in the midst of Thy people Israel. And the blood shall be forgiven them.

As to whether מחה (*macha*), דכר (*dakar*), and טהר (*tahar*) also mean forgiveness, opinions may differ. They seem to signify, at any rate, something that is

very like pardon—very closely associated therewith. For this reason the chief passages in which they are used follow here :—

מחה in Isa. xliv. 22. I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy transgressions, and, as a cloud, thy sins.

Ps. li. 1. According to the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my transgressions. Ver. 9. And blot out all mine iniquities.

Isa. xliii. 25. I, even I, am He that blotteth out thy transgressions for mine own sake.

Neh. iv. 5. And cover not their iniquity, and let not their sin be blotted out from before Thee.

Jer. xviii. 23. Yet, Lord, Thou knowest all their counsel against me to slay me : forgive not their iniquity, neither blot out their sin from Thy sight.

זכר in Ps. xxv. 7. Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions.

Isa. xliii. 25. And I will not remember thy sins.

Isa. lxiv. 9. Be not wroth very sore, O Lord, neither remember iniquity for ever.

Jer. xxxi. 34. And their sin will I remember no more.

טהר in Ps. li. 2. Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin.

II. The following are the chief, if not all the references to forgiveness in the New Testament :—

ἀπολύω in Matt. xviii. 27. And the Lord of that servant released him, and forgave him (in this case, *debt*).

Luke vi. 37. Release, and ye shall be released.

ἀπολύτρωσις in Col. i. 14. In whom we have . . . the forgiveness of our sins.

Heb. ix. 15. A death having taken place for the redemption of our transgressions (?).

χαρίζομαι in Eph. iv. 32. Forgiving one another, even as Christ also forgave you.

Col. ii. 13. You did He quicken together with Him, having forgiven you all your trespasses.

Col. iii. 13. Even as the Lord forgave you, so also do ye.

πάρεσις in Rom. iii. 25. Whom God set forth to be a propitiation through faith by His blood, to show His righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime.

ἀφίημι in Matt. vi. 12. Forgive us our *debts*, as we also have forgiven our debtors (in Luke xi. 4, *sins*).

Matt. vi. 14, 15. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly

Father will also forgive you ; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.

Matt. ix. 2. Thy sins are forgiven.

Matt. ix. 5, 6. Whether is it easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven . . . The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sin.

Matt. xii. 31, 32. Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him ; but whosoever shall speak a word against the Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him.

Matt. xviii. 21. How oft shall my brother sin and I forgive him?

Matt. xviii. 35. So shall also my heavenly Father do to you, if you forgive not every one his brother from your hearts.

Mark ii. 5. Son, thy sins are forgiven.

Mark ii. 7. Who can forgive sins but one, even God?

Mark ii. 9, 10. Whether is it easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven . . . The Son of man hath power to forgive sins.

Mark iii. 28, 29. All their sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men . . . but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness.

Mark iv. 12. Lest haply they should turn again and it should be forgiven them.

Mark xi. 25, 26. Whensoever ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have aught against any one ; that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses.

Luke v. 20, 21. Man, thy sins are forgiven thee. Who can forgive sins, but God alone?

Luke v. 23, 24. Whether is it easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven thee . . . But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power to forgive sins.

Luke vii. 47–49. Wherefore I say unto thee, Her sins, which are many, are forgiven. . . . And He said unto her, Thy sins are forgiven. And they that sat at meat with Him began to say within themselves, Who is this that even forgiveth sins?

Luke xi. 4. And forgive us our sins.

Luke xii. 10. Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven.

Jas. v. 15. If he hath committed sin, it shall be forgiven him.

1 John i. 9. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.

1 John ii. 12. Your sins are forgiven for His name's sake.

ἄφεσις in Acts v. 31. Him did God exalt with His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance to Israel and remission of sins.

Acts viii. 22. Pray the Lord, if perhaps the thought of thy heart shall be forgiven thee.

Acts xiii. 38. Through this man is proclaimed unto you remission of sins.

Acts xxvi. 18. That they may turn from darkness to light, from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive remission of sins.

Eph. i. 7. In whom we have our redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of His grace.

In Luke xxiii. 34. Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do (ἀφίημι).

III. View of forgiveness taken by Christian writers.[1]

(I.) Pre-Reformation Writers. The earliest Christian writers express themselves indefinitely, and are most frequently content with the simple quotation of Scripture language. When, however, they speak, as one may say, on their own account, there is a manifest inclination to translate "sin," when connected with "forgiveness," by "penalty."

Justin Martyr, after warning the Jews through Trypho against deceiving themselves by fancying that because they are the seed of Abraham after the flesh they shall inherit the good things announced through Christ, exhorts them to "hasten to know in what way forgiveness of sins and a hope of inheriting the promised good things shall be theirs. But there is no other [way] than this,—to become acquainted with this Christ, to be washed in the fountain spoken of by Isaiah for the remission of sins; and for the rest, to live sinless lives."[2]

Tertullian is equally naïve in his references to the subject: "Sins we divide into two classes—remissible and irremissible; in accordance wherewith it will be doubtful to no one that some deserve chastisement, some condemnation. Every sin is dischargeable either by pardon or else by penalty: by pardon as the result of chastisement; by penalty as the result

[1] The catena that follows lays, of course, no claim whatever to completeness; but it will perhaps suffice to indicate the general drift of systematic, not to say practical, thought on the subject.

[2] Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, c. xliv.; see also c. xiii.

of condemnation. Touching this difference, we have not only premised certain antithetical passages of the Scriptures, on the one hand retaining, on the other remitting sins (see John xx. 23); but John, too, will teach us: 'If any knoweth his brother to be sinning a sin not unto death, he shall request, and life shall be given to him;' because he is not 'sinning unto death,' this will be remissible. 'There is a sin unto death; not for this do I say that any is to request' (1 John v. 16),—this will be irremissible. So, where there is the efficacious power of 'making request,' there likewise is that of remission; where there is no [efficacious power] of 'making request,' there equally is none of remission whatever."[1]

In *Lactantius*, as having been more of a systematic theologian than most of his predecessors, we should expect clearness; yet his language is ambiguous, and may be taken, at all events in one passage, as suggestive of transition: "When any one is moved [by anger], and through unseasonable leniency grants pardon more frequently than is necessary, or at all times, he evidently both destroys the life of those whose audacity he is fostering for greater crimes, and furnishes himself with a perpetual source of annoyances. Therefore the restraining of one's anger in the case of sins is faulty."[2] The connection shows that anger is conceived as the immediate source of punishment.

Elsewhere, too, he says: "A judge cannot pardon

[1] Tertullian, *On Modesty*, c. ii.; compare c. xix. *On Repentance*, cc. vii., viii.

[2] Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*, c. xviii.; compare *Institutes*, Bk. VI. cc. xiii., xxiv.

offences, because he is subject to the will of another. But God can pardon, because He is Himself the judge and arbitrator of His own law; and when He laid down this, He did not surely deprive Himself of all power, but He has the liberty of bestowing pardon."

The position of *Augustine* is not easy to determine; the reason perhaps being that he took up no definite position on the subject. Many passages might be adduced from his works in which, to all appearance, he identifies forgiveness with the remission of penalties; others, again, where he draws no distinction between the two; still further, passages which seem thoroughly scriptural alike in expression and meaning. As an example of the *first* class, the following may be quoted: "What is implied in the clause, *They which receive abundance of grace and righteousness*, but that the grace of remission is given, not only to that sin in which all have sinned, but to those offences likewise which men have actually committed besides, and that on those [happy recipients of the grace] so great a righteousness is freely bestowed, that, although Adam gave way to him who persuaded him to sin, they at any rate yield not even to the coercion of the same tempter. Again, what mean the words, *Much more shall they reign in life*, when the fact is that the reign of death drags much the more down to eternal punishment, etc.?"[1] The following passage is perhaps a little more distinct: "The children of wrath God punishes in anger; whereas it is in mercy that He

[1] *Treatise on the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins*, etc., Book I. c. xvii., in the Anti-Pelagian Writings (Clark's translation).

chastises the children of grace. . . . However, there are no punishments . . . but what are owing to sin, except in the case of Him who prepared His back for the smiter in order that He might undergo all our experience in our likeness without sin, in order that He might be the saintly Priest of saints, making intercession even for saints, who, with no sacrifice of truth even, say each one for himself, *Forgive us our trespasses, even as we also forgive them that trespass against us.*"[1] The following passages rather suggest the scriptural view of the matter: "Inasmuch as there are not wanting persons of such character, just as we say in answer to those who raise this question that the punishments of sins are as such before remission; whereas after remission they become trials and trainings of the righteous. . . . It ought to surprise no one that the death of the body could not possibly have happened to man unless sin had been previously committed, of which it was to become even the penal consequence; and that after the remission of sins it happens to the faithful," etc.[2] "The Physician, who is not needed by the sound, but by the sick, knows how to heal us, and by healing to perfect us unto perfect life; nor does He in this world actually take away death, though inflicted because of sin, from those whose sins He remits, that they may enter on

[1] *L.c.*, Book II. c. xxv. See also his *Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount*, Book II. cc. viii., compared with Book I. cc. xix., xx. *Enchiridion*, c. lxv., where pardon is referred to future judgment; *City of God*, Book XXI. c. xii. ff., specially c. xxvii. See further, Book XXII. cc. xxii., xxiii., where "forgiveness" is closely connected with escape from evils of various kinds, here and hereafter. But, indeed, the interchange occurs frequently.

[2] *L.c.*, Book II. c. liv.

their conflict, having to overcome the fear of death, with full sincerity of faith."[1]

(II.) Let us see now what some of the great Protestant Confessions of Faith, of which the sixteenth century was so productive, have to say regarding forgiveness of sin. In the main, it is referred to as it is in Scripture; and as frequently as not, is treated as identical with reconciliation. Very rarely, if indeed ever, is there an approach to the identification thereof with remission of penalty. In fact, the two are not infrequently distinguished, in so far as they seem to be referred to as co-ordinate results of the death of Christ on behalf of men. Not, however, that the Confessions or the earliest theologians *expressly* distinguish the one from the other; but evidently the one inestimable blessing of Christ's work present to their mind was the fact that the anger of God was propitiated and peace with God attained.

In the *Confessio Augustana* we read: "Quid potest enim esse gratius conscientiæ afflictæ ac pavidæ in veris doloribus quam audire hoc esse mandatum Dei, hanc esse vocem Sponsi Christi, ut statuant certo donari *remissionem peccatorum seu reconciliationem*, non propter nostram dignitatem, sed gratis per misericordiam, propter Christum, ut beneficium sit certum. Significat autem justificatio in his Pauli sententiis remissionem peccatorum seu reconcilationem, seu imputationem justitiæ, hoc est, *acceptationem personæ*."[2]

The *Apologia Confessionis Augustanæ* constantly

[1] *L.c.*, Book III. c. xxiii.

[2] See *Sylloge Confessionum*, Oxon. 1821, art. "de Fide," p. 145.

associates *remissio* and *reconciliatio;* and the meaning attached to both words is sufficiently clear from the following passage, which is only a sample of many to the like effect:—"Promissio offert nobis oppressis peccato et morte gratis *reconciliationem* propter Christum quæ accipitur non operibus sed sola fide. . . . Hæc igitur fides specialis qua credit unus quisque sibi *remitti peccata* propter Christum et Deum placatum et propitium esse propter Christum, consequitur remissionem peccatorum et justificat nos."[1]

Again, the *Formula Concordiæ* says: "Credimus vocabulum (justificare) phrasi scripturæ sacræ in hoc articulo idem significare quod *absolvere* a peccatis." "Credimus quod Dominus nobis peccata remittit ex mera gratia."

In the *Apologia Confessionis Würtembergicæ* we read: "Quum Deus remittit peccata, simul donat Spiritum sanctum inchoantem novas virtutes, tamen mens perterrefacta primum quærit remissionem et reconciliationem. De hac angitur, de hac dimicat in veris pavoribus; non disputat quæ virtutes infusæ sint, quæ etsi comitantur reconciliationem, tamen nequaquam judicandum est, nostram dignitatem aut munditiem causam esse remissionis peccatorum."[2]

Further, in the *Confessio Saxonica* we also read: "Cum autem hac voce (legis) arguente mens perterrefacta est, audiat promissionem Evangelii propriam de Filio Dei, et statuat sibi remitti peccata gratis propter

[1] J. T. Müller, *Die Symbolischen Bücher der evang. luth. Kirche*, 1869, art. "de Justificatione," pp. 94, 95.

[2] Quoted in Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. ii. p. 279.

Filium Dei, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum propitiatorem. . . . Hac fide cum erigitur, certum est donari remissionem peccatorum, reconciliationem et imputationem justitiæ, propter ipsius Christi meritum." [1]

So far the German Lutheran Confessions. Remarkably enough, however, as soon as we pass over to the Reformed Confessions—the *Confessio Helvetica*, the *Confessio Belgica*, the *Catechesis Heidelbergensis*, —we find ourselves in a different atmosphere. The words *remissio peccatorum*, *reconciliatio* occur, indeed, but the context and the associated expressions show that they are acquiring a new sense.

(III.) We will now turn to the Theologians. *Luther's* judgment is clearly enough expressed in the *Confessio Augustana*, which was mainly his work; but I may quote a brief passage or two in which he speaks in his own person: "What we need to learn is that we become righteous and are released from sins by the forgiveness of sins;" "necesse est fidei tribuere justificationem *seu* remissionem peccatorum:" "Christian righteousness is nothing without the forgiveness of sins;" "justitia est quando non *observantur peccata*, sed *ignoscuntur*, condonantur et non reputantur." [2] These hints are in harmony with Luther's general treatment of Christ's work as having for its supreme end the personal reconciliation and union of man and God; although passages enough may undoubtedly be found where he lays the strongest stress on the fact that punishment, especially that of hell, is taken away by the atoning death of Christ.

[1] *Sylloge*, etc., art. "de Remissione," etc., p. 216.
[2] Quoted by Köstlin, *Luther's Theologie*, vol. ii. 445.

Melanchthon's treatment of the subject is at one with that of the *Confessio Saxonica*, of which he was himself the author. But he expresses himself to quite the same effect in his *Loci:* "Quum fide se mens erigit, donantur remissio peccatorum et reconciliatio." [1] "Justificatio est acceptio remissionis peccatorum." [2] Commenting on 2 Tim. i. he says: "Quod autem aliqui dicunt, nos esse justos inhabitatione divinitatis, sciendum est, inhabitationem esse effectionem novitatis. Hæc effectio eta fit, cum cor *prius apprehendit remissionem peccatorum* et consolationem intuens in mediatorem Filium Dei et statuens, te propter illum mediatorem habere *remissionem* et *justum* esse, i.e. *placentem* Deo. . . . Ita manet vera propositio: Paulus conversus habet remissionem peccatorum et est justus, i.e. acceptus Deo propter meritum Christi seu propter propitiatorem sola fide." [3]

Similar language is used by the one and the other theologian of the Melanchthonian school. But a change slowly crept in—crept in unawares. What had originally been regarded, or at all events naively treated, as a result of reconciliation or forgiveness, namely, deliverance from punishment, came gradually to be associated and co-ordinated with it; till eventually forgiveness was regarded as pre-eminently, if not exclusively, dispensation from the *reatus pœnæ*.[4]

Calvin's treatment of the subject is substantially

[1] Quoted by Heppe, *l.c.* ii. 274.

[2] "Ex ord. Ordinandorum," in Heppe, *l.c.* p. 275.

[3] Quoted by Heppe, *l.c.* p. 279.

[4] Compare Gurlitt, "Worin besteht die Vergebung der Sünden?" in *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1851, p. 327.

that of Luther and Melanchthon. Thus he says, "We simply interpret justification as the *acceptance* with which God receives us into His favour as if we were righteous; and we say that this justification consists in the *forgiveness* of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ."[1] "Paul declares the sum of the gospel message to be reconciliation to God, who is pleased through Christ to receive us into favour by not imputing our sins (2 Cor. v. 18–21). . . . He understands by reconciliation nothing else than justification."[2] "Justification by faith is reconciliation with God, and this consists solely in the remission of sins."[3] Yet there is a certain something in Calvin which is absent from his German contemporaries—the element of personal relationship is not so prominent; one feels that the *official* God is beginning to supplant the *personal* God, the God who is heart to heart: of whom one can say, both, *Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him;* and, *God is angry with the wicked every day.*

This becomes more and more perceptible in the divines of his school. Note, *e.g.*, how *Ursinus*, a considerable theological authority, speaks of justification. In explaining the notion of the "application of the righteousness of Christ," he distinguishes between the divine or objective and the human or subjective application: "(1) Deus ipse nobis applicat, h.e. imputat justitiam Christi, acceptans nos pro justis, propter illam, non secus ac si nostra esset. (2) Nos appli-

[1] Calvin, *Institutes*, Book III. c. xi. 2.
[2] *L.c.* c. xi. 4.
[3] *L.c.* c. xi. 21.

camus nobis, dum accipimus justitiam Christi, per fidem, h.e. statuimus quod Deus eam nobis donet et propter eam nos reputet justos et absolvet ab omni reatu et culpa." [1]

He distinguishes four effects of faith, the first two of which are, Justificatio coram Deo; and lætitia acquiescens in Deo et pax conscientiæ.[2]

Another Reformed theologian of the first half of the seventeenth century, *Heinrich von Diest*, moving further still in the direction indicated, thus defines justification: "Justificatio est sententia dei *judicis*, qua ex gratia propter satisfactionem Christi tum passivam, tum activam, sola fide vera apprehensam sine ullo operum merito partim *peccata remittens* a *condemnatione absolvit*, partim justitiam imputans *vitam* æternam *adjudicat*." [3]

Turrettine may be regarded as having almost completed the task at which his predecessors had unconsciously laboured: "Sunt qui *sola Remissione peccatorum totam Justificationem absolvi* contendunt; ut tunc nos justificare Deus censendus sit, quando peccata nostra nobis condonat et ab omni pœna absolvit." Others, he adds, showing how far things had already gone, "vero duas partes in justificatione ponunt, Remissionem peccatorum et Imputationem justitiæ, *illam, quæ eximit peccatorem a pœna*, istam, quæ eum reddit procœmio seu vitâ dignum." In a word, forgiveness is identified with freedom from penalty, and imputed righteousness with worthiness

[1] Heppe, ii. p. 310. [2] Heppe, ii. p. 309.

[3] Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt*, 1884, vol. ii. p. 420.

of reward or life. He himself is not quite satisfied with either position, because "ad justificationem plenam non *sufficit* a pœna absolutio, sed requiritur etiam juris ad vitam communicato,"—*i.e.* not merely release from punishment, but also the bestowal of right to life, is requisite to justification. "Remissio peccatorum, quæ pœnæ liberationem importat," he adds shortly afterwards, when defining more exactly his own view of justification.[1]

The German theologian *Reinhard*, a representative of the eighteenth century, defines justification by faith, or the righteousness of faith, as the "judicium Dei peccatorem propter Christum innocentem declarantis," or more completely, "justificatio est decretum Dei de *condonandis* peccatori, propter Christum, delictorum *pœnis* ac tribuenda verâ felicitate."[2]

The *Rev. Caleb Burge*, an eminent representative of the New England or Edwardean School of divinity in the United States, constantly identifies pardon with remission of penalty. For example: "If God had given up the penalty of the law, and offered pardon to guilty man without an atonement, He would have treated the law precisely as a bad law ought to be treated. . . . If, then, the penalty should be remitted, something else must be done, which would manifest for the law as much respect as the complete execution of its penalty. . . . Then God might grant pardon to sinners without doing any injustice to the law; because, in bestowing pardon in this way, He would

[1] F. Turrettini *Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*, 1683, vol. ii. Loc. xvi. De Justificatione, qu. iv. 2–6; cf. 10. Qu. v. 5. 10.

[2] Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, 1812, § 125. Compare also Bretschneider, *System. Entwickelung*, etc., p. 635.

show as much respect for His law as He could show by executing its penalty."[1]

Dr. John Pye Smith tells us, "The question whether sinners shall be pardoned is . . . one of law and government." As moral Governor, God must mark "sin with a suitable demonstration of its moral evil; . . . and this is *punishment*. Threatening and punishment impress justly and necessarily with the idea of the displeasure of the Lawgiver and Judge. Pardon, when on any consideration it takes place, brings the true and just idea of a change; but that change, in the great case before us, is not in the *mind* or character of the Supreme Ruler; but it is in the *administration* of His government, and in those outward acts by which that administration is indicated;" these outward acts being, of course, threatenings and penalties. Elsewhere Dr. Pye Smith strikes another chord, but this seems to be his doctrinal position.[2]

Professor Crawford seems to regard the subject in the same light. I have not been able, indeed, to find a passage in which he distinctly identifies forgiveness and release from penalty; nor, perhaps, would he have done so in the full sense; but his mode of reasoning certainly looks and leads in that direction. For example, replying to Bishop Ewing and Dr. John Young, who maintain that penalties can only cease with the cessation of sin, he says: "Another ground on which it has been maintained that an atonement is unnecessary—nay, even that it is impossible—is the

[1] *The Atonement: Discourses and Treatises.* Edited by Edwards A. Park, p. 445 *et passim.*

[2] *The Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ*, p. 129 f. Compare p. 70 f.

allegation that all the penalties annexed to sin flow from it inevitably in the way of natural consequence, and hence that these penalties can only be averted by the deliverance of the transgressor from sin itself, which is their cause. . . . By the removal of sin we could obtain exemption from 'these natural evils,' but 'it would still be necessary for us to be delivered from the righteous displeasure and merited judgment of God.'"[1] But such deliverance demanded an atonement; and the object of the atonement or of the sacrifice of the Son of God was that God might be enabled to extend to "transgressors a free and full pardon" consistently with the claims of law and right.[2]

Dr. C. Hodge leaves us in no doubt as to his view of the matter, though one cannot but be surprised how little is said expressly on the subject of the "forgiveness of sin," — nay more, how rarely the expression occurs,—considering the stress laid on it, not only in the Scriptures, but also by the early Protestant divines. The official conception of God and His relation to men may be said to have reached its climax in his system: "Men may philosophize about the nature of God, His relation to His creatures, and the terms on which He will *forgive sin*, and they may never arrive at a satisfactory conclusion; but when the question is simply, What do the Scriptures teach on this subject? the matter is comparatively easy. In the Old Testament and in the New, God is declared to be just, in the sense that His nature demands the punishment of sin: that, therefore, there can be no remission without such punishment, vicarious

[1] *Atonement*, pp. 409–412. [2] *L.c.* p. 408 *et passim.*

or personal; that the plan of salvation symbolically and typically exhibited in the Mosiac institution, expounded in the prophets, and clearly and variously taught in the New Testament, involves the substitution of the incarnate Son of God in the place of sinners, who assumed their obligation to satisfy divine justice, and that He did in fact make a full and perfect satisfaction for sin, bearing the penalty of the law in their stead."[1]

"Redemption is deliverance from evil by the payment of a ransom. The price paid for our ransom is Christ."[2] "Justification cannot be mere pardon,"[3] for justification is a forensic procedure, a "judicial act."[4] "*A pardoned criminal is not only just as much a criminal as he was before, but his sense of guilt and remorse of conscience are in no degree lessened. Pardon can only remove the outward and arbitrary penalty. The sting of sin remains.*"[5]

And this is the theology that claims to be *par excellence* Biblical and "orthodox," according to the recognised standards and divines of Protestantism!

Dr. A. A. Hodge reproduces in this, as in other respects, the doctrine and spirit of his father: "Two effects," he tells us, "are secured by the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer—(1) the *remission of the penalty, the pardon of sin;* (2) the recognition and treatment of the believer, as one with respect to whom the covenant is fulfilled, and to whom all its promises and advantages *legally* accrue."[5]

[1] *Systematic Theology*, vol. ii. p. 478 f. [2] *L.c.* p. 514.
[3] *L.c.* vol. iii. p. 125. Compare what Calvin says above.
[4] Vol. iii. p. 126. [5] *Outlines of Theology*, 1879, p. 502.

"To 'pardon' is, in the exercise of sovereign prerogative, to waive the execution of the penal sanctions of the law. . . . Pardon is remission of penalty *in absence* of satisfaction. If justification were *mere* pardon, it would simply release us from penal suffering, but would provide no further good for us."[1]

In *Dr. Dale's* work on the Atonement, a whole lecture is devoted to the subject of "the remission of sins;" but, so far as I can gather, notwithstanding one or two passages pointing in a different direction, his view is substantially that which has dominated Protestant thought for something like two centuries. This is sufficiently clear from the general aim of the chapter, which is the confutation of Dr. Young's contention, that "spiritual laws are self-acting; that punishment or reward, visible or invisible, or both, dispenses itself, and in the amount in which either is merited; that all their penalties and sanctions are self-acting." "If this is a true conception of the order of the moral and spiritual universe, the idea of the Atonement must be given up;" for its purpose is "to create an 'objective' ground on which remission of sins may be granted to the penitent. On this theory such remission is impossible. . . . God is as powerless to forgive sin as He is to reverse or even to modify the eternal and necessary distinction between good and evil."[2] The theory itself breaks down in face of the actual course of history. "Some more coherent argument, therefore, is necessary before we surrender the hope to which the hearts of men have clung in all ages, that it is possible to

[1] *L.c.* p. 507. [2] *Atonement*, 1st ed. pp. 318–320.

escape from the penalties of wrong-doing. Nothing that this theory contains can cause us to hesitate in receiving the declaration of Christ's infinite love, that He came into the world and died on the cross in order that the remission of sins ['escape from penalties'] might be actually conferred on us."[1] "Forgiveness may include something more than the cancelling of guilt, if guilt is defined to be 'liability to punishment on account of sin'—namely, 'restoration of fallen character,' as Bushnell holds.[2] But a sense is thus imposed on the language of Christ and His apostles concerning the Remission of sins which it was never intended to convey."[3] As to which latter point I quite agree with Dr. Dale; but neither "remission of penalty" nor "restoration of fallen character" was what was meant by the language of Christ and His apostles. The former conception of their meaning has given rise to all the unrealities of the forensic view of the Atonement; the latter would lead straight back to the legal bondage of the Romish system, whither, in point of fact, not a little of our most "advanced, broadest teaching" is rapidly conducting us, with a certainty which is only equalled by the ignorance of the agents in the task.

Only one other sentence need be quoted from Dr. Dale,—a sentence which must surely fill any one with melancholy who comes to it direct from the perusal of the references to forgiveness quoted even from the Old Testament, not to mention the New, and of the statements of the early Protestant divines: "That the Remission of sins, if it stood alone, would leave

[1] *L.c.* p. 335. [2] *L.c.* p. 336. [3] *L.c.* p. 336.

us *unsaved*, is one of the commonplaces of Christian theology; but (!) it does not follow that the Remission of sins includes the blessings which are necessary to complete our salvation, or is to be confounded with them."[1]

In a certain respect, indeed, the above statement and the corresponding ones of Drs. C. and A. A. Hodge are nearer the truth, are more evangelical, than some that have a much less harsh sound. They logically involve the recognition of the fact, that what is rectified by the work, and specially by the passion, of Christ, is a *relation*—a relation between God and man. In a very true sense nothing is given to God, nothing is rectified in God: God suffered no injury from sin. Man had suffered from sin: death was on him—death of the whole nature. He needed rectifying from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot. But, as I shall have occasion to remark hereafter, and have already remarked in an earlier part of this book, *real* rectification—rectification of character, constitution, state—can only take place on the basis of a rectification of the relation to Him without whom nothing in the cosmos can be orderly, healthy,—Him in whom all things *live, move, and have their being*. To treat rectification of constitution, character, state, as a condition of the right relation to God, is implicitly to make man his own redeemer, and to drive him either into moral indifference, or the moral unrest whose culmination in the sixteenth century was the chief cause of the wonderful success of the Reformation. The primal and essen-

[1] *L.c.* p. 336.

tial end of Christ was to establish such a relation between us and God that it might be possible for us to be made healthy. So far, then, I agree with the positions criticized.

My disagreement concerns the *nature* of the *relation rectified.* According to the writers adduced above, it is a legal relation to the moral Governor of the world. Perhaps Dr. Dale would scarcely consent to this; so much the better, but then he would be happily inconsistent. As to the others, there can be little question. Now, a *legal relation* may be rectified, and yet leave the person affected thereby in essentially the same state as he was before. A rectification such as I have in view carries with it, as by a moral necessity, the rectification of the whole man.

But this leads me to the next point.

IV. What is the true *Biblical meaning of forgiveness?* And what is the explanation of the deviation from Biblical truth with which I am charging so much of the theology of the Church?

(I.) Forgiveness and acceptance (or adoption) may be defined as the negative and positive sides of one and the same act or process,—the act or process of establishing, or rather re-establishing right normal relations between two persons; in the case with which we are concerned, God and man; or forgiveness itself may be said to have these two aspects. God therein acts as a person, in a strictly personal manner, towards man—the person. Not with God, in any *capacity* save that of the personal God, who has all personal claims upon him, has the sinner to do in forgiveness; God does not forgive us as Sovereign, or as Ruler,

or as Judge, but as God, who, as God, is Creator, Father, Ruler, Judge; and, as such, in all these aspects expects and claims the holding of all the specifically personal, normal relations, especially those which are described by such terms as reverence, trust, love.[1] Forgiveness relates to the past, acceptance to the present and the future. God treats the past relation with its failings and sins as though it had not been; and treats the sinner again as His friend and son. The *relation* is what it should be after having been what it should not be. I say the *relation;* not the character, not the state, not the mere feelings. Character, state, feelings, as was observed already, can only be what they should be, on the basis of a right *relation*, either always existent or restored. The results of sin—that is, of past wrong relations, whether conceived as punishments or as natural consequences, and whether seen in an abnormal character or in a diseased condition of the inner man, or in wretchedness of feeling, or in any other sufferings and evils—may be only partially set aside, at all events in this world and life,[2] when sin is forgiven; but the *condition of their removal is fulfilled.* For surely all will agree in this, that the ultimate root of the evils with which humanity is afflicted, is a wrong relation to God—that is, sin.[3]

The word forgiveness is doubtless used amongst men, perhaps, too, occasionally in the Bible, in

[1] See Chapter III. of this work.

[2] On this subject much that is true is very forcibly said by Dr. Dale in the chapter on the "Remission of Sins."

[3] As I have touched on this point before, I will not further pursue it here.

another sense, that of remitting debt or penalty. We distinguish clearly, however, between the two senses. Does it not happen often enough that an offender is forgiven his personal offence, without being forgiven his punishment or debt incurred along with or in and through it; or he is forgiven his debt or punishment, without being forgiven his personal offence? In other words, the evil results of the wrong personal relation are done away with, though the personal relation may not be rectified; or the personal relation is rectified, without the evil results being done away with. In the case of God, the two things are essentially inseparable, if not now, yet in the long-run; so, at all events, we hope and believe. But this is because the *relation* of man to God necessarily, absolutely, and eternally conditions his well or ill being. The place of God in the universe of being and life is unique—is such that personal beings and lives can only *be* normal, as their *personal* relation is normal to Him, the great personal source and sustainer of all things.

(II.) What, then, is the *rationale* of the deviation of which illustrations have been given?

I may first call attention to what I believe to be a historical fact, namely, that whenever there have been great religious upheavals, stirrings, revivals, new emphasis and prominence have at once been given to the *personal* relation between God and man as compared with what I have ventured to term his *official* relation. Condemnation of sin has been felt to be personal indignation, personal anger; forgiveness of sin has been felt to be equiva-

lent to personal reconciliation. The relation, in both cases, assumed a thoroughly personal aspect. In fact, the human heart at its deepest is not more able to be content and satisfied to the full, apart from a true relation between itself and God — God to it and it to God, that is, without the specifically personal relation between God and itself to which I have been referring—than is a true child able to be content in its home without a right personal relation between its parents and itself. God's world might be in perfect accord with us and our claims upon it; we might have its resources at our complete command. Yet, constituted as we are, we need Him over and beyond — Him with His fellowship and love, consciously enjoyed. As home is the mockery of a home, however gilded and luxurious, without the personal affection displayed and proved in personal intercourse; so the cosmos is the mockery of a cosmos to the human soul—not to a brute—without the personal affection of its great orderer, manifested in personal fellowship felt and known to be His.

If this statement be correct, shall we be far wrong in tracing the deviation under consideration to that relaxation of spiritual intensity which, as is well known, followed on the great outburst of life under Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and their contemporaries and coadjutors? Whilst it is true that theology—including under that now most vaguely used and frequently abused term, not merely the scientific explanation, but the scientific formulation of the objects, facts, truths of the faith—exercises the pro-

foundest influence on the genesis, nourishment, direction, and colouring of the spiritual life; it is also equally true that the spiritual life, or its relative or total absence, exerts the profoundest influence over theology. *My people will have it so*—that is another way of stating the same thing. Externalize the relation of man to God: the result must be a corresponding externalization of the *conception* of God Himself and His relations to man, especially of what He may have done or be doing for the re-establishment of right relations. And when an external or official conception of God and His relations to man has thus been generated, it not only fosters the externality of the life in which it is rooted, but, what is infinitely more perilous, supplies for it a kind of rational justification. This is just what seems to me to have happened to the Church of Christ. Its political view of God's relation to man, and the corresponding forensic theory of the means necessary for man's redemption, have tended not only to generate a life of religious legality, but to surround it with a halo of Biblical correctness and Church orthodoxy. In saying this, I am as far as possible from intending to insinuate that all who advocate the theory I am combating do so because their spiritual pulse beats languidly, and their tone is low. μὴ γένοιτο! Many, very many of them, possibly the majority, have been and are men whose own *real*, *inward* relation to God is essentially personal; whose experience of divine grace is as far as possible from being adequately expressed or explained by the forensic, "political"

theology which they expound and defend; but their intellect has not escaped from the meshes of the traditional system; indeed, they have never assumed towards it the truly critical attitude; nay more, the externality to which I object lends it a kind of clearness, definiteness, mathematical exactness, which has a special charm for certain minds, and gives them a pleasurable sense of knowing what they are about, and where they are, with a corresponding feeling of surety and safety.

Undoubtedly, too, the vast majority of men find it much easier to appreciate the *relation* to a monarch whose claims are met by the payment of a debt, or the endurance of a penalty on their behalf, than the personal relation to a God who is displeased or angry because of sin, whose anger is turned away by the intervention of Christ, and whose personal displeasure and personal grace may be, yea are, alike matters of direct personal experience and cognizance. The former falls in with lower phases of human experience; the latter can be truly understood only in the light of its higher phases. Above all, the realization of personal relations to God implies a whole self-surrender and spiritual self-discipline from which men generally shrink, on the one hand, because it is painful; and, on the other hand, because it somehow seems unreal.

I scarcely need add *another* element which has unquestionably co-operated in bringing about the result we are considering, namely, that the ordinary mind can easily understand and appreciate the removal of a penalty or the payment of a debt;

whereas it is apt to exclaim in a sort of bewilderment, "Personal relations between God and man! God forgiving me, and I to know it! How can that be?" And when the possibility of these things is not disputed, the question is apt to be dubiously asked, "And even if it be so, what can it matter? What is its value? I can appreciate salvation from pains and penalties here and hereafter; but mere deprivation of the sensible favour of God—is that much of a loss?" Most Christian believers are too carnal to enjoy divine *fellowship*, too carnal to appreciate its supreme value and profound significance; and as to the "natural man"—he, of course, *discerneth not the things of the Spirit.* How inevitable, then, that those references in the Bible to the work of Christ, which, superficially regarded, point in the direction of legal, forensic, governmental relations between God and man, should be pressed and taken as the key to the entire divine method; whilst the more personal references were gradually ignored or explained away,—a result promoted also by the fear of anthropopathisms which has haunted the Church from the beginning, and which is unfortunately now well-nigh as lively as ever.

One word more — until this question of forgiveness is thoroughly grappled with, and that in the light of the Biblical hints previously presented, it is hopeless to look for a truer estimate of the doctrine of the Atonement, and of that "articulus stantis et cadentis Ecclesiæ," the article of justification by faith, and faith alone.

CHAPTER VII.

PASSIO CHRISTI.

I. *The original relation of Christ to humanity.*[1]

He is the natural mediator between God and creation.

(I.) We are told by John in his Gospel that "all things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that hath been made."[2] "The world was made by Him."[3] "There is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through Him."[4] "All things have been created through Him and unto Him, and in Him all things consist."[5] "Through whom also He made the worlds."[6] "By whom all things consist."[7] "Upholding all things by the word of His power."[8] "He is the power of God and the wisdom of God."[9] "He is the head of all principality and power."[10] From these hints it would appear that Christ is the mediator

[1] On this subject may be compared, Plitt, *Glaubenslehre*, pp. 187, 361 f., 369, 372; Mehring, *Religions-Philosophie;* Martensen's *Dogm.* p. 240 f.; F. D. Maurice; R. W. Dale, *Atonement;* Dorner's *Glaubenslehre.*

[2] John i. 3. [3] John i. 10. [4] 1 Cor. viii. 6. [5] Col. i. 16.

[6] Heb. i. 2, cf. 10 ff., iii. 3, 4; Rev. iv. 11.

[7] Col. ii. 17. [8] Heb. i. 3. [9] 1 Cor. i. 24.

[10] Col. ii. 10; cf. Col. i. 20; Eph. i. 10. Calvin says, "Had man remained free from all taint, he was of too humble a condition to penetrate to God without a mediator," *Instit.* Book II. xii. 1. See also, "Notandum

through whom the creative, sustentative, and gubernative action of God is exercised. It is important to remember this. Christ's mediatorial relation is from the beginning; it is, as we may call it, a natural, and so far as we can discern, a necessary relation. The divine energy becomes active force in and through Christ.

Further, Christ is in a special sense the channel through which communication goes on from God to man, and man to God. This relation is rooted in the former one; or rather it is one of the aspects thereof. "There is one God, and one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus."[1] "I am the way, the truth, and the life: no one cometh unto the Father but by me."[2] "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men;"[3] "and the life was manifested;"[4] "He is eternal life."[5] "He is the true light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world; He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not."[6] "I am the light of the world."[7] "No man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and He to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him."[8] What is thus and elsewhere declared concerning Christ, must not be taken to relate exclusively to His temporal mission. Much that is said in the Scriptures,

est filium dei ante etiam assumtam carnem semper fuisse mediatorem et multa mediatoris officia jam inde a condito orbe fecisse," Zanchius, quoted by Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre*, etc., vol. i. 362. The idea is a familiar one in the Reformed Theology, at all events of the seventeenth century.

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 5. [2] John xiv. 6. [3] John i. 4. [4] 1 John i. 2.
[5] 1 John v. 20. [6] John i. 9–11. [7] John viii. 12.
[8] Matt. xi. 27; cf. John i. 18, vi. 46, x. 15.

especially in the New Testament, and most of all in the Gospel of John, relates to what is eternal, unchanging, essential, natural, grounded in the very constitution of the world. The mediatorial work of Christ as the Saviour of mankind was undertaken in pursuance of this eternal relation: though its special form was due to the new conditions arising out of sin. Christ persisted in His work, notwithstanding the sins of men, and therein displayed His love and the love of the Father.[1] This holds good, not only of the divine relation to man, but of man's relation to God. Man has access to the Father alone through the Logos, not merely as the result of sin,—though sin has, of course, if possible, intensified his dependence on the mediatorship of Christ, — but according to the primeval constitution of things. Every true prayer, confession, aspiration, desire, ascended to God through the channel of Him who became incarnate, though the men whose souls breathed them forth knew not of His existence. Even as the air was the vehicle by which men spake to each other, before science had discovered the fact; as ether may be the medium by which light, either direct or reflected, affects our sight, though its very existence is still a mere hypothesis; and even as there may be other media by which what are called telepathic communications pass from soul to soul: so has it been from the very creation of man—yea, we might say of all intelligences. In the profoundest

[1] Plitt speaks of an "Umgestaltung der Menschwerdung aus einer lichten und friedreichen zum schmerzlichen Kreuzesgang," etc., *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 370.

and broadest sense, therefore, is it true that—*no man cometh to the Father but through the Son; and no man knoweth the Father, save He to whom the Son revealeth Him.*

(II.) From the beginning God has never ceased to seek the establishment of right relations between Himself and man; in other words, He has been endeavouring to fulfil and secure the fulfilment of the conditions necessary to that end. Before the Flood, we are told, God's Spirit strove with man;[1] though the wickedness of man became so great, and the imaginations of the thoughts of his heart so evil continually, that it repented God making man, and it became necessary to destroy him.[2] The constitution of the natural world, the constitution of human society, and man's own individual constitution, brought home to him in all ages the fact that it was an evil and bitter thing to forsake the Lord God; yea, *their own wickedness corrected them, and their backslidings reproved them.*[3] In addition, as living, moving, and having their being in God, they could not but be darkly sensible, in the depths of their being, of the divine resentment: the natural reaction of the divine holiness and love against their sin and alienation could not but give rise to disturbances of their unconscious mental life, showing itself in the sad and melancholy moods to which men in all ages have been subjected. But this was not all. His Spirit has striven with men:—has sought to convince them of sin and to move them to penitence—to show them what sin was to God, and to stir them up to the

[1] Gen. vi. 3. [2] Gen. vi. 5, 7, 13. [3] Jer. ii. 19.

fulfilment of the conditions necessary to reconciliation. "*The Gentiles, which had no law, were a law unto themselves; and they showed the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts, one with another, accusing or else excusing them.*"[1] Goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering were shown to men with a view to leading them to repentance.[2]

This twofold inward action found also a twofold outward embodiment in the punishments and blessings with which men were visited. *God left not Himself without witness, in that He did good, and gave from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness.*[3] *Unto them who were factious and obeyed not the truth, but obeyed unrighteousness, God sent wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish—yea, upon every soul of man that worketh evil.*[4]

The experiences of Israel were but in a more definite and specific form the experiences of men generally; the latter became clear on the light of the former. The history of Israel, in this as in other respects, serves the purpose of the Greek chorus in the great drama of human history. What God did for them in the depths of their life was reflected in the external severities and kindnesses with which their conduct was visited. Their religions, especially their sacrificial system, supplied a kind of running commentary, both on the inward

[1] Rom. ii. 14, 15. [2] Rom. ii. 4.
[3] Acts xiv. 17; cf. xvii. 24 ff.
[4] Rom. ii. 8. See especially Heb. iii. 6–11.

and outward dealings with God. The sacrifices, in particular, wonderfully typified all the stages of the relation between God and man.

The same purpose was in a measure served by the religious, and especially the sacrificial rites that prevailed outside Judaism — in ever less measure, however, as error regarding God more fully darkened the minds of men. For they came more and more to be regarded merely as means of buying off the displeasure and vengeance of powers who, 'twere best for men that they should cease to exist, or at all events to rule. And what the law and the prophets did for Israel, that in a less perfect way the legislators, poets, historians, and philosophers did for the more cultivated nations; and the magicians, wizards, medicine men, and so forth for those who were more degraded,

(III.) If this is true, in other words, if God has all along been compassing in divers ways the fulfilment of the conditions of the establishment of His kingdom, and if it be true that humanity subsists in the Logos, draws all its life from God and gives its life to God through the Logos; then it follows that all along the Logos must have been acting as the mediator for sinners, with regard alike to the relation of God to men, and the relation of men to God. As the living channel between God and man, He could not but sympathize alike with God and man. On the one hand, He shared the effects produced by the revelations of the divine displeasure in the depths of the human soul; on the other, He entered along with men—so far His work in them

to this end was successful—sympathetically into the divine estimate of sin, justifying God in, with, and through men for His action towards sinners.

Here, again, Israel and its history throws light on the otherwise dark history of mankind. Not surely without ground are the theophanies of the Old Testament regarded as appearances of the Logos. Paul hints thereat when he says that the *spiritual rock which followed Israel in the wilderness*, and of which they drank, was Christ.[1] He was the Angel of the Presence, concerning whom Isaiah says, "In all their affliction He was afflicted: in His love and pity He redeemed them; and He bare them, and carried them all the days of old."[2] May we not apply to Him also the remarkable words which precede those just quoted: "*I have trodden the wine-press alone; and of the peoples there was no man with me. I looked, and there was none to help; and I wondered that there was none to uphold: therefore mine own arm brought salvation unto me.*"[3] May we not, too, regard the descriptions given by the same prophet, of the sufferings of the Servant of the Lord,[4] as relating not merely to the future, but also to the present and the past,—sometimes more to the one than to the other? "*Surely He hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way: and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all.*" The Logos, the Servant of the Lord,

[1] 1 Cor. x. 4. [2] Isa. lxiii. 9. [3] Isa. lxiii. 3 ff.
[4] Isa. lii. 13–liii. 1–12; cf. Rev. xiii. 8, "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world."

was even then bearing the heaviest of human burdens and the sorest of human sorrows; for the sake of men He was being afflicted.[1] And at a later period would be fulfilled what the prophet foretells, namely, that He should *sprinkle many nations; that kings should shut their mouths at Him: for that which had not been told them they would see, and what they had not heard they would understand.*[2] What was specially true of Israel, was in its measure true also of all mankind. The higher their privileges, the larger their culture; the fuller their knowledge, the intenser became the sufferings of the Logos; so long as His object remained unaccomplished, and He saw not the fruit of His travail.

Notwithstanding all, the world's sin grew more grievous, the world's gloom more profound, the world's suffering more intense.[3] The travail of

[1] See an interesting passage quoted from the Sohar by Tholuck in his *Wichtige Stellen des rabb. Buches Sohar*, etc., 1824: "When the sufferings of the descendants of Israel in the dispersion are told the Messiah, and it is at the same time said that they have deserved them, because they have not been minded to know their Lord, He lifts up His voice and weeps over their sins. Hence it is written in Isa. liii. 4, 'He is wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities.' Their souls are converted and go to their places (to bliss). The garden of Eden is an apartment which is called the sick-room. Into this room the Messiah then goes, and calls all evils, all diseases, all the pain of Israel, that they may come upon Him; and, in fact, they all do come on Him. And but for His taking these pains from Israel on Himself, verily, no man would be able to endure the pains of Israel, the punishment because of the law. Hence it is said, 'Verily, He hath borne our sicknesses,' etc. So long as Israel dwelt in the Holy Land, it warded off all evils and pains from the world by its worship and sacrifices; but now the Messiah wards these off from men." *Life of Tholuck*, i. 359.

[2] Isa. lii. 15.

[3] See Tholuck's *Heidenthum;* Neander's *Introduction to Church History;* Rom. i.

ages seemed to be in vain. Even the chosen people to whom He might have said at a very early period, "*How long shall I bear with this congregation?*"[1] and to whom He often had to exclaim, "*I am weary to bear you,*"—had at last to be cast off as too hard and stiff-necked. What should be done? The divine displeasure was increasing; the inward resistance to the striving of the Logos was becoming more obstinate; the judgments of God were more marked; His blessings were less understood; and yet the needs, yea, the yearnings of the human soul, were perhaps deeper than ever. Should the race be cast off—cut off entirely from the vine that bore it, and cast in the fire to be burned? Or should the efforts hitherto put forth find their culmination in some special work? The fulness of the time had come. A grand crisis was approaching; either the race must perish, or God's *own arm must bring salvation.*[2]

Heretofore, as we have seen, the λόγος ἀσάρκος was, on the one hand, bearing, *i.e.* helping man to bear, not only the natural results of sin, but also the exhibition of the divine estimate of sin, of the divine grief, of the divine claims; and, on the other hand, was energizing and persuading man to justify God, to enter by penitence into the divine grief, and to offer a worthy sacrifice. This He had done hitherto; what more could He do?

II. *The Logos takes flesh and thus becomes man.*—Heretofore the work of the Logos had been unknown. This was "*the mystery which had been kept in silence through the ages, but now is manifested, and by the*

[1] Num. xiv. 27; cf. 1 Pet. iii. 20. [2] Isa. lxiii. 5.

Scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the eternal God, is made known unto all the nations, unto obedience of the faith."[1] Dimly declared it had been to the higher minds of the Israelites, and dimly discerned by the more earnest and devout; but no one had apprehended the fact in its full truth. It was believed that God was dealing with them in various ways; but they had only the most passing glimpses, even when they had them at all, into the wonderful fact that the Logos, the Son of God, was working as Mediator for their salvation. This fact needed to be set forth distinctly, palpably before the world.

Man never appreciates what lies in the depths even of his own nature until it find expression. His thoughts, or those intellectual stirrings which issue in thoughts, are not his until they clothe themselves in words. This is the least requirement of his constitution. The case is similar with the other movements of the inner man. Nay, more, if he is fully to recognise and appreciate them, they must take outward form and substance. Not till then is his own inner being clear to him; not till then does he properly possess himself. This applies with equal, perhaps with greater, force to the working of God within him through the Logos. Had he been in a normal condition, possibly the word of an elect seer or poet, or *words of the "Word"* spoken within, might have served to reveal to him the presence and activity of the Logos,[2]—for the work of the Logos in humanity

[1] Rom. xvi. 25. See Redepenning's *Origen*, on the necessity of the incarnation, pp. 380, 402.

[2] See on this Plitt, *Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. 369.

did not originate with, though it was modified by, sin,—but experience had shown it to be insufficient. Even the little that had been declared regarding the work of the Logos to Israel had been misunderstood, or not understood, and at the fulness of the times men were less capable than ever of being helped in that way. The truth needed to take body; the ἀσάρκος must become ἐνσάρκος,—the acarnate, incarnate.

All along, indeed, as I have already remarked, embodiment had been given to the divine displeasure and the divine love in the joys and sorrows, the pains and pleasures, the judgments and blessings, which had fallen to men's lot. These experiences were ever interpreted, too, as signs either of divine favour or hostility. But, save in Israel, they were never connected with the twofold inward work of God; and even in Israel were rarely, if ever, properly appreciated and affiliated to the inward mediatory action of the λόγος ἀσάρκος. On the contrary, a tendency showed itself ever in Israel, and worked strongly in heathendom, to ascribe the several kinds of experience to separate deities, good and bad, kindly and envious, hostile and friendly.

But what further embodiment could be found, save one in a human life? This, at all events, is the most intelligible of all the means that can be adopted. In other words, the Logos, who was working, as it were, *diffusedly* in all men,—working below consciousness, subordinating Himself to the human personality, condescending to act the part of an impersonal energy in men, according to their various capabilities and susceptibilities,—must concentrate Himself, so to speak,

into an individual man, whose life should be, as it were, an epitome or "recapitulation"[1] of what the Logos had done and suffered, and should do and suffer, through the ages, until the redemption of the race shall be accomplished, and God shall be all in all.

This must not put a stop to His inward action. That work must go on; but it needed its external correlate, *i.e.* its thoroughly congruous correlate. Then the one would interpret the other. Whoso beheld Christ, having already yielded to His inward stirrings, he would recognise in Him the one whom his soul desired. Even as men at one and the same moment, by one and the same act, recognise in an artistic work the embodiment of the ideal after which they have been unconsciously craving:—the work interprets their soul, and their soul is the key to the work.[2] Christ was in this sense the true desire of all nations. The λόγος ἐνσάρκος was seen to be the same as the λόγος ἀσάρκος. The Logos in whom and by whom our higher nature subsists was seen to have taken flesh in Christ. "*It behoved Him to be made like unto His brethren.*"[3]

Implicitly we have touched here the question whether the Logos would have become incarnate had not man sinned.[4] I am inclined to think that

[1] An expression of Irenæus, used here, however, in a somewhat different sense.

[2] "Das Sprechen ist ursprünglich eine Art des Handelns. Das Sprechen ist eine Arbeit," says Herbart, *Psych.* ii. 233. Compare Griffith, *Gospel of Divine Life*, p. 334.

[3] Heb. ii. 17.

[4] See Kreibig, p. 195 f.; also Plitt, i. 369 ff.; Dorner, *Christologie*, ii. 1229; Müller, *Deutsche Zeitschr. für christliche Wissenschaft und christl. Leben*, 1850, p. 41 ff.; R. W. Dale, *Atonement*. Calvin, *Institutes*, Bk. II. c. xii. 4, opposes it.

we must answer it in the negative. It was according to the original constitution of humanity that the normality of its life should be conditioned by the co-operation—especially the inward co-operation—of God through the Logos. This relation of dependence was not created, it was only intensified by the incoming of sin. But may we not fairly suppose that, apart from sin, man would not only have received to the full all the energy he needed, but have discerned with growing clearness, as his development advanced, the source whence, and the channel through which, it was coming? In other words, he would more and more have known the indwelling Logos as the personal Son of God. To what end, then, an incarnation? But after sin entered the case was altered. Men's understandings were darkened; and if they ceased to know God, whose eternal glory and power were manifested in the things seen, how much more must they cease to recognise the presence and action of the Logos in their own nature? For not only did He, as it were, empty Himself in them of His glory, but their own inner life was corrupt. So that we may well say that though the identification of the Logos with the inner nature of humanity was a part of the original divine plan, the *incarnation* of the Logos was the fruit of sin.[1] It is necessary not to confound two things which are often confounded, namely, the humanification of the Logos and His incarnation. The Logos did not *become* human when He came to earth:[2]

[1] Compare the remarkable words of Irenæus, Bk. V. c. xvi. 2, on The Word as the archetype, etc. See also Plitt, *l.c. supra.*

[2] See Plitt, as above.

He is eternally manlike. It was He in whose image man was specifically made. He was, so to speak, the human in God. But He was not flesh; He became or was made flesh, as John tells us, thus manifesting to us what He eternally was. He entered also into special union with an individual; in a sense, He individualized His eternal humanity, and thus became a man like unto other men, subjecting Himself to the limitations of ordinary human nature, though without sin.

As such the Logos was in the truest sense a man of men, the Son of man, the man. No other man could ever lay claim to the designation with equal justice. He was the archetype of man; His presence in humanity had sustained and quickened the capability of becoming man in every man; He had been the indwelling idea towards which as a goal the development of men tended, and by which it was directed. How He could take the form of an individual without giving Himself up, is a mystery which we shall perhaps never be able to solve; but after all, it is but the culmination of a line of mysteries, each connected with and growing out of, yea, all rooted in and prefigured by, the mystery of creation itself.

III. *The specific sufferings of the Logos as incarnate.*

The work of the Logos as incarnate did not interfere with His work as ἀσάρκος; on the contrary, it intensified and supplemented, yea, completed it. It is a mistake to regard the sarchical work as something totally new; its conditions are new; it is new so far as a full-grown oak is new relatively to

the acorn or the tender plant; but as to essential characteristics it is the same. Yet it was necessary; unless this last step had been taken, the previous ones would have been in vain. They required it; it involved them. The previous work was, if I may so say, chiefly or exclusively generic; now it became both generic and individual, each in and with the other.

(I.) The very *limitation* to which the Logos subjected Himself in taking flesh was a form of suffering. As such it is spoken of in the New Testament: "*When the fulness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that He might redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons;*"[1] "*In His humiliation His judgment was taken away; His generation who shall declare?*"[2] "*Being in the form of God He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant; being made in the likeness of man, and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself.*"[3] "*Since, then, the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same;—for verily not of angels doth He take hold, but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham.*"[4] As was prophesied of Him, He grew up before Him as a tender plant, as a root out of a dry ground; He hath no form nor comeliness, and when we see Him there is no beauty that we should desire Him.[5]

A tremendous mystery is here, — a mystery, as seems to some, amounting to an impossibility or a

[1] Gal. iv. 4. [2] Acts viii. 33. [3] Phil. ii. 7, 8.
[4] Heb. ii. 14, 16. [5] Isa. liii. 1–3.

contradiction. If true, a tremendous humiliation, which, though voluntary and therefore lacking the element of shame or degradation, that for us commonly accompanies it, is yet real. The Logos, the eternal Son of God consenting for the time to perceive, think, feel as a real man,—what a strange and terrible experience! When men here have to descend from a higher sphere to a lower, even in mere outward matters, as, for example, from an imperial throne to that of a principality; from the position of a ruler to that of a simple subject; from a large social circle to a narrow one; from a large house to a very small one,—how troubled and distressed they are! Still worse would it be if a man should have to descend from knowledge to ignorance, from culture to unculture, and so forth, retaining all the while a dim consciousness of the sacrifice he had made or of the loss he had endured. But what are these things compared with the descent made by the Son of God! Surely it must have cast an inexplicable gloom over His whole life, — given Him the sense of being imprisoned in an impalpable prison-house.

(II.) The *fleshly organism which He assumed brought its own share of inconvenience, not to say suffering.* He came into close relations with a domain where the law of heredity holds sway. "Each infant brings into the world with it a flesh and blood which have been specialized by the channel in which they have been moulded since man appeared upon the earth. They have been manufactured in a family factory which has been at work since the family existed. All that St. Paul would call the flesh is built up and modified

by all—bad and good, moral and physical—which has passed in the lives and habits, nay, in the habitual thoughts of its progenitors to the first generation. Every infant comes into the world charged and saturated with these antecedent conditions stamped with an immemorial history, penetrated through and through with imperishable influences."[1] Even though we believe that Christ was born of a virgin without the intervention of a human father, all this is no less true qualitatively; for the Virgin herself came into existence under the influence of the law in question. Not even by accepting the Romish dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin can we get rid of the fact. Her flesh was still the flesh in whose constitution the antecedent generations had co-operated. In its measure, therefore, it inherited whatever corruption, or at all events disorder, may be transmitted by its means. As a result of the life of past generations, it certainly is not in any case the plastic, obedient, transparent organ of spirit that it was meant to be; and in very many cases it is the seducer and tyrant as which so many mystics and ascetics have denounced it. When the Logos took flesh, therefore, He exposed Himself to any hindrances, oppressions, difficulties that might arise from the source just referred to; for He, no less than any finite spirit, became so one with flesh, so penetrated and pervaded it, so constituted it His organ and himself its animating controlling principle, that what stirred in and affected it stirred and affected Him. I am not now referring to inherited disease, or weakness,

[1] *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1880.

or defect, for we have no reason for supposing that the body of our Lord was other than normal; but to profounder and more subtle discords. If, now, we men are sensible of these disadvantages and have cause to groan over our bodies,—even though partly because of our conscious neglects and sins,—how much more sensitive to them must have been the Lord of life and glory! Well may it have been said of Him, He "*took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses*,"[1]—though in a profounder sense than may often be attached to the words.

(III.) *Positive physical sufferings also befell Him as the result of the relation into which He entered.* How far He experienced pain resulting from the passing illnesses and disorders to which human beings are subject, we do not know:—few details are furnished us about the more specifically personal experiences of our Lord. But He suffered from hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness, and finally on the cross itself. "We do not forget, indeed, that martyrs have not only hung upon the cross, but, as in the case of Simon Peter, have borne cruelties superadded to those of the fatal wood. Their tortures have been prolonged by cunning devices; refinements of agony have been thought out for them; the nail, the knife, the saw, the screw, the pincers, the rack, the fire, the ice, reptiles, and vultures, and beasts of prey have been studied in their capabilities, so that they might all be applied in slow succession to the victim who was made by artificial means to linger until every muscle was sundered with a cautious violence, and not a nerve

[1] Matt. viii. 17.

could stir without its appropriate pang."[1] Nor do we forget a voluntary martyr like St. Simeon Stylites, whom Tennyson lets say,—

> Thrice ten years
> Thrice multiplied by superhuman pangs,
> In hungers and in thirsts, fevers, and cold,
> In coughs, aches, stitches, ulcerous throes, and cramps,
> A sign betwixt the meadow and the cloud,
> Patient on this tall pillar I have borne,
> Rain, wind, frost, heat, hail, damp, and sleet, and snow.
>
> Show me the man hath suffered more than I.
> For did not all Thy martyrs die one death?
> For either they were stoned or crucified,
> Or burned in fire, or boiled in oil, or sawn
> In twain beneath the ribs; but I die here
> To-day and whole years long, a life of death.[2]

As has often been observed, however, degrees of suffering cannot be determined by any outward standard. Among men, susceptibility to pain varies often according to the degree of their spiritual refinement. Many a rude barbarian will pass unmoved through tortures appalling enough to weary out the life of a Fénélon or Cowper. The filaments of our nature which transmit sensations to the mind are in some men so delicate as to vibrate like the strings of a wind-harp to the slightest touch. Who then can tell what sensitiveness a man may acquire whose human attributes have become united with the divine? Who can imagine the delicacy of fibre which he may possess whose feelings have never been blunted by one sin, and whose whole system has been quickened by the indwelling of the divine mind?[3] The Christ

[1] Park's *Discourses*, "The Sorrow of the Redeemer," p. 338.
[2] "St. Simeon Stylites."
[3] Park's *Discourses*, "The Sorrow of the Redeemer," p. 339.

may have been, nay, in the nature of things must have been, infinitely more sensitive to physical suffering than any mere man can be, not merely in virtue of His refinement, but in virtue also of the clearness and vigour of His self-consciousness, of His appreciation of the abnormality of suffering, and His discernment of the disorder that involves suffering. So that, whilst quantitatively, as one may say, His sufferings have been often exceeded, qualitatively He endured more than any man.

(IV.) *As the Christ, the Logos entered more fully into sympathy with the sufferings of men.* He was "*touched with the feeling of our infirmities.*"[1] He endured keen sufferings through sympathizing with the pains of His fellow-men—pains both of body and mind. The New Testament contains many proofs of His commiseration for the woes alike of friends and foes. He had none of that affected spirituality which pretends to overlook the physical pains of men for the sake of concentrating the regard upon their mental troubles. He was quick to suffer with any or every member of the race; even when children were needlessly rebuked, it was as if a dart had pierced the apple of His eye.[2] How significant the emphasis laid by Him on the gift of a cup of cold water to the lowliest of His followers;[3] and His assurance that before the assembled world He will say to them on His right hand, "*I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat · thirsty, and ye gave me drink.*"[4] A few

[1] On the suffering of Christ as a suffering of sympathy, see Edwards in Park, *Atonement*, xxix. and xxxviii. Compare Heb. iv. 15; cf. ii. 11, 16; Matt. xxviii. 10; John xx. 17; Rom. viii. 29.

[2] Mark x. 14. [3] Matt. x. 42. [4] Matt. xxv. 31 ff.

minutes before He was nailed to the cross He was touched to the heart by the tears of those who sorrowed for Him;[1] and on the cross itself showed that He was thinking of His mother, and the sword which was to pierce through her soul.[2] As He felt with individual sufferers, so also did He take into His comprehensive view the sicknesses and dying pains of the whole race with which He had joined Himself in brotherhood.

If He were thus sensible to the frailties of the body, how poignant must have been His griefs as He embraced in one and the same thought all the mental woes of men past, present, and to come, — the suspense, the hope deferred, the fear, the disappointment, the despair![3]

> For sacrifice they die, through sacrifice
> They live, and are for others, and no grief,
> Which smites the humblest, but reverberates
> Through all the close-set files of life, and takes
> The princely soul that from its royal towers
> Looks down and sees the sorrow.

Those who have here much to do with men in their sufferings testify how cast down, sorrowful, troubled they themselves, however healthy and otherwise happy, are apt to become. It is found, too, that but for a certain callousness which comes over the sensibilities, the sights they see would soon wear out their very life. Few things are more painful and exhausting than keen and persistent sympathy with the sorrows and sufferings of others. Yet even at their

[1] Luke xxiii. 28.
[2] Luke ii. 35.
[3] Park's *Discourses*, "Sorrow," etc., 340 ff. Lewis Morris, *Epic of Hades*, "Andromeda."

very best, men have a sense of being outside each other; in special cases we would fain enter into the very heart, but find that all we can do is to utter words or shed tears; and how hard and hollow do the words sound; how vain seem the tears! All this was other with Christ. He made our burdens, our pains, our anxieties His own, as no one could who did not hold his relation to our inmost being, and who was not endued with divine strength.

It needs scarcely be remarked that He entered vividly into what may be described as more properly the moral and spiritual woes of the race. If Paul, who deemed himself the chief of sinners, could exclaim, "*I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart: for I could wish that I myself were anathema from Christ for my brethren's sake, my kinsmen according to the flesh*,"—how much more truly might Christ have said this to Himself, who was bound to every child of Adam by ties infinitely closer than those which bound Paul to his Jewish brethren! And, doubtless, the tears shed by Him over Jerusalem, as He cried in agony, "*O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I, and ye would not!*"[1] were forced from Him, certainly not alone, nay, rather chiefly by His sense of the awful moral tribulations which He foresaw must come on the sacred city. Let any man try to take into his heart all the sinners whom he knows, and to realize what necessarily awaits the impenitent and hardened; let him try to constitute himself their inward mediator and advocate; let him put himself alongside of them and in their place, and he may

[1] Cf. Park, *l.c.* p. 543.

perhaps get a glimpse of what Christ must have endured, of what He is still enduring on our behalf.

(V.) *The evil of sin was brought home to Him in a new way through His individual human contact with sinners.* "*Consider Him which endured such gainsaying of sinners against Himself.*"[1] Scarcely a form of human weakness, imperfection, folly, hardness, wilfulness, depravity can be mentioned that He did not personally encounter. And He suffered from them all. We ourselves suffer when we encounter them; we do so notwithstanding our dulness and deadness; notwithstanding that perhaps we are ourselves chargeable with the very faults that are a trouble to us in others. How much more must they have pierced His soul, perturbed His spirit, and caused Him to groan within Himself! How irritating to find men incapable or unwilling to understand or appreciate truth that they need, and that ought to inspire them with enthusiasm! How distressing to be met with unbelief and scepticism; to have our motives misrepresented, to be counted in our best and holiest undertakings co-workers of wicked men, or even *protégés* of Beelzebub! How disheartening is blind antagonism to efforts for men's own good; and brutal indifference to the good of others if it seem to involve a sacrifice to themselves! How heartbreaking to discover that one's most intimate companions, those to whom we had opened our hearts, and who, we thought, understood us, betray a lack of sympathy when our real conflicts begin, desert us in the hour of peril, and even lend themselves as tools to our bitterest

[1] Heb. xii. 3.

adversaries! We may even reproach ourselves, and feel as though we were blamable when the friends who vowed to stand by us, and to lay down their lives for us, show themselves cowards and liars. And how we seem to break down when for all our sincere desires and efforts on men's behalf we are repaid with ingratitude, hatred, and hostility! In all these, and in many other ways did the Saviour suffer. How fearful must have been to Him, even as in its measure it must be to every man, the mockery of justice which marked His trial and condemnation by Pilate! How awful the falsity, perjury, and diabolical malice displayed by those who ought to have been the leaders of their nation in all that was true and noble! If ever public degradation and shame could crush any soul, must not the soul of Christ have been well-nigh crushed by the insults and shame that were heaped upon Him, the innocent and perfect One, prior to and in His being hung on the accursed tree! And what conceivable blow could fall more heavily than when the very men for whom He had lived and for whom He was dying, cried out, "*He saved others; Himself He cannot save!*" and made the utterance wrung from Him by the agonies of the cross—"*Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani!*"—an occasion for insinuating that He had been playing the part of a deceiver and impostor.[1] If all these things would distress us, how much more must they have distressed the incarnate Logos, who had taken flesh for the express purpose of seeking and saving the lost, and to whom these sins of men meant far more than they could possibly mean

[1] Cf. Park, *l.c.* p. 340.

to any mere man, however pure, noble, and gifted with moral and spiritual insight!

(VI.) *By becoming a member of the great body of humanity, the Logos laid Himself open further to organic influences from His fellow-members.*[1] If it be true that men are fellow-members united into one great organic whole, surely it follows that there must be links of connection between us besides those which are open to conscious observation. Must we not be bound each to each by some system of spiritual nerves, even as are the various members of our individual fleshly bodies? Along these are constantly being transmitted pulsations, inarticulate communications, which affect our moods, our feelings, and oftentimes our conduct. These influences gain entrance below consciousness, in the dark depths of our being, and there become so blended with the results of our own activity that most of us are unable to distinguish the two elements, and may therefore sometimes praise, sometimes blame ourselves for what is but very partially to be laid to our credit. Some men are more sensitive to this action of their fellow-members than others, and are apt either to suffer profoundly from them, or perhaps occasionally to be filled with a gladness which they themselves cannot explain. Now, the Logos became accessible to these generic influences to a degree which mere men are totally incapable of appreciating. He may be said to have been sensitive to the movements of all men, without exception; their envies, jealousies, malice, uncharitableness, cruelty, greed, hardness, impurities, selfishness, streamed in

[1] See Gess, iii. p. 734.

upon His great soul by these subconscious channels in one well-nigh unbroken stream,—a stream, at all events, of whose vast tide generosity, tenderness, kindness, love, purity, and the other virtues formed but a slightly colouring element. Had not divine energy been associated with divine sensitiveness, surely such an assault on His life from the side where it was most hard to repel must have been overwhelming. Perhaps the sad overthrow and downfall of many of the more finely organized among our fellow-men may be traced in part to the mass of corruption which sweeps in on the unconscious depths of their life by the channels referred to,—channels which in them are both more numerous and more open than in others.

In addition, we must remember the connection of the Logos with the inner life of men, to which reference was made above. This primal relation lent, of course, additional force and intensity to the new relation ; each, indeed, intensified the other. What a burden must accordingly have been laid on the shoulders of the Son of man ; what conflicts must He have had to endure ; what a fierce fight of inner afflictions must have been His lot ; and how ceaselessly must there have risen within Him from this instreaming flood of sin the mists which tended to hide the face of God, and thus to produce deep anguish of soul,—an effect which was unavoidable save as He pierced them and traced them to their true source ! In us, the flood I have spoken of blends so naturally with the congruous waters of our own life, that at certain moments we naturally seem to ourselves to be filled with the corruption of a world,

and find then no attitude so fitting as to cast ourselves into the dust, crying, "Unclean, unclean!"

Nay, may we not account thus in part for the terrible cry, "*My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?*" whose dark mystery angels and men alike endeavour to pierce? At that dread moment, when He was assailed by all possible forms of suffering, — sense of limitation in its intensest degree; sympathy with other sufferers, specially stirred by the agonies of the malefactors between whom He hung; physical pains of the most excruciating kind; the contradiction of sinners in its most revolting shape, when He was therefore most accessible, as we also find ourselves to be, to organic influences,—the depravity of the race seemed to become for the moment His very own; it occupied the entire horizon of His consciousness; its dark vapours obscured His sky; He "*became sin*" for a sinful race; it seemed accordingly as though the Father had forsaken Him; yet being unable to charge Himself with fault, He exclaimed in agony, "*Why, why hast Thou forsaken me?*" Then, too, did He also approach nearer than at any other moment of His career to the very borderground of sin itself. For was not doubt of God the very beginning of sin? and is not doubt of God still the most vigorous branch of the root out of which it grows? Doubt, that is sin, begins of course with a doubt in the intellect; which, in the case of a sinless being, must be suggested from without, *i.e.* must arise from that over which the doubter has no control. And did not Christ realize for the moment what it was to have doubt suggested to the soul, and that

under circumstances that lent it the greatest force, and fitted it for producing the direst consequences?

(VII.) *Christ was further exposed, as none ever before or after, to the assaults of the powers of darkness.* At the beginning of His career, and at its close, He was specially assailed,—at the former, by the temptations in the wilderness; to the latter He Himself alludes on at least two occasions: "*The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me;*"[1] "*This is your hour, and the power of darkness;*"[2] but doubtless He was constantly more or less thus beset. Indeed, we may perhaps say that this was natural. Special sensitiveness such as we must predicate of Christ to all subtle spiritual influences, human and divine, laid Him open also in a special measure to the assaults of the prince of the power of the air and his invisible army. This is, in fact, ever the case. To be constitutionally dense, unappreciative, is not an unmixed disadvantage, any more than to be constitutionally sensitive to all manner of influences is an unmixed blessing. The former realize the invisible with greater difficulty, but are perhaps less liable to the attacks of the unseen powers of evil; the latter realize the invisible more easily, taste more of the blessedness of fellowship with God, and receive more of His communications, but are for the same reason more open to the approaches, insinuations, suggestions, and action of the evil part of the invisible world. There is no blessing without its perils; there is no defect without its safeties. That the devil had nothing in Christ on which to fasten was, of course,

[1] John xiv. 30. [2] Luke xxii. 53.

a wonderful safeguard. Yet He would not have truly shared our humanity had He not been as accessible to these influences as to the organic ones previously referred to, and that, also, in the exact proportion of His general sensibility. It seems to be in the power of the evil one, acting either himself or through fitting agents, so to darken and permeate the inner atmosphere of sensitive souls by his presence and influence, that for the time they are forced to regard themselves as well-nigh utterly given over to evil; or if not that, at all events to be agitated by doubts and perplexities as to what it means. The devil so fills, so occupies the inner man; so floods him with his suggestions, impulses; so distracts and agitates thought; so prevents discrimination by the multitude of questions which are forced on the attention; so blends his energy with our inner energy,—that a feeling of desperation is apt to come over us. In our case, all this action is linked on to some besetment which then acquires fresh force, and the entire condition of things seems to be of one piece with the besetment,—the guilt thereof diffuses itself, as it were, like colouring-matter through the whole. Christ had not, of course, this experience; but perhaps the perplexity which found vent in the cry, "Why hast Thou forsaken me?" may have been partially rooted too in this. The influences referred to under the last head, and the diabolical action on the nerves, especially of the heart, generating an inexplicable yet properly physical fear, alarm, yea, even terror, blended naturally with these to produce a kind of confusion and darkness, which, conjoined with the remaining circumstances,

suggested the thought, not, indeed, of personal sin, for that could not arise, but that God was abandoning Him to possibilities before which His pure and holy soul shrank back appalled.

(VIII.) *There is a further source or channel through which Christ stood in relation to the sin of mankind.*

If the Logos is generally the mediator of the divine immanence in creation, especially in man; if men are differentiations of the effluent divine energy; and if the Logos is the immanent controlling principle of all differentiation, *i.e.* the principle of all form,—must not the self-perversion of these human differentiations necessarily react on Him who is their constitutive principle? In a very real sense He Himself is the root of humanity. The men who were abusing their power of self-control—and we must beware of pantheistically annulling human freedom[1] whilst recognising the divine immanence, yea, we must say as Paul does, in Him *we live* and move as well as have our being—had their power in and through Christ. It was His power they wielded, His life they were living in a very special sense. Must not this have been the source of a peculiar and specific trouble and discomfort to Him from the very entrance of sin into the world? Was the grief felt by God that He had created man at all not to some extent grounded herein? Transcendently God saw sin with anger and grief; immanently the divine life was also in its measure darkened by the use to which its

[1] See Gess on this.

energy was put in those who were designed to be a source of gladness and glory to God. Until we have a fuller understanding of the relations between the transcendent and immanent action of God, we shall not be able fully to appreciate this side of the matter. Speaking after the manner of men, we may say that human corruption sent up into the conscious life of Deity certain disturbing elements through that sub-conscious side by which He was in immediate, generative, creative, sustentative, *i.e.* immanent, contact with the intelligent creature. The same thought is suggested even if we avoid the word immanent and speak only of sustentation, remembering that the divine sustentation is not an outward or mechanical, but an inward and vital relation to the world He brought into existence.

When the Logos became an individual man, these darkening influences must have flooded His inner sub-conscious nature with well-nigh overwhelming force. His human nature may be compared to the narrow strait between two stormy seas from which rush in contrary currents—on the one side from the displeasure of God, on the other from human evil; and the deepest contrariety of the latter was, as it were, below the surface directly exposed to the light of consciousness. The influence we here have in view is analogous though also prior to and deeper than that arising from the properly organic connection with humanity into which He entered at His incarnation.

A faint adumbration of this influence may be found in the relation between parent and child.

That relation has not only a conscious but an unconscious side; it is organic and vital as well as individual and intelligent. And somehow or other the child's conduct affects the parent's inner state, through the unconscious organic connection as well as through the medium of what presents itself before the forum of consciousness. Hence also a vague but sometimes very oppressive sense of responsibility for its misconduct, of which no adequate explanation can be found in the fear that neglect or mistakes of training and example may have partially caused it. The uneasiness is more deeply seated than that. Can it be that some influence of an analogous kind contributed its share to the darkening of the soul of Christ, and that in this mysterious depth we have to seek the fullest interpretation of that wonderful word of the Apostle Paul, "*He who knew no sin was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him*"?

(IX.) Whilst in all these ways Christ was entering into and bearing the sins and woes of men, He was also passing through the darkness and pain caused by the divine relation to sin. The more men sinned, the sterner became the divine condemnation of sin and the divine grief; the heavier, accordingly, the burden of Christ. For as human sin passed through Christ to God, so the divine action towards sin passed through Christ to man. He Himself became the innocent occasion of darker sin than men had ever committed before; for the rejection of Him who went about doing good con-

tinually, who, when reviled, reviled not again; who sought out the degraded and lost; who healed the sick and raised the dead; whose meat and drink it was to reveal the Father's love to men, and lead them to the Father who alone could suffice them,—was the blackest in the long list of human crimes. This in its turn kindled anew the divine displeasure, and pierced the divine heart with a fresh and more poignant pain. Both intensified the sorrow and darkness of the Son of man; for, as already remarked, in Him as the natural mediator the stream from below met the stream from above, each in turn swelling the volume of the other. And this went on through His whole life on earth, the burden growing ever weightier, the gloom ever deeper, the sorrow ever intenser, till it culminated on the cross. The unutterable depravity and woes of man, and the assaults of the powers of darkness working through His awful physical suffering, seemed well-nigh to take possession of Him and sweep him away on the one side; and, on the other side, the divine wrath against an apostate world, surely never burned as it burned when that world crucified amid insults and jeers the beloved Son whom He had sent to redeem it from death unto life: both met in the soul of the Son of man, the incarnate Logos, and both conjoined wrung from Him the terrible cry, "*My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?*" What was said in partial explanation before, here finds its supplement and full expression. The state of mind of Christ was nothing artificial, no make-believe. The position of natural mediator,

referred to above, rendered this experience possible; the consummation of that relation in the assumption of our flesh rendered the experience probable; and His death on the accursed tree under its precedent and attendant circumstances, rendered the experience inevitable.

> Through all Thy brother's sins upon Thee laid;
> And through that darkest and most awful hour
> When doubt of God springs on Thee, to deflower
> The soul it cannot vanquish, and Thy prayer
> Hangs on the verge of bottomless despair.
> . . . . . .
> He passed alone the untrodden awful way,
> He understood not, but we understand—
> God hid His face, but held Him by the hand.[1]

[1] Mrs. King, *The Disciples*.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PASSION OF CHRIST THE PASSION OF MAN.

In the course of the preceding studies I have repeatedly touched on the relation of Christ and Christ's work to man; I will here approach it more closely. Not, indeed, in the expectation of solving the problem, but simply with the desire of putting it more in harmony with the hints given in the New Testament. Every attempt to explain how what Christ did and suffered can become man's doing and suffering, hitherto made, has left a residuum of unilluminated darkness more or less great; and inasmuch as the transaction is a divine transaction, we may expect this to continue to be the case. But we may hope to narrow the domain of darkness; and if an individual thinker can but convert a small part of the darkness into a kind of twilight or penumbra, he may well feel that he has done his share in this great and glorious inquiry.

I. Let us glance, first of all, at the allusions in the New Testament to the link or links between Christ's work and man; or to the mode in which Scripture teaches us to think that what He wrought out *for* us, is as though wrought out *by* us. The following are some of the more striking passages: "If we have become united with Him by the likeness of His death,

we shall be also by the likeness of His resurrection: knowing this, that our old man was crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin. If we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him. Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus."[1] "I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me."[2] "I glory in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been crucified unto me, and I unto the world."[3] "Having been buried with Him in baptism, wherein ye were also raised with Him through faith in the working of God, who raised Him from the dead. And you, being dead through your trespasses . . . did He quicken together with Him."[4] "For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God."[5] "If we died with Him, we shall also live with Him."[6] "I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and fill up on my part that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for His body's sake, which is the Church."[7] "If Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness."[8] "If ye were raised together with Christ, seek the things that are above. . . . When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also with Him be manifested in glory."[9] "That I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and

[1] Rom. vi. 5–11.
[2] Gal. ii. 20; cf. 2 Cor. v. 14.
[3] Gal. vi. 14; cf. Col. ii. 20.
[4] Col. ii. 12, 13.
[5] Col. iii. 4; cf. ii. 20.
[6] 2 Tim. ii. 11.
[7] Col. i. 24; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 7–11.
[8] Rom. viii. 10.
[9] Col. iii. 1, 4; cf. 2 Cor. iv. 14.

the fellowship of His sufferings, becoming conformed unto His death."[1] "If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature."[2] "Of Him are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption."[3] "Him who knew no sin He made to be sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him."[4] "Found in Him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ."[5] "Christ in you the hope of glory."[6] "Forasmuch, then, as Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves with the same mind; for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin."[7]

According to the New Testament,[8] therefore, men suffer in Christ's sufferings, die in Christ's death, rise again in Christ's rising, live in Christ's life, righteously, wisely, sanctifiedly, redeemedly. What He did, suffered, and is, we do, suffer, and are.[9]

II. The question still, however, arises, How does this death, resurrection, quickening, sanctification take place? That the result is brought about we know. I have already referred to the fact.[10] But how is it to be explained? At the one end we have the incarnation of the Logos, with all that it involved and accomplished; at the other, men actually humbling themselves before God, confessing their sins, grieving

[1] Phil. iii. 10. [2] 2 Cor. v. 17; cf. Eph. ii. 10, iv. 24; Col. iii. 10.
[3] 1 Cor. i. 30. [4] 2 Cor. v. 21. [5] Phil. iii. 9; cf. 1 Pet. iv. 1 f.
[6] Col. i. 27; cf. ii. 10. [7] 1 Pet. iv. 1, 2.
[8] Cf. Dale, pp. 409–427.
[9] See Luther's strong language, quoted in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 639.
[10] Cf. Dale, pp. 412, 422.

for God's grief, reconciled to God, trusting in God, loving God, serving God in newness of life: what lies between? What are the links of connection? The full solution of the problem is a hopeless task; but we may perhaps get some glimpses of its inner reasonableness.

III. We may find in the conscious relation of men to Christ a part of the secret. That relation is summed up in the profound and very elastic word faith, which connotes far more than it positively denotes. Let us see what Christ signifies to men, what He presents to their gaze.

The inmost secret of sin, its true essence, its genuine meaning, was never before brought close to human consciousness. Considered even as an ordinary crime, there surely never was one darker than the rejection of Christ. His Jewish foes betrayed the noblest and purest of their countrymen to the power which they detested, descending so low as to profess concern for Cæsar in order to gain their ends; the Roman, frivolous and cruel as he was, never so wilfully and deliberately perverted justice as when he crucified Christ professedly to please those whom he despised, and by whom he knew he was abominated.

Where else, again, can be found so wondrous an embodiment of all that is true, generous, good, noble, as in the Christ, and His death for sinful men? Did ever one witness to the truth like He? did ever one show such generosity, tenderness? was ever one so forbearing, considerate, loving? Did ever one make a sacrifice so great for those who least deserved it, and who made themselves the willing

exacters of the sacrifice? Never, surely, since time began.

But there was more in it than even this. Wickedness is never so horrible and loathsome as when it vents its spite and cruelty on purity that is seeking its good. This all confess. And where have we such an example of it as in the crucifixion of Christ? The only-begotten and well-beloved Son of the Father, against whom men had sinned, and who had come into the world to seek and save the hopeless and lost, He is despised, persecuted, defamed, and hunted to the most awful and most degrading death by the very men whom He loved: where can sin be seen in all its blackness and darkness so plainly as on Calvary? And this is its true nature, this is its legitimate outcome. Whether it could reach a deeper depth we need not here inquire: Christ's own prayer for His persecutors might be taken to suggest the possibility. At all events, human history records nothing so nearly approaching the unpardonable sin as the crucifixion amid mockery and cruelty of the blessed Son of God.

And last, not least, is a greater proof of the mercy and grace of God conceivable than that which has been given to us in the mission and passion of this perfect Son? "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins." "Scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die: but God commendeth His love to us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." [1]

[1] Rom. v. 7, 8.

Where, again, can such insight be gained into the incompatibility between sin and God, between men who love sin and God, as under the shadow of the cross, and through the person of Christ? Experience of the most varied kind tells men that the laws of God, natural and moral alike, cannot be violated with impunity; that the cosmos arrays itself against the disorderly; that God cannot away with sin. But His intense abhorrence thereof, and hostility to it—His absolute and eternal antagonism to it—were never so clearly brought out as when His own Son, sent by Him, consented to let wickedness wreak its vengeance on Him, in order that sin might be vanquished and purged away. The greatness of the divine sacrifice casts a lurid but revealing light on the hatred felt by God for the sin by which this fair province of His empire had been desolated.

Considerations like these doubtless exert a great influence on human souls; they are fitted to open the eyes of the most ignorant, to soften the heart of the most obdurate, to subdue the will of the most obstinate and self-willed. These, too, are the considerations most commonly urged; but there is something more—far more, far other—in the words I quoted from the New Testament. The action of Christ for us is more vital and organic than this; more complete, substitutional, vicarious than this. That, too, is vicarious; we cannot get rid of the vicarious element. Every bit of work, whether intellectual, moral, religious, or physical, done by another, by which I profit; still more, every form and degree of suffering that smooths my faith or relieves my pain, is to all intents and

purposes vicarious.[1] But in Christ's work it touches deeper depths—the deepest depths; depths deep in correspondence to the profundity of the relation held by the divine Logos to the life and constitution of the human race. And it is down into those depths we are called to gaze when the New Testament tells us that we die, rise, and live with Christ.

IV. The effect actually produced on men by the proclamation of the crucified One is enhanced by a further consideration. Let it not be forgotten that He who thus lived and suffered in the flesh was the same Logos who always had been and still was working in men's souls,—the Logos to whom they owed whatever of consciousness of sin, of penitence, of yearning towards God they experienced, and which they could not but count the highest and best in themselves. They had not known their source; they had ascribed all to themselves; least of all had they known that He it was who had ever been helping them to bear alike their self-imposed burdens and the divine displeasure, and that but for Him they must have been consumed. Now, however, that He had taken flesh, and that His inner relation to them was set forth plainly before their eyes in the life and passion of the Christ, their eyes were opened. They became aware of strange stirrings within; the very depths of their nature rose, as it were, to embrace its Lord. The inner Redeemer and the outer were one; the inner substitute and the outer were one; the inner atoner and the outer were one; the inner provided the key to the outer, the outer provided the key to the

[1] See Gess, p. 164 ff. Dale, p. 415 f. Dorner, ii. p. 642 ff., § 122*a*.

inner; and so man accepted and submitted to Christ by no merely reflective process, but, as it were, by a necessity of nature. Analogous phenomena are everywhere occurring. The outward enters us in virtue of a corresponding inward; the inward becomes known to us in virtue of a corresponding outward. The Logos in us had been crucified from the very entrance of sin, and had brought nigh to us all the truths that I have referred to; but we could not see. We never know what is deepest in and most essential to ourselves till it takes body; then we begin to know and also to get possession of ourselves: the body and its idea marry and become one,—

> So the soul, that drop, that ray
> Of the clear fountain of eternal day,
> Could it within the human flower be seen;
> Remembering still its former height,
> Shuns the sweet leaves and blossoms green,
> And, recollecting its own light,
> Does in its pure and circling thoughts express
> The greater heaven in a heaven less;
> . . . . . .
> Dark beneath, but bright above.[1]

So is it in the present case. This is one of the meanings of faith. We could not lay hold of Christ out of us, but for the Logos in us. What the Logos does out of us becomes verily ours, because the Logos in us is seeking to make it ours. Faith is formally the revelation in consciousness of the fact that the λόγος ἐνσάρκος and the λόγος ἀσάρκος have met and recognised each other as one. But we are still not really beyond the properly intellectual domain—*i.e.* the presentation of facts or considerations to consciousness which stir

[1] A. Marvell, *The Dewdrop*.

the soul and mould the life in the ordinary way—though the latter is a profounder and more immediate form thereof than the one referred to in the previous paragraph. We may compare the two, though they are by no means identical, with the state of mind referred to in Wordsworth's "Ode on Immortality" on the one hand, and the reflective logical arguments which the grown-up thinker adduces to himself on the other:—

> Seer blest
> On whom those truths do rest
> Which we are toiling all our lives to find.
> . . . . . .
> O joy, that in our embers
> Is something that doth live,
> That nature yet remembers,
> What was so fugitive!

V. By becoming man,—by being made as "it behoved Him," "like unto His brethren,"—and thus entering into organic relationship to the human race as such, the Logos, as we saw, rendered Himself accessible to influences from the race—*i.e.* to the influences which stream in through the channels connecting men subconsciously with each other. But if the life of the race could thus influence Him, clearly He must also by the same channels influence the race. What men were and did became His; and so what He did and was became men's. Indeed, this was the more truly the case from His side, as what He was and did was in harmony with the divine idea, the essential nature, the deepest needs, and the intensest yearnings of humanity. Superficially, indeed, evil seems to gain readier access to the human soul, through all channels, than good; and so we might imagine that the action

of Christ would be but feeble, whilst the inrush on Him would be strong though it encountered absolute resistance. Yet it must surely also be true, that the deepest affinities of human nature are with God; and he who knows how to find them will discover them. A bodily disease may lie very deep, and the whole frame and constitution may have come so thoroughly under its sway as to suggest the thought that so it was meant to be; yet there may be a medicine for it; and if there be, it only needs to be applied and the entire organism will respond. So with sin-sick humanity. Even merely human vitalizers quicken it to some extent; even their life—their thought, emotion, resolution—communicates itself to them and carries them along with it; even what *they* do and are becomes the property of the race, though it may be diffused through a mass so great, compared with its intrinsic quality or quantity, that it is soon lost sight of. How much more must this be true of the divine man, who realized all that is deepest and truest in man, whose work on our behalf goes on still,—whose self-generating life is constantly streaming in on the race!

VI. But we have still not exhausted the force of either the words of Scripture or the terms which the Church has employed to express its faith. They both seem to imply that in some sense the work is actually accomplished—accomplished once for all. Christ suffered and died once—once for all; once for all He made a sacrifice; the work of reconciliation is accomplished; forgiveness is secured. He has not to keep on suffering, dying, and so forth in every

sinner in just the same sense. Yet Scripture and the Church also teach that men have individually to become partakers in Christ and His work by faith. Each man has to die and rise with Christ. So that though Christ in a sense has done His part, that does not imply that therefore every man now is that which Christ aimed to effect. If justice is to be done to Scripture and the Church, we must show how, from our point of view, the work has both been completed and is yet being completed. The old view taught that, a certain satisfaction having once for all been offered to justice or to the law, God was free to bestow pardon according to His own good pleasure. I shall not now attempt to criticize this position, but try to point out how the claim is met in a different but more real way from my position.

We shall find what we want if we duly consider the nature of the relation in which He who has acted for us stands to us and we to Him. Those who ordinarily represent and act for men, who do or suffer vicariously on their behalf, are too distinct and separate from them to allow of their work or suffering being spoken of as we speak of Christ's. In a sense it is the work or suffering of those whom they represent; it stands as theirs; the ends of human authorities and laws are thus subserved; the dignity of the offended, their rights and so forth, are thus guarded and asserted; but we want something more real—something veritably real—in dealing with the relations of God and man. As are the relations to be established, so the means by which they are established. The relations on earth are external or super-

ficial, so the means. In the case of God, the relations are real, inward, deep; and the means must be of the same character. In fact, the representative must so fulfil the conditions that the desired relations *are* established, so far, of course, as is compatible with the freedom of those for whom he acts. There is always this limit. We need, especially at this point, to bear in mind the fact referred to before, that humanity is an organism constituted by *organisms*, each of which is within certain limits self-controlled. Neither of these poles must be overlooked,—or can be overlooked without fatal confusion.

Men have always had a dim idea of a representative such as Christ is. They have felt that he who was to act for them in such a way that his acts should be theirs, must in some sense *express* them; that they must put themselves, as it were, into him; that the whole must be present in him. Some men fulfil this condition more nearly than others; still none can do it completely. All are outside the rest, merely co-ordinated to or with them; they have also to be selected; and however instinctively a community may act, mistakes may be made and are made. And at the best there is not the identity which is the condition of truly vicarious action. There must, in fact, be identity with distinction; identity with the whole, yet distinction from the whole,—two conditions which no individual in the very nature of the case can possibly fulfil.

Now the Lord Jesus Christ does fulfil these conditions, if what I have previously advanced be true. He is as the Logos the man in men, the humanity in

mankind. He is the formative principle; the constitutive, indwelling idea; the living energy. Every individual man is rooted in Him; is what He is as man in virtue of that inherence. Just as the branches are what they are because they grow out of the stem, so we relatively to Christ or to the Logos.

Our consciousness of individuality, which is apt to mislead us, is a consciousness of the surface of our being and life. Its depths, its roots are hidden from view. *We* — who are we? Not merely the ever-changing thoughts, affections, feelings, purposes, and so forth. No; but what? We are all that; but more —more. Scripture seems to hint to us that that *more* is God in whom we live, and move, and have our being, between whom and ourselves the Logos mediates.[1]

And what we are thus really, we are also to God in God's view. We do right to lay stress on our individual relation to God—that must never be relegated to a subordinate place in our thinking; but it is not all. We shall never understand ourselves if we take it for all. Nor does God leave it out of sight. To Him we are not merely a vast mass of distinct individuals. No, He also regards us as that which He created us—namely, an organization of organisms. Accordingly what the whole does, He regards as having been done once for all by the whole. The Logos, who, as I said, is the whole—the human in man—stands for man,—really and not assumedly or forensically, or by any fictitious, arbitrary process whatever, as the whole: and what He therefore does

[1] On individuality in relation to personality and humanity see Mehring, *Geschichtsphilosophie*, and Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*.

or suffers for the whole is, and is regarded as, the doing or suffering of the whole.

Remember, men have not first to engraft themselves into Christ, the living whole. If they had to do that, the position of matters would be different—very different. They subsist naturally in Him. They have to separate themselves, cut themselves off from Him, if they are to be separate. This is the mistake which is made by the "Life in Christ" theory. Men are treated as in some sense naturally out of Christ, and as having to get into connection with Christ. Christ is the leaven, the life of the world. Every man will be leavened and quickened by him who suffers him to work. It is not that we have to create the relation; we have simply to accept, to recognise, to ratify it. Rejection of Christ is in its deepest root not so much refusal to become one with Christ as refusal to remain one with Him, refusal to let Him be our life. "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you;" "He came unto His own, but His own rejected Him."

This is the kernel of the old and genuinely Protestant position that salvation is a completed thing which we have simply to recognise, to accept; not to refuse, not to put aside. We may, of course, by our act nullify what Christ has done; nay more, owing to our corrupt state we shall not ratify what Christ has done on our behalf unless special influence is brought to bear on us—the influence of God's Holy Spirit, which, however, is given to all who hear of Christ in measure sufficient for their specific need. He takes, as it is said, of the things of Christ and shows them to us.

To approach the subject from another point of view: — c'est le premier pas qui coute. Christ, on behalf of the organism of which He is the head, has done and suffered what I have described. When a man takes a decisive step on his own behalf, he is committed, as we say; he has given himself a determining direction; that determination is taken up into the vital activities of his organism, and unless hindered reproduces itself; even if it have to be ratified and repeated, the ratification and repetitions are something different from the first step. So in a very true sense with the work of Him who is the life and light of men. The new relation He has created for us grows as it were in us,—not, of course, without our co-operation; but it creates whilst it is accepted; it conditions whilst it is conditioned; it becomes the natural basis on which the spiritual raises itself and works.

Yet what Christ accomplished on men's behalf, though really accomplished, finished, cannot avail them unless it carry them with it. He cannot be our substitute in such a manner that He is righteous and so forth for us, whilst we can remain unrighteous and yet be freed from penalty and inherit heaven. He came to save us, to redeem us unto Himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works, not merely to set aside the penalties of sin; He came to reconcile us to God, not merely to save from torment. Whatever He has accomplished is supposed to be ours, though it is His work. This true principle lies at the back of the doctrine of imputed righteousness, of our being clothed in Christ's righteousness, though as

ordinarily presented that doctrine takes into consideration solely the active righteousness of Christ or His obedience, and not His passive righteousness or sufferings. What is needed is to include both. By doing so we shall find ourselves more in harmony with the very words of Scripture, as well as nearer the heart of the great mystery. Christ is to us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, redemption. What He has done becomes ours; it could not be ours if it were not first of all His; but it would be of no use to us unless it became ours; nay, indeed, in view of the relation between Him and us, it could not be His without being potentially ours.

According to Scripture, which in this is as true to human nature as it is to the moral cosmos, Christ becomes ours, and we become His by faith.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ATONEMENT AND PRAYER: AN *ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM*.[1]

MAN is a dependent being; he is not sufficient to himself; in a word, he has not, like God, life in himself. As he is not self-existent, so is he not self-sustained. Not only does his being rest on another than himself, but his life also is rooted in what is other than itself—his life not as a mere abstraction or potentiality, but as an actuality, in all its varieties of form and degree. Whatever control he may have over his life—that is, over his activities—he cannot originate the energy of which they are the manifestation. He directs the energy, but another provides it.

Expressed in the technical language of modern biological science,—and we are here in the domain of biology, physical and psychical or pneumatical,—man owes his existence, and especially his growth and development, to a previously existent environment. The functions of environment may be briefly and summarily said to be the following:—to bring into

[1] A part of what follows is quoted from a paper headed "The Atonement and Prayer," published in the *Expositor* for 1877. Coincidences with Professor Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* are accidental.

existence the various living creatures; to sustain them in existence as the source of energy; to evoke and stimulate them to activity; to guide and supply objects for their activity; to correct and punish, or even destroy, when there is misactivity or wrong relation, or inactivity and refusal of relation; and finally, curative and restorative action when wrong activity or inactivity has induced disease or atrophy.

These functions of environment are discharged in two chief ways—one by action from without on the living being, the other by action from within. There is activity from without that goes no farther; the activity from within is preceded by activity from without—in man's case mostly by an appeal to his intelligence and by evoking his co-operation—prehensive and assimilative.

Now, man's relations to his environment have their ground—their real ground—in the relations of his environment to man. Any energy expended on it by him is energy which he has previously received from it. He may be able to select the mode in which he will relate himself to the environment—select out of a very large, though still definite number of relations, in themselves as fixed as those possible between sun, moon, and stars; but the power put forth is derived originally and continuously from his environment. Speaking broadly, it is the sun itself which has furnished the astronomer with the energy he expends on its observation and investigation. The botanist is enabled to botanize by the very plant-world which he analyses and classifies. In a word, it is our environment that energizes in us when we

act on it. This is the case when our relation to the world is normal and we ourselves are healthy; but no less so when, in consequence of wrong relations, we have become unhealthy. If we are to be restored to health and to right relations to our environment, the world, energy from that world must enter into us to restore order, supply deficiencies, and correct excess; in a word, to cure and make whole. So that our environment has not only to provide us with energy for normal action, but also to supply curative energy when by our abnormal action we have got into disease. It has to enable us to act normally, and has to restore us to normal action when we are suffering from abnormal action. In fact, we live, move, and have our being in the universe, in health and disease, in weakness and strength.

What is true generally is true specifically—is true specially of God, who is the great factor of the environment of our spiritual nature. From Him comes our spiritual being and our spiritual energy or life. The energy we manifest towards Him comes from Him. We direct it; but what we direct originates with Him. I am speaking, of course, of spiritual energy in the spiritual-physical, not in the ordinary moral or religious sense. I mean our *power* to know, trust, love, serve God, which we may refuse to use for Him. That power has Him for its fountainhead as certainly as the power to walk and speak has the sun for its fountainhead. God sends His energy into us, gives us the control of it, and expects us to use it on, towards, for Himself, in certain definite ways. This is the case normally. But it is none the less so,

nay, rather, it must be all the more so, when man has acted abnormally towards God, and therefore himself fallen into an abnormal state. What shall restore him to normal relations? Not himself. Else must he be spiritually self-sufficient. Or rather, strangely enough, he would have become self-sufficient as to the highest or deepest aspect of his nature, by turning against and away from Him in whom he spiritually lives, moves, and has his being. That verily were the miracle of miracles. Were that true, the tempter who led our first parents astray would be justified—"they did become as gods" in the deepest of all senses, that of having life in themselves—by disobeying; and the Scriptures from beginning to end would be a delusion and a snare. No; according to the constitution of man and the universe, man can only enter into normal relations out of his abnormal relations to God, when God Himself energizes in him to change the abnormal to normal. Startling as the conclusion may seem, and objectionable as it may be found by all who love to dwell on the surface and hate the region where paradoxes abound, it is unquestionably, yea, blessedly true.

God's entry into man is not, of course, against man's will or without his consent; nor does His energy work without man's co-operation; yet He has first to move, and we can no more resume true relations to Him without Him, than without Him we could have given ourselves being and life.

The relation which I have just described to God is explicitly recognised in prayer. Prayer, in fact, is but man's conscious and voluntary formulation in

words of the biological law, that his environment must give what he needs, both for the support of being and the exercise of activity, so far as it includes God within its compass. Towards the non-intelligent and non-voluntary world we simply act—we take and use; of the intelligent and voluntary world we ask, recognising its power to withhold or to give, and its consequent demand that we shall ask. Prayer is therefore as correct and natural a mode of laying hold of divine energy, as taking bread into our mouths is of laying hold of mundane energy. The thought I am here presenting is profoundly expressed by Robert Browning,—

> 'Tis Thou, God, that givest, 'tis I who receive;
> In the first is the last, Thy will is my power to believe:
> All's one gift: Thou canst grant it, moreover, as prompt to my prayer
> As I breathe out this breath, as I open these arms to the air;
> From Thy will stream the worlds, life and nature, Thy dread Sabaoth.[1]

This is, of course, emphatically the case with prayer for inward, spiritual blessings of all kinds. As such, it has been presented in all ages.

When Cleanthes, B.C. 300, wrote in his "Hymn to Zeus,"—

> But Jove all bounteous! who in clouds
> Enrapt, the lightning wieldest.
> May'st thou from baneful Ignorance
> The race of men deliver!
> This, Father! scatter from the soul,
> And grant that we the wisdom
> May reach, in confidence of which
> Thou justly guidest all things;
> That we, by thee in honour set,
> With honour may repay thee,[2]—

[1] *Dramatic Lyrics*, "Saul."

[2] See F. W. Newman, *Phases of Faith*, p. 74.

he was unconsciously recognising the principle laid down. So, too, is it recognised by *Cicero*, when he says that "all things should be begun with the immortal gods;"[1] by *Pliny*, when he says that prayer should precede all speech and action, because nothing can be done rightly or prudently without the help of the immortal gods;[2] by *Epictetus*, when he encourages men to approach the gods in confidence as counsellors;[3] by *Plato*, when he introduces Socrates praying that the gods may grant him to be made fair within;[4] and even by a *Juvenal*, when he says that "we ought to pray for a sound mind in a sound body; for a strong spirit that fears not death; and to be ignorant of wrath and low desires."[5]

Now the principle underlying prayer is identical with the principle embodied in the atonement. Logically considered, both stand and fall together: I say, *logically* considered.

For the sake of clearness, and in order to prevent the suspicion that the use I am here making of prayer may be based on ambiguities or consist of tricks of subtlety, I will begin by defining as plainly as I can, in general terms, the senses in which I shall speak of prayer and of the atonement.

First, then, *Prayer*. There are two main views of the nature or bearings of prayer. (*a*) According to the Church or orthodox view, prayer, to use very general terms, is a mode of human activity by which

[1] See the interesting volume, "*Christliche Klänge*, aus den griechischen und römischen Klassikern," von R. Schneider, Gotha 1865, p. 301.
[2] *Christliche Klänge*, p. 302.
[3] *L.c.* p. 303.
[4] *L.c.* p. 304.
[5] *L.c.* p. 305.

God is determined or influenced, as He would not be determined or influenced without it. In more concrete phrase, when we pray we ask God to be towards us, or do for us, what, without our prayer, He would not be or do. As the schools have it, prayer here is assumed to have an objective effect. (*b*) According to the other view of prayer,—if view of *prayer* it deserve to be designated,—words in the form of petition or request are addressed to God, not with the expectation or intent of influencing Him, but partly for the purpose of expressing submission to His will, and partly for the purpose of affecting our own inward state. To this class of thinkers — and it is a class which has long been numerous in Germany, and which is rapidly growing in our own country—prayer is essentially *une gymnastique spirituelle*, as it has been aptly described. Its philosophy is that the petitioner unconsciously influences himself, and either fits himself for doing without what he thinks he needs and desires, or for assimilating that which comes to him in the regular course of nature, but which, apart from this preparation, might possibly escape him. In the language of the schools, prayer is here a purely subjective process.

Of the orthodox view there are again two modifications. (*c*) Some hold it to be right and of use to pray to God in relation to external things, such as recovery from sickness, seasonable weather, provision of food and clothing, protection from dangers by land and water, and other similar blessings. (*d*) Others, again — and their numbers are rapidly in-

creasing—would restrict prayer to what are termed spiritual blessings, such as light for the understanding, invigoration for the will, stimulus for the emotions, and comfort and support in suffering and sorrow.

For the sake of not burdening my position with unnecessary difficulties, I shall speak of prayer solely in this second sense. I might almost say that I make this restriction, not because prayer for *spiritual* things is less encompassed with difficulties than prayer for external things, but because to my mind it is either equally or even more perplexing. At any rate, as this aspect of prayer is still accepted by many, it will serve my present purpose to leave the other aspect out of consideration.

Let us now turn to *the Atonement*. There are two main views of the saving work of Jesus Christ.

(*a*) According to the Church or orthodox view, to use very general terms, the humiliation, sufferings, and death of Christ were undertaken for the purpose of producing a change in the relation of God to man as well as of man to God. However varied may be the modes of representing the effect produced on God, and of explaining how it was produced, all agree in the one point that something was done apart from which no reconciliation between Him and man could have been brought about. This is the essential element. In the phraseology of the schools, this is the *objective* view of the atonement.

(*b*) According to the other view, the humiliation, sufferings, and death of Christ were undertaken for the purpose of simply producing a change in the

relation of man to God. He came to scatter the darkness and correct the errors of the human mind touching God; His mission was so to exhibit the divine character—its holiness, truth, and love—and the evil of sin, that men should be constrained to return in humble penitence and loving trust to their Father in heaven. The Scripture expression of this view is, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself." This is the essential element. As worded by the schools, it is the *subjective* or moral view of the atonement.[1]

It is in the first-mentioned sense that I shall speak of Christ's work, especially of its Godward aspect.

Now, what I affirm and wish to show is, that whosoever allows the utility of prayer, in the modified sense referred to above, has no logical right to object to the orthodox view of the atonement. One and the same principle underlies both.

Having thus defined our terms, let us proceed to inquire into the significance of prayer, and to ascertain the principle involved in it.

We will restrict our inquiry to prayer for divine aid in the discharge of our primary or direct duty to God and man; that is, the duty of cherishing certain affections and avoiding others. All duty may be said, in common phrase, to begin in the region of the heart.

If we have a God and Father in heaven, and if we owe Him anything at all, we surely owe Him reverence, trust, and love; or, to comprehend the whole in one word, we ought to love Him with all

[1] Compare the classification of views of the atonement given in the Introduction to this work.

our heart and soul, and mind and strength. This, as Christ taught, is the first and great commandment. In truth, this is all we have it in our power to give to Him whose are the heavens and the earth, and the fulness thereof. Now, when we become conscious of falling short of the reverence, trust, and love we owe to God, what course do we take? What is our remedy? Where is our hope? We cannot help ourselves, for it is "we" who need the help; our fellow-men cannot help us, for they are in like case with ourselves. To whom then are we to look? Christian teachers and believers send us to God in prayer. From our indifference, and distrust, and coldness we ask God to free us. We pray, "Inspire us with reverence, with holy awe; enable us to trust, give us faith; fill our hearts with divine love." We entreat God by His Holy Spirit to work in us to will and to do His own good pleasure relating to Himself.

How forcibly, too, is this expressed in Michael Angelo's "Sonnet to the Supreme Being,"—

> The prayers I make will then be sweet indeed,
> If Thou the spirit give by which I pray:
> My unassisted heart is barren clay,
> Which of its native self can nothing feed.
> Of good and pious works Thou art the seed,
> Which quickens only where Thou say'st it may.
> Unless Thou show to us Thine own true way,
> No man can find it: Father, Thou must lead:
> Do Thou then breathe those thoughts into my mind
> By which such virtue may in me be bred,
> That in Thy holy footsteps I may tread:
> The fetters of my tongue do Thou unbind,
> That I may have the power to sing of Thee,
> And sound Thy praises everlastingly.[1]

[1] Wordsworth's translation.

I have quoted expressions which are in common use by Christians of all sections of the Church universal—some of them have been used by those who never heard either of Christ or His Church. What do they signify? Remember it is *our* duty to cherish such emotions toward God. This is the law binding on *us*. God being what He is, and we being what we are, this is how we should behave—we namely, we ourselves. And we ask God to help us to fulfil this law; we ask Him to do for us what we cannot do. He is to enter into us, and to honour, trust, and love Himself on our behalf, in, with, and through us. God in man is to obey God out of man, and the obedience thus rendered by God to Himself is our obedience. God's relation in us to Himself is counted as, nay, verily is, so far as our consciousness is concerned, our relation to Him. This position should be distinctly apprehended. When we ask God to enable us, to energize in us, that we may honour, trust, and love Him, we are really asking Him to honour, trust, and love Himself in us, and to make this His loving and honouring of Himself ours—ours in the truest and most real sense, ours as absolutely as though it were in the ordinary sense ours. It is His, and yet ours; it is ours, and yet His.

And now let us turn to man. I suppose I may take for granted that we owe to our fellow-men respect, trust, love, in the various degrees and modifications conditioned by relations and circumstances. I refer here, again, solely to the affections, not to their manifestations in act: to the inward relation, not to its outward and visible embodiment. This is

the law binding on all of us. No man can be what his nature requires him to be unless he renders to his fellow-men and receives from them such respect, trust, and love.

As a matter of fact, however, we find that we fall wofully short of our duty, and therefore of our ideal. Pride, with its correlates contempt, distrust, suspicion, envy, hatred, and uncharitableness, take possession of our hearts. Nor do our own efforts, even when we put them forth, suffice for the cleansing of our hearts. Even if we vanquish an enemy for a moment, it returns; and while we are battling with one form of these inward evils, another instals itself in the high places of our soul. What then are we counselled to do? To pray; to pray to God,—"Cleanse Thou the thoughts of our hearts by the inspiration of Thy Holy Spirit." We ask God again to work in us to will and to do His good pleasure, but now relatively to our fellow-men—to enable us to think and feel toward them as we ought. But what again is this? Surely it is to ask Him to fulfil His own law in us; to honour, trust, and love our fellow-men for, in, with, and through us, and to make His conduct our conduct. If it do not mean this, I am unable to say what it does mean. In thus interpreting our ordinary expressions I use no violence; I do but bring out an aspect of them which is too frequently overlooked.

The principle involved in prayer for spiritual blessings has been already indicated, but it may be generally expressed as follows: *God obeys His own law in our stead;* or, somewhat differently and still

more generally expressed, *God fulfils His own law on our behalf, and His fulfilment stands as ours, or rather really becomes our fulfilment.*

> Enoch as a brave God-fearing man
> Bow'd himself down and in that mystery,
> Where God-in-man is one with man-in-God,
> Prayed for a blessing. . . .[1]

How God can do this, or how we can have it done, is a mystery. That it takes place is a matter of personal experience. My purpose is not now to explain the position just described; but, whether understood or not, it is a fact that God does work in us to will and to do; that He thinks and feels and wills in us and for us; and that His thinking, feeling, and willing are in the truest sense our own. Nay more, it might almost be said that what is thus wrought in us by God is more truly our own than what we work by and for ourselves.

> Then will I trust on Him alone,
> Nay, e'en to trust in Him was also His;
> We must confess that nothing is our own,
> Then I confess that He my Saviour is:
>
> But to have nought is ours, not to confess
> That we have nought. I stood amazed at this,
> Much troubled, till I heard a friend express
> That all things were *more ours by being His.*[2]

The same thought is no less beautifully than truly expressed by Madame Guion,—

> I love my God, but with no love of mine,
> For I have none to give.
> I love Thee, Lord; but all the love is Thine,
> For by Thy love I live.
> I am as nothing, and rejoice to be
> Emptied, and lost, and swallowed up in Thee.

---

[1] Tennyson's *Enoch Arden.*

[2] George Herbert, p. 148 (Pickering's edition).

In a very real sense, indeed, what has been affirmed regarding divine help is in its measure true of the help rendered by man to man. He who aids me in the solution of a problem, in the unravelling of a perplexity, in the clearing up of a difficulty; he who by his exhortations, or warnings, or example, or stimulus, strengthens me to vanquish evil or to discharge duty, may be said to have done my work for me. He has wrought what it was my business to have wrought, and his effort, and the results thereof, become mine whilst yet they are his. God's work for us, however, is as much more real, more intimate, and more truly our own, than that of man, as his relation to us is more profound, more inward, more vital. "In him we live, and move, and have our being."

Let us now turn to the consideration of the atonement. I have already defined in general terms the view of the atonement to which I here refer.

Both in the New Testament and in the writings of the teachers of the Church various modes of setting forth the two aspects of the work of Christ have been adopted.

In the former we find descriptions such as, God "hath made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him;" "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us;" "Now once in the end of the world hath He appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself;" "Being now justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him;" "Whom God hath set forth to be

a propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness, that He might be just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus;" "In whom we have redemption through His blood, even the forgiveness of sins;" "The Son of man came . . . to give His life a ransom for many;" "By His own blood He entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us;" "Who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree." In various modifications and combinations the same descriptions have been employed by the teachers and preachers of Christianity.

At the bottom of all these representations lies the idea that Christ took our place and bore what it was just and right that we should bear. His humiliation, sufferings, and bitter death were endured for our sake, in our stead—not merely to show us His own feelings, or the mind of God, or the nature of sin, or all these, though this was part of His design; but because, unless He had endured them, corruption, misery, and eternal death must have been our portion. In a word, He was our substitute. Christ being, in the belief of the Church, the Son of God, the third Person of the Blessed Trinity, what He did for us was done by God.

Now surely we have here the very principle which we found underlying prayer—God taking our place, enduring our sufferings, and His endurance standing as ours. In the case of divine help given in answer to prayer, God obeys His own law for us, and His obedience becomes ours: in the case of the atonement, God endures the penalty of the transgression

of His own law for us, and His endurance becomes ours.

But there is a difference,—the difference between active obedience and passive endurance,—and perhaps this difference may be an essential difference. Let us see.

I have already observed that, God being what He is, and we being what we are, we ought to cherish certain affections toward Him. This is the law binding on us in virtue of His nature and of our relation to Him. The reverse side of this position is: The natural relations between God and man being such as they are, if man neglect to cherish certain affections toward God, such-and-such sufferings must come upon him. From these sufferings no escape is provided either by man's individual constitution, or by the system of which he forms a part—so far as we know. Now, in the last instance, the suffering in question is no less required by God than the obedience. His will is as really and truly expressed in it as in His positive commands. The sufferings are as natural as the claims. In a very true sense man is normally related to God when he endures suffering after or in sinning: if he could sin with impunity, his abnormality would be double. Suffering is the normal effect produced by the divine law on him who is guilty of abnormal conduct. But unfortunately this suffering means to man, misery, ruin. It is *he* who sins and suffers, who suffers in sinning.

So, then, suffering is God's law for man's passivity; obedience, for man's activity. The one as really as the other, therefore, is obedience to the divine law.

Hence, too, Christ is said to have rendered "*obedience unto death, even the death of the cross.*"

When, therefore, Christ takes our place in the atonement, He does—that is, God does—in principle the same thing that is done when, in answer to prayer, He helps us to render unto Him due obedience. In both cases the righteousness of God becomes our righteousness: it is His, yet ours; it is ours, yet His. For the expression of the principle in this application we may again use the general terms:—*God fulfils His own law on our behalf; and His fulfilment stands as ours, or rather really becomes our fulfilment.*

So far from the endurance of our penalty involving greater difficulty than the performance of our duties, it might be considered to involve less difficulty. It seems easier to conceive of a substitute bearing our burden than doing our work. In the latter case a more complete incorporation with the will of him who is aided seems to be requisite than in the former. That relatively to which I am and must be passive seems more readily transferable than that relatively to which I am and must be active. Be this, however, as it may, the principle in both cases appears to me one and the same.

I am aware of the objections that are raised against the substitutionary view of Christ's work. We are told that it is an unreality. We are told that it is a monstrous perversion of truth and rectitude that the innocent should be treated as guilty; and the guilty, on that ground, as innocent. We are told that it is impossible for a penalty to be transferred; that,

though we commonly enough suffer with and for each other, such suffering is in no strict sense substitutionary; that each back must bear its own burden; that God Himself, the loving Father, cannot require a substitution such as is involved in the orthodox view of the atonement: and much more of a like character. All I can reply at present is: If God can be righteous on our behalf in the form of obedience, why not in the form of suffering? If it be untrue and perverse for Him to endure our penalty and *count* it as ours, nay, *make* it our endurance, why is it not untrue and perverse for Him to render obedience to Himself on our behalf, and make His obedience ours?

But the identity of the principle of prayer and the atonement will become still more clear when I call attention to another equally common subject of prayer, not included in those already considered. We do not restrict our petitions for inward blessings to light, invigoration, and stimulus: we also ask for support and comfort in suffering and sorrow. Now what do we mean by "divine support and comfort"? Surely, that God in some way should, as it were, take our suffering and sorrow on Himself. I do not now refer to prayer for the removal, for the taking away of suffering and sorrow, — that is a totally different thing,—but for help in bearing them. We beg not only for divine sympathy—though that is much, and true sympathy, even in man, aims at far more than mere fellow-feeling, even at veritable participation in, and, were it possible, transference of, the suffering and sorrow—we beg also for real help, assistance. Men are able to assist us really in bearing

a load that presses on our shoulders or hands; when we become weary, they can put themselves more or less in our place; but they cannot touch the inward burdens. This is God's privilege; and as really as a brother man can relieve us in carrying a physical burden, so really can God relieve us in carrying a spiritual burden. But not even God can do this, without in His measure feeling our suffering to be suffering to Him, our sorrow, sorrow to Him. In these relations, too, He must be "*touched* with the *feeling* of our infirmities." *There is no such thing in the moral world as bearing a burden without feeling it to be a burden.*

Remembering now that inward suffering and sorrow are, at all events for the most part, the fruit of sin, either directly or indirectly, — the fruit of the sin either of the individual sufferer or of the race to which he belongs,—is it not clear that, when God in His condescension answers our prayers for support and comfort, He undertakes to bear for us the results of the violation of His own law? Inasmuch, further, as these results are of His own ordering, nay, in the last instance, of His own inflicting, are we not compelled to say that, in helping us to bear our sufferings, He is indirectly in its measure inflicting suffering on Himself for our sake, offering a sacrifice to Himself in our stead, and making propitiation to Himself for our sins?

If what has just been advanced hold good, then the so-called "moral" view of the atonement is open to essentially the same objections as the orthodox view, whatever its protestations to the contrary. Even its

advocates will not dream of questioning that the humiliation, suffering, sadness, and death which were endured by Christ in carrying out His mission of enlightenment and love — which were, in fact, not merely an accidental accompaniment, but a necessary feature of that mission—were endured, not on His own account, but on ours ; not for His own sake, but for ours. Nor will they question that the sufferings from which He delivers us would have been justly ours—that in our case they would have been a penalty for sin.[1] And, further, they will not deny that the humiliation, sufferings, and death He endured were veritably painful and distressing to Him : some of His sufferings, too, the direct effect of the displeasure which God feels, and must feel at sin. But if all this be true, how can they avoid saying of Christ—He became our substitute, He endured our penalty, and His endurance is constituted our endurance ?[2]

[1] See F. W. Robertson ; also Stopford Brooke's beautiful sermon on "The Atonement."

[2] This study is strictly an *argumentum ad hominem;* not intended at all to supply an adequate principle for the development of a theory of the atonement. The idea of it arose in me, I have no doubt, as the fruit of my study of Schöberlein's *Grundlehren des Heils*, etc., and Göschel's *Zerstreute Blätter*, etc., though at the time I was not aware of the fact. *There is nothing new under the sun.*

CHAPTER X.

THE HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST.[1]

I PROPOSE, first, to call attention to the contrast between the estimate formed of the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth by His contemporaries, and the position it has actually held in the history of mankind for the last eighteen hundred years; and secondly, to inquire into the reason of this phenomenon. Outwardly considered, few events have had less significance than the death of Jesus on Calvary; and yet His death has formed one of the principal factors in the life of humanity ever since it occurred. What is the explanation? There is not another phenomenon of human history remotely comparable to it — not even that very remarkable phenomenon, the rise and progress of Buddhism. The existence of the contrast cannot be denied, save by an ignorance so dense that its opinions are worthless. It is therefore the duty of the philosophical historian to seek to account for it. Nor, considering the important practical bearings of the question, ought any man to rest until he has found a solution. Especially ought those philosophical historians to recognise their obligation, one of whose

[1] This chapter is reprinted from the American *Bibliotheca Sacra* of October 1868.

fundamental principles is, that the course run by the human race has been the development of the highest reason, and one of whose prime axioms is: Where reason is, there must reason be found.

Attempts without number have been made to solve the problem to which we refer; and one solution has seemed to satisfy thousands and tens of thousands of the wisest and best men who have lived. Is that solution the true one? Or does the problem still await a solution?

We shall discuss the subject before us under three heads:—

I. *In what light was the crucifixion of Jesus regarded by most of His contemporaries?*
II. *What position has His death actually held in the spiritual history of humanity?*
III. *What is the explanation of the contrast between the two?*

Let us then consider—

I. The light in which the crucifixion of Jesus was regarded by most of His contemporaries.

(I.) *How it appeared to the Romans and Greeks.*

Those who were immediately concerned with the crucifixion of Jesus evidently regarded it as in itself an event of slight consequence.

Pilate, for example, by the very readiness which he evinced to let Jesus go, showed that he attached little importance to His life; and if His life were of small consequence, of how much less His death! He, for his part, found no fault in Him; he felt that to execute Him would be needless cruelty. He saw

clearly that the objections brought against Him, so far as they came under his cognizance, were false, and that His accusers were stirred by envy; and yet he delivered Jesus to be crucified! The fact was, he had an opportunity of meeting the wishes of the Jewish people, and thus securing a little popularity without risk and at little cost, and therefore let them have their way. For a man in his position to "take water, and wash his hands before the multitude, saying, 'I am innocent of the blood of this just person; see ye to it,'"[1] was to show for his victim and everything relating to Him a profound indifference, or even contempt.

The general sentiment is reflected clearly enough, also, in the conduct of the officials who had to see to the carrying out of the sentence. The simple details given by the evangelists[2] betray a cold-blooded cruelty and unconcern such as the slightest sense of the significance of the transaction would have rendered impossible: "They stripped Him, and put on Him a scarlet robe; they platted a crown of thorns and put it on His head, and a reed in His right hand; and they bowed the knee before Him, and mocked Him, saying, Hail, king of the Jews! And they spit upon Him, and took the reed and smote Him on the head. And after they had mocked Him, they took the robe off from Him, and put His own garment on Him." While He hung on the cross, they parted His garments among them,

[1] See Matt. xxvii. 24 sq.; Mark xv. 15 sq.; Luke xxiii. 22 sq.; John xix. 6 sq.

[2] The momentary qualm of conscience, or perhaps superstitious fear, to which John alludes, must have disappeared again directly.

casting lots; and sitting down, watched Him. It is true the bitterness and scorn felt for Christ's person by the Jews seems to have passed over to the Roman soldiers; but that the death they were bringing about with such a brutal spirit was in itself more than the death of the malefactors who shared Jesus's fate, they had not the remotest conception. To one man alone, to the centurion, does a passing glimpse seem to have been vouchsafed into the character of Him who hung before his eyes on the cross; but he too did not dream that "the Son of God," as he termed Him, was, at the moment of giving up the ghost, accomplishing that reconciliation of heaven and earth which had been the object of the deepest yearnings of all the ages.

Nor did the higher Roman authorities — the authorities to whom Pilate was answerable—attach any importance to the crime he committed in putting Jesus to death. For this event he was certainly never called to account. On the contrary, to judge by analogy, one may imagine that he would rather earn praise than blame for preventing a disturbance by sacrificing Jesus. So long as peace and the semblance of contentment were preserved, the life of this or that man was of little consequence.[1]

Contemporary Roman and Greek writers, both by the way in which they mention the event and by their silence, treat the death of Jesus as a trivial occurrence.

[1] Pilate was removed from office by Vitellius the president of Syria, in consequence of the disturbances to which his violence and tyranny gave rise, and which could only be suppressed by force of arms. See Josephus, *Antiquities*, xviii. 3. 1 sq.; *Jewish War*, ii. 9. 2 sq.

Tacitus (A.D. 61–117), in his account of the great fire of Rome during the reign of Nero, tells us that the emperor, "in order to suppress the reports which charged him with the deed, accused other people of it, and inflicted on those who went by the name of Christians the most exquisite punishments. The originator of this name was one Christ, who was punished with death during the reign of Tiberius by Pontius Pilate the procurator." He afterwards speaks also of Christianity as a *superstitio exsecrabilis*, and refers to both Christians and Jews as being in many cases taken into custody, not so much for the crime of setting fire to Rome as because they were haters of the entire human race. The death of Christ had obviously no meaning to this most philosophic historian, save that of the merited end of a wretched impostor.

Suetonius (A.D. 54 – 110) refers in his *Life of Claudius* to the banishment of the Jews from Rome, assigning as the reason that they were constantly exciting uproars at the instigation of Chrestus (Christ); and in the *Life of Nero* informs us that the Christians — a sect given up to a new and pernicious superstition — were punished with death. So far was the death of Jesus from being to him of any weight, that he does not even seem to be aware of its having occurred prior to the great fire of Rome. He speaks as though Chrestus was personally the exciter of the tumults in question.

Pliny the younger (A.D. 62 – 117) describes the Christians as holding a *pravam et immodicam super-*

stitionem, but makes no allusion to the crucifixion on Calvary.[1]

Lucian (A.D. 120–200) introduces into his *Life of Peregrine*[2] a reference to the worship paid by the Christians to the crucified impostor, and terms Jesus ironically, "the great man who was impaled in Palestine." But that such a death should or could have any great significance never occurs to him.

How difficult it was, and must always have been, for Greeks and Romans to attach any importance to this event, we may learn also from the mode in which their writers allude to the Christian belief on the subject. Celsus, for example, who probably lived early in the second century, bases on the death of Christ arguments against His having the elevated characteristics ascribed to Him by Christian believers. The notion of their worshipping as the Son of God a man who had been so ignominiously put to death was in his eyes intensely absurd. And that His death should be for the destruction of the devil and sin, he is quite unable to admit. The worshippers of the captured and dead Christ he compares to the Getæ who worshipped Tmolus.[3] Tertullian (A.D. 160 – 220) says that the pagans called Christians *crucis religiosi*, *crucis antistites*, *crucicolæ*, by way of nickname.[4] In the dialogue of Minucius Felix, between Cæcilius and Octavius, the former, the representative of heathen objections to Christianity,

[1] See Pliny, *Epist.* ix., x.
[2] *Peregrinus Proteus.*
[3] Orig. *Contra Celsum*, lib. ii., iii., vi.
[4] Tertull. *Apolog.* c. xvi.; *Ad Nationes*, lib. i. c. xii.

is introduced as speaking with abhorrence of those who worship one punished with the extreme penalty of the law for the crimes he had committed, and ridiculing the reverence of Christians for the cross.[1] Lactantius (A.D. 330) writes: "It is made a matter of opprobrium against us, both that we worship a man at all, and that we worship one who was tortured and put to death."[2] And Arnobius (A.D. 300) expresses the views and feelings of the heathen in the words: "We [the heathens] are not angry with you because you worship the omnipotent God, but because you pay daily homage to a man whom you maintain to have been God, and who was put to death in a way that is a disgrace even to the vile."[3] These testimonies, selected from among many others, are surely clear proof, if proof were required, that the heathen, at all events, were as far as possible from attaching importance to the death of Christ. Nor was it possible, considering the estimate in which death by crucifixion was held, that anything but contempt should be felt for the man who underwent such a punishment. Seneca styles the cross, *infelix lignum;* Livy, *infelix arbor;* Apuleius, *crux damnata;* others, *infamis stipes.* The punishment is spoken of by Cicero as *crudelissimum deterrimumque supplicium;* by Apuleius as *extrema pœna;* by Tacitus as *servile supplicium.*

(II.) *How it appeared to the Jews.*

The priests, scribes, and elders of the Jews, who

[1] Minucius Felix, *Octavius.* [2] Lactantius, lib. iv. c. xvi.
[3] Arnobius, *Adversus Gentes*, lib. i.

had been the means of securing Christ's condemnation, undoubtedly regarded His death as a triumph, as the removal of a danger. No thought of its being the divinely foreknown and foreordained completion of their enemy's mission ever entered their minds. The advice given by Caiaphas—"It is expedient that one man should die for the people"—meant, so far as the words expressed the views of himself and companions, "to avert the peril this man threatens to bring on us and the nation, it is better that he be put out of the way; it is better that one suffer, rather than that the many suffer." How far any of them were from discerning the significance of the death of Jesus is sufficiently clear from their conduct on Calvary. The chief priests, we read in Matt. xxvii., with the scribes and elders, mocked Him, saying: "He saved others, himself he cannot save. If he be the king of Israel, let him come down from the cross, and we will believe him. He trusted in God; let Him deliver him now if He will have him; for he said, I am the Son of God." The passers-by, too, "reviled Him, wagging their heads, and saying, Thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days, save thyself. If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross." Even one of His fellow-sufferers "railed on Him, saying, If thou be Christ, save thyself and us" (Luke xxiii. 39). Not the vaguest idea that the Son of God could not descend from the cross — could not in their sense save Himself—without failing to accomplish the work committed to Him, crossed their

minds. It was His *life* they feared; it was to His life they attached importance: dead, He was dead. The request of the chief priests and Pharisees, that the sepulchre might be made sure (Matt. xxvii. 64) until the third day, lest the disciples should come by night and steal Him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead, and the last error be worse than the first, shows also that the death in itself was to them a trivial affair. These were the enemies of Jesus Christ among the Jews.

(III.) *How it appeared to His friends and disciples.*

But He had friends, well-wishers, and disciples; in what light did His death appear to them? As a most sad and cruel event, but certainly not as an event of the profound significance which they afterwards saw it to possess. Joseph of Arimathea went to Pilate, and besought him that he might take away the body of Jesus; and he took it, and laid it in a new tomb hewn out of the rock; thus paying, as he supposed, the last honours to his friend and master (Matt. xxvii. 60; John xix. 38). Nicodemus, which at the first came to Jesus by night, brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about a hundred pounds weight, and wound the body of Jesus in linen clothes, with the spices, as the manner of the Jews was to embalm; wishing at all events to preserve the mortal remains of his rabbi as long as possible (John xix. 39). Mary Magdalene and other women prepared spices and ointments for the same purpose, and, not finding

the body of Jesus, supposed the gardener or some other person had removed it. But no one of them breathes a syllable indicating insight into the true nature of the death Jesus had endured. Nor is a different impression made upon us by the simple and touching story of the walk to Emmaus. As the disciples tell their unknown companion, in the most artless possible way, how Jesus of Nazareth had been a prophet mighty in deed and word before all the people; how they had trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel; how the chief priests and rulers had delivered Him to be condemned to death, and crucified Him; and how certain of their number had astonished them all by saying that they had been early to the sepulchre where Jesus was laid, had not found His body, but had seen a vision of angels which said that He was alive; nothing can be clearer than that they had never dreamed of the crucifixion,—which robbed them of their beloved master, blasted their brightest hopes, and quenched the purest joys their lives had known,—having a profound, an universal significance.

Confirmatory evidence that these were the lights in which the death of Jesus appeared to contemporary Jews, foes and friends, and that it could not well be otherwise regarded, is supplied also by Jewish works written and opinions reported during the succeeding two or three centuries. Philo Judæus (who was born twenty years before Christ, and died about A.D. 50), the Alexandrian, never so much as mentioned the name of Jesus or any circumstance connected with

His life or history; and yet he can scarcely be supposed to have remained in ignorance of what passed in Jerusalem. Josephus (A.D. 37–93) does not allude to Christ with a single syllable in his *History of the Jewish War*, although he gives a detailed account of the Procuratorship of Pontius Pilate. In his later work, that on the *Jewish Antiquities*, occur two passages in which Christ is mentioned. The second one,[1] in giving an account of the martyrdom of James, simply says that he was the brother of Christ. The first passage[2] is one of great importance, if it be not a Christian interpolation. It runs as follows: "At that time lived also Jesus, a wise man—if it be allowable to call him a man—for he was an accomplisher of wonderful works and a teacher of men who receive the truth with pleasure; and drew to himself many, both Jews and Greeks. This was Christ; and although Pilate punished him with the death of the cross at the complaint of our chief men, those who loved him at first did not cease: for he appeared to them on the third day again alive, the divine prophets having declared these and myriads of other wonderful things about him. To the present day the tribe of Christians, called after this same man, has not failed." Supposing Josephus himself to have written these words, which we greatly doubt, still they evince no sense of the importance of the death of

[1] *Antiq.* lib. xx. c. 9. 1.

[2] *Antiq.* lib. xviii. c. 3. 3. A small library might be formed of the treatises discussing this passage. Some consider it altogether spurious; others maintain merely portions of it to be interpolations; and others believe the whole to be genuine. We, for our part, agree with the first mentioned; but this is not the place for examining the point. It has no special bearing upon our present argument.

Christ. The Mishna, although it introduces many rabbis who lived at or about the time of Christ, never mentions the name of the latter or refers to any one of His sayings.[1] Both in the Babylonian and the Jerusalem Gemara are passages relating to Jesus.[2] The former adduces a tradition that "Jesus was crucified on the day of preparation for the Sabbath. Forty days long an herald walked before him who proclaimed aloud, 'He is to be stoned because he has practised magical arts and excited and seduced the Israelites.' Whoso is able to advance anything to prove him innocent, let him come and declare it! As no evidence of his innocence could be adduced, they crucified him on the day before the feast of Passover."[3] The other passages either do not allude at all to His death, or else in a manner even more superficial than in the one just quoted.[4] Justin Martyr, in his *Dialogue with Trypho*,[5] represents the Jew as objecting: "Be assured that all our nation waits for Christ; and we admit that all the Scriptures which you have quoted refer to him. Moreover, I do also admit that the name of Jesus, by which the son of Nave (Nun) was called, has inclined me very

[1] The Mishna was probably collected about A.D. 219; but portions of it are certainly as old as, if not older, than the Christian era.

[2] The Jerusalem Gemara was collected about A.D. 390; the Babylonian, about 500; but both include much that is centuries older. See, for example, Tract. Sanhedrim 43, 67, fol. 107; Sota, fol. 47; Sabbath, fol. 104.

[3] Tract. Sanhedrim, fol. 43.

[4] We quote these authorities because there is little doubt but that they contain much precipitated Jewish sentiment of far earlier date, which, considering the conservative tendency of the nation, need not occasion surprise.

[5] *Dial. cum Tryph.* c. 89, 90. We quote the translation published by Clark of Edinburgh.

strongly to adopt this view. But whether Christ should be so shamefully crucified, this we are in doubt about. For whosoever is crucified is said in the law to be accursed; so that I am exceedingly incredulous on this point. It is quite clear, indeed, that the Scriptures announce that Christ had to suffer; but we wish to learn if you can prove it to us whether it was by the suffering cursed in the law. Prove to us whether he must be crucified and die so disgracefully and so dishonourably by the death cursed in the law. For we cannot bring ourselves even to think of this." There is every reason for assuming that Trypho's words express the feelings most natural to, and most widely cherished by, the Jews.[1]

[1] We might have quoted also the Toldoth Jeshu, or Jewish "History of Jesus;" for, although first brought to light in the thirteenth century, it contains fragments of a tradition which was probably current among the Jews at the time of Justin Martyr, and parts of which we find in Origen's work against Celsus. As some of our readers may not be acquainted with the Toldoth, we will add a word or two about its character and contents. There exist two versions of the book; but who were their writers is totally unknown. Both of them contain the most extravagant stories and frightful blasphemies. According to the version first published by Huldrich in Leyden in 1705, under the title, *Historia Jeschuæ Nazareni a Judæis blaspheme corrupta*, Jesus was a son of adultery—the son of Miriam a Friseuse, wife of Papus, by Joseph Pandira of Nazareth. Jesus, when he was grown up and heard that he was an illegitimate child, is said to have crushed his mother's breasts between the door and the door-post, and to have killed his father. As a sample of the stories it contains, we may quote the following: "One day Jesus asked a shepherd the way. Too lazy to get up, the man simply pointed with his foot in the direction which Jesus and his disciples ought to take. Shortly after, they meet a shepherdess; and she, being asked the way, accompanied them till they came to a stone that served as a sign-post. Jesus blessed the girl, and wished that she might become the wife of the shepherd. Peter asked: 'Why didst thou bless the shepherd, by wishing that this woman might become his wife?' Jesus answered: 'Because he is idle, and she, being active, will be able to keep her husband, who would otherwise fare ill; for I am a compassionate God, and appoint marriages according to the works of men. David prophesied of me in

If there is one thing clearer than another in connection with the history of Christianity, whether viewed with the eye of hostile criticism or of loving belief, it is that neither its friends nor its foes originally saw any special significance in the death of Jesus, the founder. His death, as such, was no more than the death of His companions in tribulation. We might even question whether His friends deemed Him a martyr to the truth.

II. We come now to the second part of our task, which is briefly to review the position held by the death of Christ in the spiritual history of humanity.

(I.) *The view taken by the personal disciples of Jesus.*

Scarcely had three months elapsed when we find the men whom Jesus had appointed apostles, and who had followed Him as disciples — men almost exclusively drawn from the uncultivated classes — who, though their souls had been touched by the spiritual power, life, and light of the Master, had probably been mainly spurred on by dreams of realizing their country's hopes, and thus promoting their own temporal interests; who had hoped against hope, notwithstanding the strange, and to them foolish,

Ps. cii. 24, He weakened my strength in the way.'" One of his miracles was rowing about on the sea seated on a millstone; a power which he had in consequence of uttering the name of God, to which the Jews ascribe a magical force.

Further details may be found in Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum*, in Origen's work against Celsus, and in a little book entitled, *Die Urtheile heidnischer und jüdischer Schriftsteller über Jesus und die ersten Christen*, to which we are indebted for several references, though we have used them for a purpose directly opposed to that of the anonymous author.

ideas and words of Jesus, as long as He lived; but who were scattered like sheep without a shepherd by His death;—these men, we find, giving utterance to conceptions totally opposed to all that we know of them before. We find them proclaiming publicly that the Jesus who had been ignominiously nailed to the cross was a man approved of God, though according to the law every crucified man was accursed; that God had showed before by the mouth of all His prophets that He, the Christ, should suffer (Acts iii. 18); that He was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God (Acts ii. 23), being the Prince of Life (Acts iii. 15); that there is no salvation in any other, none other name being given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved (Acts iv. 13). Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that the teachings of the apostles regarding the crucifixion very soon acquired the clearness and definiteness which we find in the Epistles of Peter and of John; where the former speaks of the blood of Jesus Christ as the blood of sprinkling (1 Pet. i. 2); of our being redeemed with the precious blood of Christ as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, from our vain conversation (1 Pet. i. 18, 19); of His suffering for us and bearing our sins in His own body on the tree, healing us by His stripes (1 Pet. ii. 21–24); of His having once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God (1 Pet. iii. 18); while the latter, the beloved disciple, tells us that He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2);

that He laid down His life for us (1 John iii. 16).[1] Now, even supposing that the Tübingen view of the Epistles of John and Peter as the products of a later age, and the reflections of a later phase of thought, had been established, there would still be satisfactory reasons for assuming that the conception of the death of Jesus just quoted was the one germinantly, if not substantially, held at the early date to which we are alluding. Such passages as Acts ii. 23, "delivered by the determinate counsel of God;" or Acts iii. 18, "those things which God before had showed by the mouth of all His prophets, that Christ should suffer, He hath so fulfilled;" or Acts iii. 26, "God sent Him to bless you in turning every one of you from his iniquities;" or lastly, Acts ii. 38, "Repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus for the remission of sins,"—are the vague expression of a state of feeling which must recognise in the statements of the Epistles the distinct expression of its real essence.

This is the first problem presented by the history of Christianity: How came these disciples to entertain such views of the death which had been the death-knell of their hopes and joys?

(II.) Not only did these uneducated, dispirited men

[1] It seems to us that neither Scripture nor the psychological constitution of man warrants us in supposing that the first teachings of the disciples were as clear as their later ones. The later were not opposed to, but they certainly were a development of, the earlier. And it strikes us that a most powerful argument for the genuineness of the Acts of the Apostles might be drawn from a comparison of its doctrinal teachings with those especially of the First Epistle of Peter—a comparison showing how Peter's mind grew to fuller clearness, and how what he is reported to have preached at first was just such a basis of what he wrote later as to the nature of the human mind and the circumstances of the case would have led us to expect.

proclaim a conception of the ignominious event to which no one had at first dreamed of attaching any special significance, that ran counter to all their own and their countrymen's prejudices; but, what is even more surprising, actually persuaded a considerable number of their antagonists to accept the same view. The very men who had made a mock of the apostles, became pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and the rest, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" (Acts iii. 37); and formed themselves into a community which recognised Jesus as the corner-stone, in whose name alone there is salvation (Acts iv. 11, 12), and as the "Saviour who giveth repentance to Israel and the remission of sins" (Acts v. 31); —in a word, whose constitutive principle and bond of union was belief in the death of the Nazarene as a death for human sin. The Acts of the Apostles tells us that three thousand souls were added in one day; but even if this were an exaggeration—which there is no reason whatever for believing it to be—one thing is clear: the newly-formed community was sufficiently large and important to excite a severe persecution. No critic has called in question the reality of the persecution spoken of in Acts viii. 1; and one can scarcely imagine that the Jewish leaders were foolish enough to stir up a persecution merely because a handful of men were preaching a view of Christ's death which to the natural mind must always appear absurd.

This is the second problem: How came Jews, either inhabitants of, or sojourners in Jerusalem, or both, who probably knew all about the condemna-

tion of Jesus, and had possibly witnessed and mocked at His crucifixion, to consent to do after His burial what they refused to do before—namely, take upon them the reproach of His name and expose themselves to rejection, expatriation, imprisonment, and death on His account?

(III.) Within three years of the death of Jesus, we see the principal and most zealous agent in the persecution to which we have referred, suddenly allying himself, body, soul, and spirit, with the community against which he had "breathed out threatenings and slaughter" (Acts ix. 1). Saul of Tarsus, who said of himself at Jerusalem before his countrymen (Acts xxii. 3), "I am verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city of Cilicia, brought up in this city, at the feet of Gamaliel, taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, and zealous toward God, as ye are this day;" who afterwards, in perfect harmony herewith, wrote to the Galatians (Gal. i. 14): "I profited in the Jews' religion above many my equals in mine own nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of the fathers;" who after his conversion loved his countrymen so passionately that he could use the strong words: "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart; for I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh" (Rom. ix. 1–3); who had probably known Jesus, and if he were not present at, was fully aware of the fact and circumstances of His crucifixion, and who had "verily

thought with himself that he ought to do many things against the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts xxvi. 9); —this same Saul burst all the ties of blood, custom, country, belief, religion, and adopted, and began to preach with most fiery energy, such ideas as that "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20); "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13); "God commendeth His love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us . . . being justified by His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him" (Rom. v. 8, 9). And so possessed was he by the unfathomable significance of that apparently most unimportant event, that in his Epistle to the Galatians he gave vent to his feelings in the almost ecstatic words: "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world" (Gal. vi. 14).[1]

This is the third problem which calls for solution: How a man of Paul's training, ability, intelligence, sincere attachment to the faith of the fathers, and burning contempt for the new sect, should come to

[1] We have purposely quoted solely from the four principal Epistles of Paul—namely, those to the Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians,—because even the wildest criticism is compelled to acknowledge their genuineness and authenticity. We shall refer farther on to the explanation of Paul's conversion given by Dr. Baur of Tübingen and his school.

make that very thing his glory which was once in his eyes the uttermost ignominy?

(IV.) During the next two hundred and fifty years we find the view of the death of Jesus which the apostles, including Paul, had preached, further adopted and advocated by thousands and tens of thousands of men of all classes and conditions, and in all countries; and that in the face of every species of opposition and persecution that subtle cruelty could devise or strong political authorities carry out. Hundreds of communities were formed whose constitutive principle was the recognition of the death of Jesus as a propitiation for the sins of the world. If we only cast our eye superficially over the pages of the Church writers of the first three centuries, we shall be surprised at the singular unanimity with which they reiterate, not slavishly, but under forms suggested by their own peculiar training and circumstances, the teachings of the first apostles on this central and vital theme. It will be of interest, however, to adduce the principal names and let them speak for themselves. Clement of Rome (about A.D. 97), a man of appreciative, if not productive mind, sound, practical judgment, and general culture, says, in his Epistle to Corinthians:[1] "Let us reverence Jesus Christ, whose blood was given for us" (chap. xxi.); "On account of the love He bore us, Jesus Christ our Lord gave His blood for us by the will of God; His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls" (chap. xlix.); "Let us look

[1] With the majority of authorities at the present day, we regard the Second Epistle of Clement as spurious. But, whoever may have been its author, its teachings on this matter are identical with those of the other writings of this period.

stedfastly to the blood of Christ and see how precious that blood is to God, which having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world" (chap. vii.). In the so-called Epistle of Barnabas[1] (about A.D. 107–120) we read: "The Son of God who is Lord, and who will judge the living and the dead, suffered that His stroke might give us life:—the Son of God could not have suffered except for our sakes" (chap. vii.). Ignatius, writing about A.D. 107 or 116,[2] speaks of Jesus as "giving Himself an offering and sacrifice to God" (Eph. i.); as being nailed to the cross for us in the flesh, and suffering all things for our sakes, that we might be saved (Smyrna, i. 2); as having died for us (Rom. vii.). Polycarp the martyr (before A.D. 107), who, according to Irenæus his disciple, was instructed by the apostles and brought into contact with many who had seen Christ,[3] uses in his Epistle to the Philippians such words as, "who for our sins suffered even unto death" (chap. i.); "who bore our sins in His own body on the tree; who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth, but endured all things for us, that we might live in Him" (chap. viii.). In the calmly philosophic but also deeply earnest Epistle to Diognetus (during the second century), whose writer is unknown, we find the following noble passage—than which a nobler is scarcely to be found in any Christian

[1] It is scarcely likely that this Barnabas is the Barnabas mentioned in Acts iv. 36 and elsewhere; nor would it be a gain to the Church and Christianity to establish their identity.

[2] We have quoted passages only which are found both in the short and the long version of the Epistles of Ignatius.

[3] The Epistle of Polycarp, with the exception perhaps of chap. xiii., is now generally allowed to be genuine.

production: "He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities; He gave His own Son as a ransom for us—the Holy One for transgressors, the Blameless One for the wicked, the Righteous One for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible One for the corruptible, the Immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than His righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the one only Son of God? Oh, sweet exchange! Oh, unsearchable operation! Oh, benefit surpassing all expectation! That the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors!" (chap. ix.). Justin Martyr, a Samaritan by birth, trained in the schools of philosophy, but afterwards converted to Christianity, and put to death in Rome about A.D. 161–168,[1] expresses himself as follows: "It is He who bears our sins and is afflicted for us; He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of peace was upon Him, by His stripes we are healed"—quoting the words of Isaiah the prophet;[2] "He became man for our sakes, that becoming a partaker of our sufferings He might also bring us healing;"[3] "The Father of all wished His Christ for the whole human family to take upon Him the curses of all;"[4] "the lamb which was commanded

[1] Three works alone attributed to Justin Martyr are probably genuine,—the two *Apologies*—one addressed to Antoninus Pius, about 138, the second to Marcus Aurelius soon after A.D. 161—and the *Dialogus cum Tryphone*.

[2] *Apol.* i. 50. [3] *Apol.* ii. 13. [4] *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 95.

to be wholly roasted was a symbol of the suffering of the cross which Christ would undergo;"[1] "Christ served (as Jacob did Laban) even to the slavery of the cross for the various and many-formed races of mankind, acquiring them by the blood and mystery of the cross."[2] Irenæus,[3] the greatest teacher of the Church before Clemens Alexandrinus, the first who combined philosophical insight, breadth of mind, and liberality of spirit with due regard to the history and earnest belief in the truths of Christianity, speaks of "Christ being made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross, that He might do away with the disobedience of man;" of His destroying death, doing away with error, exterminating corruption, dissipating ignorance, leading captivity captive, and vanquishing the devil by His death; of His redeeming us rationally by His own blood, giving Himself a ransom for those who had been led into captivity, giving up His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh.[4] Clemens Alexandrinus (died A.D. 220), one of the most genial, learned, and cultivated of the early Fathers of the Church, a man who had drank at the purest, nay, perhaps at all, the fountains of heathen wisdom, but had been unable to quench his soul's thirst save in the Scriptures; who refers also to the "foolishness of the cross,"[5] says that Christ was immolated a sacrifice for us, being typified by Isaac;[6]

[1] *Dial.* c. 40. [2] *Dial.* c. 134.

[3] Irenæus was Bishop of Vienne and Lyons from A.D. 177 to 202. The only work of his extant is the *Adversus Hæreses* in five books.

[4] See lib. v. 16. 1, 2; ii. 20. 3; v. 1. Irenæus was the first to attempt to theorize about the death of Christ.

[5] Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, c. 18.

[6] *Pædagogus*, lib. i. c. 5.

that we are redeemed by His blood;[1] that He gave His life a ransom for many;[2] that as a good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep, so He gave Himself a sacrifice for us;[3] that we are healed by His stripes.[4] Tertullian (A.D. 160–220), the fiery African rhetorician, the Tacitus of the young Christian Church, represents Christ as expiating the sins of men by every kind of satisfaction.[5] He says, it behoved Him to become a sacrifice for all nations;[6] Christ our passover is sacrificed;[7] who can free another from death by dying himself, save the Son of God?—He, being Himself free from fault, underwent all suffering for the sake of sinners;[8] Christ redeemed man by His blood; He was delivered unto death, even the death of the cross, that He might free us from our sins.[9] Origen (A.D. 185–254), the founder of philosophical theology and the learned commentator and critic, the chief originator of the celebrated Alexandrian school, discusses the death of Christ in numerous passages, and represents it under the most varied forms, all, however, in harmony with the view we have hitherto described. Our Lord and Saviour, being led as a lamb to the slaughter and offered as a sacrifice on the altar, obtained remission of sins for the whole world;[10] He made propitiation by the shedding of His own blood;[11] we are cleansed by the precious blood of Christ as of a spotless

[1] *Pæd.* lib. i. c. 6.
[2] *L.c.* lib. i. c. 9.
[3] *L.c.* lib. i. c. 11.
[4] *Stromata*, ii. p. 388.
[5] *De Cultu Fœm.* i. 1.
[6] *Adv. Jud.* 13.
[7] *Cont. Marcionem*, iv. 7.
[8] *De Pudicit.* 22.
[9] *De Fuga*, 12.
[10] Origen, *In Num. hom.* xxiv. 1.
[11] *Comm. in Ep. ad Rom.* iii. 8.

victim;[1] God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son for the life of the world.[2] Cyprian, bishop of Carthage from A.D. 248–258, a celebrated rhetorician and pleader till his conversion, and to the end a man of insight, experience, and earnestness, speaks of Christ undergoing death on the cross, redeeming believers with the price of His own blood, and reconciling man to the Father;[3] of His being wounded, that He might heal our wounds; of His being made subject to bondage, that He might bring those who were bound to liberty; of His enduring death, that mortals might have immortality;[4] of His offering Himself up a sacrifice to the Father;[5] of our being redeemed and quickened by His blood.[6]

These, and many others who speak in the same tone, and express the same view of the death of Jesus on Calvary, spoke not merely for themselves, but for myriads of Christians scattered through Arabia, Parthia, Persia, India, Italy and Rome, Africa and Carthage, Asia Minor, Gaul, Armenia, Germany, Britain, Spain, and many other countries. On this point there was perhaps more agreement than any other. From all parts of the then known world the eyes of sin-sick men were directed to the dying Nazarene uplifted on Calvary, and the sight brought comfort to their guilty hearts, light to their under-

[1] *In Levit. hom.* iii. 8.
[2] *In Num. hom.* xxiv. 2.
[3] Cyprian, *Ad Demetrium*, p. 196.
[4] *De opere et elemos.*
[5] *Epist.* 63.
[6] *Epist.* 63. We need scarcely remark that we have no intention of giving anything like an exhaustive view of the teachings of the Church during the period in question. See Baur's *Geschichte der Lehre von der Versöhnung Christi.*

standing, strength to their will, and purity to their entire being. This is the fourth problem.

(V.) About the year 305, the Emperor Diocletian, instigated by his vicious colleague Galerius, inaugurated a last, cruel persecution of the Christians, designed to exterminate the *religio crucis* and to rehabilitate Paganism. But neither the one nor the other end was gained. The immediate successors of the retired Diocletian, namely Galerius, Maximian, and Constantius Chlorus, were soon superseded by Licinius in the East, and Constantine in the West. In 313 both emperors issued edicts of toleration, in virtue of which the *crucicolæ*, the cross-worshippers, were recognised as a religious party, having equal rights with all others. As emperor of the West until A.D. 323, Constantine treated the Christian Church ever with more and more favour, conferring upon it privileges, wealth, security; and when he became sole possessor of the empire, he openly avowed his wish and design to constitute Christianity the one undivided religion of the State. And this purpose he executed. Henceforth we find the cross, which three hundred years before had been spoken of, especially in connection with the low-born Nazarene, by the high in station, the refined in taste, the lofty in genius, the profound in thought, the philosophic in insight, the learned in knowledge, the devout in religion, as *crux damnata*, *infelix lignum*, *infamis stipes*, occupying the highest place of honour that the universal Roman Empire could assign it: it was stamped on the coinage, it formed an integral part of the *labarum* or imperial standard borne before the emperors, and it raised its

head on the temples and other buildings recognised by the authorities. Surely a marvellous revolution! And what a powerful commentary on the paradoxical but profound words used by the Apostle Paul relatively to Jesus the crucified One in his First Epistle to the Corinthians: "God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; and *base things of the world, and things which are despised*, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things which are."

Whatever view we may take of the motives that animated Constantine, and whether we may regard the event as beneficial or harmful to the Church and Christianity, it cannot be denied to be one of the most striking phenomena presented by the history of the world! It is a fifth problem arising out of the course run by the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth.

(VI.) The death of Christ constitutes from this time onwards one of the most important factors in the life of civilised humanity. Its history is, to no small extent, the history of what is profoundest in human thought, what is purest in human feeling, what is noblest in human endeavour, what is loftiest in human self-sacrifice, nay more, we might add, of what is best in human life—whether in the family, the society, or the State.

Paganism made a last attempt in the person of Julian the Apostate to recover the position from which it was rapidly being driven by the *religio crucis*. If ever there were a man fitted for extirpating a hollow

belief, it was Julian — a valiant soldier, a man of philosophic culture, a comparatively pure and generous character, an intense lover of his country, and a thorough devotee of the ancient superstition. All that man could do, and that man an emperor, with every conceivable human means at command for realizing his aim, was done. He ridiculed, reviled, controverted, and discouraged the Christians in every possible way, without positively persecuting them; he extolled, praised, defended, encouraged the old idolatry and its priests in every possible way, by example, precept, and favour; but all was in vain; and when he died (A.D. 363) he is said to have exclaimed: "Nazarene, thou hast conquered." Whether these were his words or not, they undoubtedly express the fact. What his predecessors had failed to accomplish by brute force, seconded by the blind hatred of the mob, the fanatic hostility of the superstitious, the scorn of the refined, the satire of the poets, the misrepresentations of the historian, and the subtle refutations of the philosophers when the Christians were as yet a very feeble folk, Julian also failed to accomplish. The cross has pursued an almost unhindered course of conquest down to the present day; and we should but express the thorough conviction of myriads of souls were we to describe it as "the salt of the earth and the light of the world." But we must as heretofore limit ourselves strictly to bare facts,— facts which all acknowledge to be such, whatever opinion may be entertained as to their rationality or worth.

1. No inconsiderable portion of human thought

has been devoted to this event, from the days of Anselm, who first opened up the ethical problems it involves, down to Hegel and Baur, who after their manner also constituted it one of the main pillars of their speculative historical edifice. To enumerate the writers who have made it the subject of some of their profoundest inquiries would be to tell the roll of the greatest thinkers of their respective ages; and these all, with rare exceptions, have recognised the fact that the cross is the salvation of humanity, even when they were either unable to explain how, or fell on explanations logically incompatible with the fact. Prior to Anselm we find it discussed most zealously by Augustine, whose influence on Christian literature is traceable even to the present hour; by Leo, justly designated the Great, a churchman of most vigorous grasp of mind and will; by Gregory of Nyssa, noted for philosophical subtilty; by John of Damascus, the comprehensive summarizer of the results of theological thought up to his time; by Basil, great in his zeal alike for science, monkery, and the Church; by Gregory Nazianzen, theologian and orator; by Athanasius, mighty in faith, in word, in deed, and in suffering; by Theodoret the learned; by Hilary, the Athanasius of the West; and by Scotus Erigena, one of the profoundest thinkers of the Christian era.

After Anselm had given a new direction to inquiry by his immortal treatise, *Cur Deus Homo?* we find the subject taken up in all earnestness by Abælard, once the most popular teacher of philosophy and theology in Paris; by Bernhard, saint and hero; by Hugo St. Victor, scholastic and mystic; by Peter

Lombard, the learned master of sentences; by Bonaventura, the seraphic doctor; by Thomas Aquinas, the Doctor Angelicus, who aimed at combining Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine in one comprehensive system; by Duns Scotus, Doctor Subtilis; by Wyclif, the morning star of the Reformation; by Wessel, the reformer before the Reformation; by Luther the Reformer; and by a host of thinkers of all classes, and in all the countries of the civilised world, since his day down to the present moment. And never did the crucifixion on Calvary under Pontius Pilate attract more thought and speculation than it does at this present moment. So much for its position in the history of human thought. A thousand times tabooed as a problem beneath the notice of philosophic minds, and a thousand times imperiously claiming the most concentrated attention of the simplest and the profoundest!

2. But, besides engaging the intelligence of man, it has also awakened in him feelings, stirred him to efforts, and manned him to self-sacrifice as pure, as high, as lofty—we should be justified in saying immeasurably purer, higher, and loftier—as any recorded on the whole page of human history. What was it that led to the establishment of the hundreds of monasteries, convents, and similar institutions, which, whatever they may have been in the days of their degeneracy, were founded by men of the purest zeal for their own and others' welfare, and were for generations a source of refining, elevating, and civilising influences to the districts around them? It was the cross. What was it that drove hundreds of the

best men of their respective generations from their native lands to traverse pathless wilds, and seek out unknown and barbarous tribes for the purpose of saving them from temporal and eternal ruin? It was the cross in their hearts, whose image they often bore in their hands. What gave the signal for the movement of those immense masses of men of all classes and ages from all parts of Europe on Jerusalem during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries —to the Crusades, which, however else we may judge of them, must be confessed to have been rooted in an enthusiasm such as the world had never before witnessed? It was the cross. What was it that inspired Italian art, at the noblest period of its existence, with its grandest thoughts and colours and forms? Was it not the cross? In whose honour were raised the finest monuments of the most spiritual style of architecture that human genius has conceived? Surely the cross, which they exhibit in their form—the cross, that towers aloft on their summits! Under what sign arose and laboured the numerous orders and associations of the Middle Ages—cleric and laic, civil and military—for the defence of the Church and for the care of the sick and needy? Under the sign of the cross. Why was it that the Romish Church gradually lost so much of its quickening and purifying influence on the world, and became at its very centre a mass of festering corruption? Because it had dimmed the brightness of the cross, substituting other sacrifices for the one sacrifice offered by the Nazarene. What was it that gave light and life to Luther's soul, and lent his voice an almost magical influence on the

hungering and thirsting peoples of Europe? It was the message of the cross. To what do the tens of thousands of churches, whose spires adorn the landscapes of Europe and America, and other parts of the world, owe their existence? To the cross. To what purpose are devoted the vast majority of the benevolent associations which exist all over the civilised world? To the preaching of the cross. Whatever may be said to the contrary, and however many defects and weaknesses may be pointed out in its bearers, can it be denied that the message of the cross is at the present moment as powerful and stirring as ever?

Throughout Christendom, notwithstanding that many maintain it to be surfeited of the cross, wherever that cross is held up distinctly, simply, faithfully, it never fails to speak to the human conscience, heart, and will with a power which, unexplained as it may be, is none the less indubitably great. And the victories it gained over the heathenism of Greece, and Rome, and Egypt, and Carthage during the early years of its proclamation, it is still gaining, and likely to gain, in India, China, Africa, and Polynesia.

Here we have a sixth problem, or rather a series of problems, which await the solution of the philosophical historian.

Such, then, is a brief and very imperfect view of the position occupied by the death of Jesus in the history of humanity during the last eighteen hundred years. It has been believed in by millions as the propitiation for the sins of the world, and as

such has stimulated thought, awakened hope and love, strengthened volition, and restored life to an extent unparalleled within the known existence of humanity.

III. We have now to inquire: What is the reason that the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, which, as we have shown, no one regarded as an event of special significance when it took place, came to be believed in—first by the disciples, then by natives of Jerusalem, then by Paul, and afterwards by millions throughout the length and breadth of the world — as a sacrifice for sin; and as such to take so strong a hold as it undeniably has done on the human intelligence, the human heart, the human will, the human conscience, in a word, on human life? Or, to put the matter in another form, what conclusion are we justified in drawing from the contrast between the supposed and apparent insignificance of the event and the marvellous influence it has had on the course of human history?

Throughout all the centuries of the Church's existence, attempts have been made to explain the phenomenon under consideration in a way different from that adopted by Christian believers and apologists; but the only success achieved has been to saddle mankind with a degree of folly and hallucination such as to render all inquiry alike futile and absurd. To review these attempts would be a labour as tedious as unprofitable. Whatever form the explanations may have taken, they have all issued in the one or the other of the following

alternatives: those who first taught that Christ's death was a sacrifice for sin — whether they were the original disciples, or Paul, or later writers — must either have been labouring under a hallucination, or have wilfully propagated what they knew to be erroneous; and their successors, whether in the belief or in the propagation of the belief, must either have deceived themselves or been deceived, or been deceivers and deceived together. By way of at once confirming what we have just remarked, and furnishing a sample of the kind of shifts to which eminent men have resorted, we will here notice the account given by Dr. Baur of Tübingen, of the way in which, first, the immediate disciples, and then Paul, arrived at their belief. With regard to the former he says:[1] "As long as Jesus lived there was still a possibility of the Jewish people recognising Him as the Messiah, notwithstanding the antagonism between his idea of the promised deliverer and theirs. But after enduring the death of the cross it was totally impossible for a Jew, so long as he remained a Jew, to recognise Him as the Messiah. Whoso believed in Him as the Messiah after such a death must have cast aside all the carnal elements of the ordinary Jewish expectations. In fact, what could a dead Messiah possibly be to a Jew? Either, therefore, the faith in Him must be extinguished by His death, or, if it were firm and strong enough, it must break the bounds of death, and pierce

[1] We quote from Dr. Baur's *Kirchengeschichte der drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, pp. 39 sq. and 45 sq.

through from death to life.[1] Nothing but the miracle of the resurrection could have scattered the doubts which seemed necessarily to involve the extinction of faith. What the resurrection was in itself is not a subject for historical inquiry. It is sufficient for the historian to know that the disciples believed it to be a fact. The fact of the resurrection is not necessary to the explanation of what follows, but only the belief of the disciples in the fact." Dr. Baur elsewhere denies that the resurrection was or could have been a fact. Expressed in plain English, Baur's view is just this: the hallucination into which the disciples fell as to the significance of Christ's death, was a consequence of the hallucination under which they laboured that He had risen again.[2]

Let us now hear what he has to say about Paul. After affirming that the *miracle* (Wunder) of Paul's conversion was nothing but an inner spiritual process, though Paul himself laboured under the hallucination of having actually seen Jesus, he goes on to say: "The very thing which rendered it impossible for a Jew to believe in Jesus as the Messiah, to wit, His death on the cross, was converted by Paul's deeper thinking mind into its very opposite; the thought dawned upon him that that which is most opposed to the carnal mind of man may be the profoundest truth; that the very death which

[1] We think it proper to assure our readers that we are not caricaturing, but quoting.

[2] It would lead us aside from our present purpose to attempt to point out the absurdities contained in this pre-eminently philosophical and rational account of the rise of Christianity, as it claims to be.

is apparently the strongest argument against the Messiahship of Christ, may have been a part of His mission, and, as ordained by God, have a special religious significance."[1] How Paul's mind came to perform so extraordinary a somersault Dr. Baur does not at all explain. The sentences immediately preceding what we have just quoted indicate so extraordinary a power of performing logical and psychological somersaults on the part of Dr. Baur himself, that we cannot help further referring to them: "No analysis, whether psychological or dialectical, is capable of clearing up the mysterious act by which God revealed His Son in Him. Still we are justified in asking whether his conversion was not brought about by the mighty impression which the great fact of the death of Jesus all at once made on his soul. From the moment when the Son of God was revealed in him, he lived in the contemplation of the crucified One; he knew of no other; he was crucified with Him; and his entire system of thought hung on this one fact. The death which was to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness, was to him the sum and substance of salvation." Unpleasant as it is to us to refer to a man of Dr. Baur's eminence in such terms, we must say the above passage is as conspicuous an instance of perversity as can be found in any work that has ever come into our hands. 1. He speaks of God revealing His Son: a "God" who, according to Baur, is not a God in any sense warranting His

[1] See also Baur's *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, p. 130.

being represented as revealing; and a "Son" who in no sense whatever suitable to the connection, deserves the name. 2. What he immediately before describes as purely a process of Paul's own mind, he here describes as a revealing act of God. 3. The death of Jesus, that is, the very event, which we have every psychological reason for believing to have been one of the chief grounds of His righteous scorn and wrath at those who trusted in Him as the Messiah, became the principal link in his conversion.

Baur's is, confessedly, one of the ablest attempts of modern times to account for the rise of the idea that Christ's death was a sacrifice in a way different from that recognised by the Church; and with what result? Surely, to add hallucination to hallucination, improbability to improbability. In point of fact, as we have already remarked, every explanation save one issues in the imputation of either hallucination or imposture, of self-deception or the wilful deception of others. Either it was the fact, or not the fact, that Christ died a propitiation for sins. If it were not the fact, the propagators of the idea must either have persuaded themselves of its truth, or have propagated it, knowing it to be an untruth, or have been misunderstood by those to whom they spake. Let us look for a moment at each of these alternatives. Were the first propagators self-deceived? No one of the first preachers of Christ did so much to persuade men that He died for sin as Paul. He himself lays special stress on his not having received his gospel of man, and pronounces accursed all who

should preach any other gospel than that which he had preached (Gal. i. 8, 12). Is it possible to suppose, then, that he was self-deceived? One of the subtlest attempts to show how he might have arrived at the conviction he entertained although it was groundless, is the one made by Dr. Baur; and what perversities it is chargeable with we have seen above. Eccentric as the human mind sometimes is, and capable as it is of cherishing strange delusions, an eccentricity and a delusion like this of the disciples of Christ has never been witnessed,—apart altogether from the improbability that their very enemies, who were as well acquainted with what had occurred as themselves, should be also persuaded to accept the delusion. Nor have we another example in the entire religious history of the world of such a significance being attached to the death of a mere man, either by his own friends or by later generations,—not even among heathens, how much less among Jews! As to the second alternative, that the first followers of Jesus wilfully propagated what they knew to be untrue, such a thing lay, of course, within the range of possibility. Abstractly considered, we allow they might have combined for this purpose. But it would have been a folly of unparalleled senselessness and purposelessness. They had all to lose, and plainly nothing whatever to gain, by adopting such a course. And surely we can scarcely suppose that the enemies of their Master and of themselves would be persuaded to accept the lie that was offered to them, and risk for its sake the loss of all things. The third alternative, that the first preachers of Christ were mis-

understood, seems more plausible; but, often as it has been advanced, it is hollow to the core. We are told that, as Orientals, and particularly as Jews, they may have used much stronger language than Occidentals are in the habit of using; and that, accordingly, they may merely have intended to represent Jesus as dying a sacrifice for us in essentially the same sense as that in which all sufferers for the truth, for right, and for love, are sacrifices both for men and for sin. Or they may have regarded Him and themselves — nay, the whole world — as forming a veritable, vital, solidaric unity;[1] and in this sense have believed in Christ as a propitiation for the sins of the world. Apart altogether from the difficulty of explaining how they could have risen even to such a view of their Master's crucifixion without some hallucination like that of the resurrection, and while we may allow that Western hearers might possibly have attached to some of their words a

[1] One of the ablest members of the Tübingen school, Dr. Th. Keim, Professor of Theology at the University of Zürich, expresses himself in his *Der Geschichtliche Christus* as follows: "Strongly as many object at the present day to recognise in Christ our substitute both in obedience to the law and in the payment of our debts, and much as they try to loosen the connection between what He did and what humanity has gained, faith demands and facts recommend its recognition; although not in the coarse sense in which the Middle Ages understood His substitution. Faith is not quieted before God by an ideal in the soul which never becomes a reality, nor by the penitence which is always imperfect, and which would not atone for the irrecoverable burdens of our life, even if it were perfect, nor by the certainty that Jesus has revealed the heart—the love, grace, and compassion—of God. In view of the holy God, faith cannot be content with what is imperfect; and the soul cannot think of God's love without also thinking of His righteousness,—that righteousness which Jesus also proclaimed. It calls for facts instead of wishes, and finds them in Christ. The perfect Christ, being ours, consoles us for our imperfection. The Christ suffering innocently, being ours, calms us relatively to the divine and human

fuller meaning than they naturally bore, we must still ask: Did, then, the inhabitants of Jerusalem who believed in Jesus not understand them? Was Paul, who sets forth the view in question with greater definiteness, fulness, and variety, than any other of the sacred writers, incapable of rightly apprehending what was intended? And was he never brought to correct his own language by his intercourse with Greeks and Romans, to whom his preaching was foolishness? Did the converts from heathenism never make the discovery that the doctrine they had accepted was based on a misapprehension; not even those who, like Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others, had gone through the schools of philosophy prior to their conversion? The entire supposition is absurd.

There is but one hypothesis fitted to account satisfactorily for the phenomena we have passed in review. This hypothesis does fully and satisfactorily account

remembrance of our sins and guilt. Is it a mere matter of religious fancy thus to base on persons and facts what is essentially an inner experience? Not so; for all people in all times have believed in substitution. God was gracious to Israel for the sake of the faithfulness of Abraham, Moses, and David. For the sake of unrighteous sufferers, but still more for the sake of righteous sufferers, are people delivered. The greatness of great men is diffused, as it were, over the entire nation. The scene of a martyrdom lightens the hearts of those who surround it, as though it were a means of purification and propitiation before God. And here is more than a great man, more than a human martyr. What history teaches is confirmed by reason. There is a veritable, vital unity, a solidaric obligation between the members of the same people, between all the members of the human race. As the vital process rises and falls, the one lives and suffers with the other; the weak lean on the strong, the strong bow down to the weak; and when the strong man dies for the weak, the latter can courageously rise again. The life of Jesus is an illustration of this league between the strong and the weak." An interesting approximation to the doctrine of the atonement on the part of a man who logically ought to have rejected it in every form.

for every one, whatever difficulties it may itself involve. The hypothesis in question is, that what was preached was true,—that what was proclaimed as a fact was a fact. If the death of Jesus really was the propitiation for the sins of the world, and, as implied therein, the world needed a propitiation, then nothing could be more natural than that it should produce the effects ascribed to it; nothing would have been more unnatural than for it not to stir the deepest depths of the intellect, heart, conscience, will, and whole life of mankind. And as the hypothesis fully explains the facts, so the facts require the hypothesis. Every single step in the history of the position actually occupied by the crucifixion of Jesus in the life of humanity becomes as simple and natural as possible, the moment we accept the double supposition above mentioned. If either the one or the other be denied, the history of humanity, not only during but even before the Christian era, becomes a huge labyrinth of confusion. Under these circumstances, there is only one other question that the philosophical historian, the man of science, has a right to put,—the question, namely, whether the acceptance of the hypothesis lands us in greater difficulties than its rejection? If it does, we must of course reject it. We cannot here enter on a discussion of this very important question, but must content ourselves with one remark. The difficulties which present themselves when we deny that Christ actually made propitiation for our sins are appreciable, tangible, demonstrable; the difficulties in the way of the acceptance of the fact of the propitiation are almost

all *à priori*, theoretical suppositions, and of such a nature as to give the lie to other important phenomena of human history which are altogether independent of Christianity and of the Bible.[1]

[1] It is clear enough, that if the phenomena described warrant us in concluding the death of Christ to have been actually what it was believed to be, they warrant also other conclusions, or require other hypotheses, as, for example, the divine-human nature of Christ; that He rose again from the dead; that the disciples were supernaturally enlightened to see the significance of the outwardly insignificant event, and so forth.

APPENDIX.

—o—

Note I. p. 12.

Baur is decidedly of opinion that many of the early writers believed in a real transaction with the devil, and gives the following account of the mode in which the two essential points, namely, the conception of justice and that of deception, were handled :[1]—

1. It was universally taken for granted that the sin to which the devil had seduced man gave him a right over them; though it is not always affirmed with the same distinctness as by Augustine, who maintained his claim to be grounded *jure æquissimo*.[2] Gregory the Great, whilst not denying the reality of his claim, yet declared it to be a mere show of right—*quasi juste tenuit hominem*.[3] Most of their successors contented themselves with the indefinite notion that man was in the power of the devil, and did not lay special stress on the idea of justice.

The more the right of the devil was recognised, the more necessary must it appear that he should be treated no otherwise than according to the law of righteousness. Accordingly, men must not be forcibly withdrawn from him by divine omnipotence. In explaining the procedure, they started with the assumption that man could only be justly freed from the power of the devil by a man who should victoriously battle with him. The following were their chief reasons :—(1) The dominion of the devil could

[1] *Versöhnungslehre*, p. 68 ff. [2] Baur, p. 68. [3] P. 69.

last only until he should put to death a righteous One in whom he found nothing worthy of death. Such an one was Christ. (2) He was vanquished in the same way in which he himself had vanquished man, namely, through the medium of the free will. As man fell into his power with his own consent, so Christ as man vanquished him by the power of his free will. (3) In place of men whom he was compelled to let go, the devil received not merely an equivalent, but even a much greater and more valuable ransom.[1] At this point, however, the idea of deception necessarily suggests itself, and it becomes clear that whilst violence is avoided out of regard to justice, so much cannot be said of cunning.

2. The second point was the trick played on the devil. No hesitation was felt, strangely enough, in characterizing the divine plan for man's delivery as a deception—"he is deceived, who deceived man," says Gregory of Nyssa: "oportuit hunc fraudem diabolo fieri," says Ambrose. The former Father tries to explain how the devil came to accept the ransom. The root of his wickedness being selfishness, he was not likely to take anything of less value than man; nay more, his pride would be a further motive for endeavouring to secure something of greater value. Never having known of any one with so great excellences as Christ, who had wielded such miraculous powers, he thought to make a good bargain in accepting Him. But the question suggested itself even to Gregory, How came the devil to fancy that he could get hold of Jesus, who was endowed with attributes which he must recognise as divine? The answer he finds in the infleshment. Owing to the flesh, the devil held Christ for a true man; and the divine powers wielded by Him only made him therefore all the more eager. Accordingly, the humanity is compared by him to the bait by which fish are

[1] ὑψηλοτέρου καὶ μείζονος ἀνταλλάγματος, Gregory of Nyssa. Ambrose, "pretium nostræ liberationis erat sanguis Christi quod necessario solvendum erat ei, cui peccatis nostris venditi eramus." See Baur, p. 73.

drawn to the hook. Origen had spoken of the being caught in the net of the cross; but Gregory spins the idea out into still fuller detail. The notion of an *ἀντάλλαγμα* given by divine justice, with which he started, is obviously inconsistent enough, and it was dropped by both Leo the Great and Gregory the Great, who made no pretence of treating the humanity of Christ as anything but a means of deceiving the enemy. The former compared him with the leviathan whom the Redeemer caught with the hook: the human nature was the bait, the deity the hidden sting which bored him through. Isidore of Seville adopted the image of a bird caught in a net; and Peter the Lombard, outstripping all who had preceded him, represented the devil as a mouse caught in the trap set for him in the Saviour's cross: "tetendit et muscipulam crucem suam: posuit ibi, quasi escam, sanguinem suum."[1]

Of Luther's way of regarding the relation of Christ's work to the devil, the following extracts will convey an idea: "The devil was caught in his own net when he thought within himself — all men descended from Adam and Eve I have killed. Here comes a poor carpenter's son who pretends to be a king and to rule—I will kill him also like the rest. But over this innocent, eternal person, neither the law, sin, nor death had any power, because He was without sin. . . . Hear what Job says about the leviathan (xli. 1): 'Canst thou draw out leviathan with a hook, or bind his tongue with cords?' Gregory makes a fine use of this image, as though he would say, 'It will be much too large for thee; thou wilt need another sort of hook: this will not do it. Then God took a sharp fish hook, hung a worm on it, and cast it into the sea. Christ is the worm, the hook is His deity. The worm, *i.e.* the humanity or flesh of Christ, deceives the devil. He thinks within himself, "Am I not able to swallow that little worm?" but not seeing the hook, he seizes hold and

[1] Baur, p. 79. "Illusus est diabolus morte domini quasi avis."

is caught."'"[1] Elsewhere, he goes into the rights of the matter: "Then Christ takes the devil, sin, and death, and brings them before the court, and charges the devil thus, 'Why hast thou sat in judgment on and condemned me as a rebel, seeing that I am the Son of God, eternal righteousness itself?' Against such a charge the devil remained dumb. Then is it demonstrated with power that Christ, who hung on the cross and was killed, was eternal righteousness, wisdom, and life. By rights, therefore, the devil lost his authority and power. Previously, indeed, he had the right to destroy us; he was our executioner, and made use of his right. But what can he do now? This man Christ has done no sin; yet he has murdered Him for nothing. Then Almighty God pronounces judgment, and saith, 'Devil, thou hast misused thy function in the case of this man; I shall take thy life: thou hast had too great an appetite, and taken too large a morsel.' The sentence runs, that the devil, with sin and death, shall be subjected to Christ."[2]

In another passage Luther represents Christ as conquering by non-resistance: "Death and the devil regard Christ as if He were a Lazarus, or Isaiah, or some other prophet, and think within themselves, 'We have devoured all these, great and high as they may have been; now we will eat and swallow up this man; he will be little more than a morning snack.' But they made a mistake, for they attacked a man who neither could nor was under obligation to die. But they did not find this out at first, and assail Him with all their might. Christ takes neither sword nor armour, neither gun nor other weapon, but stands quite still, lets the devil and death rush upon Him, and does not stir a finger; and by this very means vanquishes sin, death, devil, and hell."[3]

The following passage is perhaps the most highly coloured of all his descriptions of the struggle between Christ and the devil: "The devil had gained power

[1] Heppe, ii. p. 193. [2] *L.c.* ii. p. 194. [3] *L.c* ii. p. 194 ff.

over the world by means of sin, death, and law. Cum fortis armatus (Luke xi. 21). No one but Christ could vanquish him. The devil had therefore raised a banner with the inscription, 'I am the Lord and God of the world, and all men are mine.' Christ tears his banner down. The devil is angry, and rushes after Jesus; Christ says to him, 'What these people have done wrong, avenge on me.' This the devil does to the utmost, and eggs the whole world—saints, authorities, Pilate, Caiaphas, Herod, Hannas—on Jesus, in order that He may die for the people. He opens wide his jaws to swallow Him, but he swallows death in swallowing Him. For Christ pierces him through his belly, and robs him of his power. Hell binds the Saviour with its pains, but it cannot hold Him (Acts ii. 42; Ps. xvi. 16). God fetches Him forth."[1]

Note II. p. 13.

Luther represents Christ as dealing with the *Law* as follows:[1] "The law sets on this innocent, holy, righteous, and blessed One, even as on us. Nay, indeed, it raged and showed its tyranny much more fearfully against Him than it ever did against men, although they are sinners—cursed and damned. For He was accused as though He were the worst of blasphemers and rebels; nay more, as though He were guilty of the sin of the whole world. Yea, it so filled Him with sorrow and fear that He sweat blood. And at last it condemned Him to death—and that not mere death, but the most shameful death of the cross. The law having acted in this monstrous and calumnious manner, it must submit to be brought up for judgment. Then Christ Himself appears, and says, 'Mistress Law, you may be a mighty, invincible ruler, and have wielded a cruel tyranny over the

[1] *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1860, p. 637 f. [2] *L.c.*

entire human race; indeed, you had a right to do so. But what have I done to you, that you should so horribly and calumniously accuse, terrify, and condemn me?' To this the law, which had previously condemned the whole world, having nothing to answer, was forced to submit to condemnation and execution; so that from henceforth it has no right nor power either against Christ or against those who believe in Him."[1]

Elsewhere he answers the question, "How came it that Christ took the law prisoner?" as follows: "Paul teaches us in Gal. iv. 4, iii. 11, 13. There thou learnest that Christ crept into the prison where we all were kept under lock and key. How so? He was a man full of grace, righteousness, life; yea, He was life itself, and was yet made under the law. Then comes the law, and wants to treat Him as it treats other children of Adam. Christ keeps silence, lets the law, which had ruled like a cruel tyrant over the whole human race, and had pronounced sentence of death on it, rule over Him, and falsely accuse Him, and condemn Him as an accursed sinner. Nay, He bears the title of being Himself a curse, is overthrown, dies, and is buried. Victory! cries the law. But it knew not that it had made a terrible blunder. For thus condemning Him who was innocent, and over whom it had no right, even the Lord of the law and the Creator of all, the law is now compelled to go to prison, to be nailed on the cross, and to lose all power; nay more, to be eternally trodden under foot by Him it had itself condemned."[2]

Note III. p. 22.

Dr. C. Hodge states as the "orthodox" doctrine, whose essential features are common to the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches, this, "That the

[1] Heppe, ii. p. 196. [2] *L.c.* ii. p. 195 f.

work of Christ is a real satisfaction, of infinite inherent merit, to the vindicatory justice of God; so that He saves His people by doing for them and in their stead what they were unable to do for themselves, satisfying the demands of the law in their behalf, and bearing its penalty in their stead; whereby they are reconciled to God, receive the Holy Ghost, and are made partakers of the life of Christ to their present sanctification and eternal salvation."[1]

The exposition of Dr. A. A. Hodge is in the main a summary of that of his father, and has the advantage over that of the latter of being less wrapped up in verbiage, and bringing out into clearness the true features of the theory.

In order to appreciate this summary statement, we must go back to the elaborate definitions given of the various terms employed.

A distinction is drawn between *justice* and *law*. The former is defined as "that form of moral excellence which demands the righteous distribution of rewards and punishments, which renders it certain, under the government of God, that obedience will be rewarded and sin punished. This is also called vindicatory justice—not vindictive."[2] Law, on the contrary, is "a more comprehensive term than justice. It demands far more than the punishment of sin; and satisfaction to it includes more than the satisfaction of vindicatory justice—namely, obedience as well as sufferings, active as well as passive righteousness."[3]

We are here concerned specially with *justice*, which means, "not simply general rectitude or rightness of character and action; nor simply rectoral justice, which consists in a due regard to the rights and interests of subjects in relation to order; much less does it mean commutative justice or honesty" (as shown in the payment of debts of a *quid pro quo*);[4]

[1] *Perfection of Christ's Satisfaction*, p. 484. Elsewhere it is called "full," p. 495; "a real satisfaction of infinite inherent dignity and *worth*," p. 495.

[2] Vol. ii. p. 489. [3] P. 493 f. [4] P. 470.

but "that form of moral excellence which demands the righteous distribution of rewards and punishments, which renders it certain, under the government of God, that obedience will be rewarded and sin punished. This is also called, especially in its relation to sin, vindicatory justice, because it vindicates and maintains the law."[1] Another term is frequently used in this connection, and as such, though it does not occur in the statement quoted, is carefully defined, namely, guilt (*reatus*): "Guilt expresses the relation which sin bears to justice, or to the penalty of the law. This relation is twofold. *First*, that which is expressed by the words criminality and ill-desert or demerit. This is inseparable alike from the sin and the sinner; it cannot be transferred. *Secondly*, it means the obligation to satisfy justice; and this may be transferred from one person to another. It is in this sense that the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to us."[2] "To impute sin is (in scriptural and theological language) to impute guilt; and by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice." "When it is said that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, it is not meant that they committed his sin or were the agents of his act; but simply that in virtue of the union between him (the federal head) and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race."[3]

What, then, are we to understand by *penalty?* "By the penalty of a law is often understood a specific kind or degree of suffering." "On the contrary, any kind or degree of suffering judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice is penalty; and the very same suffering might be calamity, or chastisement, or penalty, according to the reason of its occurrence. The design of the infliction of suffering alone is expressed when we speak of penal or penalty; nothing is declared concerning its nature. When, therefore, Christ's sufferings are described as penal, nothing is

[1] *L.c.* p. 489. [2] P. 476. [3] P. 195.

said as to their nature or degree; we simply say that they were designed to satisfy justice. Not, however, that their kind or degree was a matter of indifference. There must be some proportion between the evil endured and the benefit to be secured. There must be enough of self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and inherent value to the proffered atonement." [1]

According to Scripture, death, yea, "eternal death," is the wages or penalty of sin or disobedience, demanded by the law or by justice.[2] Death as used in Scripture includes all kinds and degrees of suffering inflicted as the punishment, reward, or wages of sin.[3]

The next term to be considered is *satisfaction*, of which Dr. Hodge distinguishes two kinds, the one pecuniary or commercial, the other penal or forensic. The former is a simple matter of *quid pro quo;* if a debt is paid, it matters not by whom, and the debtor is at once freed from obligation. The latter is a question of *crime*. In this case the demand is on the offender; and in human courts no one else can meet it. The essential point is not the penalty, but the person who is to suffer. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The penalty need not be of the very nature of the injury inflicted; but it should be a just equivalent.[4]

Let us finally see what is said about the important word *Vicarious*. Vicarious suffering is not merely suffering endured for the benefit of others, such as are the sufferings of martyrs and a thousand others. It is suffering endured by one person in the stead of another, *i.e.* in his place. When a man dies in the place of another to save him from a deserved penalty, that is vicarious.[5]

Under the heading *Expiation* and *Propitiation*, which in his view are correlative terms, the former referring to the sinner or his guilt, the latter to God or justice, he states his position in another form as follows: — The incarnate Son of God substituted

[1] Vol. ii. pp. 473, 474. [2] Pp. 494, 491. [3] Pp. 474, 201.
[4] P. 470. [5] Pp. 475, 476.

Himself in the place of sinners, assumed their obligation to satisfy divine justice, and made a *full and perfect* satisfaction for sin, bearing *the penalty of the law* in their stead.[1]

Before going on to criticize Dr. Charles Hodge, it will be well to quote Dr. A. A. Hodge's summary. He puts the case, *first*, negatively: "(1) The sufferings of Christ were not a substitute for the infliction of the penalty of the law upon sinners in person, but they are *the penalty itself* executed on their substitute.[2] (2) It was not of the nature of a pecuniary payment, an exact *quid pro quo*. But it was a strict penal satisfaction, the person suffering being a substitute. (3) It was not a mere example of punishment. (4) It was not a mere exhibition of love or of heroic consecration.

"*Secondly*, positively. (1) Its *motive* was the ineffable love of God for the elect. (2) As to its *nature*. (*a*) Being a divine person, He assumed the legal responsibilities of His people under the conditions of a human being. (*b*) He obeyed and suffered as their substitute. His obedience and suffering were vicarious. (*c*) The guilt or just legal responsibility of our sins were imputed to Him, *i.e.* charged upon and punished in Him. (*d*) He did not suffer the same sufferings, either in kind, degree, or duration, which would have been inflicted on them, but He did suffer precisely that suffering which divine justice demanded of His person standing in their stead. (*e*) His sufferings were those of a divine person in a human nature."[3]

The criticisms which I have now to make will relate, not so much to the general point of view considered in itself, as to the manner in which the subject is treated. Notwithstanding a great apparatus of definitions, much use of logical terms and wonderful professions of agreement with "Catholic" opinion, the exposition seems to me confused in reasoning, inconsistent with itself, and out of harmony with the

[1] Vol. ii. pp. 478, 479. [2] The italics are my own.
[3] *Outlines of Theology*, by A. A. Hodge, D.D., 1879, p. 405 f.

earlier, still more with the earliest Protestant teaching.

According to Dr. C. Hodge, the penalty of disobedience is "eternal death."[1] In assuming this he agrees with the symbols of the Reformed Churches from which he quotes.[2] Man is hell-deserving;[3] merits "damnation."[4] "The wages of sin is death."[5] A. A. Hodge puts it, "The entire penalty of the law, including all the spiritual, physical, and eternal consequences of sin, is called death in Scripture. Hence, when Christ bore the penalty of sin, it was necessary for Him to die."[6] Eternal death is therefore the penalty due by the sinner to the divine law, or claimed by divine justice.[7] Further, *our guilt*, that is, our legal responsibility for penalty, was laid upon Christ as our substitute; in other words, He undertook to endure "eternal death" for our sakes, in our stead; it was charged upon and punished in Him.[8] We are further informed that "the sufferings of Christ were not a *substitute* for the infliction of *the penalty of the law* (*i.e.* not a substitute for 'eternal death'), but the *penalty itself* (viz. 'eternal death') inflicted on their substitute."[9] This is language strenuous enough to satisfy a Gerhard or Burman; but let us look farther. What then was the real nature of Christ's sufferings? Notwithstanding that they were a "strict penal satisfaction,"[10]—words which surely suggest endurance of the strict penalty, namely, "eternal death,"—we are assured that Christ "did not suffer the same sufferings, either in kind, degree, or duration, which would have been inflicted on them."[11] He did, however, "suffer *precisely* that suffering which divine *justice* demanded of His person standing in their stead;"—but if this was not *the penalty* which was

[1] Vol. ii. p. 473. [2] P. 480. [3] P. 189. [4] P. 491.
[5] P. 516. [6] *Outlines*, p. 548. [7] C. Hodge, pp. 491, 494.
[8] A. A. Hodge, p. 406.
[9] *Ut supra*, p. 405. "He bore their guilt, and suffered the penalty of the law in their stead," C. Hodge, p. 499; cf. p. 492.
[10] A. A. Hodge, p. 405.
[11] A. A. Hodge, p. 406. On the meaning of death, see also C. Hodge, ii. 120, where it is made to include both "spiritual and eternal death."

imputed to Him on our account, *i.e.* justly imputed to Him, how can it be "precisely" what divine *justice* demanded?

Still further, to the Socinian objection, "that Christ did not suffer the penalty of the law, because that included essentially (*a*) remorse, (*b*) eternal death," Dr. A. A. Hodge replies, "The penalty of the law is essentially simple divine displeasure, involving the withdrawal of the life-giving communion of the Holy Ghost. This in the case of every creature (*a*) leads to spiritual death, (*b*) hence is naturally everlasting. Christ suffered this displeasure and desertion (Matt. xxvii. 46); but being a divine person, spiritual death was impossible." Implicitly the penalty due to man, *i.e.* "eternal death,"[1] which was charged on our substitute, is here converted into something that *leads to* spiritual death; and this something that *leads* to spiritual or eternal death is borne by Christ. This may be quite true; in fact, this explanatory statement is more satisfactory than the original statement; but the two are not in agreement — the one explains the other away, or at all events whittles it down. In the same connection as above, we are also told that Christ "suffered precisely *that kind, and degree, and duration* of pain which divine wisdom, *interpreting* divine justice, required in a divine person vicariously suffering the penalty of human sin; for the same reason, the temporal suffering of one divine person is a full legal equivalent for the *ill-desert* of mankind."[2] Originally, Christ endured "the penalty itself," "not a substitute for the penalty;" now it is "that kind or degree which divine wisdom interpreting divine justice"[3] requires; in other words, if words have any meaning, "a *substitute* for the infliction of the penalty," and not "the penalty *itself*—which in point

[1] A. A. Hodge, p. 414.

[2] *L.c.* p. 414; cf. C. Hodge, p. 473: "The perfection of the satisfaction of Christ is due, not to His having suffered, either in kind or degree, what the sinner would have been required to endure, but principally to the dignity of His person," p. 483.

[3] A. A. Hodge, p. 414.

of fact Christ could not endure." As Dr. C. Hodge puts it, "there must be enough of self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and inherent value to the proffered atonement."[1] But surely to use words like "enough" about sufferings which are elsewhere described as a "full and perfect satisfaction," as a "bearing of the penalty of the law,"[2] and as "infinitely transcending in value" the sufferings of sinners,[3] is, to say the least, an incongruity. The fact is, some of these expressions and whittlings smack strongly of the *acceptilatio* theory, on which both writers pour out the vials of their theological indignation.[4]

And what shall we make of words like the following? "All that the Church teaches when it says that Christ satisfied divine justice for the sins of men is, that what He did and suffered was a real adequate compensation for the penalty remitted and the benefits conferred. His sufferings and death were adequate to accomplish all the ends designed by the punishment of the sins of men;"[5] and of a statement such as that the sufferings inflicted on sinners are inflicted in execution of the penalty of the law, and for the infinitely important object of maintaining its authority?[6] Taken in conjunction with ambiguous terms, like "enough," "adequate," "equivalent," already referred to, the whole exposition seems to wear a certain air of uncertainty. It has a sort of facing-both-ways character.

How different the position taken up by older theologians like Gerhard! That was, at all events, intelligible. Eternal death they assumed to be the penalty to which man was liable, and which his substitute undertook to pay to the broken law. Justice requires the exact penalty, *i.e.* to quote again A. A. Hodge's words, "the penalty itself, not a substitute," —the full, perfect penalty. Christ paid that penalty, not indeed extensively, but intensively; not as to

[1] C. Hodge, vol. ii. p. 475.
[2] P. 479.
[3] P. 471.
[4] See p. 486 ff.
[5] P. 471.
[6] P. 205.

duration or quantity, but as to quality. The brevity of His pains were outweighed by the intensity of the suffering which He was capable of enduring because He was the Son of God. They did not say that His "dignity" made up for the lack; but that His "dignity" enabled Him to suffer as much in the short time He was engaged in His earthly mission as man would have endured throughout all eternity, *i.e.* an infinite measure of suffering. By the surreptitious substitution of this term "dignity" and others, a departure is effected from the doctrine of a real, full satisfaction to justice, to which the Hodges attach so much importance.

The modifications on which I have just remarked seem to me to lead logically to the Governmental position. The feeling, or thought, or mental attitude which gives rise to them is one that will find no rest till landed there. Not that there is any intention of the kind, but there is a consistency which is independent of the intention or even resistance of individual minds. The two extremes of the juridical point of view are, that of the early systematic theologians of the Continent to one or two of whom reference was made, on the one hand, and the Governmental scheme represented, say by Gilbert,[1] on the other. The "Old School" Presbyterian view, represented by the writers just criticized, is neither one thing nor the other, a half-way house occupied by travellers whose faces are set "New School" way.

Note IV. p. 33.

I am glad to see that *Dr. Shedd* has dared to express in vigorous language what seems to me the real Scripture position on this subject; nay, not merely the teaching of Scripture, but that also of any

[1] Gilbert, *Atonement*, elsewhere referred to, seems to me to be the most thoroughgoing Governmentalist who has yet appeared.

philosophy that penetrates into the true significance and substance of the ethical and the personal.[1] "Christ's priestly work has an objective reference, namely, it affects and influences the Divine Being. . . . Whatever be the effect wrought by the vicarious death of the Son of God, it is wrought upon the divine nature.[2] If it *appeases*, it appeases that nature; if it *propitiates*, it propitiates that nature; if it *satisfies*, it satisfies that nature; if it *reconciles*, it reconciles that nature. A merely *subjective* reference requires a forced exegesis of Scripture.

"At the same time, revelation plainly teaches that the *author* of this atoning influence and effect upon the Divine Being is the Divine Being Himself. God propitiates, appeases, satisfies, reconciles God. None of these are the acts of the creature. In all this work of propitiation, reconciliation, and redemption, God Himself is the originating and active agent. He is therefore both *active* and *passive;* both *agent* and *patient*. God is the Being who is angry at sin; and God is the Being who propitiates this anger. God is the offended party, and He is the One who reconciles the offended party. . . .

"The doctrine of vicarious atonement consequently implies that in *God there exist simultaneously both wrath and compassion*. . . . The propitiation is no oblation *ab extra*, no device of a third party, or even of sinful man himself, to render God placable towards man. It is wholly *ab intra* a self-oblation on the part of the Deity Himself." So far I agree, save perhaps as to some turns of expression, with Dr. Shedd: the end of Christ's passion was to affect the relation of God to man, and of course man's relation to God; and God Himself it is, not another, who does what is needed to be done in order to bring about this change.[3]

[1] In his just issued *Dogmatic Theology*, 2 vols. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

[2] I should, for myself, prefer saying, *one* aspect of its twofold effect.

[3] See vol. ii. p. 398 ff. Our *dilettanti* indeed, who largely owe their theology to hysterical novels like *Robert Elsmere*, *Donovan*, et hoc

But my agreement stops at this point, and afterwards becomes disagreement. His view of the *modus operandi* seems to me not to fit his view of the end. As to the end to be accomplished so far as the above statements go, Dr. Shedd belongs decidedly to the personal subdivision of the objective class: in treating of the *mode* of accomplishment I should have to apply to him a good deal of the criticism applied to Turretine, Drs. C. and A. A. Hodge, and others. If I may indicate the kernel of my objections in a word, it is this:—he tries to show how an essentially personal *ethical* end—the appeasement of moral indignation in God—can be accomplished by *legal* or forensic processes. The legal is not of course unethical, still less anti-ethical; but it is a low stage of the ethical. There is a point, I think, at which even an analogy to the forensic or to "public justice" may enter, but it cannot take the place assigned it in Dr. Shedd's system.[1]

I am disposed to think that Dr. Shedd does not consistently keep to the personal Godward end, which he so well brings into view in the passage I quoted. In fact, the view he takes of the *modus operandi* would prevent his doing so.

Note V. p. 104.

As Mr. Gladstone well puts it,—

"A *κοινωνία*, a common life: a common life in the family, in the nation, in the tribe, and in each of the relations which each of these contain, was, apart from direct manifestations of the divine will, the grand counteractor of the disorganizing essence of self-worship. . . . Yet there can be no doubt that, as the records of ancient history too plainly testify, the

genus omne, and to *Aufklärung* newspapers and periodicals, will naturally discharge the usual volley of adjectives at Dr. Shedd's representation. Be it so; let them settle the matter with the New Testament, especially with Christ and John.

[1] See p. 422 ff.

ordinary and habitual relation of man to man, when independent of any form of positive affinity or fellowship, was one of hostility. . . . The rights of hospitality might, indeed, create reciprocal obligations between individuals who were personally strange to one another; but they always had reference to community of race or of nation, or to some specific acts, as their basis. . . . There was a law that in various degrees bound father to son [among the Greeks]; but there was no law that bound man to man and nation to nation. And we find only the partial reconstructions of primitive obligation in the several divinely ordained forms of a common life, constituted by the union of men into bodies."[1]

Note VI. p. 107.

"The universe everywhere bears testimony to oneness of life and action. . . . The Grecian tongue spoke with an unbiassed simplicity in giving it the name of *κόσμος*, or essential order: arrangement everywhere referred to a single and prevailing law. Plato has delivered, in the noblest manner, the conception of that fellowship which sustains the universe and controls the tendencies to disorder: *φασὶ δ' οἱ σόφοι, ὦ Καλλικλεῖς, καὶ οὐρανον, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θεοὺς, καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τὴν κοινωνίαν ξυνέχειν, καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ κοσμότητα, καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ δικαιότητα· καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν.*[2] The Latins retained in their language, and have conveyed into ours, the fundamental notion of *τὸ πᾶν*, of a fixed point and a revolving system, the *universum*.[3] The idea is that expressed in the fine lines of Virgil:—

[1] *Relations of Church and State.*

[2] Plat. *Gorg.* i. 137, quoted by W. E. Gladstone, *State in its Relations with the Church*, i. 46 ff.

[3] Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 43.

Cœlum ac terras, camposque liquentes
Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque Astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.[1]

The noblest of heathen minds referred the law of mutual association to our nature, and not to any device of the conscious understanding :—

mundi
Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
Tantum animas ; nobis animum quoque ; mutuus ut nos
Affectus petere auxilium et præstare juberet ;
Dispersos trahere in populum, migrare vetusto
De nemore, et proavis habitatas linquere sylvas.
JUVENAL, *Sat.* xv. 148."[2]

See also the following remarks expressing Mr. Gladstone's own views :—

"This joint or common life is what is ordinarily intimated by the phrase, the personality of societies. That phrase becomes applicable when the community of law, sentiment, and interest assumes the determinate form of incorporation, and becomes subject internally to a deliberative regulating principle. It is not any mere metaphysical or theological abstraction, nor a phrase invented for the purpose of discussion, but a reality, having its own palpable exponents in the persons of those who are the organs of the societies."[3]

Compare also E. Burke :—

"Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure ; but the State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some such other low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence ; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership

[1] *Æn.* vi. 724.
[2] Gladstone, *l.c.* p. 54.
[3] *L.c.* p. 65 ; cf. also *l.c.* pp. 108–110, 84, 86 f., 90.

in all science; it is a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular State is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible worlds, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those who, by an obligation above them and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law.

"He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also the necessary means of its perfection; He willed therefore the State; He willed its connection with the source and archetype of all perfection. They who are convinced of this His will, which is the law of laws and the sovereign of sovereigns, cannot think it reprehensible that this our corporate fealty and homage, that this our recognition of a signiory paramount—I had almost said this oblation of the State itself, as a worthy offering on the high altar of universal praise—should be performed as all publick solemn acts are performed—in buildings, in musick, in decoration, in speech, in the dignity of persons, according to the custom of mankind, taught by their nature; this is, with modest splendour, with unassuming state, with mild majesty, and sober pomp."[1]

Coleridge expresses himself as follows:—

"The records of the Hebrew polity are rendered far less instructive as lessons of political wisdom by the disposition to regard the Jehovah in that universal and spiritual acceptation in which we use the word as Christians. For relatively to the Jewish polity the

[1] E. Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, 1790, pp. 143 f., 146.

Jehovah was their covenanted King; and if we draw any inference from the former or Christian sense of the term, it should be this: that God is the unity of every nation; that the convictions and the will, which are one, the same and simultaneously acting in a multitude of independent agents, are not the birth of any individual; that when the people speak loudly and unanimously, it is from their being strongly impressed by the Godhead or the demon. Only exclude the idea of a demoniac possession, and then *vox populi* is *vox Dei*. It was in the character of the king, as the majesty or symbolic unity of the whole nation, both of the State and of the persons; it was in the name of the king, in whom both the propriety and the nationality ideally centred; and from whom, as from a fountain, they are ideally supposed to flow; it was in the name of the king that the proclamation throughout the land, by sound of trumpet, was made to all possessors: The land is not yours, saith the Lord, the land is mine! To you I lent it!"[1]

"The correspondence between the body politic and the body natural holds even in the detail of application."

Note VII. p. 118.

The ethical or personal law alluded to in the text is touched on in passing by *David Hume*, when he writes, "It is not conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one."[2] *Professor Calderwood* also refers to it in still more significant and pregnant terms, as follows: "Affections take the form of Love or Hate (antipathy) according as the objects of them are

[1] Coleridge, *Church and State*, 1852, pp. 47–49, 100. Compare Herbert Spencer's *Sociology*.

[2] "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals." *Essays*, section i. p. 1. (Vol. ii. p. 215.)

esteemed, in any sense, good or bad; and the form of Reverence or Pity, according as the object is esteemed either superior or inferior in nature and experience. Desires invariably seek what is accounted a personal gain. But affections are of two classes, seeking either the benefit or the restraint of others. In the latter class, affections have an element of *self-protection, which is of great moral significance.*"[1]

The law spoken of in the text is easy enough to understand, its application, too, plain enough, as long as men are normal, and their relations normal. That every one should render to his neighbour or fellow-man the respect, trust, and love—not to speak of the modes in which these inward activities, or sentiments, or feelings embody or manifest themselves—which are his due, all right-minded men will at once allow. The difficulty begins when the respect in any case becomes disrespect, the trust, distrust, the love, aversion. Suppose my fellow-man cherish (and express more or less distinctly) towards me disrespect, distrust, dislike, which I have consciously done nothing to deserve, what shall be my inward relation to him? Can I go on regarding him as I regarded him before his mode of regarding me underwent a change? Ought I to do so? If I think his conduct due to involuntary misunderstanding on his part, it will be my duty to do what I can to clear up the misunderstanding, and thus to render possible a normal relation between us. But what about my "feelings" till I succeed? Can they, ought they, to remain unchanged? If his conduct is due to some fault of my own, of which I had been unaware till I saw its effect on him, it will clearly be my duty to confess it; and shall I not say to myself, "I deserved that he should thus regard me; he did right to regard me thus; it was good for me to be regarded thus"? But if it should be impossible to put such a construction on the conduct of my fellow-man; if I have to give a less

[1] See Professor Calderwood's most comprehensive *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, 13th ed. p. 155.

favourable account of it, what then? Can I, should I, go on regarding him as at first?

The reply will possibly come quickly, Did not Christ command us to love our enemies—to love and not to hate? Undoubtedly. But one may also ask the question in return, Did Christ regard His enemies with exactly the same "feelings," *i.e.* respect, trust, love, as He regarded His friends? Was "that fox" Herod just the same to Him as the "beloved disciple"? Judas as Peter? Peter denying Him, and Peter penitent? If not, what was the nature of the difference?

Two considerations need, however, to be kept in view, when dealing with the application of the law, or rather with conformity to the law—supposing it to be a law—"I to thee as thou to me." The *first* is, due care should be taken that the relation be proportionate alike in quality and quantity. "I to thee *as* thou to me; that is, as thou really art to me, not more nor less; not other." It is the manner of men who carry out this principle,—and most men do, in fact are only too ready to carry it out,—first, to neglect inquiring whether they may not have done something to cause their fellow-man's abnormal relation; they either assume that they are perfectly clear and innocent, or ignore the reverse fact; secondly, they exaggerate the feelings which they condemn; thirdly, they attribute feelings which are not cherished; and as a result, they pronounce a moral condemnation which is not deserved. In view of these dangers to which even the best of men are exposed, a broad rule like that of Christ is needed. Probably, too, the reason of our Lord's injunction is to be sought here. The *second* consideration is this, that if the resentment felt by us is what it should be, resentment at injustice, at wrong—truly moral resentment; if we are not merely stirred by the inconvenience or pain caused to our individual selves; if, on the contrary, this latter—which in itself is, of course, inevitable and legitimate enough as far as it goes—is taken up into, or rather

is never dissociated from, but blended with the former, transfigured, immanently ethicized by it: then efforts will of necessity be at once put forth to put an end to the wrong relation, as wrong, as unjust. How can true resentment against wrong, and aversion to relations which are wrong, be felt by a man of right moral character, without his being stirred up to do his best to rectify them? In other words, whilst conforming to the law, "I to thee as thou to me," in its abnormal phase, he will do his best to bring about a relation on the part of the offender that shall render possible the normal realization of the law. He who is unjustly treated must show in his conduct that he is sensible of the injustice; but inasmuch as it is injustice he resents, he must at the same time seek to put an end to the injustice, — which will be possible only by changing the attitude of the offender, inducing the offender to alter his behaviour.

We are therefore brought face to face with a strange antinomy:—The law of our personal being compels us to treat the undeserved disrespect of our fellow-man with disrespect, his undeserved distrust with distrust, his undeserved aversion with aversion, in due proportion; yet, inasmuch as these relations of ours, according to the law, are relations to injustice, to moral wrong as such, the same law demands of us that we do all in our power to convert the disrespect into respect, the distrust into trust, the aversion into love.

One other point I would just touch on before closing this very fragmentary note: — The law in question is rooted in the essential and distinctive nature of personality as self-controlled. Persons are bound to take persons as they give or reveal themselves. No one has a right to say of a man, "I will treat him as I think proper." I have to accept his self-controlled decision primarily as his, as self-controlled. If I refuse, I treat him as if he occupied a lower level than myself; I violate his rights as a free being. When, then, I duly reciprocate his personal

relation, I am giving him his due—the due which is of all dues most sacred, least to be withheld. But as the giving of his due involves me in abnormality, caused by his prior abnormality; and as, further, so long as the relation lasts, I am robbed of my due: clearly a due regard for right, in every respect, will impel me to do my utmost to bring the offender to a right mind.

Note VIII. p. 142.

"The more eminent the great heroes of the Bible are for holiness of life, the more intensely do they realize their oneness with the people whose pastors and priests they are, and take upon themselves the burden of their nation's transgressions and sins. Listen to Abraham interceding on the plains of Mamre for the guilty inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. xviii. 23); to Moses pleading the cause of rebellious Israel (Ex. xxxii. 31); to Jeremiah (Lam. iii. 42), Nehemiah (i. 5–11), Daniel (ix. 20), all identifying themselves in their sublime prayers with their sinning countrymen, and charging themselves with their iniquities. Themselves blameless in the midst of an idolatrous race, they forget their own righteousness, while they accept for themselves the consequences of the falls and sins of Israel. 'We have sinned,' they exclaim, 'we have transgressed, we have rebelled against Thee; to us belongeth confusion of face, because we have sinned against Thee.' And St. Paul, last of the heroic line of Scripture heroes, 'could wish that he himself were accursed from Christ, for His brethren, his kinsmen according to the flesh' (Rom. ix. 3)."[1]

[1] Bersier, *Solidarity of Humanity*.

Note IX. p. 146.

"How natural in all decisive circumstances is symbolic representation to all kinds of men! . . . A whole nation gathered in the name of the Highest, under the eye of the Highest; Imagination herself flagging under the reality; and all noblest ceremony as yet not grown ceremonial, but solemn, significant to the utmost fringe" (Carlyle, *French Rev.* vol. ii. Bk. I. c. ix., quoted by Cave, *Sacrifice*, etc., p. 110).

The pleas advanced in favour of a national recognition of religion draw their force from such facts as have been under consideration. A nation should show reverence and love to God in its corporate, national capacity. If the history of Israel teaches any lesson at all, it is the lesson that God required of it, national loyalty, as well as the loyalty of individuals; that to be faithful to Him in its national capacity, rendering unto Him the reverence, love, worship, homage due unto His name, was to ensure His favour and blessing: whilst to go a-whoring from Him as a nation, was to bring upon themselves misery and ruin. The experience of Christian nations read in the light of the promises and threatenings of the Old Testament supplies ample confirmation of the principle. A State as such ought to be a Christian State. Christ is as truly the Lord of men in their corporate as in their individual relations and activities. The only question is how this recognition of the national relation to God is to be made, and made under existing conditions. By making the ministers of religion, whether of all sections or of only one section of the Christian Church, guaranteed servants of the State? Or by having a chaplain to offer prayer at the opening of the deliberations of the Houses of Parliament or representatives? Or by occasional days of humiliation and rejoicing? Yes, if a nation were as much one in belief, sentiment, purpose, as was Israel: but a modern European nation! No one of the methods

mentioned and actually in operation can be regarded by unprejudiced eyes as tolerable.

Note X. p. 185.

"In the law, Lev. i. 5, no mention is made of the sons of Aaron in relation to mactation, but it has left that to every one's own pleasure. But for the purpose of taking the blood the priest is necessary; for our wise men have determined that the sacerdotal office begins at the receiving the blood" (Maimonides in Mishna v. 15, *Essay*, etc., p. 207). We read further, that "the killing of holy things may be lawfully done by strangers; even of the most holy things, whether they be the holy things of a particular person or of the congregation." So Maimonides in Brath Hamikdash ch. ix. § 6. The Mishna also says, "The slaying done by all profane persons, *i.e.* those who are not priests, is lawful, because slaying is lawfully done by strangers, women, servants, and the unclean, even in the most holy things, provided the unclean do not touch the flesh" (*De Sacrificiis*, vol. v. p. 15). "All may kill their sacrifice, and their mactation is lawful, except a deaf man, a fool, and a minor" (Mishna, *tit. de profanis*, v. p. 114, *Essay*, etc., 207 ff.).

"Priests were not originally employed among the Gentiles to slay the victims; but only to interpret signs or prognosticate. In Homer the ἱερεύς is never represented as concerned with mactation; but the offerer always killed the victim, burnt it, and prayed. Orpheus is described as knowing the ways of beasts, and birds, and the position of the entrails, and what dreams portend, and the solutions of signs and prodigies, and the course of the stars, and purifications, and the appeasements of the gods, and the various gifts of men" (*Orphei Argon.* l. 33 ff.); . . . "but it is nowhere represented as his duty to sacrifice or slay victims, or to pour out or offer the blood or

burn the parts of the animal to any of the gods." On certain solemn occasions, however, priests did perform the office. Thus Laocoon, priest of Thymbræan Apollo, was chosen by lot Priest of Neptune, and he

> Solennes taurum ingentem mactabat ad aras.
> *Æn.* ii. 202.

That this was the custom of the Greeks is clear from Homer, *Odyss.* iii. 439–460.

By degrees, however, as priests became more expert than others, and as niceties with regard to victims increased,—perhaps, too, because in general men disliked the task,—the whole business came to be relegated to them; till at last the idea grew up that it was their proper function, and necessary to the efficacy of the sacrifices.[1]

Note XI. p. 187.

Representative Sacrifices for the Nation.

"When the Spaniards conquered Mexico they found a gigantic and elaborate system of human sacrifices, which exceeded all that had appeared in history. The annual ceremonies consumed several days, and the immolations of victims counted, not by thousands, but by tens of thousands. It was the function of the Mexican Government, and devolved upon what might be called the Home Office, to expiate the sins of the whole population of Mexico; and so radically was the sacrificial system made a State object, that it affected even the foreign policy of the empire. . . . The blood of human victims thus flowed in such torrents that not a single sin could escape expiation in the whole empire of Mexico; and the monarch as representative of the interests of his subjects could point to most conspicuous success.

[1] *Essay*, etc., p. 214 f.

"Human sacrifices originated in the idea that what justice required was so much suffering, vicarious or otherwise. Assuming that the more suffering the more expiation, careless whether it was voluntary or involuntary, the idea of sacrifice could not rest in brutes as victims, but must go on to men, who could suffer more intensely." [1]

Note XII. p. 215.

If we may take the ideas of the later Jews as laid down in the Talmud and elsewhere as at all representative of what their forefathers believed, there can be little doubt that objective efficacy was attributed to the sacrifices. In the popular estimate, no sacrifice was more efficacious than that which was offered for the people at large every morning and evening. "In Midrasch Rabba on Num. xxi., we read, 'No man could pass the night in Jerusalem laden with sin. How was this? The daily morning sacrifice expiated the sins committed during the night, and the evening sacrifice expiated the sins committed during the day.' Again, in the oldest Palestinian Midrasch on Num. xxviii. it is said, 'Why did the daily sacrifice consist of sheep? What was their symbolical meaning?' The School of Schammai taught כְּבָשִׂים = כְּבָשִׁים = Pressers down, suppressers of the sins of Israel, as it is said in Micah vii. 19, 'He (God) will suppress our sins.' The School of Hillel, on the other hand, teaches, that which is suppressed comes to light again; but the significance of the sheep of the sacrifice reminds us of the verb כָּבַס, to wash, they purify all the sins of Israel and make Israel free from all sins, just like a child of a year old. Two of these sacrifices are appointed for each day as *παράκλητοι*, on the particular day of which it is said in Mal. iii. 17, 'They shall be

[1] Mozley's *Sermons*, "Atonement," pp. 164, 165.

my property, saith the Lord Sabaoth, on the day which I will *make.*'"[1]

"The blood of the sinner in equity ought to have been poured out and his body burnt, as was the blood of the victim poured out and its body burnt" (Moses ben Nachman). "God in His mercy and goodness took the victim instead of, and an expiation for, the offender"—"Blood for blood, soul for soul" (Rabb. Bechai).[2]

Amongst the Hindoos, "The design of sacrifices varied according to the circumstances. By the sacrifice of a horse everything desirable was secured. The Brahmanas have a tradition, however, that its proper end was the ransom of the offerer's own person. Some hold the original meaning of animal sacrifices to be that they were substitutes for human sacrifices. It was sought to deprive the rite of the character of a bloody sacrifice; the blood which was once offered to Rudra is no more applied to this purpose, but consecrated to the evil spirits, quite contrary to the custom of other Indo-Germanic peoples."

"The killing of the victims is as it were symbolically nullified; for through Agni, in which they are presented, they are conceived as being born anew, and as therefore coming alive to the gods.

"When a man vows a vow, he is forfeited to the gods, and ransoms himself by a sacrifice; in like manner as a corpse is born anew when it is burnt, and enters heaven therefore alive. The animals sacrificed act as his representatives in heaven."[3]

[1] Biesenthal, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 250.

[2] See *Essay on Sacrifice*, p. 149; cf. Outram, *De Sacrificiis*, pp. 274–277.

[3] See Schwalb, *Thieropfer*, etc., pp. 16–20; compare p. 100 ff. on the mactation of the animal.

INDEX.

ABARBANEL, 154, 181, 182.
Abelard, 44, 109, 390.
Aben Ezra, 144.
Absoluteness of God, 254.
Acceptilation, 20, 22, 23, 416.
Adam Bremensis, De situ Daniæ, 176.
Adoption, 285.
Advanced school, 1.
Alexander the Great, 138.
Alexander, Dr., Biblical Theology, 154, 229.
Amberley, Analysis of Religious Belief, 201.
Ambrose, 405.
Andrews, Latin Dictionary, 165.
Angels, 82, 83.
Anger, genetically considered, 239; in the animal world, 240; in man, 242; corporeal and psychical elements in, 245 ff.; condemnation of, in Scripture, 250; discussion of the same, 250, 423 ff.; justifiable in certain cases, 252. *See* Resentment.
Anger of God, 33, 34, 59, 217 ff.; Scripture references to, 217–219; anthropopathic conception of, 223; doctrinal exposition of, 236 ff.; objections thereto, 250 ff. Views of, taken by Augustine, 224 ff.; Böhme, 233; Clemens Alexandrinus, 223; Crawford, 228; Gerhard, 227; Irenæus, 223; Lactantius, 222; Martensen, 231; Origen, 223; Pye Smith, 228; Schöberlein, 232; Tertullian, 220; Wardlaw, 229.
Animal world, principle of individuality in, 108.
Anselm, 55, 390; his Cur Deus Homo, 55–58.
Anthropopathism, in relation to anger of God, 223 ff.; and forgiveness of sins, 291.
Apologia Confessionis Augustanæ, 31, 157, 272.
Apologia Confessionis Würtemburgicæ, 273.
Apuleius, 368.
Architecture, Gothic, 392.
Aristotle, 108.
Arnobius, Versus Gentes, 368.
Art, Italian, 392.
Arthur, W., Physical and Moral Law, 111.
Athanasius, 390.
Athenæus, 161, 175.
Atonement, day of, 144; and prayer, 342 ff.; objective and subjective views of, 349 f. *See* Theories of Atonement; also Crucifixion of Christ, Death of Christ, End of Christ's Work, Forgiveness of Sins, Mediator, Passion of Christ, Propitiation, Ransom, Reconciliation, Redeemer, Relations of Man to God, Sacrifices, Sacrifice of Christ, Substitute, Sufferings of Christ, Vicarious Element in Christ's Work.
Augustine, 390, 404; on Manichæan Heresy, 225; Enchiridion, 225, 271; on Trinity, 225; City of God, 226, 271; on Merits and Forgiveness of sin, 270; Exposit. of the Sermon on the Mount, 271.

BÄHR, Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus, 153, 170, 174, 179, 180, 184–188, 193, 197, 207, 210.
Bain, A., 13.
Barnabas, Epistle of, 382.
Barnes, Albert, 49.
Bartholomäi, 253 f., 261.
Basil, 390.
Baumgarten-Crusius, on Anselm, 55.
Baur, 12, 380, 390; Gnosis, 233; Kirchengeschichte, 395 ff.; N. T. Theology, 397; Versöhnungslehre, 404; Views on the Resurrection of Christ, 395; on Death of Christ, 396; criticism of these, 397.
Bechai, Rabbi, 432.
Biesenthal, Epistle to the Hebrews, 432.
Bernhard, 390.

Bertheau, Weissagung über Israels Reichsherrl, 254.
Bersier, Oneness of the Race in its Fall and in its Future, 107, 427.
Bhagavad-gita, 201.
Biedermann, Dogmatik, 64.
Binney, T., View of Christ's Work, 59.
Blood-sprinkling in sacrificial rites, 191; meaning of, 196.
Böhme, Jacob, 63, 233.
Boissier, La Religion Romaine, 170.
Bonaventura, 391.
Bretschneider, System. Entwickelung, 278.
Briggs' Messianic Prophecy, 153.
Brooke, Stopford, Sermon on Atonement, 361.
Browning, R., Christmas Eve, 119; Dramatic Lyrics, 104, 346.
Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, 101.
Burge, Caleb, Scripture Doctrine of Atonement, 28.
Burke, Life of, by John Morley, 137.
Burke, Thoughts on the French Revolution, 136, 422.
Burning of sacrifices, 200; meaning of, 206.
Bushnell, 7, 39, 283; Life and Light of Men, 39; Vicarious Sacrifice, 39.

Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 98.
Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, 424.
Calvin, 7, 31, 288, 292; Institutes, 31, 276, 303.
Campbell, M'Leod, Theory of Atonement, 38.
Candlish, Lectures on Kingdom of God, 76.
Curcellæus, 23.
Carlyle, T., On Heroes and Hero-Worship, 137; French Revolution, 428.
Catechesis Heidelbergensis, 274.
Catholic Theories of Atonement, 16, 23.
Cave, Sacrifices, 153, 428.
Chalcedon, Symbol of, 2.
Chinese sacrifices, 161.
Christ, as Son of man, 305; as humanity's Representative and Head, 36, 336 f.; root of humanity, 321; His original relation to humanity, 292; as Logos, 294—*see* Logos; as channel between God and man, 293; His sympathy, 311; and the Powers of Darkness, 319. *See* also Crucifixion of Christ, Death of Christ, Incarnation, Mediator, Mission of Christ, Logos, Passion of Christ, Representative, Saviour, Son of God.
Church, Schleiermacher's view of, 61.
Church Quarterly Review, 308.
Churches, national, 428.
Cicero, 347, 368, 420.
Clarke, Samuel, 13.
Clausen, Baader's Leben und Ideen, 261.
Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus, 346.
Clemens Alexandrinus, 164, 223, 401; Stromata, 384, 385; Pædagogus, 384, 385.
Clement, Epistle of, 381.
Coleridge, Church and State, 423.
Confessio Augustana, 272, 274.
Confessio Belgica, 274.
Confessio Helvetica, 274.
Confessio Saxonica, 32, 273, 275.
Confessio Würtembergica, 31.
Constantine's edicts of toleration, 387.
Constitution of humanity, 98 ff.
Controllable relations, 112 ff.
Corban, 154.
Corporate relations of men to God, 130.
Crawford, 8 ff., 18 ff., 228, 279.
Crucifixion of Christ, terrible sin of, 330; how regarded by His contemporaries, 363 ff.; by Greeks and Romans, 363 ff.; by His disciples, 370; by His *immediate* disciples, 375; by Paul, 379; by Apostolic and Ante-Nicene Fathers, 381; in still later times, 387 ff.; its apparent insignificance and world-wide influence, 394. *See* Death of Christ.
Crusades, the, 392.
Crypto-dualistic theories of the Atonement, 9 ff., 54.
Crypto-humanitarianism explained, 2 ff.
Cudworth, Ralph, 13.
Cunningham, History of Theology, 26.
Cyprian, 386.

Dale, R. W., Atonement, 12, 28, 32, 113, 282–284, 292, 303, 328, 332; article in British Quarterly Review, 12 ff.
Dante, 137.
Daub, 63.
De Maistre, Soirées, 207.
Death of Christ, for remission of sins, fact, of revealed in N. T., 65; and in the Lord's Supper, 65. Historical influence of, 362. *See* also Crucifixion of Christ.
Debt, sin a, 17, 26.
Dependence on God, man's, 127; Schleiermacher's view of religion, 128.

Devil, place given him in early theories of the Atonement, 10 ff., 404 ff. ; as Prince of this world, 86.
Differentiation, law of, 98.
Diocletian, persecution of, 387.
Diognetus, Epistle to, 382.
Dionysius Halicarnassus, 171.
Dithmar, 177.
Doctrine of Atonement as aiming to exhibit rationale of Christ's work, 66 ff.
Döllinger, Heidenthum u. Judenthum, 170, 173, 174, 179.
Donovan, 418.
Dorner, 332 ; his theory of the Atonement, 37 ; Glaubenslehre, 12, 38, 55, 105, 111, 292, 338 ; Sittenlehre, 98 ff. ; Christologie, 2, 303 ; Unchangeableness of God, 117, 255.
Douglas, Confucianism, 186.
Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, 80, 342.
Duncker, 11.
Duns Scotus, 23, 391.
Dynamic theories of Atonement, 54.

Ebrard, 210.
End of Christ's mission and work, 8, 52, 89, 90 ; to establish normal relations, 92 ff.
Environment, functions of, 342 ; man's relation to his, 343 ; his energy derived from, 343 ; God great factor in man's, 344.
Epictetus, 347.
Episcopal Churches, Protestant, 101.
Episcopius, 23.
Ernst v. Lasaulx, Die Sühnopfer der Griechen u. Römer, 177.
Ethnic religions, 83 ; sacrifices in, *see* Sacrifices.
Euripides, Hecuba, 194.
Eusebius, Præp. Evang., 175.
Evolution, of universe, 113 ; in Israel, 147.
Ewing, Bishop, 279.
Expiation, Dr. C. Hodge on, 412.

Faith, 329, 333, 341.
Fall of man, 96.
Feasts, three principal Jewish, 142.
Flesh of Christ, 307.
Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, 98.
Foreknowledge of God, 25 ff.
Forgiveness of sins, 263 ff. ; Biblical references to, 263–268 ; Biblical meaning of, 285 ; deviation of Church teaching from Biblical, 263, 285 ; personal element in, 285, 287 ff. ; as distinct from remission of penalties, 263 ; as rectification of relations, 284 ff. ; rationale of, 287. —Views of Augustine, 270 ; Burge, 278 ; Calvin, 275 ; Crawford, 279 ; Dale, 282 ; Heinrich von Diest, 277 ; Hodge, A. A., 281 ; Hodge, C., 280 ; Justin Martyr, 268 ; Lactantius, 269 ; Luther, 274 ; Melancthon, 275 ; Reinhard, 278 ; Pye Smith, 279 ; Tertullian, 268 ; Turrettine, 277 ; Ursinus, 276 ; Young, 279.—Also views set forth in Apologia Confessionis Augustanæ, 272, 274 ; in Apologia Confessionis Wurtembergicæ, 273 ; in Confessio Augustana, 272 ; in Confessio Saxonica, 273 ; in Formula Concordiæ, 273.
Formula Concordiæ, 273.

Gemara, the, 373.
Gerhard, 7, 26, 227, 416.
Gesenius, on Isaiah, 164.
Gess, theory of Atonement, 36 ff., 322 ; zur Lehre v. der Versöhnung, 37, 316, 321.
Gilbert, Josiah, Congregational Lecture, 51, 229, 417.
Gladstone, W. E., Church and State, 135, 420, 421.
God, as Ruler of the Universe, 17 ; Judge, 17 ; Creditor, 17 ; Offended Party, 17 ; as Myriad-sided, 99 ; unity of, 100 ; diversities in, 100. *See* Anger of God, Dependence on God, Immanence of God, Immutability of God ; Integrity of Divine Life, Justice of God, Kingdom of God, Laws of God, Love of God, and Relations of Man to God.
Göschel, 361.
Governmental theory of Atonement, 16, 17, 42, 45 ff., 289 ff., 417 ; as really identical with moral theory, 52-54.
Gregory the Great, 404, 406.
Gregory Nazianzen, 390.
Gregory of Nyssa, 390, 405.
Griffith, Gospel of Divine Life, 303.
Grotius, 7.
Guilt, Dr. C. Hodge on, 411.
Guion, Madame, 354.
Gurlitt, Worin besteht die Vergebung der Sünden, 275.

Hegel, 63, 93, 390.
Hegelianization of the Christian faith, 63.
Heinrich von Diest, 277.
Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus, 32, 273, 275, 277.
Herbart, 303.

Herbert, George, 354.
Herodotus, 164.
Hettinger, Apologie des Christenthums, 58.
High Priest, Jewish, 143.
Hilary, 390.
Hill, Principal, 52; theology, 20.
Hillel, school of, 431.
Hindoo sacrifices, 161.
Hodge, Dr. A. A., Outlines of Theology, 281, 413–415.
Hodge, Dr. C., Systematic theology, 8, 85, 280, 281; Perfection of Christ's Salvation, 410.
Hofmann, 52, 189, 197, 210.
Honour of God, 57.
Hugo, St. Victor, 390.
Huldrich, Historia Jeshuæ, 374.
Hume, David, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 423.
Humanitarianism, 5.
Humanity, constitution of, 98 ff.; as a self-developing organism, 104. *See* Man.

Identification of Christ's Work with Man's, 326.
Ignatius, Epistles of, 382.
Iliad, the, 187, 202, 203.
Immanence of God in man, 338. *See* Logos.
Immutability of God, 57, 116, 252.
Imposition of hands in sacrificial rites, 178 ff.; meaning of, 180.
Imprecatory psalms, 244.
Imputed righteousness, 341.
Incarnation, 59, 300, 305, 328; necessity of, 303. *See* also Logos and Mediator.
Individualism, 98, 110; among Israelites, 100.
Individuality, 98, 108, 109; recognised in Scripture, 99; our consciousness of, 338; in our relations to God, 99.
Integrity of the Divine life, 248 ff.
Intellect, as subordinate to heart and conscience, 122.
Internationalism, 104.
Irenæus, 10, 223, 303, 304, 384.
Isidore of Seville, 406.

Jerusalem, the heavenly, 81.
Jevons, Logic, 113.
John of Damascus, 390.
Josephus, Antiquities, 365, 372; Jewish War, 365.
Judicial satisfaction, 19.
Julian the Apostate, 388.
Juridical theory of Atonement, 30, 55.
Justice of God, 21, 23–27; discussion of meaning of, 29; Dr. C. Hodge on, 410.
Justin Martyr, 401; Dialogue with Trypho, 268, 373, 383 f.; Apologies, 383.
Juvenal, 347, 421.

Kant, 63.
Keil, Archæology of the O. T., 153, 157, 189, 198, 213.
Keim, Der Geschichtliche Christus, 400.
King, Mrs., the Disciples, 325.
Kingdom of Darkness, an unscriptural expression, 86.
Kingdom of God, 69 ff.; territory of, 78, 84; inhabitants or subjects of, 81, 84; constitution of, 83; physical laws of, 79; other laws of, 83, 147, 148; mutual relations between monarch and subjects of, 83; distinction of *de jure* and *de facto* in 84 ff., 147; rebellion in, 84, 86; Israel's history as beginning of, 141; method of establishing it, 148.
Kingdom of heaven, distinction between it and the kingdom of God, 88.
Kippēr, discussion of meaning of, 210.
Kleinert, Theorie des Opfers, 160, 163, 164, 169, 174, 179, 180, 185, 186, 187, 193, 194, 201, 206.
Kliefoth, 210.
Köstlin, 111; Theologie Luthers, 31, 274.
Kreibig, 116, 303.
Kuhn, 161.
Kurtz, Sacrificial Worship of the O. T., 153, 180, 188, 189, 196, 197, 207, 210, 211, 213.

La Potterie, History of North America, 204.
Lactantius, 368; on anger of God, 222, 269.
Lange, Zorn Gottes, 233, 236.
Law, senses in which used, 113.
Law, the, 24, 26, 54; Christ and, 408; Dr. C. Hodge on, 410.
Laws of God, 20, 79, 83, 147, 148.
Legge, Religions of China, 186.
Leo the Great, 390, 406.
Life in Christ theory, 339.
Limborch, 23.
Lipsius, Dogmatik, 61.
Livy, 368.
Loccenius, 177.
Logos, the, 294 ff.; activity of, previous to the incarnation, 302; as working in humanity, 332 ff., 338; as mediating between God and man, 338; as accessible to influences from the

human race, 334; incarnation of, 300 ff., 328; humanification of, 304; limitation of, 306; sufferings of, 305 ff.; as suffering servant of the Lord, 298; as working upon men both from within and from without, 333, 337.
Lord's Supper, as witnessing to fact of Christ's death for remission of sins, 65.
Lotze, 111.
Love of God, issuing in creation of man, 130; and anger of God, 260.
Love of man towards God, 125, 128 ff.
Lucian, Peregrinus Proteus, 367.
Luther, 7, 11, 13, 31, 274, 288, 328, 391, 392, 406, 408.
Lutheranism, 101.

MAGEE, BISHOP, the Atonement, 58, 59.
Maimonides, 157, 181, 194, 429.
Man, as an individual, 98 ff.; brought into being and sustained by God, 114; dependent on God, 114, 130; his consciousness of God, 115; his relation to the Logos, 297. *See* also Organic Unity of the Human Race.
Martensen, Dogmatik, 232, 292; Jacob Böhme, translated by Rhys Evans, 233.
Martineau, 7.
Marvell, A., the Dewdrop, 333.
Maurice, F. D., his theory of the Atonement, 34 ff.
Maximus Tyrius, 202.
Mediator, 7, 292 ff.
Mehring, Geschichts-Philosophie and Religionsphilosophie, 98, 292, 338.
Melancthon, Loci, 275.
Method of Christ, 91.
Michael Angelo, 351.
Michaelis, Typische Gottesgelahrtheit, 207.
Mill, J. S., Dissertations, 13.
Milton, John, 85, 137.
Minucius Felix, Octavius, 368.
Miracles, 72.
Mishna, 181, 373, 429.
Mission of Christ, 69 ff.; as episode in the history of the kingdom of God, 70.
Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, 171.
Monastic institutions, 391.
Montesquieu, 112.
Moral law, 14.
Morley, John, Life of Burke, 137.
Morris, Lewis, Epic of Hades, 312.
Moses ben Nachman, 432.
Mozley, Sermons, 215, 431.
Müller, Deutsche Zeitschr. für Christliche Wissenschaft und Christl. Leben, 303.
Müller, J. P., Die Symbolischen Bücher der evang. luth. Kirche, 273.

NÄGELSBACH, Nachhomerische Theologie, 178, 196.
Napoleon, 138.
Neander, Introduction to Church History, 299.
Neumann, 189.
Newman, F. W., Phases of Faith, 346.
Normal relations of man as an individual to God, 119.

OBEDIENCE unto death, Christ's, 6, 34, 54.
Odyssey, the, 194, 430.
Oehler, 144, 210; theology of O. T., 153, 182, 188, 198; in Herzog's Real-Encycl., 157, 184, 188, 196, 198, 207, 214.
Olai Wormius, 177.
Orelli, Messianic Prophecy, 154.
Organic theory of the Atonement, 54 ff.
Organic unity of the human race, 98 ff., 101, 104, 105, 107–109, 337, 338, 400; Biblical recognition of, 101, 102; Church as embodying idea of, 104; compared to a tree, 106; relations to God involved in, 107, 130; as expressed in united worship, 132; as witnessed to in great national crises, 133.
Origen, 11, 223, 385, 386, 406; Contra Celsum, 367; Comm. on Epistle to Romans, 385; De Principiis, 224.
Outram, De Sacrificiis, 153, 156, 432.
Owen, 7.

PARK, DR. EDWARDS A., 52, 54; Atonement: Discourses and Treatises, 279, 310–315.
Passion of Christ, 292 ff.; nature of, 6; relation to establishment of Divine kingdom, 66; as the passion of man, 326 ff.
Pausanias, 169, 194.
Payne, George, 52.
Penalty of Sin, Dr. C. Hodge on, 411, 414. *See* also Punishment.
Perichōrēsis, 134.
Personal theory of Atonement, 24, 26, 27 ff.
Peter Lombard, 391, 406.
Philo, 174, 181, 371.
Philo Byblius, 175.
Philosophical theories of the Atonement, purely, 62.
Picart, Ceremonies and Religious Customs, 195, 204, 205, 206.

Plato, 202, 347, 420.
Plath, Cultus der alten Chinesen, 160, 161.
Pliny, 347.
Pliny the younger, Epistles, 366.
Plitt, Glaubenslehre, 292, 294, 301, 303, 304.
Plotinus, 224.
Polycarp, Epistle of, 382.
Porphyry, 176.
Prayer, as a laying hold of divine energy, 346; orthodox or Church view of, 347; subjective view of, 348; for spiritual blessings, 351 ff.; for divine support and comfort, 359 ff.
Prayer and the Atonement, 342 ff.
Procopius, De Bello Gothico, 163.
Propitiation, meaning of, 31, 34; Westcott's view of, 32; Dr. C. Hodge's, 412; Shedd's, 417.
Protestant doctrine of salvation, 339.
Punishment of sin, 14, 15, 16, 56; and forgiveness of sin, 263.

Quenstedt, 26.

Ramsay, Roman Antiquities, 156, 174, 187, 193, 203.
Ransom, Christ's death as, 10, 405 ff.
Reconciliation of God and man, 43, 66, 91.
Redeemer, the inner and the outer, 332.
Redepenning, Origen, 301.
Reinhard, Dogmatik, 278.
Rejection of Christ, 339.
Relations of man to God, 111 ff.; general considerations as to, 111; controllable and uncontrollable, 112 ff.; personal and official, 123, 287; normal and abnormal, *de jure* and *de facto*, 112, 119, 147; bodily, 119; intellectual, 120; affectional, 122; considered as relations of an organism to its environment, 343 ff.; corporate or organic relations, 107, 130 ff.; re-establishment and rectification of, 92, 284.
Relation to Christ, man's consciousness of his, 329.
Religion, as defined by Schleiermacher, 128; its seat in the heart, 123.
Remission of sin, *see* Forgiveness.
Representative, Christ as our, 7, 36, 336, 337.
Representatives, action through, 134 ff.
Resentment, altruistic, 243; moral, 243. *See* also Anger.
Reverence towards God, 124, 126.
Righteousness, eternal law of, 13 ff.; imputed, 341.
Ritschl, A., 61.
Robert Elsmere, 418.
Robertson, F. W., 7, 361; theory of Atonement, 59 ff.; Sermons, 60.
Roman Catholic idea of the Church, 100.

Sacrifice, as offered by God to Himself, 360.
Sacrifice of Christ, 35; views taken of, by Magee, 59; Robertson, 60; Edward White, 42.
Sacrifices, national, 430; origin of, in Israel, 150–152; in heathen world, 152; classification of, 154 ff.; as practised amongst Albanians, 179; Arabs, 164; Babylonians, 175; Carthaginians, 174; Celts, 176; Chinese, 186, 192, 201; Danes, 186; Egyptians, 173, 179, 185; Floridans, 205; Franks, 163; Germans, 186, 193; Greeks, 163, 164, 169, 173, 187, 193, 202; Hindoos, 179, 185, 193, 201, 432; Lapps, 186, 193; Lycians, 174; Mexicans, 190, 194, 201, 430; Nicaraguans, 194; North Americans, 203; Persians, 175, 179, 185, 202; Peruvians, 201; Phœnicians, 174, 175; Romans, 155, 163, 169, 170, 173, 176, 187, 193, 203; Scythians, 164; Swedes, 186; Suevi, 177; Teutons, 176, 180; Thracians, 164; Virginians, 204. *See* also Sin-Offerings.
Salvation, 90; Protestant doctrine of, 339.
Sartorius, 38.
Satisfaction, 21, 23, 30, 56; Dr. C. Hodge on, 412.
Saviour of both individuals and the race, Christ as, 109.
Schafferi, 177.
Schelling, 63, 98.
Schleiermacher's definition of religion, 128; theory of Atonement, 61; Glaubenslehre, 62.
Schneider, Die luther. Lehre u. Opfertode Christi, 157, 190; Christliche Klänge, 347.
Schöberlein, Grundlehren des Heils, 38, 233, 361.
Schwalb, Das Altindische Thieropfer, 162, 432.
Schweizer, Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche, 277.
Scotus Erigena, 390.
Seneca, 368.
Servant of the Lord, 298.
Seth and Haldane, Essays on Philosophical Criticism, 110.
Shakespeare, 137.
Shedd, 11; Dogmatic Theology, 418; History of Christian Doctrine, 23.

Simcox, Edith, Natural Law, 113.
Sin, real essence of, 329 ff.; the unpardonable, 330: Anselm's view of, 55; Robertson's, 59; relation of, to incarnation, 303.
Sin-offerings, 147 ff., 158 ff.; material of, 159; spotless character of, 172; rites and ceremonies observed in presenting them, 178 ff.; idea of substitution in, 183; idea of consecration, 183; slaying of victim, 184 ff.; blood-sprinkling, 191 ff., 432; burning of victim, 200, 432; imposition of hands, 178 ff. Function of sin-offerings, as atoning, 209, 213, 431; as a symbolical atonement, 213; as sacramental types, 213. *See* Sacrifices.
Slaughter of victims in sacrifice, 184, 429; meaning of, 187.
Smith, Dictionaries, 153.
Smith, Pye, 52, 113, 228; discourses, 228; The Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ, 279.
Smyth, Dr. Newman, 38; reality of Faith, 39.
Solidarity of universe, 113; of human race. *See* Organic Unity.
Son of God, meaning of title, 1.
Son of man, 305.
Spencer, Herbert, Sociology, 110, 423.
Spiritual body, the, 80.
Stahl, 52.
Strachey, Jewish History, 102.
Substitute, 7.
Suetonius, 176, 366.
Suffering, Origin of, 357.
Sufferings of Christ, 305 ff.; nature of, 6, 7; Schleiermacher's view of, 61. *See* also Passion of Christ, Death of Christ, and Crucifixion of Christ.
Sylloge Confessionum, 272, 274.
Sympathy of Christ, 311.

Tacitus, 176, 177, 366, 368.
Talmud, conception of the law in, 16; on objective efficacy of sacrifices, 431.
Taylor, Isaac, Physical Theory of Future Life, 80.
Taylor, Dr. N., 52.
Tennyson, Enoch Arden, 354; In Memoriam, 259; Locksley Hall, 104; St. Simeon Stylites, 310.
Tertullian, Apologia, 367; De Cultu Fœm., 385; De Fuga, 385; Adv. Jud., 385; Against Marcion, 220 ff., 385; on Modesty, 269, 385; Ad Nationes, 367; on Repentance, 267.
Theodoret, 390.
Theology as affected by the spiritual life, 288 ff.
Theophanies, Old Testament, 298.
Theories of Atonement, acceptilation, 20, 22; Catholic or churchly, 8, 16; Crypto-dualistic, 9 ff.; Governmental, 16, 17, 42, 45 ff., 289 ff., 417; Governmental, New England, 27; Juridical, 30, 55; Moral, 6, 7, 8, 17, 43, 109; Objective, 6, 8; Objectivo-dualistic, 9 ff.; Organic or Dynamic, 54; Personal or Godward, 16, 27 ff.; Philosophical, 62.
Also as held by Anselm, 55; Barnes, 49; Campbell, M'Leod, 38; Crawford, 19; Dale, 12 ff.; Dorner, 37; Gess, 36 ff.; Gilbert, 51, 417; Hodge, A. A., 409 ff.; Hodge, Dr. C., with Criticism of, 409 ff.; Magee, Bishop, 58; Maurice, 34; Robertson, 59; Schleiermacher, 61; Smyth, Newman, 38; Turrettine, 17, 18; Wace, 46 ff.; White, Edward, 40, 43; Young, 44.
Tholuck, Heidenthum, 299.
Thomasius, 38.
Thomson, Archbishop, Atonement, 177, 194.
Toldoth Jeshu, or Jewish History of Jesus, 374.
Tree, organic unity of race compared to, 106.
Trust in God, 124, 126 ff.
Tübingen, view of Epistles of Peter and John, 377.
Turrettine, 7, 17, 18, 22, 26, 227, 277; his theory of the Atonement, 17 ff.; De Satisfactionis Christi Necessitate, 18, 227; Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ, 18, 278; De Justificatione, 278.

Unchangeableness of God. *See* Immutability; also Dorner.
Uncontrollable relations, 112, 114 ff.
Unity of God, 100.
Universe, the, in its totality as the kingdom of God, 75; evolution of, 113; solidarity of, 113.
Ursinus, 276.

Vicarious element in Christ's work, 331, 356; in God's answering of our prayers, 360; Dr. C. Hodge on, 412.
Vicarious work of Christ, peculiar character of, 336.
Virgil, Æneid, 120, 203, 421, 430; Georgics, 170.

Wace, The Gospel and its Witnesses, 49; theory of Atonement, 46.
Wardlaw, Ralph, 52, 229.

Weber, Zorn Gottes, 209, 210, 223, 227, 231, 252, 255; System der Altsynagogalen Theologie, or des Talmud, 16, 219.
Wessel, 391.
Westcott, Commentary on the Epistles of St. John, 29, 32.
White, Edward, theory of the Atonement, 40–43; Life in Christ, 40, 41.
Wilkinson, 173.
Wolf, F. A., 206.
Word, the. *See* Logos.
Wordsworth, Ode on the Intimations of Immortality, 334.
Worship, as expressive of man's corporate relations to God, 132; more particular in ancient Israel, 142 ff.
Wullen, Life and Teaching of Jacob Böhme, 233.
Wuttke, Geschichte d. Heidenthums, 190, 194, 201, 202.
Wyclif, 391.

XENOPHANES, 258.

YOUNG, Dr., 7, 44, 282; Atonement, 279, 280; Life and Light of Men, 44, 45; theory of Atonement, 44.

ZWINGLI, 288.

MORRISON AND GIBB, EDINBURGH,
PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

PUBLICATIONS OF

T. & T. CLARK,

38 GEORGE STREET, EDINBURGH.

LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO.

Adam (J., D.D.)—An Exposition of the Epistle of James. 8vo, 9s.

Ahlfeld (Dr.), etc.—The Voice from the Cross: Sermons on our Lord's Passion by Eminent Living Preachers of Germany. Cr. 8vo, price 5s.

Alexander (Prof. W. Lindsay)—System of Biblical Theology. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Alexander (Dr. J. A.)—Commentary on Isaiah. Two vols. 8vo, 17s.

Ante-Nicene Christian Library—A Collection of all the Works of the Fathers of the Christian Church prior to the Council of Nicæa. Twenty-four vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £6, 6s.

Augustine's Works—Edited by Marcus Dods, D.D. Fifteen vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £3, 19s.

Bannerman (Prof.)—The Church of Christ. Two vols. 8vo, 21s

Bannerman (Rev. D. D.)—The Doctrine of the Church. 8vo, 12s.

Baumgarten (Professor)—Apostolic History. Three vols. 8vo, 27s.

Beck (Dr.)—Outlines of Biblical Psychology. Crown 8vo, 4s.

——— Pastoral Theology in the New Testament. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Bengel—Gnomon of the New Testament. With Original Notes, Explanatory and Illustrative. Five vols. 8vo, Subscription price, 31s. 6d. *Cheaper Edition, the five volumes bound in three*, 24s.

Besser's Christ the Life of the World. Price 6s.

Bible-Class Handbooks. Crown 8vo.

Binnie (Prof.)—The Church, 1s. 6d.
Brown (Principal)—The Epistle to the Romans, 2s.
Candlish (Prof.)—The Christian Sacraments, 1s. 6d.
——— The Work of the Holy Spirit, 1s. 6d.
——— Christian Doctrine of God. 1s. 6d.
Davidson (Prof.)—The Epistle to the Hebrews, 2s. 6d.
Dods (Marcus, D.D.)—Post-Exilian Prophets, 2s. Book of Genesis, 2s.
Douglas (Principal)—Book of Joshua, 1s. 6d. Book of Judges, 1s. 3d.
Hamilton (T., D.D.)—Irish Presbyterian Church History, 2s.
Henderson (Archibald, M.A.)—Palestine, with Maps. *The maps are by Captain Conder, R.E., of the Palestine Exploration Fund.* Price 2s. 6d.
Kilpatrick (T. B., B.D.)—Butler's Three Sermons on Human Nature. 1s. 6d.
Lindsay (Prof.)—St. Mark's Gospel, 2s. 6d.
——— St. Luke's Gospel, Part I., 2s.; Part II., 1s. 3d.
——— The Reformation, 2s.
——— The Acts of the Apostles, Two vols., 1s. 6d. each.
Macgregor (Prof.)—The Epistle to the Galatians, 1s. 6d.
——— Book of Exodus, Two vols., 2s. each.
Macpherson (John, M.A.)—Presbyterianism, 1s. 6d.
——— The Westminster Confession of Faith, 2s.
——— The Sum of Saving Knowledge, 1s. 6d.
Murphy (Prof.)—The Books of Chronicles, 1s. 6d.
Scrymgeour (Wm.)—Lessons on the Life of Christ, 2s. 6d.
Stalker (James, M.A.)—Life of Christ, 1s. 6d. Life of St. Paul, 1s. 6d.
Smith (George, LL.D.)—A Short History of Missions, 2s. 6d.
Thomson (W. D., M.A.)—Christian Miracles and Conclusions of Science. 2s.
Walker (Norman L., M.A.)—Scottish Church History, 1s. 6d.
Whyte (Alexander, D.D.)—The Shorter Catechism, 2s. 6d.

Bible-Class Primers. Paper covers, 6d. each; free by post, 7d. In cloth, 8d. each; free by post, 9d.

Croskery (Prof.)—Joshua and the Conquest. Given (Prof.)—The Kings of Judah.
Gloag (Paton J., D.D.)—Life of Paul. Iverach (James, M.A.)—Life of Moses.
Paterson (Prof. J. A.)—Period of the Judges.

Bible-Class Primers—*continued.*

ROBSON (JOHN, D.D.)—Outlines of Protestant Missions.
SALMOND (Prof.)—Life of Peter. The Shorter Catechism, 3 Parts. Life of Christ.
SKINNER (J., M.A.)—Historical Connection between Old and New Testaments.
SMITH (H. W., D.D.)—Outlines of Early Church History.
THOMSON (P., M.A.)—Life of David. WALKER (W., M.A.)—The Kings of Israel.
WINTERBOTHAM (RAYNER, M.A.)—Life and Reign of Solomon.
WITHEROW (Prof.)—The History of the Reformation.

Blaikie (Prof. W. G.)—THE PREACHERS OF SCOTLAND FROM THE 6TH TO THE 19TH CENTURY. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Bleek's INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Bowman (T., M.A.)—EASY AND COMPLETE HEBREW COURSE. 8vo. Part I., 7s. 6d.; Part II., 10s. 6d.

Briggs (Prof.)—BIBLICAL STUDY: Its Principles, Methods, and History. Second Edition, post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— AMERICAN PRESBYTERIANISM. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— MESSIANIC PROPHECY. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Brown (David, D.D.)—CHRIST'S SECOND COMING: Will it be Pre-Millennial? Seventh Edition, crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Bruce (A. B., D.D.)—THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE; exhibiting the Twelve Disciples under Discipline for the Apostleship. 3rd Ed., 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST, in its Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Buchanan (Professor)—THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— ON COMFORT IN AFFLICTION. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

——— ON IMPROVEMENT OF AFFLICTION. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

Bungener (Felix)—ROME AND THE COUNCIL IN 19TH CENTURY. Cr. 8vo, 5s.

Calvin's INSTITUTES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION. (Translation.) 2 vols. 8vo, 14s.

Calvini Institutio Christianæ Religionis. Curavit A. THOLUCK. Two vols. 8vo, Subscription price, 14s.

Candlish (Prof. J. S., D.D.)—THE KINGDOM OF GOD, BIBLICALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Caspari (C. E.)—A CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF CHRIST. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Caspers (A.)—THE FOOTSTEPS OF CHRIST. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Cassel (Prof.)—COMMENTARY ON ESTHER. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Cave (Prof.)—THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF SACRIFICE. 8vo, 12s.

——— AN INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY: Its Principles, its Branches, its Results, and its Literature. 8vo, 12s.

Christlieb (Dr.)—MODERN DOUBT AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF. Apologetic Lectures addressed to Earnest Seekers after Truth. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Cotterill—PEREGRINUS PROTEUS: Clement to the Corinthians, etc. 8vo, 12s.

——— MODERN CRITICISM: Clement's Epistles to Virgins, etc. 8vo, 5s.

Cremer (Professor)—BIBLICO-THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. Third Edition, with Supplement, demy 4to, 38s. SUPPLEMENT, separately, 14s.

Crippen (Rev. T. G.)—A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. 8vo, 9s.

Cunningham (Principal)—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY. Review of the Principal Doctrinal Discussions since the Apostolic Age. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— DISCUSSIONS ON CHURCH PRINCIPLES. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Curtiss (Dr. S. I.)—THE LEVITICAL PRIESTS. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Dabney (R. L., D.D.)—THE SENSUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSIDERED. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Davidson (Professor)—AN INTRODUCTORY HEBREW GRAMMAR. With Progressive Exercises in Reading and Writing. Ninth Edition, 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Delitzsch (Prof.)—A System of Biblical Psychology. 8vo, 12s.
——— New Commentary on Genesis. Two Vols., 8vo. Vol. I.
——— Commentary on Job. Two vols. 8vo, 21s. [now ready, 10s. 6d.
——— Commentary on Psalms. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
——— On the Proverbs of Solomon. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Old Testament History of Redemption. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.
——— Commentary on Isaiah. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On the Epistle to the Hebrews. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
Doedes—Manual of New Testament Hermeneutics. Cr. 8vo, 3s.
Döllinger (Dr.)—Hippolytus and Callistus; or, The Roman Church in the First Half of the Third Century. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Dorner (Professor)—History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Five vols. 8vo, £2, 12s. 6d.
——— System of Christian Doctrine. Four vols. 8vo, £2, 2s.
——— System of Christian Ethics. 8vo, 14s.
Eadie (Professor)—Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians. New and Revised Editions, Edited by Rev. Wm. Young, M.A. Three vols. 8vo, 10s. 6d. each; *or set*, 18s. *nett.*
Ebrard (Dr. J. H. A.)—The Gospel History. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Commentary on the Epistles of St. John. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Apologetics. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
Elliott—On the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. 8vo, 6s.
Ernesti—Biblical Interpretation of New Testament. Two vols., 8s.
Ewald (Heinrich)—Syntax of the Hebrew Language of the Old Testament. 8vo, 8s. 6d.
——— Revelation: Its Nature and Record. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Old and New Testament Theology. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Fairbairn (Principal)—Typology of Scripture, viewed in connection with the series of Divine Dispensations. Sixth Edition, Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— The Revelation of Law in Scripture, 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Ezekiel and the Book of his Prophecy. 4th Ed., 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Prophecy Viewed in its Distinctive Nature, its Special Functions, and Proper Interpretations. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— New Testament Hermeneutical Manual. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— The Pastoral Epistles. The Greek Text and Translation. With Introduction, Expository Notes, and Dissertations. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Forbes (Prof.)—Symmetrical Structure of Scripture. 8vo, 8s. 6d.
——— Analytical Commentary on the Romans. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Studies in the Book of Psalms. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Frank (Prof. F. H.)—System of Christian Evidence. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Gebhardt (H.)—The Doctrine of the Apocalypse, and its Relation to the Doctrine of the Gospel and Epistles of John. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Gerlach—Commentary on the Pentateuch. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Gieseler (Dr. J. C. L.)—Ecclesiastical History. Four vols. 8vo, £2, 2s.
Gifford (Canon)—Voices of the Prophets. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
Given (Rev. Prof. J. J.)—The Truths of Scripture in connection with Revelation, Inspiration, and the Canon. 8vo, 6s.
Glasgow (Prof.)—Apocalypse Translated and Expounded. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Gloag (Paton J., D.D.)—A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— The Messianic Prophecies. Crown 8vo, price 7s. 6d.
——— Introduction to the Pauline Epistles. 8vo, 12s.

Gloag (P. J., D.D.)—INTRODUCTION TO THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— EXEGETICAL STUDIES. Crown 8vo, 5s.
Godet (Prof.)—COMMENTARY ON ST. LUKE'S GOSPEL. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— COMMENTARY ON ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— COMMENTARY ON 1ST EPISTLE TO CORINTHIANS. 2 vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— LECTURES IN DEFENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. Cr. 8vo, 6s.
Goebel (Siegfried)—THE PARABLES OF JESUS. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Gotthold's Emblems; or, INVISIBLE THINGS UNDERSTOOD BY THINGS THAT ARE MADE. Crown 8vo, 5s.
Grimm's GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Translated, Revised, and Enlarged by JOSEPH H. THAYER, D.D. Demy 4to, 36s.
Guyot (Arnold, LL.D.)—CREATION; or, The Biblical Cosmogony in the Light of Modern Science. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5s. 6d.
Hagenbach (Dr. K. R.)—HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
——— HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
Hall (Rev. Newman, LL.B.)—THE LORD'S PRAYER. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Hamilton (T., D.D.)—BEYOND THE STARS; or, Heaven, its Inhabitants, Occupations, and Life. Crown 8vo. (*New Edition in Preparation.*)
Harless (Dr. C. A.)—SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Harris (Rev. S., D.D.)—THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THEISM. 8vo, 12s.
———THE SELF-REVELATION OF GOD. 8vo, 12s.
Haupt (Erich)—THE FIRST EPISTLE OF ST. JOHN. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Hävernick (H. A. Ch.)—INTRODUCTION TO OLD TESTAMENT. 10s. 6d.
Heard (Rev. J. B., M.A.)—THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF MAN—SPIRIT, SOUL, AND BODY. Fifth Edition, crown 8vo, 6s.
——— OLD AND NEW THEOLOGY. A Constructive Critique. Cr. 8vo, 6s.
Hefele (Bishop)—A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH. Vol. I., to A.D. 325; Vol. II., A.D. 326 to 429. Vol. III., A.D. 431 to the close of the Council of Chalcedon, 451. 8vo, 12s. each.
Hengstenberg (Professor)—COMMENTARY ON PSALMS. 3 vols. 8vo, 33s.
——— COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES. Treatises on the Song of Solomon, Job, and on Isaiah, etc. 8vo, 9s.
——— THE PROPHECIES OF EZEKIEL ELUCIDATED. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— THE GENUINENESS OF DANIEL, etc. 8vo, 12s.
——— HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— CHRISTOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Four vols. 8vo, £2, 2s.
——— ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
Herzog—ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF BIBLICAL, HISTORICAL, DOCTRINAL, AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY. *Based on the Real-Encyklopädie of Herzog, Plitt, and Hauck.* Edited by Prof. SCHAFF, D.D. In Three vols., price 24s. each.
——— ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LIVING DIVINES, ETC., OF ALL DENOMINATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA. (*Supplement to Herzog's Encyclopædia.*) Imp. 8vo, 8s.
Hutchison (John, D.D.)—COMMENTARY ON THESSALONIANS. 8vo, 9s.
——— COMMENTARY ON PHILIPPIANS. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Janet (Paul)—FINAL CAUSES. By PAUL JANET, Member of the Institute. Translated from the French. Second Edition, demy 8vo, 12s.
——— THE THEORY OF MORALS. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Johnstone (Prof. R., D.D.)—COMMENTARY ON FIRST PETER. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Jouffroy—PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. Fcap. 8vo, 5s.
Kant—THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. Crown 8vo, 6s.
——— PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. Trans. by W. HASTIE, B.D. Cr. 8vo, 5s.
Keil (Prof.)—COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH. 3 vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.

Keil (Prof.)—COMMENTARY ON JOSHUA, JUDGES, AND RUTH. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON THE BOOKS OF KINGS. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON CHRONICLES. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON EZRA, NEHEMIAH, ESTHER. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON JEREMIAH. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— COMMENTARY ON EZEKIEL. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— COMMENTARY ON DANIEL. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— ON THE BOOKS OF THE MINOR PROPHETS. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— MANUAL OF HISTORICO-CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— HANDBOOK OF BIBLICAL ARCHÆOLOGY. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Keymer (Rev. N., M.A.)—NOTES ON GENESIS. Crown 8vo, 1s. 6d.

Killen (Prof.)—THE OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH; or, The History, Doctrine, Worship, and Polity of the Christians, traced to A.D. 755. 8vo, 9s.
——— THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES ENTIRELY SPURIOUS. Cr. 8vo, 2s. 6d.

König (Dr. F. E.)—THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF ISRAEL. A Discussion of the Chief Problems in Old Testament History as opposed to the Development Theorists. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Krummacher (Dr. F. W.)—THE SUFFERING SAVIOUR; or, Meditations on the Last Days of the Sufferings of Christ. Eighth Edition, crown 8vo, 6s.
——— DAVID, THE KING OF ISRAEL: A Portrait drawn from Bible History and the Book of Psalms. Second Edition, crown 8vo, 6s.
——— AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Kurtz (Prof.)—HANDBOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY. Two vols. 8vo, 15s.
——— HISTORY OF THE OLD COVENANT. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.

Ladd (Prof. G. T.)—THE DOCTRINE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE: A Critical, Historical, and Dogmatic Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testaments. Two vols. 8vo, 1600 pp., 24s.

Laidlaw (Prof.)—THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF MAN. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Lange (J. P., D.D.)—THE LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. Edited, with additional Notes, by MARCUS DODS, D.D. Second Edition, in Four vols. 8vo, Subscription price 28s.
——— COMMENTARIES ON THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. OLD TESTAMENT, 14 vols.; NEW TESTAMENT, 10 vols.; APOCRYPHA, 1 vol. Subscription price, nett, 15s. each.
——— ON ST. MATTHEW AND ST. MARK. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
——— ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. LUKE. Two vols. 8vo, 18s.
——— ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Lechler (Prof. G. V., D.D.)—THE APOSTOLIC AND POST-APOSTOLIC TIMES. Their Diversity and Unity in Life and Doctrine. 2 vols. cr. 8vo, 16s.

Lehmann (Pastor)—SCENES FROM THE LIFE OF JESUS. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Lewis (Tayler, LL.D.)—THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION. Cr. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Lichtenberger (F, D.D.)—HISTORY OF GERMAN THEOLOGY IN 19TH CENTURY. 8vo, 14s.

Lisco (F. G.)—PARABLES OF JESUS EXPLAINED. Fcap. 8vo, 5s.

Lotze (Hermann)—MICROCOSMUS: An Essay concerning Man and his relation to the World. Second Edition, two vols. 8vo (1450 pages), 36s.

Luthardt, Kahnis, and Brückner—THE CHURCH. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Luthardt (Prof.)—ST. JOHN THE AUTHOR OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. 7s. 6d.
——— ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL DESCRIBED AND EXPLAINED ACCORDING TO ITS PECULIAR CHARACTER. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.
——— APOLOGETIC LECTURES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL (*Sixth Edition*), SAVING (*Fifth Edition*), MORAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY (*Third Edition*). Three vols. crown 8vo, 6s. each.

Macdonald—Introduction to Pentateuch. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— The Creation and Fall. 8vo, 12s.
M'Lauchlan (T., D.D., LL.D.)—The Early Scottish Church. To the Middle of the Twelfth Century. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Mair (A., D.D.)—Studies in the Christian Evidences. Cr. 8vo, 6s.
Martensen (Bishop)—Christian Dogmatics: A Compendium of the Doctrines of Christianity. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Christian Ethics. (General Ethics.) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Christian Ethics. (Individual Ethics.) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Christian Ethics. (Social Ethics.) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Matheson (Geo., D.D.)—Growth of the Spirit of Christianity, from the First Century to the Dawn of the Lutheran Era. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— Aids to the Study of German Theology. 3rd Edition, 4s. 6d.
Meyer (Dr.)—Critical and Exegetical Commentary on St. Matthew's Gospel. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On Mark and Luke. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On St. John's Gospel. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On Acts of the Apostles. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On the Epistle to the Romans. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On Corinthians. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
——— On Galatians. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— On Ephesians and Philemon. One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— On Philippians and Colossians. One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— On Thessalonians. (*Dr. Lünemann.*) One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— The Pastoral Epistles. (*Dr. Huther.*) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— The Epistle to the Hebrews. (*Dr. Lünemann.*) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— St. James' and St. John's Epistles. (*Huther.*) 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— Peter and Jude. (*Dr. Huther.*) One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Michie (Charles, M.A.)—Bible Words and Phrases. 18mo, 1s.
Monrad (Dr. D. G.)—The World of Prayer. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.
Morgan (J., D.D.)—Scripture Testimony to the Holy Spirit. 7s. 6d.
——— Exposition of the First Epistle of John. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Müller (Dr. Julius)—The Christian Doctrine of Sin. An entirely New Translation from the Fifth German Edition. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
Murphy (Professor)—Commentary on the Psalms. 8vo, 12s.
——— A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Exodus. 9s.
Naville (Ernest)—The Problem of Evil. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.
——— The Christ. Translated by Rev. T. J. Després. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.
——— Modern Physics: Studies Historical and Philosophical. Translated by Rev. Henry Downton, M.A. Crown 8vo, 5s.
Nicoll (W. R., M.A.)—The Incarnate Saviour: A Life of Jesus Christ. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Neander (Dr.)—General History of the Christian Religion and Church. Nine vols. 8vo, £3, 7s. 6d.
Novalis—Hymns and Thoughts on Religion. Crown 8vo, 4s.
Oehler (Prof.)—Theology of the Old Testament. 2 vols. 8vo, 21s.
Oosterzee (Dr. Van)—The Year of Salvation. Words of Life for Every Day. A Book of Household Devotion. Two vols. 8vo, 6s. each.
——— Moses: A Biblical Study. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Olshausen (Dr. H.)—Biblical Commentary on the Gospels and Acts. Four vols. 8vo, £2, 2s. *Cheaper Edition*, four vols. crown 8vo, 24s.
——— Romans. One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Olshausen (Dr. H.)—CORINTHIANS. One vol. 8vo, 9s.

——— PHILIPPIANS, TITUS, AND FIRST TIMOTHY. One vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Orelli—OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY OF THE CONSUMMATION OF GOD'S KINGDOM. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— COMMENTARY ON ISAIAH. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Owen (Dr. John)—WORKS. *Best and only Complete Edition.* Edited by Rev. Dr. GOOLD. Twenty-four vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £4, 4s. The '*Hebrews*' may be had separately, in Seven vols., £2, 2s. nett.

Philippi (F. A.)—COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. From the Third Improved Edition, by Rev. Professor BANKS. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Piper—LIVES OF LEADERS OF CHURCH UNIVERSAL. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Popular Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. With Illustrations and Maps. Vol. I.—THE SYNOPTICAL GOSPELS. Vol. II.—ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL, AND THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. Vol. III.—ROMANS TO PHILEMON. Vol. IV.—HEBREWS TO REVELATION. In Four vols. imperial 8vo, 12s. 6d. each.

Pressensé (Edward de)—THE REDEEMER: Discourses. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Pünjer (Bernhard)—HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT. 8vo, 16s.

Rabiger (Prof.)—ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THEOLOGY. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Rainy (Principal) — DELIVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. (*The Fifth Series of the Cunningham Lectures.*) 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Reusch (Prof.)—NATURE AND THE BIBLE: Lectures on the Mosaic History of Creation in Relation to Natural Science. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Reuss (Professor)—HISTORY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 640 pp. 8vo, 15s.

Ritter (Carl)—THE COMPARATIVE GEOGRAPHY OF PALESTINE AND THE SINAITIC PENINSULA. Four vols. 8vo, 26s.

Robinson (Rev. S., D.D.)—DISCOURSES ON REDEMPTION. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Robinson (Edward, D.D.)—GREEK AND ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 8vo, 9s.

Rothe (Prof.)—SERMONS FOR THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Saisset—MANUAL OF MODERN PANTHEISM. Two vols. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Sartorius (Dr. E.)—DOCTRINE OF DIVINE LOVE. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Schaff (Professor)—HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. (New Edition, thoroughly Revised and Enlarged.)

——— APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 1–100. 2 vols. Ex. 8vo, 21s.

——— ANTE-NICENE CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 100–325. 2 vols. Ex. 8vo, 21s.

——— POST-NICENE CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 325–600. 2 vols. Ex. 8vo, 21s.

——— MEDIÆVAL CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 590–1073. 2 vols. Ex. 8vo, 21s. (*Completion of this Period*, 1073–1517, *in preparation.*)

——— MODERN CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 1517–1530. 2 vols. Ex. 8vo, 21s.

——— THE TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES. The Didachè and Kindred Documents in the Original. Second Edition, ex. 8vo, 9s.

Schmid's BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Schürer (Prof.)—HISTORY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT TIMES. Div. II. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.

Scott (Jas., M.A., D.D.)—PRINCIPLES OF NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION ESTABLISHED AND APPLIED TO BIBLICAL CRITICISM. Cr. 8vo, 2nd Edit., 4s.

Shedd—HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— SERMONS TO THE NATURAL MAN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— SERMONS TO THE SPIRITUAL MAN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. Two vols. Ex. 8vo, 25s.

Simon (Rev. Prof. D. W.)—THE BIBLE; An Outgrowth of Theocratic Life. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Simon (Rev. Prof. D. W.)—The Redemption of Man. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Smeaton (Professor)—The Doctrine of the Atonement as Taught by Christ Himself. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— On the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 8vo, 9s.

Smith (Professor Thos., D.D.)—Mediæval Missions. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Stalker (Rev. Jas., M.A.)—The Life of Jesus Christ. New Edition, in larger Type. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

——— Life of St. Paul. Large Type Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Stanton (V. H., M.A.)—The Jewish and The Christian Messiah. A Study in the Earliest History of Christianity. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Steinmeyer (Dr. F. L.)—The Miracles of Our Lord: Examined in their relation to Modern Criticism. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— The History of the Passion and Resurrection of our Lord, considered in the Light of Modern Criticism. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Stevenson (Mrs.)—The Symbolic Parables: The Predictions of the Apocalypse in relation to the General Truths of Scripture. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Steward (Rev. G.)—Mediatorial Sovereignty: The Mystery of Christ and the Revelation of the Old and New Testaments. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— The Argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Stier (Dr. Rudolph)—On the Words of the Lord Jesus. Eight vols. 8vo, Subscription price of £2, 2s. Separate volumes, price 10s. 6d.

——— The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary on the Epistle of St. James. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— The Words of the Apostles Expounded. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Tholuck (Prof.)—The Epistle to the Romans. Two vols. fcap. 8vo, 8s.

——— Light from the Cross. Third Edition, crown 8vo, 5s.

Tophel (Pastor G.)—The Work of the Holy Spirit. Cr. 8vo, 2s. 6d.

Uhlhorn (G.)—Christian Charity in the Ancient Church. Cr. 8vo, 6s.

Ullmann (Dr. Carl)—Reformers before the Reformation, principally in Germany and the Netherlands. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— The Sinlessness of Jesus: An Evidence for Christianity. Fourth Edition, crown 8vo, 6s.

Urwick (W., M.A.)—The Servant of Jehovah: A Commentary upon Isaiah lii. 13–liii. 12; with Dissertations upon Isaiah xl.–lxvi. 8vo, 6s.

Vinet (Professor)—Studies on Blaise Pascal. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Walker (J., D.D.)—Theology and Theologians of Scotland. New Edition, crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Watts (Professor)—The Newer Criticism and the Analogy of the Faith. Third Edition, crown 8vo, 5s.

——— The Reign of Causality: A Vindication of the Scientific Principle of Telic Causal Efficiency. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Weiss (Prof.)—Biblical Theology of New Testament. 2 vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— Life of Christ. Three vols. 8vo, 31s. 6d.

White (Rev. M.)—Symbolical Numbers of Scripture. Cr. 8vo, 4s.

Williams—Select Vocabulary of Latin Etymology. Fcap. 8vo, 1s. 6d.

Winer (Dr. G. B.)—A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek, regarded as the Basis of New Testament Exegesis. Third Edition, edited by W. F. Moulton, D.D. Ninth English Edition, 8vo, 15s.

——— The Doctrines and Confessions of Christendom. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Witherow (Prof. T., D.D.)—The Form of the Christian Temple. 8vo, 10/6.

Workman (Prof. G. C.)—The Text of Jeremiah; or, A Critical Investigation of the Greek and Hebrew with the Variations in the LXX Retranslated into the Original, and Explained. Post 8vo, 9s.

Wright (C. H., D.D.)—Biblical Essays. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Wuttke (Professor)—Christian Ethics. Two vols. 8vo, 12s. 6d.

Emmanuel Library
Emmanuel School of Religion
Route 6

EMMANUEL SCHOOL OF RELIGION LIBRARY
3 0173 1010 889 5